Copyrighted material. For private use only.
by Andrei Zolotov
Ecumenical News International Daily News Service, 7 August 2000
Moscow, 4 August (ENI)--The climax of Russia's millennium celebrations begins a week from now, when more than 150 bishops from across the former Soviet Union will come to Moscow to take a series of major decisions about the future of the Russian Orthodox Church, the world's biggest Orthodox church and an important player in the spiritual and social life of this nation.
The Jubilee Council of Bishops, which begins on 13 August in Moscow, is expected to take three key decisions reflecting changes since the fall of communism and defining church policies for the new century. The council last met in 1997.
Last month the church's permanent 12-member synod put three main tasks on the council's agenda - a decision on the canonisation of several hundred Christians, including Tsar Nicholas II and his family, who died at the hands of the Soviets; and the adoption of two major documents - setting out the church's first "social doctrine" and guidelines for relations with non-Orthodox churches.
Preparations for the canonisation of the "New Martyrs of Russia" began several years ago, and some Orthodox martyrs from the Soviet era have already been declared saints. But the council's decision will be historic, not least because of the number of people involved. The canonisation of members of the imperial family is a particularly controversial issue because of diverging views of Tsar Nicholas's legacy. Although many Russian Christians already revere his family as saints, the synod chose its words tactfully when describing the forthcoming canonisations, noting that the last tsar and his family deserved sainthood not for their lifestyle or leadership before the 1917 revolution, but for the Christian humility they displayed when facing imprisonment and death.
Given the many divisions within the Russian Orthodox Church after the death of Patriarch Tikhon in 1925, even the canonisation of bishops and priests from the 1920s and 1930s - when the church suffered harsh persecution from the Bolsheviks - is a delicate question because some clergy strongly disagreed with the church leadership. (One Orthodox axiom declares that "the sin of schism is never washed away, not even by the blood of martyrdom".) After Tikhon's death, central leadership was disbanded and the church was split into several groups. Prelates chosen by Tikhon as possible leaders were imprisoned. The acceptance of Soviet rule became a highly divisive issue within the church, and many clergy refused to recognise one of Tikhon's successors, Metropolitan Sergei Stragorodsky, who in 1927 declared his loyalty to the Soviet Union.
The documents on social doctrine and relations with other churches have been kept strictly secret and are likely to prove controversial. One of the church's most influential prelates, Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, who heads the church's department of external relations and chaired the commission which drafted the document on social doctrine, gave a few clues in an interview to be published next week in Moscow's NG-Religii newspaper.
According to the interview, the social doctrine document will show that Russian church grudgingly accepts the modern pluralist society of which it is part, as well as the rapid growth of technology. But the church will continue to proclaim traditional, conservative values in a time of rapid change.
The document will reject growing pressure from some highly conservative church groups who claim that the church should view rule by the tsars as the only form of government acceptable to Christians. Instead the document will confirm the church's modern policy of "not tying itself to any state or public organisation, nor to any political force".
At the same time, the document will refuse to endorse the principle of "freedom of conscience" as an Orthodox doctrine. Metropolitan Kirill states in the interview that when the practice of religion ceased to be the social norm and became a "private affair" for individuals, the state became "an exclusively earthly institution". In pre-revolutionary Russia the state was seen as an instrument of divine law.
The document also deals with the church's social role, as well as a range of subjects never officially discussed by Russian Orthodox councils: genetic engineering, reproductive technology, contraception, organ transplants, homosexuality, sex changes, public education, the mass media and sport.
Another document of 20 pages on the Russian church's relationships with the Protestant and Roman Catholic churches, "The Basis of the Russian Orthodox Church's Attitude Towards the Heterodox", is likely to draw strong interest both in Russia and abroad. The document was drafted by the church's Theological Commission and approved by the synod.
Hilarion Alfeyev, the Moscow Patriarchate's senior official in charge of relations with non-Orthodox churches, told ENI that the document was necessary because ecumenical relations had become a highly controversial issue here in the 1990s.
"The subject of inter-Christian relations is used by various groups [within the church] as a bogey in partisan wars," Alfeyev said. "In particular, it is used to criticise church leaders who, as is well known, have taken part in ecumenical activities over many years."
