FINDINGS: Religious freedom conditions in Russia continue to
deteriorate. In the past year, the government increased its use of
anti-extremist legislation against religious groups that are not known
to use or advocate violence. National and local government officials
also harass religious groups they view as non-traditional and Muslims
through enforcement of other laws. Difficulties include: denials of
registration; detention and harassment of members of religious
communities; and delays and refusals to permit construction of or grant
permits to rent places of worship. Russian officials continue to
describe certain religious and other groups as alien to Russian culture
and society, thereby contributing to a climate of intolerance.
Continued high levels of xenophobia and intolerance, including
anti-Semitism, have resulted in violent and sometimes lethal hate
crimes. Despite increased prosecution for violent hate crimes, the
Russian government chronically has failed to address these serious
problems consistently or effectively. Based on these concerns, USCIRF
again places Russia on its Watch List in 2010. The Commission has
reported on Russia every year since 1999, but placed Russia on the
Watch List for the first time in 2009.
While concerns about the Expert Religious Studies Council established
by the Ministry of Justice in 2009 have not resulted in official limits
on religious freedom, Russia adopted several policies in 2009 that
violate its constitutional provisions on secularism and the equal
status of all religions. Specifically, the new official military
chaplains and school curricula on religion are limited to the four
religions officially viewed as traditional (Russian Orthodoxy, Islam,
Buddhism and Judaism). Numerous violent hate crimes against members of
various religious communities continue to occur. Violent chauvinistic
groups have targeted individuals, groups, and judges and other
government officials who defend and enforce minority rights. Although
Moscow police officials stepped up arrests and prosecution of violent
chauvinists in 2009, most other regions lagged behind.
PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS: As part of its “reset” of bilateral
relations, freedom of religion or belief should be an important issue
in the U.S.-Russia bilateral relationship, recognizing that it is both
a human rights and security concern in Russia. Although Russia does
face genuine domestic security concerns, as evidenced most recently in
the March Moscow Metro bombings, the U.S. and international community
should press Russia to reform its overly broad law on extremism and
ensure that it is not being used against peaceful religious believers,
which risks increasing radicalism and instability. The U.S. should
implement the “Smith Amendment” of the 2010 Consolidated Appropriations
Act to prohibit U.S. financial assistance to the Russian Federation
government due to its official policies on religious groups,
particularly its wide use of the extremism law. The U.S. also should
institute a visa ban and freeze the assets of Chechen President Ramzan
Kadyrov due to his leadership of the Chechen armed forces, which the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has found involved in severe
human rights abuses. U.S.-funded grants to NGOs should include the
promotion of international legal guarantees on freedom of religion or
belief, and U.S.-funded exchange programs should include participants
from Russian regions with sizeable Muslim and other religious minority
populations. In addition, the United States should initiate
International Visitor’s Programs for Russian officials on the
prevention and prosecution of hate crimes. Additional recommendations
for U.S. policy toward Russia can be found at the end of this chapter.
Religious Freedom Conditions
Overall Human Rights Climate
In recent years, Russia has steadily retreated from democratic reform,
endangering post-Soviet human rights gains, including those regarding
freedom of religion or belief. Evidence of this general retreat
includes further limitations on media freedom and on political parties,
tighter controls on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and religious
communities, concerted harassment of human rights activists and
organizations, legal restrictions on freedom of assembly, and
constraints on popular referenda. Increasingly, Russian journalists,
lawyers and others who have defended human rights— particularly those
who seek to bring such violations to international attention-- have
been subjected to brazen killings and attacks, and the perpetrators
usually act with impunity. Moreover, Moscow opposed international
efforts to draw attention to these serious problems by terming such
inquiries “meddling” or “interference in internal affairs.” This sharp
deterioration in the human rights climate appears to be a direct
consequence of the authoritarian stance of the Russian government as
well as the growing influence of chauvinistic groups in Russian
society. Russia’s weak judicial system, inconsistent adherence to the
rule of law, and local officials’ arbitrary decisions in regard to the
status of the four so-called traditional religions have also
contributed to chronic problems for the country’s diverse religious
communities. Official respect for freedom of religion or belief varies
widely over Russia’s vast territory depending on the personal views of
regional Ministry of Justice officials or even governors. For example,
Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov has declared that his republic “would
be better off” if it were ruled by sharia law, and he has also
justified polygamy and honor killings. Moreover, government respect for
the legal rights of a religious community is often dependent on that
group’s relationship with individual state officials.
