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     Title:
          Cultural Contributions to Explaining Institutional Form, Political Change, and Rational Decisions.
 Subject(s):
          COMPARATIVE government; CULTURE
   Source:
          Comparative Political Studies, Oct99, Vol. 32 Issue 7, p862, 32p, 1 diagram
 Author(s):
          Lockhart, Charles
  Abstract:
          Relying on culture as an important explanatory variable is regarded with skepticism by many contemporary
          political scientists. Yet, doubts about culture's usefulness rest in large part on false perceptions of various sorts.
          These misunderstandings relegate an important explanatory variable to the social science scrap heap.
          Accordingly, the author engages in three tasks. First, selected prominent arguments for culture's lack of
          explanatory usefulness are discussed. Second, it is demonstrated how at least one conceptualization of culture,
          Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky's grid-group theory, overcomes aspects of these difficulties and contributes
          to explaining institutional form and political change. Third, it is argued that grid-group theory contributes
          significantly to both institutional analysis and rational choice theory. Grid-group theory augments each of these
          latter two approaches and, more important, reveals complementary aspects, linking these modes of analysis
          together as mutually supportive elements of a more inclusive explanatory scheme. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
      AN:
          2301872
    ISSN:
          0010-4140
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Political Studies, October 1999

 CULTURAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL FORM,
             POLITICAL CHANGE, AND RATIONAL DECISIONS

Relying on culture as an important explanatory variable is regarded with skepticism by many contemporary political scientists.
Yet, doubts about culture's usefulness rest in large part on false perceptions of various sorts. These misunderstandings relegate
an important explanatory variable to the social science scrap heap. Accordingly, the author engages in three tasks. First, selected
prominent arguments for culture's lack of explanatory usefulness are discussed. Second, it is demonstrated how at least one
conceptualization of culture, Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky's grid-group theory, overcomes aspects of these difficulties
and contributes to explaining institutional form and political change. Third, it is argued that grid-group theory contributes
significantly to both institutional analysis and rational choice theory. Grid-group theory augments each of these latter two
approaches and, more important, reveals complementary aspects, linking these modes of analysis together as mutually
supportive elements of a more inclusive explanatory scheme.

Numerous cultural approaches contend in comparative politics; political science generally; and related fields such as
anthropology, sociology, and social psychology.(n1) Furthermore, cultural approaches have attracted a range of criticism. In
this article I defer to the fine work of others with respect to surveys of cultural approaches and some ranges of criticism
(Dittmer, 1977; Lane, 1992; Ross, 1997). My own criticism is focused on matters of particular relevance to my positive agenda:
showing how one version of political culture theory, grid-group theory (Douglas, 1982a; Thompson, Ellis, & Wildavsky, 1990),
helps to explain institutional form and political change and fosters complementary linkages between political culture theory,
institutional analysis, and rational choice theory in comparative politics.

                        THE CASE AGAINST CULTURAL EXPLANATIONS

Three criticisms hold particular relevance for this agenda. In the narrowest, scholars argue with features of the "first wave" of
postwar American political culture studies (Almond, 1956; Almond & Coleman, 1960; Almond & Powell, 1966; Almond &
Verba, 1963; Pye & Verba, 1965). These studies promoted an "allegiant participant" ideal that the United States resembled
more closely than other societies (Lijphart, 1984). Furthermore, the functionalist orientation that these studies adopted toward
political development had a system-preserving bias (LaPalombara, 1987).

Two broader and deeper deficiencies have been attributed to theories of political culture generally. First, many scholars regard
institutional form as fundamental. Institutionalists are skeptical of causal linkages between culture and its alleged consequences
(Orloff & Skocpol, 1984) and origins (Hall, 1986, p. 34) because for them human activity inevitably fits the procedures of the
institutions that fill persons' lives. Persons are less creatures of choice than of habit and duty, honoring the obligations of their
institutional niches (March & Olsen, 1989). These scholars commonly view culture as insubstantial and residual (Berliner,
1988; Coleman, 1990; Lowi, 1984) and hold that theories of political culture lack promise for developing political science.

Second, scholars often argue that cultural explanations cannot account for political change (Johnson, 1982; Steinmo, 1994).
Rogowski (1974) offers an incisive statement of this position (pp. 3-17). His argument against cultural explanation rests on a
critique of the conception of socialization associated with first-wave studies. This conception of "cumulative socialization" is
concisely detailed by Eckstein (1988), who believes that early learning acts as a "filter" for later learning (pp. 790-791). So
earlier learning becomes deeply rooted and resilient to change. Furthermore, these filters help to construct orientations that fit
various pieces of learning into larger coherent patterns. In this view, culture amounts to established patterns of attending to, and
interpreting, a complex ambiguous world. Such cultures carry inertia that makes rapid adjustment unlikely (Eckstein, 1988, p.
796).

Articulating a theme echoed by others recently (March & Olsen, 1989), Rogowski doubts that early learning is crucial. He
draws on German experience in advocating this view. Extensive support for the Nazi regime in the late 1930s was generally
attributed to authoritarian cultural orientations among Germans. Yet, by the early 1970s, the Federal Republic had acquired a
quarter-century's experience as a democracy with broad popular support. Because he sees no significant intergenerational
differences in this support, Rogowski concludes that cultural explanations of this change run contrary to the first-wave's
emphasis on the importance of early learning and are thus ad hoc. Rogowski's analysis pits culture against rational choice
theory, which portrays persons as adept at adjusting behavior to realize their interests under shifting circumstances.