Ecumenism was also being used by breakaway groups, such as the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad and Old-Calendarists, to undermine people's trust in the church, Alfeyev added. So there was a need for "a clear document outlining the theological basis of the Russian Orthodox Church's attitude towards heterodoxy, i.e. the question of why we need and whether we need dialogue with non-Orthodox confessions, and if so which form this dialogue should take."
Although this draft is also embargoed, Alfeyev told ENI that it categorically rejected the so-called "theory of branches" according to which the church founded by Christ had been split into parts which must be reunited to form a whole church.
The draft proclaimed, Alfeyev said, that "the Orthodox Church is in fact the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church founded by Christ". However Christ's call for unity "remains the imperative which must be aspired to by all Christians, which is why Orthodox Christians need to make every effort to ensure that witness of the Orthodox faith is heard by those people who have split from the church."
The document is expected to specify that the Orthodox Church will not conduct dialogue with "sects", but will hold various forms of dialogue with the Roman Catholic and Oriental Orthodox churches, as well as with some Protestant churches.
"On the one hand, the ecumenical movement has existed in certain forms for more than a century," Alfeyev said. "On the other hand, as far as relations between Orthodox and Protestants are concerned, there is no rapprochement, but an estrangement." He singled out the ordination of women priests and pastors and the "liberalisation" of theology and morality in some Protestant Churches as factors that had contributed to the estrangement.
Alfeyev was unable to say whether the Bishops' Council would discuss the Russian Orthodox Church's membership of the World Council of Churches. But he said that the Moscow Patriarchate was committed to continuing discussions with the WCC's joint commission of Protestant and Orthodox representatives about the role of Orthodox churches within the WCC and the ecumenical movement.
The Bishops' Council will meet in the newly reconstructed Cathedral of Christ the Saviour, an imposing edifice in central Moscow. The cathedral's consecration will take place on 19 August, the highlight of this month's meetings and celebrations.
(c) Ecumenical News International (posted 7 August 2000)
from Union of Councils for Soviet Jews (UCSJ)
7 August 2000
[Editor's note: the following conclusions come from a brief update to the UCSJ January 2000 report "Antisemitism, Xenophobia and Religious Persecution in Russia's Regions." The update presents UCSJ's analysis of the impact of the election of President Vladimir Putin on the problem of antisemitism in Russia, as well as speculation about future trends. The full report can be accessed by following the link on its title.]
Conclusions
Antisemitic threats and violent hate crimes dramatically increased across the Russian Federation between 1998-99. Not only do Jews face specific dangers through incidents of antisemitism, but an infrastructure of antisemitism - at the grassroots and official levels - is taking hold throughout much of the country, influenced by communist, neo-Nazi, Russian Orthodox and other sources of antisemitic activity. These forces act with near complete impunity, sending the message that neither the central nor local governments will provide for the physical or political safety of Russian Jews.
Despite positive statements on the need to fight antisemitism from leaders of the Russian government, a massive decentralization of power has given Russia's regional leaders unprecedented power. These officials are not accountable to anyone for their violations of human rights, or for their blatant cooperation with antisemitic forces. For example, in 11 regions, regional and/or municipal authorities collaborate with, or show a high level of tolerance for, the neo-Nazi movement Russian National Unity (RNU), in some cases even giving them police powers, without any fear of sanction from Moscow.
Jews and other targets of the RNU face an uncertain future in Russia due to the RNU's popularity with disaffected Russian youth. As the country's economic, social and ethnic situation continues to stagnate, this trend is likely to continue.
At the national level, particularly in the State Duma (the lower house of the Russian parliament), the Communist Party of the Russian Federation has revived antisemitism as a leading plank in its platform. Communist antisemitism, as espoused by party chief Gennady Zyuganov, takes the traditional Soviet approach of couching antisemitic rhetoric in the language of anti-Zionism, while parliamentarians like General Albert Makashov and Victor Ilyukhin directly defame and incite violence against Jews.
The passage of the extremely discriminatory religion law in 1997, which was backed enthusiastically by the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), opened the door to massive persecution of religious minorities in the regions, especially of Christian faiths that are seen as serious competitors to the ROC. In many regions covered in our January 2000 report, ROC clergy have joined forces with regional officials, including former KGB religious affairs officials, communists and local extremist organizations like the RNU, to harass, defame, threaten and attack religious minorities. While Jews have not been the primary target of this law, the Jewish community can only thrive if Russia succeeds in developing a culture of religious tolerance towards minority faiths.