Application of Extremism Laws
As is the case in many other countries, the Russian government faces
major challenges as it addresses extremism and acts of terrorism that
claim a religious linkage, while also protecting freedom of religion or
belief and other human rights. The post-Soviet revival of Islam, along
with the ongoing violence throughout the North Caucasus, compound
difficulties for the Russian government in dealing with its 20 million
Muslims, the country’s second largest religious community. As evidenced
by the March 2010 terrorist attacks in the Moscow metro, Russia faces
security threats from domestic terrorism, particularly those related to
violence in the North Caucasus. The North Caucasus region also faces
chronic instability due to severe economic dislocation, especially
among young men; certain radical foreign influences on indigenous
Muslims, and endemic corruption and local political grievances,
particularly in Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria.
All these factors fuel increasingly widespread and sometimes violent
expressions of popular dissatisfaction by Muslims with the local and
national Russian government.
Human rights groups report that, particularly in the North Caucuses,
Muslims perceived as “overly observant” have been killed, disappeared,
or arrested on vague official accusations of alleged Islamist extremism
or for allegedly displaying Islamist sympathies, without any proven
relationship to Islamist militancy. There are also at least 200 cases
of Muslims who have been imprisoned on the basis of evidence, including
banned religious literature, drugs, or weapons, allegedly planted by
the police. Persons suspected of involvement in alleged Islamist
extremism have also reportedly been subjected to torture and
ill-treatment in pre-trial detention, prisons, and labor camps. In
2009, Amnesty International accused the Russian Internal Ministry’s
Center for Extremism Prevention (known as Center “E”) of engaging in
torture to extract confessions from suspects. Muslim prisoners in the
Murmansk oblast filed a case in the ECtHR in 2008 alleging official
mistreatment on the basis of their religion. The Russian government has
specifically equated the practice of Islam outside of
government-approved structures with extremism and even terrorism. In a
2008 joint order, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), Procuracy
General, and Ministry of Internal Affairs accused “Muslim communities
and preachers not dependent on the Muslim Spiritual Directorates
(MSDs)” of “extremism under cover of Islam.” The director of the
Interior Ministry’s Department for the Prevention of Extremism has also
said that young Muslims who refuse to participate in the official MSDs
thereby “transformed themselves” into antigovernment militants.
Russia’s 2002 Extremism Law broadly defines extremist activity in a
religious context. It refers to “propaganda of the exclusivity,
superiority or inferiority of citizens according to their attitude
towards religion or religious affiliation; incitement of religious
hatred; obstruction of the lawful activity of religious associations
accompanied by violence or the threat of violence; committing a crime
motivated by religious hatred.” Russian government officials have used
this provision to deny the verbal claims of the superiority of
religious ideas, which is a basic tenet of religious freedom. In 2006,
the legal definition of extremism was expanded to encompass “violation
of the rights and freedoms of the person and citizen” and “harm to the
health or property of citizens in connection with their beliefs.” In
2007, the definition was expanded to include “obstruction of the lawful
activity (…) of social, religious or other organizations” without
requiring the threat or application of actual violence. In addition,
those alleged to have defended or even expressed sympathy with
individuals charged with extremism were also made liable to charges of
extremism. The Extremism Law also empowers the Procurator-General to
file a suit against private organizations, including religious ones,
after just one warning. The organization has two months after the
warning to correct the alleged violation, and, if it does not do so,
the Procurator-General may then file suit to close the organization.