These two deeper reservations with theories of political culture portray them at odds with widely practiced contemporary forms
of political explanation: institutional analysis and rational choice theory. If these claims were accurate, culture would likely hold
little value for the development of comparative political studies. But it is intuitively unreasonable to think that culture is irrelevant
to institutional development and a theory of instrumental preferences. How do persons know what form their institutions should
take or what values, objectives, and interests their instrumental choices should realize if not through culture? Following Eckstein
(1997), I argue that social science is a science of culture. A new entrant in the field of conceptualizations of culture, grid-group
theory, surmounts many of the limitations associated with previous theories of political culture.(n2)

        SURMOUNTING LIMITATIONS ATTRIBUTED TO THEORIES OF POLITICAL CULTURE

AN INTRODUCTION TO GRID.GROUP THEORY

Grid-group theory was conceived in sociology (Durkheim, 1897/1951), refined in cultural anthropology (Evans-Pritchard,
1940; Douglas, 1978, 1982a, 1982b, 1986, 1992), and recently advanced and applied in political science and related areas
(Coyle & Ellis, 1994; Ellis, 1993; Holling, 1979; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990; Thompson, Ellis, & Wildavsky, 1990). The
theory explains how persons derive a limited range of answers to basic social questions such as: How does the world work?
What are humans really like? To whom am I accountable (Wildavsky, 1994). Grid-group theorists argue that persons' answers
to these questions produce orientations toward two basic social dimensions: legitimacy of external prescription (grid) and
strength of affiliation with others (group).(n3) The theory thus helps to fill a notorious void in the social sciences (Becker, 1976,
p. 133) by explaining how distinctive social-relations preferences are formed as consequences of acquiring various grid and
group positions (Schwartz & Thompson, 1990, p. 49; see below: pp. 870-871). The range of actual social practice is
constrained because only four general ways--each admitting some variations--of responding to these questions are socially
viable.(n4) Preferences for various patterns of social relations prompt supporting justifications or cultural biases and vice versa.
Together, preferences and justifications form distinctive ways of life or cultures (see Figure 1).

For instance, low tolerance for external prescription, reinforced by weak feelings of group membership, produces an
individualistic way of life organized largely by self-regulation among voluntary contract-based networks of persons. Promoting
such a way of life among persons perceived as self-interested, with roughly equal broad competencies such as rationality, is one
purpose of Smith's Wealth of Nations. Increasingly strong feelings of group affiliation together with weak prescription entail a
way of life that grid-group theorists call egalitarian. From this perspective, broadly equal humans, unmarred by natural flaws
destructive of social harmony, prefer to organize into small groups that reach collective decisions through discussions designed
to produce consensus. This process is reminiscent of Rousseau's descriptions of the social ideal in The Social Contract. High
feelings of group affiliation in conjunction with perceptions legitimizing strong external prescription create a realm of hierarchy. In
this view, unequal humans with various social shortcomings that require improvement through institutional guidance are arrayed
in vertical collectives. The ideal polis portrayed by Plato in The Republic illustrates this way of life. Weak feelings of group
affiliation, intersecting with perceptions of external direction, elicit a way of life that grid-group theorists call fatalism. The
unhappy combination of recognizing constraint by others but not feeling part of any broader social collective predisposes fatalists
to social avoidance rather than interaction. As a consequence of avoidance, fatalists rarely write political theory; their views
have, however, been well portrayed by others (Banfield, 1958; Douglas, 1996, pp. 93-94; Mars, 1982, pp. 66-69; Turnbull,
1972).(n5)

Grid-group theorists argue that all four ways of life are present in varying proportions in all societies.(n6) Similarly to the
interaction of different amino acids in biological systems, each way of life provides services for the others that they cannot create
for themselves. Societies thus tend to be "multicultural" in this sense. Sharp differences in the historical contingencies that
societies face contribute importantly to variations in the relative influence of rival cultures among them. It is difficult to imagine, for
instance, the individualism of Hobbes' claim that, when the sovereign's directives nullify the basis for his authority (rescuing one
from the perpetual threat of violent death), one's obligation may be set aside gaining much credence among the encircled
continental Germans. Nearly perpetual rivalries among early German principalities and the later encirclement of Germanic
territory by states harboring security fears and revanchist aspirations virtually assured an influential position for the culture of
hierarchy in German society. Even in the highly individualistic United States, fears for internal order arising from the Great
Depression and external security prompted by the Second World War contributed to greater influence for hierarchy and the
construction of a larger more active American state across the late 1930s and early 1940s.

Individualism is a culture more applicable to societies relatively insulated from severe security concerns. Low-grid cultures were
initially better represented in what became the United States as a consequence of early immigrants fleeing various aspects of
hierarchy (Lipset, 1990). Thereafter, the ready availability of real property afforded greater realization of the practices of the
liberal theorists than was possible in Europe, and all cultures in the American colonies found some mutual accommodation in
variations of representative government and civic virtue. The Revolutionary War further depleted and demoralized the ranks of
hierarchists. Subsequently, the prevailing predispositions of individualists were "crystallized" or institutionalized in a new
Constitution, and relative isolation from other powerful societies helped individualists retain a dominant, although (as I discuss
below) not a monopoly, position across much of American history.

Although the peculiarities of the historical contingencies that societies confront influence the specific character of their policy
responses, grid-group theory's cultures have distinctive predispositions with respect to institutional design. The characteristic
institutional preferences of rival ways of life suggest that the sharp distinction that Lowi (1984) and other structuralists draw
between culture and structure is misguided. Instead, the two realms have a symbiotic relationship; culture is an important source
for the formation and sustenance of social institutions and vice versa.

MUST CULTURAL THEORIES PLAY FAVORITES?

I begin my argument that grid-group theory's concept of culture is less susceptible to problems frequently associated with
theories of political culture by returning to the two controversial features of the first-wave studies that I mentioned above. First,
grid-group theory includes inherent safeguards against global favoritism of one culture. Each of the four rival ways of life makes
distinctive socially valuable contributions to the multicultural societies that they comprise. As J. S. Mill (On Liberty) suggests,
individualistic influence is crucial for the development and sustenance of individual rights. Persons armed with these rights have
produced unprecedented degrees of one vision of social progress in some Western societies. This vision employs personal
liberty and market (efficiency)-driven technological progress to realize economic prosperity. This combination of institutions is
unique to individualism (Olson, 1993).

Hierarchists, for instance, focus on other social goods and are especially concerned with the creation and preservation of
expertise and order. Particularly when spurred by historical contingencies that pose severe threats, hierarchists are capable of
remarkable feats of social mobilization such as Stalin's industrialization drive (Lindblom, 1977) or the development efforts
launched by the Meiji Restoration (Johnson, 1982). So hierarchists may sponsor more social progress than Mill was inclined to
grant. But liberty stemming from individual rights and market-based concern for economic efficiency are not the institutions that
provide hierarchical development. Instead, hierarchical social development is guided by a master plan devised by societally
recognized experts. From this perspective, a market-based process, driven by the countless decisions of persons exercising
liberty, is too haphazard and chaotic.