Russia's failure to successfully create a rule of law based state, and severe problems of torture and lawlessness on the part of the police and other authorities, have created a dangerous environment for all citizens of the Russian Federation, but particularly for members of minority populations. This trend constitutes a passive form of antisemitism since victims cannot count on the police or the courts for protection from hate crimes.
Attacks on ethnic minorities are common, as are public xenophobic statements by regional officials, groups and media. Unconstitutional residency requirements in cities like Moscow, and police targeting of ethnic minorities, especially Chechens and Meskhetian Turks, for extortion, torture and expulsion are of serious concern for Russia's future as a multi-ethnic state.
Antisemitism in Russia often goes hand in hand with anti-Western and specifically anti-American sentiments. In Russia, antisemitism is the common language for the united opposition to democratic reform and cooperation with the United States, and Russian Jews are accused of being part of a Western conspiracy to destroy Russia. NATO's actions in Kosovo, and criticism of Russia's war in Chechnya, have greatly exacerbated this trend.
President Putin's reliance on the security apparatus and his apparent contempt for many aspects of civil society, including environmental and human rights NGOs and a free press, may lead to new threats to Russian Jews, as the Jewish community will never be safe unless Russia develops a democratic system. (posted 7 August 2000)
Nicholas II: Some worry that canonizing the last czar would send a disturbing message to Christians
by Frank Brown, Religion News Service
from Orthodox
Christian News Service, Inc.
YEKATERINBURG, Russia, August 6, 2000 (RNS) -- On a July night 82 years ago in a private home, a Bolshevik squad escorted Russia's last czar, his wife and five children into the cellar and shot them to death.
By most accounts, the Romanov family faced months of captivity and ultimately execution with grace and humility. For this exemplary behavior, a Bishops' Council of the Russian Orthodox Church meeting in Moscow this month is almost certain to make saints out of Czar Nicholas II, his wife, Alexandra, and their children, Olga, Tatyana, Maria, Anastasia and Alexei.
In the opinion of the church commission recommending canonization, the family deserves sainthood for the Christian way in which they met death, not for the way they ruled the Russian empire.
It is an important distinction. Nicholas was a bungling, reactionary czar who believed in a worldwide Jewish conspiracy. Alexandra had a deep and peculiar attachment to Rasputin, the frisky mystic from Siberia.
But it is a distinction that may well be lost on the mass of Russian Orthodoxy's 80 million members, many of whom already venerate Nicholas II as a saint with a special empathy for the problems of a country brutalized by 70 years of Communist Party rule.
"I am convinced that the fate of Russia depends on the recognition of his holiness," said Marina Smelyanskaya, a 45-year-old Russian Orthodox believer, who said her prayers to Nicholas II are often answered. "I personally think that the reason for the czar's sacrifice is so that now, 80 years later, we can repent and begin to build again."
Like other many other boosters of Nicholas II's sainthood, Smelyanskaya believes Russia's last czar was a talented ruler who was deliberately vilified by generations of Soviet historians keen on justifying the 1918 execution. Some supporters of canonization even go so far as to deny that deadly anti-Jewish pogroms took place from 1903 to 1906.
Because of the focus on the way Nicholas II and his family met their deaths, the Russian Orthodox Church commission charged with considering the worthiness of the Romanovs need not deal with less-than-saintly aspects of the last czar, including his anti-Semitism, about which there is little question.
"He personally hated Jews," said Alexander Lakshin, a Jewish historian in Moscow who specializes in 19th- and early 20th-century Russian history.
"By upbringing and by thought he was an anti-Semite," Lakshin added, citing private correspondence between Nicholas II and his mother in which the czar refers to "zhids," a hateful term for Jews.
Moscow's chief rabbi, Pinchas Goldschmidt, is succinct on the topic: "We would rather this not happen."
"It might give the wrong signal to believers, especially in rural areas that are led by extreme nationalists," the rabbi said in a telephone interview. "People may say that if a person was a saint then he can do nothing wrong, so if he was persecuting Jews then he must have been right to do that."