Under the Extremism Law, any Russian court may rule literature
extremist. After such a ruling, the text is automatically added to the
Justice Ministry’s official list of extremist materials and is banned
throughout Russia. Anyone who publishes or distributes a banned text on
the list faces a potential fouryear prison term. The list, which was
established in July 2007 with 14 titles, included 573 items as of
February 2010. Islamic materials reportedly constitute the majority of
the religious items; 52 Jehovah’s Witnesses publications were added in
the past year. Although the extremism law does not expressly prohibit
private ownership of such material, the Russian police have interpreted
the law in that fashion. The mass distribution, preparation, or storage
of titles banned as extremist may also result in prosecution under
Criminal Code Article 282 (“incitement of ethnic, racial or religious
hatred”), with potential penalties ranging from a fine to up to five
years in prison. Violators may also be prosecuted under Article 20.29
of the Administrative Violations Code (“production and distribution of
extremist material”), with penalties ranging from a fine to a maximum
of a 15-day term of detention.
In 2003, the Russian Supreme Court banned 15 Muslim groups for alleged
ties to international terrorism without adequate process, review, or
transparency. It was not until 2006 that the official government
newspaper Rossiiskaya gazeta published the Federal Security Service
list of terrorist-designated organizations, even though such
publication is a pre-condition for the ruling to have legal standing.
Furthermore, the published list of the banned groups included 17
groups, without providing any reason for the inclusion of the two
others. In May 2009, the Tabligh Jamaat was also officially banned in
Russia for extremism. The Russian General Prosecutor maintained that
Tabligh Jamaat is a radical organization whose goal is the
re-establishment of an Islamic caliphate, but some human rights
activists claimed that the organization scrupulously follows the law
and exists only to educate people about Islam. According to the State
Department, the Tabligh Jamaat is an “Islamic missionary organization”
that is not known to have used or advocated violence. Human rights
groups are concerned that the 2003 ruling has facilitated arbitrary
detentions, convictions and imprisonment of hundreds of individuals on
extremism charges for unproven ties to the banned groups. Some Muslims
have claimed that they were beaten or tortured by police in an effort
to force them to testify against other suspects.
The chair of Russia’s officially-approved Council of Muftis, Ravil
Gainutdin, has accused some local courts of “poor understanding of
religious and theological issues,” noting that courts had banned as
extremist books recommended by his own council, such as “The
Personality of a Muslim,” a Koran-based life guide that espouses
kindness, including towards non-Muslims. In May 2008, a criminal case
for “incitement of religious hatred” was brought against Aslambek
Ezhayev, the head of the Publishing Department of the Moscow Islamic
University, which had printed “The Personality of a Muslim.”
Authorities later dropped the incitement charge, but in March 2009
charged Ezhayev with copyright violations and use of harmful software.
In 2007, a Russian court banned as extremist the Russian translations
of fourteen parts of Risale-i Nur (Messages of Light), Turkish
theologian’s Said Nursi’s commentaries on the Koran and Islam. In 2008,
a lawyer from Izhevsk filed a case in the ECtHR challenging the ban on
Nursi’s writings. Russia’s Human Rights Ombudsman has denounced the ban
on Nursi’s writings, warning that “it is very important that we do not
allow interference in the convictions and beliefs of millions of
citizens on the poorly grounded, unproven pretext of fighting against
extremism.” Since the Nursi texts were first banned in 2007, there have
been dozens of police raids throughout Russia of individuals suspected
of reading or owning his works, and seizures of those works; criminal
charges have also been initiated against some individuals. More
recently, official accusations of extremism have been leveled against
Jehovah’s Witnesses. In December 2009, the Russian Supreme Court upheld
a court decision liquidating the Jehovah’s Witness congregation in the
city of Taganrog, partly on the grounds that 34 of its texts are
extremist. As a result of this decision, all of the congregation’s
property will be seized and the congregation will not be allowed to
meet as a community. In addition, in January 2009 a city court in
Altai, in the Gorno-Altai republic, ruled 16 Jehovah’s Witness
publications extremist. Since these rulings, numerous members of the
Jehovah’s Witnesses community across Russia have been detained by
police for up to several hours, usually without official documentation.
In one recent example, a Jehovah’s Witness who was driving on the main
Moscow-Ryazan road in March 2010 was stopped by traffic police to check
for the transport of extremist literature. Although he did not have
literature on the federal list of banned texts, he nevertheless was
ordered to report to local police.