Egalitarians do not value either of the preceding conceptions of development. For them, social progress is defined in terms of
achieving social circumstances (ideally, small-scale groupings) that facilitate person-respecting social solidarity (Titmuss, 1971).
Both the individualists' markets and the hierarchists' bureaucracies are apt to fall short of recognizing the peculiar capacities of all
persons, relegating those whose skills enjoy little market demand or fit poorly with the direction chosen by society's recognized
experts to the fringes of social life. The inherent stratifying effects of markets and bureaucracies create a central point of
contention for egalitarians who strive to reduce status differentials among persons and to build senses of self-esteem, caring, and
inclusive social equality.(n7)

When society is confronted by particular historical contingencies, one of these cultures and its characteristic social institutions
may be more important to societal viability than others (Lockhart & Franzwa, 1994). For example, an extensive centrally
directed mobilization for development was probably crucial in preventing Japan from experiencing the sort of subjugation and
dismemberment that China suffered in the late 19th century. But grid-group theory allows its practitioners to be evenhanded in
recognizing all four cultures as sources of potentially crucial social contributions.

Second, for grid-group theorists societal viability is an unintended byproduct of the activities of adherents of distinctive ways of
life. In contrast to many other political culturalists, they argue that the "system" that cultural adherents strive to maintain is their
own way of life rather than multicultural society. Individualists seek to implant their favored institutions more thoroughly
throughout society, and the adherents of other cultures have similar objectives. The inevitable result of this intercultural, but
intrasocietal, conflict is social change as issues raised by historical contingencies favor one culture and then another. If one
culture is highly dominant--hierarchy in the Soviet Union--the pace of change may be slow. But as we have recently witnessed,
possibilities for innovation will eventually increase as historical contingencies afford improved opportunities to other cultures. The
adherents of each culture, then, strive perpetually to reshape society more thoroughly in their own image.

IS CULTURE RESIDUAL?

I now examine, in turn, how grid-group theory allays each of the two deeper concerns that many scholars voice with respect to
cultural explanation. Culture's centrality to social explanation depends on how it is conceived. As Eckstein (1988) laments, "The
term culture, unfortunately, has no precise, settled meaning in the social sciences" (p. 801). In part, grid-group theorists conceive
of culture as the beliefs and values with which various factions justify their rival ways of life (Thompson et al., 1990, pp. 1-38).
These cultural biases are based on beliefs about the natural and social environments that rest ultimately on experience,
particularly childhood and adolescent socialization.(n8) Distinctive conceptions of humans follow from specific beliefs about the
world. Together, these beliefs about humans and their world locate persons with respect to the grid and group dimensions and
spawn preferences for specific patterns of social relations.

But grid-group theorists also recognize cultures in the distinctive institutions that arise from these social-relations preferences
(Douglas, 1986; Katznelson, 1997, pp. 105-106).(n9) This theory illuminates tighter, more specific relations between disparate
constrained sets of practical objectives and interests that rival clusters of beliefs and values foster and the distinctive institutions
that embody these sets than other theories of political culture. This characteristic enables theorists to capture key features of
persons' political worlds more effectively. Thus, grid-group theory generates clearer, more easily measurable concepts than
alternative theories of political culture. For instance, individualists perceive a bountiful and resilient natural (Locke, Second
Treatise, chap. 5) and social (Nozick, 1974) world. They also view humans as self-interested and equal in broad capacities.
These humans are thus properly motivated and sufficiently capable to master their own fates in a cornucopian environment.
Accordingly, individualists evince low-grid preferences, relying primarily on self-regulation among persons. Government, with its
inherent coercion, should be limited. They reveal their low-group position in preferences for working through networks of
persons linked by voluntary contractual relations rather than through ascribed groups.

Egalitarians, in contrast, see a fragile environment. Not only is nature subject to depredation but social contexts--the inner
city--are easily perverted as well. Egalitarians believe that humans are naturally benign in their motives and broadly equal in both
basic capacities and needs (Gewirth, 1978), thus fitting with this delicate environment. Yet, humans are easy prey for destructive
social stratification. Egalitarians believe that by undoing natural human equality, stratification creates arrogance in the dominant
and resentment in the dominated, perverting in the process the natural goodness of all. Accordingly, egalitarians exhibit a
high-group position, preferring to deal with the hazards posed by fragile environments through the collective resources of
close-knit groups that share a limited material bounty fairly equally--exemplified by the aphorism "live simply so that others may
simply live" or as Schumacher (1973) had it, "small is beautiful." These groups are ideally relatively small and manifest their
low-grid position by reaching collective decisions through open discussion resulting in consensus (Downey, 1986; Zisk,
1992).(n10)

Hierarchists believe in more complex tolerant/perverse environments. Both the natural and social worlds are sufficiently robust to
support some exploitation, but if humans press too hard, disaster will follow. Figuratively, humans live on mesas, not needing to
worry about minor variations of the table-top terrain, but having to stay clear of the encircling cliffs. Experts in various matters
are required to discern crucial natural and social boundaries not equally evident to everyone as well as for ascertaining how
humans should adjust their behavior in conformity with these limits. For this high-grid culture, then, many of the obvious
interpersonal differences in specific talents that low-grid individualists and egalitarians believe to be morally and socially
inconsequential take on significance. Hierarchists' high-group position appears in their preference for organizing societies into
vertically arrayed collectives. High-grid preferences appear in the way these institutions bring experts and ordinary persons
together, the former providing the dual services of education and social control for the latter. Authorities thus occupy ordinary
persons with sanctioned activities, simultaneously improving their lives and enabling them to contribute more appropriately to
society.(n11)

So persons draw on their cultures not only to interpret the world (North, 1995, p. 17; Scott, 1985, p. xvii) but also to shape it
(Ross, 1997, p. 64), building distinctive institutions that realize their rival beliefs and values. Their perceptions of matters such as
the world about them, their fellow humans, and the forms of social relations appropriate for these humans under such conditions
provide crucial guidance for institutional development. I develop this thesis by drawing on two examples--one American, the
other German--of persons employing their cultural beliefs and values to shape institutions in distinctive predictable ways.(n12)

Late 18th-century colonists in North America worked their way through several governmental variations. Dominion status in an
empire and a loose confederation of local popularly elected legislatures were preferred by hierarchists and egalitarians,
respectively. For instance, the writings of Jonathan Boucher and Thomas Paine provide prototypical examples of hierarchical
and egalitarian views on humans and their world, respectively (Levy, 1992, pp. 86-91,73-80). Boucher was as well an
implacable advocate of remaining with England, whereas Paine worked indefatigably for local legislatures. These two men are
typical of others in terms of their associating empire with hierarchy and limited local government with egalitarianism (Main, 1964;
Wood, 1969).