In Yekaterinburg, that is precisely the thinking of the half-dozen or so monarchists, Cossacks and neo-fascists who gather frequently at the site of the 1918 execution to hawk ideas and souvenirs to the dozens of tourists who visit daily. Although church and city officials plan to construct a $12 million memorial worship complex, the site remains a scraggly plot of land with a black marble cross and a small wooden chapel.
When they are not meeting and greeting tourists, the men gather in the green construction trailer that overlooks the site where archaeologists are sifting through the remains of the house where the Romanovs were killed.
Changes anticipated
Alexander Vassiliech, 37, is a regular. An earnest man in a rumpled suit jacket, Vassiliech has tremendous faith in Nicholas II's canonization.
"As soon as they canonize the czar, everything will change, in a spiritual way and, God willing, in a government way, too," said Vassiliech, a monarchist who makes a living selling small metal trays with the Romanovs' portrait for 50 rubles ($1.80) each.
Vassiliech grows indignant at the suggestion that Nicholas II's bloody reign from 1894 to 1917 make him unworthy of sainthood. Rather than debate details, Alexander denies wholesale, for example, that the pogroms ever took place. He has no doubt the execution of the Romanovs was part of a Jewish ritual requiring the sacrifice of Christians.
The men who gather here daily are by no means representative of mainstream thought within Russian Orthodoxy. But, all the same, they function as de facto tour guides and the local hierarch, Bishop Vikenty, who has jurisdiction over the property, tolerates the posting of their anti-Semitic placards.
Father Vladimir Zyazev, the man in charge of building the memorial complex, said the church cannot control what signs are posted on the property. "All different kinds of people hang posters up there and, more often than not, they do it secretly," he said.
Over a three-day period in July, however, the placards tacked up to a wooden fence near the marble cross remained unmolested. They included a collection of four signs trumpeting various ultranationalist causes along with a screed detailing the Jewish backgrounds of the czar's executioners.
"In our times any noteworthy place is going to attract extremists and all kinds of people," said Zyazev, 54, a burly man with striking red hair. "So all we can do is go on with our work."
In this city of 1.4 million located two time zones east of Moscow, Zyazev acknowledged that some of the extremists' views are quite widely held. Jews, for example, are held responsible for the execution.
"I can say that many people, Russian Orthodox people, figure it that way -- that it was a ritual murder," he said, adding he has no personal opinion on the issue."
Wrestling with Jewish issues
Other churches, of course, are also wrestling with Jewish issues. During Lent of this year, Pope John Paul II apologized to the world's Jews for 2,000 years of Christian hostility. The Russian Orthodox Church is unlikely to take such a step any time soon, said Alexander Verkhovsky, a Moscow scholar of Russian nationalism and the church.
"Our church is not ready to ask forgiveness for anything from anyone," said Verkhovsky, explaining that the Russian Orthodox Church is too conservative and still recovering from Soviet persecution.
All the same, if, as expected, the czarist family is canonized during the Aug. 13-20 Bishops' Council, repentance will be a central theme. For Smelyanskaya, sainthood for the Romanovs is "the first step" toward Russians generally repenting for the sins of the Soviet regime.
"In principle, the Russian leaders are not repenting," she said. "We must." (posted 7 August 2000)
Published by the San Jose Mercury News, August 6, 2000
by Archbishop Vsevolod of Scopelos Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the
USA
from Orthodox
Christian News Service, 7 August 2000
From several vantage points, this letter to the Patriarch must be considered odd, even unprecedented. In its very form of address, the text violates the accepted forms of writing within the Orthodox praxis. One properly addresses such a letter to "His Divine All Holiness, BARTHOLOMEW, Archbishop of Constantinople and New Rome and Ecumenical Patriarch", and one begins by asking for the Ecumenical Patriarch's blessing. The text before us does neither one.
Since it is completely incredible that the Hierarchical Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church" [Moscow Patriarchate] could possibly be ignorant of the correct title of the Ecumenical Patriarch, one is forced to conclude that the much-diminished form of address which this letter in fact uses is a deliberate insult. It is intended to deny the well-known authority of the Ecumenical Patriarch, the primus inter pares, to receive appeals from throughout the Orthodox world. The authors of this text evidently wish to place the Ecumenical Patriarch on, at most, the same level as the Patriarch of Moscow, or even to advance Moscow's well-known ambition to replace Constantinople as the Protothrone of Orthodoxy.