In May 2009, authorities in the town of Ramon in the Voronezh region
detained two Jehovah’s Witnesses, allegedly on suspicion of involvement
in local robberies. When the men denied the allegations, police
reportedly forced one to confess by making him wear a gas mask to which
they cut off the oxygen supply, subjecting him to electric shock, and
threatening him with sexual assault. The police later released both men
and dropped all charges. Jehovah’s Witnesses view their recent official
treatment unfortunately as reminiscent of the Soviet era. In February
2010, 160,000 members of this community distributed 12 million copies
of a publication making this comparison and refuting official
allegations that they are extremist. In Nizhny Novgorod in late
February 2010, two Jehovah’s Witnesses, one a minor, were detained by
police for distributing this leaflet. Although the father tried to
enter the room in the police station where his son was detained, the
son was first interrogated alone. When the boy refused to answer
questions, he reportedly was told that documents confirming he had
parents would be burnt and he would be sent to an orphanage.
In February 2010, armed police in the city of Kaluga, acting on a tip
about a “sect” using “extremist” literature, raided a Lutheran
ordination service attended by Archbishop Iosif Baron of the Augsburg
Lutheran Church. During the one-hour search, copies of the Bible and
hymnals were the only texts discovered; nevertheless, the church’s
pastor was summoned to the local police station.
The Official Distinction between Traditional and Non-Traditional
Religions
Despite provisions in the Russian constitution establishing a secular
state with equal legal status for all religions as well as the 1997
religion law’s declaration that all religions are equal under the law,
the preface to that law claims that only four religions—Russian
Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism— have traditional status in the
country. The de facto favored status of the Moscow Patriarchate Russian
Orthodox Church (MPROC) also results in official discrimination against
other religious groups, including the other three officially
traditional faiths. Russian government officials and police also have
made frequent negative comments about Protestant and other religious
communities. Official statements have stressed the alien character and
foreign funding of these communities. Such statements have gone so far
as to imply espionage, much as the Soviet system promoted suspicion of
enemies, traitors and “wreckers” of society. Such allegations
contribute to a climate of intolerance that has led to discrimination
and hate crimes. The MPROC claims adherents among 60 percent of
Russians and has a special role in Russian history and culture. The
MPROC receives the bulk of Russian state support for religious groups,
including subsidies for church maintenance and construction. For
example, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced on Orthodox Christmas
in January 2010 that the Russian government would provide almost $100
million to restore holy sites, monasteries and churches destroyed by
the Soviet government. Nevertheless, Islam, Buddhism and Judaism also
sometimes benefit from government funding, as do other groups. For
example, the Moscow city government has funded major renovations of the
buildings of Old Believers, which in the 1600s was Russia’s majority
Orthodox community but is not part of the MPROC. In December 2009, the
Kremlin signed a concordat with the Vatican. The MPROC has special
arrangements with numerous government agencies and bodies to conduct
religious education and to provide spiritual counseling, including with
the Ministries of Education, Defense, Health, Internal Affairs, and
Emergency Situations. For example, the vast majority of religious
facilities in Russian prisons are Russian Orthodox.
In July 2009, President Medvedev issued an executive order establishing
state-funded military chaplains. By January 2010, 200 MPROC clergy had
been appointed to Russian military units. Under the executive order,
Muslims, Jews, or Buddhists must comprise 10 percent of a military unit
before an official chaplain of that religion would be appointed.
According to a Russian Defense Ministry survey, two-thirds of the
country’s soldiers are religious adherents, and of these, 83 percent
are Russian Orthodox, eight percent are Muslims, and the remaining nine
percent are from other religions or denominations, including
Protestants. The Slavic Center for Law and Justice observes that the
survey is replete with “insulting remarks against those religious
associations that do not belong to the announced four ‘traditional’
religions.”
In addition to the military chaplains paid by the Russian state, an
estimated total of 2,000 MPROC priests also work in the Russian
military, as do a small number of Muslim and Protestant clergy. Various
Russian military units have adopted Russian Orthodox saints in official
insignia and there are MPROC chapels on army bases, but authorities
reportedly rarely allow Islamic services and often deny Muslim
conscripts time for daily prayers or alternatives to pork-based meals.