But these options were successively challenged and overcome by the Revolution and the replacement of the Articles of
Confederation with a new Constitution. This Constitution was furthered by a coalition between hierarchists and individualists.
The former, having lost on the issue of dominion, found the Articles incapable of delivering the security and order they desired
and sought improved circumstances through a coalition with some individualists who, following egalitarian attacks on specific
forms of property, shared important practical objectives and interests with hierarchists (Beard, 1913/1965). Political-economic
elites' disaffection with life under the Articles afforded Madison the opportunity for suspending existing institutions and creating
innovative alternatives that realized the Lockean values, objectives, and interests prominent in his education (Ketcham, 1971,
chaps. 1-2). As Madison's appeals for ratification of the Constitution (Federalist, 10 and 51) reveal, its separation of powers
defines the form of governing institutions favored by those whose views of self-interested human nature and visions of a bountiful
human condition construct the grid-group position of individualism. His unusual scheme of checks and balances is rarely
duplicated outside the exceptionally individualistic United States.

Rohrschneider's (1994) study of Berlin's united parliament also clearly reveals how cultural values and the related practical
objectives and interests that derive from them shape institutions. Rorhschneider finds that members of parliament (MPs) from the
former West Berlin conceive of democracy differently than MPs from the former East Berlin. In contrast to the individual-rights
version of democracy favored by western MPs, eastern MPs adhere to an egalitarian view of democracy relying heavily on
plebiscitarian procedures and relatively equal material distribution. Furthermore, parliamentary experiences refine views arising
from MPs' early socialization (Rohrschneider, 1994, p. 932). So the institutions in which persons spend their lives shape their
beliefs and values; institutions form and sustain cultures.

But it does not follow that culture is residual, for there is another causal loop to this process. The institutions that socialized
Rohrschneider's MPs--largely to allegiance in the West and to opposition in the East where few current Berlin MPs have close
ties to the former German Democratic Republic (GDR)--were constructed through processes involving considerable
extrasocietal influence designed to support particular beliefs and values. External powers helped to shape the institutions of the
Federal Republic and the GDR roughly in the images of individualism and hierarchy, respectively. The United States, whose
dominant culture disapproved of hierarchy as the preeminent source for the Federal Republic's Basic Law, constructed--with
sympathetic Germans--a competitive parliamentary democracy and market economy. In the East, the Soviets--with sympathetic
Germans--created distinctive hierarchical institutions, embodying the Soviet belief in a society led by an expert elite toward an
improved historical era. Although the relatively egalitarian eastern MPs in the current Berlin parliament resist hierarchical means,
their conceptions of democracy nonetheless reveal a shared high-group position that the GDR's institutions surely helped to
shape. For egalitarian eastern MPs, individualism is sullied by both its general association with personal greed and the complicity
of its industrial adherents with the Nazis. So, individualistic and high-group cultures formed and sustained the institutions of the
Federal Republic and the GDR, respectively.

Furthermore, the democratic institutions of the new united state (Land) of Berlin are likely to be somewhat different from those
that characterized West Berlin in the past. Democrats from western Berlin will persist in attempting to realize democracy through
greater protection of various individual rights. But their newly arrived democratic colleagues from eastern Berlin will strive to
develop democracy by incorporating sometimes compatible, but often contradictory, efforts to let "the people" decide and to
effect greater economic redistribution. This flow of causation, through which cultures shape institutions, is no more residual than
the flow through which institutions acculturate persons.

This point does not address Hall's (1986) concerns as to where and how persons acquire cultures (p. 34). I cannot elaborate
this matter sufficiently here, but there is no mystery about the general answer (Lockhart, 1998, chap. 2). Briefly, if we examine
the process of basic socialization (learning about becoming a person), it is clear that in the process of growing up, persons
acquire beliefs and values that identify them as adherents of one or another of grid-group theory's cultures. The broad
fundamental issues on which grid-group theory focuses (does the social environment present opportunities or threats, are humans
relatively equal or unequal, is centralized expertise preferable to a grassroots consensus) make this acquisition virtually inevitable.
This process is distinct from the adult professional socialization (learning a role) that March and Olsen (1989) view as influential
in explaining the preferences of persons who compose political institutions. As Madison's activities show, March and Olsen's
narrow focus leaves unanswered why adults sometimes discard the institutions in which they live and create others in their place.

I close this section by responding to a related objection to cultural explanations raised by contemporary institutionalists. March
and Olsen (1989) find culturalists' claims about the influence of exogenous socialization unpersuasive (pp. 40-41). That is, how
can socialization that political elites acquire in early life influence their actions in the professional institutions of adult life?
Grid-group theory questions the boundaries applied in both first-wave political socialization and contemporary institutional
analysis. The former tended to define political socialization narrowly (e.g., party affiliation). Grid-group theorists argue that
broader forms of learning--How extensive are the opportunities afforded by the social environment? How capable are humans
of mastering their own fates? What institutions are suited for various worlds and humans?--hold political implications that carry
over into a broad range of adult activities.

Contemporary institutional analysts also perceive varying life experiences as too compartmentalized. Why should answers that
are acquired in adolescence to the broad social questions in the previous paragraph not carry over into varying social contexts in
later life? Self-selection provides an obvious transfer mechanism. Hierarchists are more likely to choose careers in the military
services and the Catholic Church than individualists or egalitarians. In turn, individualists are more likely to succeed as
entrepreneurs than less flexible hierarchists and less materially motivated egalitarians. And contemporary American social
workers are more apt to be adherents of one of the high-group cultures (egalitarianism under Aid to Families with Dependent
Children [AFDC], more hierarchical under Temporary Assistance for Needy Families [TANF]) than individualists. Professional
experience routinely reinforces and refines orientations stemming from early socialization. So, small businesspersons may
become progressively less inclined to accept what they see as government interference in market activities. But early socialization
to individualism likely contributes to persons' developing careers in small business.

IS CULTURE CAPABLE OF EXPLAINING POLITICAL CHANGE?