The failure to ask for the Ecumenical Patriarch's blessing is probably also a deliberate affront, since the only "blessing" which the authors of this letter want is the Ecumenical Patriarch's absence. Considering the content of the letter, it is perhaps appropriate that they have not requested any blessing; His All Holiness could hardly be expected to bless the body of the letter.
On the face of it, the letter is an attempt to convince the Ecumenical Patriarch to refrain from any intervention in the existing ecclesiastical divisions among Orthodox Christians in Ukraine. There have been repeated petitions from many persons, including hierarchs, clergy and laity, pleading with the Ecumenical Throne to intervene and to attempt to restore order. The Ukrainian Government has several times appealed to the Ecumenical Patriarch. No one can accuse the Ecumenical Patriarchate of having acted hastily; this situation has been growing worse for more than a decade, and the Ecumenical Patriarch has very patiently waited, in the hopes that healing could take place without the need for Constantinople to intervene. However, healing has not taken place, so it appears that the Ecumenical Throne is deciding to act.
What arguments against such intervention does this text propose? First, the text claims that a majority of Eastern Orthodox faithful in Ukraine belong to the Moscow Patriarchate's Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The text gives no estimate of the number of these believers, and Ukrainian census figures do not support this claim. The text also claims that the Moscow Patriarchate's Ukrainian Orthodox Church now has over 8,500 parishes. This is certainly interesting and relevant information; one would like to see a list of these parishes, and some external support for this claim. If it is true, then it is also true that this represents a majority of the total number of Eastern Orthodox parishes in Ukraine. But that does not prove that a majority of the Orthodox faithful support the Moscow Patriarchate, nor does it prove (as the text alleges) that a majority of the Ukrainian Orthodox faithful are happy with a state of dependence upon the Moscow Patriarchate. It remains true that a large, significant number of Eastern Orthodox parishes adhere to one or another of the Orthodox judicatories in Ukraine, which do not recognize the authority of the Moscow Patriarchate. As the text itself implies, there are large areas of Ukraine in which the Moscow Patriarchate's Church is practically non-existent.
The text repeatedly accuses politicians of being to blame for the ecclesiastical divisions among the Ukrainian Orthodox, and employs emotional language with reference to these un-named politicians. The text of course assumes that all righteousness and morality are on the side of the Moscow Patriarchate, and that those who reject the authority of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine are offenders of Church discipline, unrepentant divisive groups and so on. There is not even a hint of recognition that the Moscow Patriarchate and its followers in Ukraine have played any part at all in bringing about these divisions. Calling others to repentance would be more convincing if there was evidence that the Moscow Patriarchate is itself willing to repent, and to acknowledge its share of the responsibility for the crisis.
The text lays claim to some "status of wide autonomy enjoyed by being in canonical unity with the Patriarchate of Moscow." If the Moscow Patriarchate has granted "autonomy" to its Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the other Local Orthodox Churches have not been informed of this development, nor has any such document been published. Moscow refers to this Ukrainian Orthodox Church as "independent and self-governing", but these are not canonical terms, nor is it clear what, if anything, they mean.
The text asserts that "this division in Ukraine can only be removed by measures from within". That is not self-evident. The efforts at measures from within over the past ten years or so have only made matters worse. This is particularly true of the hasty and ill-considered "anathema" against Michael or Philaret Denysenko, whom the Moscow Patriarchate previously exalted and now anathematizes; who once supported Moscow and now styles himself Patriarch of Kiev. The divisions in Ukraine are reverberating elsewhere in the Orthodox world: in Bulgaria, in Greece, in Western Europe and in North America. It is imperative that the Ecumenical Throne address this matter urgently, since the "measures from within" are clearly not improving the situation.
Divisions involving thousands of parishes, as is the case in Ukraine, are not just an internal affair of the specific Local Church; such divisions are of legitimate concern to all the Local Orthodox Churches. One scarcely needs to demonstrate this; how could the Local Churches not be concerned for such a matter?