Also in July 2009, President Medvedev issued an order that, beginning
in September, fourth-grade students in 19 diverse regions of Russia --
ranging from the Muslim-majority North Caucasus to Russian Orthodox
majority areas in Central Russia to the Jewish autonomous region in
Siberia – could, with parental permission, choose to study the new
curriculum of “Foundations of Religious Cultures and Secular Ethics.”
The course is divided into three sections over six months: one on
Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism, and Judaism; another on the history of
religious cultures, and a third on secular ethics. Parents are supposed
to be allowed to select, if they wish, one of the three sections for
their children to study. The Russian Ministry of Education claims that
the course is based on, and its teachers will rely on, scholarly
information. Russian human rights groups have reported instances in
which Russian Orthodox Church officials are alleged to have pressured
parents not to allow their children to select the secular ethics
portion of the course.
Parliament also continues its consideration of a draft law to transfer
property of religious significance to religious organizations,
including land, buildings and movable property. The draft law would
grant religious organizations ownership of all historical property in
their use. Currently, religious organizations have the right to use
such property indefinitely, but that property remains Russian state
property. If the draft law is passed – and several informed observers
think its chances of passage are good -- the MPROC would become one of
Russia’s major property holders and Muslim communities will also claim
pre-1917 titles to land and other property. Many Russian cultural
figures oppose this bill because it will remove, for example, many
historical icons from public museums.
Legal Status Issues
Russia’s 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience is complex and contains
numerous ambiguous provisions. The law defines three categories of
religious communities with varying legal status and privileges: groups,
local organizations, and centralized organizations. An unregistered
“religious group” can hold worship services and teach religion to its
members, but lacks legal status to open a bank account, own property,
issue invitations to foreign guests, and publish literature; its
individual members in theory can rent or buy property, and invite
guests to engage in religious instruction, and import religious
material. A “religious organization” requires at least 10 citizen
members to register, either as part of a centralized organization or as
a local organization that has existed for at least 15 years. Since such
organizations are registered, they can conduct activities denied to
unregistered groups, including operating houses of worship, and engage
in religious activities in prisons, public hospitals and the military.
“Centralized religious organizations” are comprised of a minimum of
three local registered organizations and can open local organizations
without a waiting period. A minimum of 50 years of existence is
required for the use of “Russia” or “Russian” in the titles of
religious organizations. Registered groups must re-register annually at
both the national and local levels. The law also allows officials to
bring court cases which may result in decisions to ban the activities
of particular religious communities found to have violated Russian law.
The law’s 15-year existence requirement for religious groups to
register disfavors groups new to the country. Moreover, at the time the
law was enacted it effectively meant that a group must have existed
during the highly restrictive Soviet era. In October 2009, the ECtHR
found that the 15-year requirement violated the European Convention on
Human Rights’ provisions on the freedoms of religion and association.
The case, Kimlya and Others v. Russia, was brought by the Church of
Scientology of Nizhnekamsk, which had been denied registration on the
grounds that it had existed in that locality for less than 15 years.
This ruling could have a major impact on the Russian religion law,
since according to the Russian Constitution, international legal
obligations take precedence over domestic law. Furthermore, in February
2010 the Russian Constitutional Court ordered Russian national courts
to review and change legal decisions after a negative ECtHR ruling,
rather than simply awarding monetary compensation to the plaintiffs, as
had been the usual Russian government practice.
The 1997 law required all religious organizations previously registered
under the more liberal 1990 law to reregister by December 31, 2000.
This process, which involved simultaneous registration at both the
federal and local levels, required considerable time, effort, and legal
expense. Some Pentecostal and Baptist congregations refused to register
out of religious conviction. Reportedly as many as half of the
functioning Muslim communities decided not to undergo the cumbersome
process and some Muslim clerics have reported that since 1999 it has
become “much harder” to register new Muslim communities. At the federal
level, most religious organizations who have applied have been
registered by federal officials and the Russian Constitutional Court.