Tighter linkages between rival sets of beliefs and values and the distinctive institutions they construct create clearer indices of
culture. These indices contribute, in turn, to more empirically testable propositions (Coughlin & Lockhart, 1998; Dake &
Wildavsky, 1990; Ellis & Thompson, 1997; Grendstad, 1995; Grendstad & Selle, 1997). I now extend earlier applications of
grid-group theory by employing it in the explanation of political change. According to this theory, culture arises from
experience, and earlier work applying the theory to this task argued that historical contingencies change cultural biases through
surprise. That is, the world no longer works the way one's culture predicts--for example, individualists' faith that conscientious
effort will be rewarded (Thompson et al., 1990, pp. 69-93). In response to the Great Depression, for instance, some persons
who had considered themselves self-reliant recognized that new social circumstances left them dependent on help from more
active public institutions.(n13) Their shift toward the high-group cultures supported Roosevelt's efforts to build a more active
state. As their beliefs about the world changed, so did their views of humans and their preferences with respect to institutions. As
Richard Nixon later remarked, "I am now a Keynesian" (Silk, 1972, p. 14).

This is the sort of change that Eckstein (1988) argues political culture theory precludes (p. 796). Grid-group theory is less
restrictive. Two points are pertinent to a clarification of differences. First, as I shall soon show, this means of culture contributing
to political change (persons dropping one culture and adopting another) is rare. Other mechanisms, more compatible with
first-wave political culture theory, account for most of culture's contributions to political change. But grid-group theorists do
emphasize the lifelong character of socialization and think that extraordinary events in later life may override aspects of earlier
socialization. For grid-group theory, culture provides a conception of how the world works that supports certain forms of social
behavior as moral and prudent. If persons' experiences provide clear messages that the world is no longer working the way it
was once perceived to do, we should not be surprised if some persons, particularly those with hybrid cultural biases (to be
introduced below), apply a different culture.

Second, Eckstein, similarly to Rogowski, portrays political culture theory as a rival to rational choice theory, so he emphasizes
their differences, including the former's stress on the lasting effects of early socialization. Grid-group theorists see rational choice
theory and their own as complementary. The latter offers an explanation of social preferences, and the former explains how
persons go about realizing what they prefer (Becker, 1976; Lockhart & Coughlin, 1992; Wildavsky, 1994). In this view,
explaining a person's choices does not involve a rivalry between self-interest and culture. Everyone is self-interested in some
sense, but rival cultures define the self and its appropriate motivations and interests differently (Lockhart & Wildavsky, 1998).
Adherents of rival cultures thus exhibit distinctive conceptions of self-interested behavior. For instance, both individualists and
hierarchists strive to be sincere. But to be sincere according to the low-grid low-group standards of individualism, a person must
express her inner thoughts and feelings frankly to essentially equal others even if these others will not be pleased by her views. In
contrast, among the members of a high-grid, high-group hierarchy sincerity requires behaving in accordance with externally
imposed requirements that derive from one's position in a social ladder of superiors and subordinates and leaving unvoiced inner
thoughts and feelings that deviate from these guidelines (Pye, 1988, 50-51). So the interests that adherents of rival cultures seek
to realize are distinctive, constrained, and predictable.

In my view, cultures contribute to political change more through creative problem solving than surprise-induced cultural shifts.
That is, in responding to threatening historical contingencies, cultures are more likely to adjust their institutions so as to better
support their ways of life in altered circumstances than to transform themselves into other cultures. I shall consider two such
problem-solving mechanisms.(n14) First, particularly in a relatively pluralistic society such as the contemporary United States,
persons are apt to have socialization agents that represent different cultures. These persons may retain sympathies for rival
cultures, particularly with respect to certain domains of social life, thus developing hybrid cultural biases (Hochschild, 1981;
Walzer, 1983). Consider the situation of a hypothetical attorney who is also a wife and mother. Following a series of academic
and professional mentors, she applies individualism toward workplace issues. But, in accordance with themes introduced to her
by feminists, she practices egalitarianism in her family: roughly equal spousal sharing of household responsibilities and
participation of the children in family decisions. She has, then, an egalitarian-individualistic (EI or IE) hybrid cultural bias.

Historical contingencies may alter the cross-pressures weighing on such a bias and contribute to political change in the process.
The emergence of the family leave issue that sharpens tensions between the home and the workplace, for example, may prompt
this attorney to broaden the application of her egalitarian cultural bias to an aspect of the workplace by endorsing new
institutional supports for working parents at the expense of the firm's economic efficiency. In so doing she does not replace her
culture of individualism with a new culture of egalitarianism; rather, she shifts marginally the way she applies her two preexisting
cultures across domains of social life. Institutional pressures, such as those on which March and Olsen (1989) focus, are likely
to attenuate a person's flexibility in this regard but not necessarily constrain it entirely.

Issues that prompt such shifts arise from contingencies that likely defy prediction, but the intrapersonal mechanism that triggers
the revised application of particular cultures can be specified. This trigger involves a shift in relevant analogies that has the effect
of relocating a boundary between social categories. Heretofore, for example, this attorney has associated workplace matters
with an individualistic efficiency model and family matters with an egalitarian caring model. So long as coworkers are viewed as
workers, the efficiency model applies to their activities. But the family leave issue reveals some coworkers as parents and
suggests the application of the caring model. In these revised circumstances many persons may gradually begin applying
egalitarianism to an issue on which their practice has been individualistic. These shifts in the application of hybrid cultural biases
may alter the relative influence of rival cultures and prompt institutional change.

A second mechanism through which culture contributes to political change is also set in motion by historical contingencies.
Threatening events may foster changes in relations among cultures, and revised political institutions may result from new cultural
coalitions. American political history may be viewed as oscillation between various multicultural coalitions. Hartz (1955) was
correct about the leading culture in America, but he exaggerated. Individualism (I), although prominent, is hardly alone (Ellis,
1993). Rather, it provides the stable element of coalitions that for a time oscillated back and forth between egalitarianism (E) and
hierarchy (H). Each of grid-group theory's cultures shares values with two other cultures: I and E both support personal rights
against state authority; I and H both practice social stratification; and E and H both exhibit direct concern for the social
collective's health. These shared values provide bases for coalitions. But each of these cultures is also at odds with the others
regarding conflicting beliefs, values, practical objectives, and interests, so political coalitions are temporary.