Most ominously of all, this text includes a completely unacceptable threat to the August Person of the Ecumenical Patriarch, and to the profound ecclesiastical unity of the Orthodox Church. In words of the most unprecedented insolence, "the Hierarchal Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church" [Moscow Patriarchate] has dared to write: "Any participation of Your Holiness in their reckless moves could jeopardize Your own personal authority and Your authority as Patriarch of Constantinople. And what is even more dangerous, it could draw out a crisis or even a division in the Orthodox world, which could remind everyone about the consequences of the tragedy of 1054."
This goes much too far. It is impermissible for anyone at all to presume to address the Ecumenical Throne with such offensive language, which is clearly intended to threaten and intimidate the Ecumenical Patriarch. The Phanar will do well to return this letter to those who sent it, with a note saying that in view of the violation of churchly order which this letter represents, those who are accusing others of a lack of discipline and of divisiveness would do well to repent of such threats, to learn to address ecclesiastical authorities with the accustomed deference, and to give honor to those to whom honor is due.
These insulting threats betray the realization that the arguments put forth to persuade the Ecumenical Throne to refuse to intervene in Ukraine are hopelessly weak and unconvincing. Thus the only hope Moscow has of persuading the Ecumenical Throne to refuse the appeals from Ukraine is the use of sheer intimidation. Moscow, through her agents in Ukraine, is telling Constantinople "stay out of Ukraine and let Moscow do whatever Moscow wishes, or Moscow will make a new schism and lay claim to the leadership of the Orthodox world" - in other words, another attempt to make Moscow the "Third Rome". This has been tried before; it has never succeeded in the past and there is no particular reason to think that it would succeed now. In the present circumstances, the Patriarchate of Moscow has quite enough to do to heal the terrible wounds, which the Church of Russia has suffered at the hands of the Communists, instead of threatening the unity of world Orthodoxy and struggling desperately to maintain an ecclesiastical colony in Ukraine so as to support the political ambitions of the Russian state.
In any event, the authors of this present text must absolutely be rebuked and reminded that such insults and threats can have no place in the ordered life of the Orthodox Church. (posted 7 August 2000)
Released by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church
of USA, August 3, 2000
SOME COMMENTS ON THE "DECLARATION OF THE HIERARCHICAL COUNCIL OF THE UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH" (Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine)
by Archbishop Vsevolod of Scopelos Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the
USA
from Orthodox
Christian News Service, 7 August 2000
A copy of this undated, unsigned four-page Ukrainian text has just reached me, with a request for my analysis of it.
The background for this text is simple enough: President Leonid Kuchma and the Ukrainian government have asked the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople to intervene, in an effort to mediate among the divided factions of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. This is because the current state of divisions is detrimental to the Orthodox Church and, therefore, to Ukrainian society, since the Orthodox are by far the largest religious body in Ukraine. The Moscow Patriarchate does not want such an intervention from Constantinople, for two underlying reasons:
a) the Moscow Patriarchate is not disposed in general to accept the right or privilege of Constantinople to mediate, even when there is an invitation to Constantinople to do so, and b) the Moscow Patriarchate fears that any impartial mediation is apt to reach a decision critical of Moscow's role in the Ukrainian Orthodox ecclesiastical problematic.
That is clear, but the text does not give either of those reasons, since the writers of the text would find them embarrassing. Instead, the text argues that the government's attempt to facilitate a reconciliation is politically motivated. Well, of course it is; who would deny it? Governments normally act for political reasons. But the text ignores the salient point: the Ukrainian government is not attempting to dictate the terms of the solution. The government is merely appealing (as anyone is entitled to do) to the relevant Orthodox higher authority: the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, to seek for a way out of the dilemma.
The most that the government can do is to launch such an appeal, and then assist the Ecumenical Patriarchate in technical ways (such as arranging transportation and lodging, providing facilities for meetings - perhaps providing translators and so on). Ecclesiastical questions will remain the exclusive preserve of the Church.
The text attempts to muddy the waters by writing as if the government were trying to create some sort of Ukrainian super-Church, uniting the various "confessions" in Ukraine without regard to Orthodox dogma or ecclesiological principles. The facts do not support this implication: the government has not, for example, suggested that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and/or the Ukrainian Evangelical Baptists should be involved in any way at all in the process of healing the internal divisions of Ukrainian Orthodoxy.