Religious groups that have gone to court to overturn denials of
registration have often been successful, but local administrative
authorities have sometimes delayed or refused to implement these
rulings. The Salvation Army was finally re-registered in the city of
Moscow in April 2009, as required by the Russian Constitutional Court
in 2002 and the ECtHR in 2006. The Salvation Army case was the first
case involving a religious community where the Russian state took the
remedial action required by the ECtHR, rather than only paying
compensation. According to the Ministry of Justice, as of January 1,
2009 there were 23,078 registered religious groups operating in Russia,
of which 55 percent are affiliated with the MPROC. In 2005 (the last
year for which statistics are available), authorities investigated the
activities of 3,526 religious organizations. The Ministry of Justice
sent notifications of violations to 2,996 such organizations. The
courts issued rulings to liquidate 59 local organizations for alleged
violations of constitutional norms and federal legislation during that
period.
Reports indicate that in 2009 no religious group has been denied
registration due to its lack of required documentation, although some
communities were asked to provide updated data. On other grounds,
however, the Russian authorities continued to deny registration to
certain religious communities, such as the Falun Gang and
Scientologists.
After Aleksandr Konovalov was named Russian Minister of Justice in
2008, two individuals known for their intolerant views were appointed
to senior positions: Aleksei Velichko, as Deputy Justice Minister, and
Sergei Milushkin, as director of the Department of Noncommercial
organizations. These two officials were dismissed in early 2010. The
Justice Ministry, however, has expanded its activities in 2009 to
include oversight over unregistered as well as registered religious
communities. For example, in March 2009 the Ministry replaced a 1998
law on the status of representational offices of foreign religious
organizations operating in Russia; the new law set complex registration
procedures, including for proving registration and establishing an
official register. In October 2009, the Ministry of Justice proposed
amendments to the 1997 religion law to require every religious
community, even if they do not plan to apply for registration, to
provide the government a membership list, unlike the current law that
requires religious organizations to provide such a list only during the
registration process. The proposal also called for closer regulation of
“missionary activity,” mandating that anyone engaged in missionary
activity outside of designated religious sites must present proof of
authorization by the relevant religious association or such activity
would be banned. After protests from religious groups and by some
Russian officials, in November 2009 the proposed amendments were
removed from the Ministry of Justice’s website.
Russia’s 2006 NGO law granted the Ministry of Justice extensive
oversight functions which also apply to religious communities. The law
enables the Ministry to interfere with the activities of NGOs, examine
their documents, attend their meetings with advance notice, and
initiate court proceedings which may deny the registration of groups.
NGOs are also required to submit detailed annual reports on their
activities, governing bodies, and funding, including from foreign
sources. In 2007, after lobbying by the Russian Orthodox Church, the
reporting requirements for religious groups under the NGO law were
reduced, but still required documentation of foreign donations, as well
as the full names, addresses, and passport details of executive board
members. In July 2009, President Medvedev further amended the NGO law
to ease registration and reporting requirements, particularly for small
NGOs. Representatives of numerous religious communities in Moscow
informed USCIRF staff in late 2008 that they had not encountered
difficulties due to the requirements of the NGO law at that time.
Official Religious Affairs Agencies
Governmental mechanisms to interact with religious communities and
monitor implementation of the religion law exist at the national,
regional, and local levels. At the national level, there is a
Presidential Council on Cooperation with Religious Associations,
chaired by the Presidential Administration chief. This Council is
comprised of Presidential Administration officials, academic
specialists, and representatives of traditional and major
non-traditional communities. There also is a Governmental Commission
for the Affairs of Religious Associations. In addition, in 2009 the
Ministry of Justice established two new bodies in this area: an Expert
Religious Studies Council and a Council for the Expert Analysis of
Religious Literature with regard to Extremism.