For example, as Bailyn (1967)relates, in 1760, social stratification arising from hierarchical and individualistic sources was
widely accepted in colonial North America (pp. 302-303).(n15) But by the mid-1760s, increasing English regulation of the
American colonies (e.g., the Stamp Act) began to foster common ground between Whig individualists such as Samuel Langdon
and egalitarians such as Thomas Paine in opposition to particular forms of stratification. Many individualists reacted to increased
external regulation by emphasizing a democratic public-action face compatible with egalitarianism. This face is familiar from
McClosky and Zaller (1984), Hirschman (1982), and Huntington (1981) for whom it forms one pole of American political
oscillation. Colonial Whigs had grown up under the benign neglect with which Britain had generally viewed the colonies prior to
incurring the expenses of the French and Indian War and had become accustomed to regulating their own social lives. The
imposition of new British regulations served as a trigger for an individualistic-egalitarian (I-E) coalition by bringing individualists
initially to question these British actions and eventually to join egalitarians in maintaining that institutions that acted so
high-handedly were thoroughly corrupt. This antiauthority coalition of low-grid cultures reacted against distant insensitive
authorities, creating an independent society under the extremely limited central government provided by the Articles of
Confederation. Concomitantly, it formed new governing institutions in several of the states that emphasized local control through
an active citizenry operating legislatures with limited powers.

In the decade following the Revolution, new historical contingencies, especially Shay's rebellion, left some--not all (Beard,
1913/1965)--propertied interests feeling endangered. Perceptions of "desperate debtors" (Hamilton, Federalist, 6) using
egalitarian state legislatures to attack some forms of property thus provided the trigger for an I-H coalition. Increasingly,
individualists thought that government needed less to represent ordinary humans than to filter out their crasser influences (Ellis,
1993, pp. 63-67). The constitutional convention of 1787 illustrates the movement of these individualists toward a coalition with
hierarchists such as Alexander Hamilton and Gouverneur Morris. Under these threats to property, individualists reveal another
face, this one focused on private material interests, also familiar from McClosky and Zaller (1984), Hirschman (1982), and
Huntington (1981) for whom it forms the second pole of American political oscillation.(n16) The resulting Federalist coalition
built a more powerful and active national government than had existed under the Articles.

However, routine Federalist practices of economic favoritism and exclusion--franchises, concessions, charters, and so forth--as
well as glorification of public authority, gradually prompted some individualists to lean again toward closer relations with
egalitarians. This shift reached a crucial juncture in the election of 1800 that produced Thomas Jefferson's resurgent I-E
coalition. The trigger in this instance lies in the success of the preceding I-H coalition's efforts to achieve greater social
stratification. The Jeffersonian phase of this coalition was not as ambitious in attacking the Federalist state as many of its
supporters had hoped, and "Jeffersonian" inclinations were actually relaxed for the time after 1812, but the antiauthority
character of the Jeffersonian period was reasserted by Andrew Jackson's presidency (1829-1837), which marked another high
point in terms of antistatist collaboration between individualists and egalitarians. Jackson reduced the size and activities of the
national government, destroying some aspects of the Federalist state in the process.

Instances of shifting coalitions stem from unpredictable events, but similarly to the situation of hybrid cultural biases, the trigger
mechanism can be specified. In addition to disagreeing with hierarchists and egalitarians on many matters, individualists share
some beliefs and values with hierarchists and still other beliefs and values with egalitarians. An event that triggers an I-E coalition
raises a threat to individualists (e.g., the imposition of external authority), which suggests working with egalitarians to construct
institutions--an independent society under the Articles or Jackson's state-bashing presidency--that support shared values and the
practical objectives that derive from them. But such a coalition and the institutions it creates are vulnerable to a dissolution
because they do not support the beliefs and values that individualists share with hierarchists. These values may require an I-H
coalition and the distinctive institutions--the Federalist state--associated with it.

I now return to the sharp changes in Germany between the late 1930s and early 1970s that Rogowski (1974) uses so effectively
against first-wave culturalists. Germany appears to be a crucial instance that political culture theories must explain before they
can regain credibility. Rapid German transformation from a predominantly hierarchical to a much more individualistic society
(Dahrendorf, 1967; Grendstad, 1990) is unusual but not miraculous. Historical contingencies prompted the shifting cultural
coalitions that produced it, whereas the cultural identities of the shifting coalition partners shaped the resulting institutional
innovations.

As in the preceding American example, the point central to grid-group theory's explanation of German political change is that
there was no single national culture in Germany. Despite a history of hierarchical dominance, the egalitarian and individualistic
cultures were reasonably well developed in Germany by the late 1930s. The former, for instance, provided the basis for the
opposition workers' socialist movement, and the latter appeared most noticeably among entrepreneurs who had long been the
constrained lesser partners in the ruling H-I "blood and iron" coalition.(n17)These latter cultures had been discredited by their
association with the social and economic turbulence of the Weimar period. But the hierarchical faction dominant in the late
1930s was the upstart Nazi Party, which was not well respected by more traditional factions of the H-I coalition. After achieving
mass popularity through reestablishing social stability and economic prosperity, the Nazis led Germany to destruction in the
Second World War. The German regions that initially formed the Federal Republic were dominated by Western societies that
worked selectively with German elites to build individualistic institutions.

Thus, a historical contingency, the unusual openness to external influence created by Germany's wartime destruction, interacted
with the presence of a significant indigenous individualistic culture with which representatives of the West could work and
facilitated a reversal in the relative influence of the partners in the long-standing German governing coalition. German
individualists were encouraged and emboldened by Western colleagues and set about constructing the institutions through which
individualists realize their values: a rights-based, competitive, representative, political system and a form of market capitalism.
Simultaneously, German hierarchists frequently found that their values and the institutions that realized them were discouraged by
the Western allies. During the formal occupation, a coalition of Western and German individualists dominated western Germany,
reshaping its institutions in accordance with their values. As the Federal Republic acquired autonomy, it became increasingly
clear that indigenous German individualists had replaced hierarchists as the preeminent partners in the governing coalition.(n18)

Rogowski (1974) puts particular emphasis on a paucity of generational differences in citizen support for this new coalition and its
institutions (p. 9). Others have since acquired extensive evidence of intergenerational change. Using participation in political
discussion as an index of democratic allegiance, Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt (1981) show that although participation in
political discussion increased for five different German generations between 1953 and 1972, there are also sharp and growing
intergenerational differences (see pp. 13, 45-52, especially 46). Later generations participate more actively in political
discussion. Across the Federal Republic's early decades, then, it is reasonable to interpret the growing support for individualistic
institutions (Conradt, 1978, p. 49, 1980; Dalton, 1989, pp. 100-104) as the result of two factors. First, some cultural shifting
occurred among older persons, particularly those with hybrid cultural biases, as a consequence of hierarchical social dominance
having produced total defeat in total war. Second and more significant, increasing proportions of individualistic and egalitarian
cultural biases developed among younger persons socialized under the sharply different circumstances of the Federal Republic.