Thus the example cited in the text of the Emperor Heraclius and the Monothelite heresy has absolutely nothing to do with the case. No "heresy" is in question within Ukrainian Orthodoxy. No doubt there is ignorance, but nobody is seriously setting up false doctrines in the name of Orthodoxy. Furthermore, there is not the slightest reason to suspect that the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople is in support of any heresy, open or covert, or that the Ecumenical Throne would lend itself to the support of any heresy, even if asked to do so by some secular government. Monothelitism has not been a problem in Ukraine.
The text complains of the absence of an awareness of the principles of Orthodox ecclesiology, and a neglect of the spiritual-mystical aspect of the Church. No doubt that complaint is justified. But one must seek the cause of this absence, this neglect. For centuries, the Russian Church, in close alliance with the Russian government (be it Tsarist, Communist, or the present regime) has treated the Ukrainian Orthodox like a combination colony and cash cow. Neither the principles of Orthodox ecclesiology nor the spiritual-mystical aspect of the Church justified the suppression of the distinctive Kievan liturgical tradition (as found, for example, in the Trebnyk and Leitourgiarion of Saint Peter (Mohyla)), let alone the actual suppression of the historic Metropolitanate of Kiev. But the Russian Church did both of these. To this day, the Moscow Patriarchate's "independent and self-governing Ukrainian Orthodox Church" is unable to provide Ukrainian-speaking monks for the Pochaiv Lavra or the Pechers'ka Lavra.
The very position of this "independent and self-governing" Church, which is neither autocephalous nor autonomous, is a serious ecclesiological anomaly, which the text before us ignores completely. What sort of ecclesiastical entity is this, and by virtue of what canons has it been established?
The text complains of "nationalism" on the part of the government, and on the part of those who seek to heal the divisions in Ukrainian Orthodoxy. When one dispassionately reviews the record of the Moscow Patriarchate's behavior in Ukraine, one can understand that patriotic Ukrainians have had their fill of Moscow's ecclesiastical interference in their country. Even now the Moscow Patriarchate is openly allied with the Russian government in seeking to promote the "re-union" of Ukraine and Belarus with Russia, to integrate these three countries into one "Great Russian" state. Recently the Moscow Patriarchate organized a so-called "religious pilgrimage" to promote this blatantly political aim. The text's pious assertion that the Ukrainian government is nationalist is a striking example of "the pot calling the kettle black".
Curiously, the text looks with horror on any notion of involving the rest of the Orthodox Local Churches in the discussion. This attitude itself betrays the absence of an awareness of the principles of Orthodox ecclesiology, and a neglect of the spiritual-mystical aspect of the Church. The Local Orthodox Churches are administratively independent of one another, certainly, but that does not mean that they are indifferent to one another's problems. Still less does it mean that the Local Orthodox Churches should be kept in ignorance of a schism which involves millions of Orthodox Christians and which is spreading to Western Europe and North America.
The notion that the representatives of other Local Churches cannot possibly assist in the healing of a schism is un-historic and ridiculous. When an agreement cannot be reached internally, it is normal to call for help. The real agenda here is the claim that Moscow and Moscow alone is the relevant authority. But Moscow is also one of the offending parties, which makes Moscow an unlikely candidate for an impartial arbiter.
In another attempt to avoid clarity, the text suddenly announces that its writers (presumably the hierarchs of the Moscow Patriarchate's Ukrainian Orthodox Church) are unable to participate in any discussion with "the anathematized Michael Denysenko" - in other words, with "Patriarch Philaret", as his claimed Kyivan Patriarchate and the Ukrainian government style him. If this were not such a serious matter, it would be amusing: not so very many years ago the Moscow Patriarchate used to send the then-Metropolitan Philaret to numerous important meetings around the world as an "expert in Orthodox canon law". It was the Moscow Patriarchate that used state force and violence to enthrone Philaret in Saint Sophia's Cathedral in Kiev. Is it possible that Moscow's more recent anathema against Philaret (or Michael) Denysenko is merely a falling out among thieves?
But the seriousness of the situation does not permit us to dwell on this bit of irony. The point here is that this "anathema" does not serve the best interests of the Orthodox Church. Moscow's clumsy handling of the ecclesiastical problematic in Ukraine has created this problem, and the "anathema" only makes matters worse. The practical situation of the moment is that Philaret and his followers are a significant element within the Ukrainian Orthodox mosaic in Ukraine; an attempt to achieve a resolution of these divisions without even speaking to Philaret is doomed from the start.
