252
MICHAEL J. LABBEE
pays for living in an organized society.
89
We can, once again, illustrate the application of this requirement by
adapting the facts of
Champion
. If Mrs. Champion had not died, but in-
stead had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and severe
depression as a result of witnessing her daughter’s death, she would have
satisfied this requirement, because both these illnesses are medically rec-
ognized and diagnosable psychological injuries
.
90
But if Mrs. Champion
had merely claimed a general emotional distress, without any medical sup-
port for her claim, she would not have been eligible for compensation. This
kind of claim would fall within the same “spiritually intangible” concerns
originally noted in
International
.
91
(iii) Secondary Victims and Economic Losses
The final limiting factor should apply only to secondary, and not to primary,
victims. It is that only the actual economic losses resulting from the en-
dured psychological injury should be compensable. If Mrs. Champion had
survived, she could then potentially have been awarded the costs of her
past and future visits to a therapist to deal with her PTSD, the costs of any
medications which have been prescribed to her as a result of the incident,
and any lost wages she might have suffered from missing work as a result
of her severe emotional trauma. But she would not be entitled to a sum
simply for pain and suffering.
A significant concern underlying current adherence to the impact rule is
89
Champion v. Gray
,
(citing
Stewart v. Gilliam
,
(Reed, J. dissenting).
90 See American Psychiatric Association,
.
91
International Ocean Telegraph Co. v. Saunders
,
.
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