Grid-group theory thus offers an interpretation of German responses to shifting events across the 1930s-1970s that does not
force culturalists into strained unconvincing improvisation. First, with respect to coalition dynamics, grid-group theory focuses on
an externally prompted and supported transposition of the two cultures forming Germany's long-standing dominant coalition.
Historical contingencies of the early cold war period facilitated the activities of individualists in western Germany and hindered
their hierarchical counterparts. So, rather than relying on the process about which Rogowski is understandably skeptical (an
entire society of hierarchists rapidly reorienting and adopting individualism), the initial transformation of the Federal Republic was
accomplished by emboldened indigenous individualists replacing hierarchists in many positions throughout the governing
coalition. Thus, what had once been an H-I coalition became an I-H coalition. The new institutions that this coalition constructed
then increasingly socialized the population to allegiance.

Second, with respect to persons with hybrid cultural biases such as Konrad Adenauer (IH), the influential historical
contingencies of the early postwar period encouraged HI and IH hybrids to apply their individualistic faces more extensively
across domains of public life. These contingencies provided considerable scope for realizing individualistic ambitions and more
limited avenues for achieving hierarchical aspirations. More significant from the standpoint of using culture to explain political
change, over time these contingencies triggered shifts in relevant analogies. Hierarchy became increasingly associated with the
German defeat and the stagnant punitive East. Individualism, in contrast, became progressively associated with growing
prosperity and the ascendent constructively interventionist (e.g., Marshall Plan) West. These circumstances encouraged a
growing tendency among West Germans with IH or HI cultural biases to apply their individualism in public life.

LIMITATIONS AND REFUTATION OF GRID-GROUP THEORY APPLICATIONS

It seems reasonable to point out certain limitations to various applications of grid-group theory as well as some likely ways in
which these limitations might lead to refutations of particular applications. First, the various historical contingencies on which my
examples have drawn, although possibly less contingent from other theoretical perspectives, are likely to be unpredictable as to
timing and strength. In any case, grid-group theory makes no claim to being able to make such predictions.

Second, the only prediction that grid-group theory makes with respect to the specific character of institutional responses to
various historical contingencies is that they will support the basic beliefs and values of the culture responsible for them.
Bismarck's predecessors had mostly dealt with various social hazards among the poor through limited public charity modeled on
Roman Catholic practice. Yet, in an example of what Eckstein (1988) calls "pattern maintaining change" (pp. 793-794),
Bismarck created national social insurance programs. Bismarck's central beliefs, values, practical objectives, and interests were
similar to those of his hierarchical predecessors, but the specific circumstances he faced (egalitarian socialist industrial disruption
in a delicately balanced diplomatic atmosphere) were new, and he developed new institutions to maintain his values and related
practical objectives under these new circumstances. Grid-group theory could be used to predict that the hierarchical Bismarck
would be more willing to construct new state institutions in support of his values than would individualists, but it could not have
predicted the specifics of his innovation.

Third and perhaps most important, it is not yet clear how widely, strongly, and persistently grid-group theory's cultures are held
among various political actors. Among the general citizenry doubts remain about the strength and persistence of cultural
influences (Coughlin & Lockhart, 1998), although evidence suggests that both increase with citizen activism (Ellis & Thompson,
1997). Thus, it seems likely that among political elites, cultural orientations are sufficiently strong and stable to bear the
explanatory burden that I place on them in this article. Yet, culture may not regularly overwhelm other sources of preferences,
and institutionalists such as March and Olsen (1989) are likely correct that many actions of most political actors reflect
institutional norms.

Hence, grid-group theory is most fruitfully employed in a specific range of situations. In a few instances historical contingencies
may appear with such speed and force as to overwhelm disagreement and adaptive interaction among cultures, leaving societies
to cope as best they can through existing institutional mechanisms. Alternatively, many other routine instances pose sufficiently
modest implications so that, as institutionalists suggest, political actors dutifully carry out their institutions' standard operating
procedures, even if these conflict with the actors' cultural preferences. Among the instances between these two extremes are
those that Cook (1993) characterizes as "pressured decision points" (p. 6). These situations afford political actors time to create
innovative responses and are serious enough to prompt choices among alternatives based on rival value clusters. This is the most
fruitful territory for grid-group theory's application. Rational-choice theorists can model individualists' actions in these situations,
but the actions of adherents of other cultures likely appear to them as "irrational norms" (Elster, 1989). Grid-group theory
reveals these situations as straggles among rival cultures, each striving to realize efficiently or rationally distinctive clusters of
constrained and predictable values, practical objectives, and interests.

                BROADER CULTURAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIAL EXPLANATION

Lichbach (1997a) correctly calls for "creative confrontations" among cultural, structuralist, and rational choice approaches to
comparative politics (p. 273). But in confronting one another, we should not overlook possibilities for complementary
contributions among these research traditions. Zuckerman (1997, pp. 299-300) credits Shepsle (1995) for linking institutional
analysis with rational choice theory and Douglas (1986) for a related strategy with respect to political culture and rational
choice theories. This article continues in this vein. I have shown how a relatively new conception of culture avoids some biases of
first-wave cultural studies. Moreover, I have developed this theory in a fashion that evades marginalization by contemporary
institutionalists and extended the theory so that it contributes to the explanation of political change. Furthermore, this conception
is properly interpreted as an ally of both the new institutionalism and rational choice theory.(n19)

In the case of institutional studies, grid-group theory helps us to recognize the symbiosis between structure and culture. Political
institutions clearly help to transmit and sustain cultures, but culture shapes and legitimates institutions as well. In their emphasis on
the institutional-influence side of this symbiotic relationship, institutionally oriented contemporary political scientists have
neglected cultural contributions (cf. King, 1973). By linking a limited number of rival sets of beliefs and values tightly to
distinctive institutional preferences, grid-group theory helps to highlight the neglected, cultures-shape-institutions portion of this
loop. As Madison's individualistic efforts to replace first hierarchical British imperialism and then the egalitarian Articles of
Confederation with a sharply individualistic Constitution suggest, changes in the relative influence of distinctive cultural
preferences contribute significantly to the direction of institutional innovation. Accordingly, by marginalizing culture, political
scientists constrain inquiry as to why institutional innovation takes one form rather than another (Verba et al., 1987, p. 270).
They thus beg rather than examine some of the most basic questions about political institutions, ignoring in the process the
potential for analysis of shifting coalitions within multicultural societies to explain institutional change.