There is no reason at all to think that Moscow's continued attempt to maintain religious (and political) hegemony over Ukraine will lead to ecclesiastical peace - quite the contrary. The Ukrainian Government's appeal for intervention from Constantinople is based firmly on Orthodox tradition and on the lessons of Orthodox history. That intervention can only succeed if it is based on sound Orthodox ecclesiology and dogmatic teaching, and if all the various factions within Ukrainian Orthodoxy are able to recognize that they are receiving a sympathetic, peaceful hearing. All the anathemas which have been hurled must of course be lifted; in a situation such as this one, where dogmatic teachings are not involved and where there is plenty of blame to go around, judgment must be left to Almighty God.
The text has one point that is strong: the text argues that Ukraine at the moment is not ready to receive the blessing of a fully autocephalous Church. However, it does not therefore follow that Ukraine should remain an ecclesiastical colony of Moscow. Rather, it would be far more sensible for the Ecumenical Patriarchate to assume a well-defined, temporary ecclesiastical tutelage, for long enough to reorganize theological education and monastic life, with the clear goal of erecting a fully developed Local Church headed by a Patriarch of Kiev.
If Moscow's position, as set forth in this text, were to prevail, and Constantinople refrained from any effort to respond to the appeal for help, the result will be more divisions, more drift, and the continued weakening of Orthodoxy in Ukraine. These divisions scandalize the faithful and bring joy to all types of sectarians, to say nothing of un-Christian cults. Piously folding our hands and telling all the Orthodox in Ukraine that they really must submit to Moscow is a recipe for the destruction of Orthodoxy in Ukraine. (posted 7 August 2000)
Released by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of USA, August 3, 2000
Today an Appeal of the Union of Orthodox Citizens of the city of Odessa to the bishops' council of RPTs was distributed in which the request of the union to the upcoming bishops' council was expressed in the following points:
1. To declare in a separate point firmly and uncompromisingly that the unity of the Russian Orthodox church is not a matter for discussion and thus the autocephaly of UPTs is unacceptable.
2. To recognize that any expansion of the autonomy of UPTs actually means the autocephaly of the latter and therefore is unacceptable.
3. To study the experience of the autonomous existence of UPTs taking into account the foregoing arguments.
4. Relying upon the heritage of the great prelate Tikhon, patriarch of all-Russia, to liquidate the autonomy of UPTs and to return to it the status of an exarchate of the Russian Orthodox church.
5. To make a very precise canonical assessment of the anti-Orthodox schismatic actions of the Constantinopolitan patriarchate, taking into account the negative experience of the compromise on the question of the Estonian Orthodox church. (tr. by PDS, posted 7 August 2000)
Pravoslavnaia gazeta
from Communications Service, OVTsS MP, 7 August 2000
The Evangelism Department of the Ekaterinburg diocese conducted a sociologi cal investigation among residents of the October district of the provincial center. Those questions included 550 persons, both men and women, of all age groups.
Department workers were interested in the attitude of citizens toward faith in general, as well as toward nontraditional religions and the "Jehovah's Witnesses" sect, in particular.
An average of 51.3% of those questioned called themselves believing people. At the same time the quantity of believing women in several microdistricts reached 62%, while among men religiosity did not exceed 50.8%. 28.9% of those questioned consider themselves nonbelievers, including 36.8% of the men and 26.8% of the women. Every fifth person (19.8%) found it difficult to answer the question regarding attitude toward faith.
Attitude toward sects, according to the data received, was predominantly negative: 74% of men and 86% of women expressed their negative attitude toward the activity of nontraditional cults. 7.8% said that they had a positive attitude and 21.6% were indifferent.
The number of people who know of the "Jehovah's Witnesses" sect was relatively high, more than a third of those questioned. 7.1% of the 550 respondents declared that Jehovah's Witnesses had gone to their homes inviting them to attend their meetings.
The Evangelism Department plans in the future to investigate the degree of activity of the sects in the city, as well as to conduct prophylactic measures to prevent new members being attracted to the sects. (tr. by PDS, posted 7 August 2000)
If material is quoted, please give credit to the publication
from which it came.
It is not necessary to credit this Web page. If material
is transmitted electronically, please include reference to the URL, http://www.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/.