Even more significant, grid-group theory provides a concern with preference formation to complement rational choice theory's
focus on preference implementation. The latter facilitates analysis of who gets what and why, whereas the former deals with who
wants what and why. The instrumental rationality of adherents of rival cultures is driven by different high-priority objectives and
interests. So, although persons pursue their interests efficiently as rational choice theorists argue, the sets of interests sought by
the adherents of rival cultures are distinctive, constrained, and predictable.

For instance, persons' locations in the grid-group space of Figure 1 tell us whether their highest priorities entail building
interpersonal relationships, based on either conceptions of duty (hierarchy) or love (egalitarianism) or engaging in personal
material acquisition (Chai, in press; Coughlin & Lockhart, 1998; Elster, 1989; Lockhart, 1999, chap. 3; Lockhart & Coughlin,
1992; Lockhart & Wildavsky, 1998; Sen, 1979; Wildavsky, 1994). Furthermore, grid-group theory enables us to understand
why persons with, for instance, low-grid but high-group orientations prefer the benefits of intense relationships to those of
material gain. If persons believe that what individualists refer to (unpejoratively) as "exploiting" natural resources is seriously
harmful, they are apt to seek satisfaction through the richness of their relations with others rather than the acquisition of material
wealth. This improved recognition of distinctive sets of culturally constrained objectives helps us to avoid reliance on ad hoc
devices such as "nonrational norms" (Elster, 1989; cf. Wildavsky 1991).

Having rival cultures with distinctive constrained central objectives helps comparativists produce testable propositions. In this
regard, I have initiated exploration in this article as to how shifting coalitions among rival cultures contribute to institutional
change. The roughly half-century of American politics from the 1770s to the 1830s and the German experience bridging the late
1930s to the early 1970s both provide instances of rapid political change that initially appears impossible for theories of
political culture, characteristically burdened by inertia in persons' beliefs and attitudes, to explain. Yet, when we examine these
events through the lens provided by grid-group theory, we see that political change does not require individuals to change their
cultures. Rather, the political changes at issue can as well be produced as a result of the shifting coalitions among cultures that
are induced by historical contingencies.

Grid-group theory's conception of culture then adds crucial elements to two of the leading approaches among contemporary
political scientists.(n20) In the case of institutional analysis, the theory's contributions are appropriately considered coequal.
Culture is an important source for the formation and sustenance of social institutions and vice versa. Grid-group theory's
contributions in conjunction with rational choice theory are potentially more basic. Why people wnt what they do is arguably a
more fundamental question than how they achieve their objectives, supporting Eckstein's (1997) assessment that social science is
essentially a study of cultural acquisition and application.

More than simply contributing to institutional analysis and rational choice theory, grid-group theory's conception of culture
helps to weave together aspects of these modes of analysis that are currently distinct, often competitive, practices. Grid-group
theory identifies the high-priority sociopolitical objectives of the adherents of rival cultures. Thus, the theory specifies distinctive,
constrained, and predictable objectives and interests for each culture. Action aimed at achieving these objectives generally takes
the form of supporting specific institutions that embody these goals vis-a-vis alternative institutions based on distinct and
frequently conflicting objectives. Many persons do not engage in building the macro-social institutions that have provided the
focus for most institutional analysis in political science.(n21) But for those who do, the construction and maintenance of
distinctive macropolitical institutions (achieving social organization through markets, influential state bureaucracies, or unstratified
grassroots activist groups) represent rational choices for the realization of their varying high-priority values (freedom of choice
that leads to personal individuation and social prosperity, policy formulation by experts resulting in social order, or equality of
respect contributing to relative equality of social condition, respectively). Thus, the development of disparate institutions is linked
to the basic values, practical objectives, and interests of rival cultures as rational means to distinctive ends.

AUTHOR'S NOTE: I want to thank Dennis Coyle, Richard Ellis, Chalmers Johnson, Brendon Swedlow, and two anonymous
Comparative Political Studies reviewers for helpful comments on previous versions of this article.

(n1.) A few prominent examples in these categories include Inglehart (1997, 1988); Lipset (1996, 1990); Putnam (1993);
Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti (1988); Wilson (1997, 1992); Huntington (1996); Almond and Verba (1963); Verba et al.
(1987); Verba, Nie, and Iim (1978); Laitin (1986); and North (1990); Elazar (1980); Feldman and Zaller (1992); Harrison
(1993); Jones (1994); and Hinich and Munger (1996); Shweder (1991) and Benedict (1934); Parsons and Shils (1951); Pye
(1962) and Whiting (1980).

(n2.) Although Ross (1997, p. 62) is less encouraged by grid-group theory's overall potential than I, he also sees its particular
strength as fostering complementary contributions between political culture approaches and rational choice theory (pp. 46,
50).

(n3.) By "legitimacy of external prescription" I refer to the varying ease with which persons accept that other persons' judgments
are valid for, and binding on, them. For a career-enlisted person in a military service, for instance, this legitimacy is apt to be high
because be or she will have chosen a life that routinely involves accepting the instructions of officers with few questions.

(n4.) Although this claim is controversial, it is obviously less limiting than the widely accepted notion that only variations on two
ways of life--hierarchy and individualism--are socially viable; see Lindblom (1977). There is also a fair amount of empirical
analysis supporting this claim; see Evans-Pritchard (1940), Dumont (1980), Strathern (1971), and Ucbendu (1965).

In addition, Fiske (1993), Maruyama (1980), and Lichbach (1995) have independently derived similar typologies. The
similarities between Lichbach's market, community, contract, and hierarchy options for resolving collective action problems and
grid-group theory's individualistic, egalitarian, fatalistic and hierarchical ways of life are particularly striking. Lichbach's contract
option presents a more positive face than fatalism as portrayed by Banfield (1958). However, as Mars (1982, pp. 66-69) and
Douglas (1996, pp. 93-94, 183-187) show, fatalists do fairly well in some institutional niches.