The Expert Religious Studies Council has wide powers to recommend
investigations of religious groups during the registration procedure,
to assess if a registered community’s activity is in accord with its
charter, and to ascertain if an organization, one of its members, or
the literature it produces or distributes is extremist. While
governments must combat acts of violent extremism as part of their
obligation to protect citizens, there have been numerous expressions of
concern over the establishment, composition, and expansive mandate of
this Council. Aleksandr Dvorkin, the Council’s chairman, is Russia’s
most prominent “anti-cult” activist and lacks academic credentials as a
religion specialist. His deputy, Roman Silantyev, has written numerous
intolerant articles on Islam. The Council’s members include five
individuals known for their “anti-sect” activities. As a result,
observers are concerned that the council may call for the closure of
minority religious communities, although thus far the council’s only
known official recommendation has been to declare Russia’s 70,000
member Yezidi community eligible for registration. Nevertheless,
Council members continue to make intolerant (or absurd) public
comments: in a May 2009 Radio Vesti interview, Dvorkin stated that the
“tiny, totalitarian Church of Scientology was the government religion
of the United States.”
The Council for Expert Analysis of Religious Literature with Regard to
Extremism is chaired by Vitaly Naumkin, a member of the Russian Academy
Sciences Oriental Institute, with his deputy, Aleksandr Zaluzhny, a
professor on the national security faculty at the Russian Academy of
State Service. The role of this Council is advisory; it does not have
the authority to counteract court decisions finding literature
extremist
On the regional and local level, religious organizations interact with
various authorities, including the sub-offices of some of the seven
Plenipotentiary Presidential Representatives that address social and
religious questions. In addition, regional administrations and many
city administrations have named certain officials to interact with
religious organizations.
Restrictions on Places of Worship
Building or renting worship space remains difficult for a number of
religious communities, including Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Pentecostal congregations,
Orthodox groups that do not recognize the Moscow Patriarchate,
Molokans, and Old Believer communities. Protestant, Catholic, Muslim
and some Orthodox congregations also allege inordinate official
interest in fire safety and other details in regard to their worship
buildings, which may result in court-ordered fines, temporary closures
or official demolition threats. In 2009 and 2010, Russian regional and
local officials denied building permits or confiscated buildings
already in use by religious communities. In December 2009, the
administration of the city of Izhevsk again refused, as it has since
2002, a permit to the Evangelical Christian community for church
construction. Another case involved properties of the Russian Orthodox
Autonomous Church (ROAC), which is not affiliated with the Moscow
Patriarchate, in the town of Suzdal. In February 2009, a regional court
ordered that 11 of the ROAC’s historic churches must be returned to the
state; one year later, three more churches in the Suzdal region were
removed. Reportedly, the ROAC may be forced out of its Saint Petersburg
church. The autonomous Russian Orthodox Church (AROC) was ordered by
the Pacific coast city of Vladivostok in December 2009 to vacate its
church building. Nevertheless, several lengthy official refusals
regarding houses of worship were reversed, including for the Lutheran
community in Krasnodar. In addition, the Baptist community and the
MPROC reached a positive settlement regarding a dispute over a house of
worship in Lipetsk. Muslims have also encountered difficulties in
gaining official permission to open and maintain mosques. Although in
2009 local authorities in Balashikh allowed a local mosque to open and
in Tambov Muslim communities were finally granted land for mosque
construction, there reportedly has been no official response to
longstanding requests for permission to build mosques from Muslim
communities in the widely scattered regions of Perm, Oryol, and
Komsomolsk in Chuvashia. In August 2006, the Russian Supreme Court
upheld a lower court decision ordering that the local Muslim community
in the city of Astrakhan on the Caspian pay for the demolition of its
new mosque. In May 2007, the Supreme Court agreed to reconsider the
case. Allegedly, the city’s Muslim community had not received all the
required building permits, although construction of the mosque had been
partly funded by the previous local government. In July 2007, the ECtHR
prioritized the Astrakhan case application and presently is still under
consideration.
Restrictions on Religious Education
Under the 1997 religion law, religious organizations encounter
confusing definitions over what type of religious activity requires an
education license; educational activity might require a license, while
teaching does not. The Smolensk Regional Court dissolved a local
Methodist church for running an unlicensed Sunday school, but in June
2008 Russia’s Supreme Court overturned that ruling. After they sang
hymns in public, members of unregistered Baptist communities in
Kaliningrad were twice detained in 2009 and fined for violating public
assembly rules. In the Ryazan region, police raided an unregistered
Baptist 2009 summer youth camp and charged them with ecological
violations.
Restrictions on Foreign Religious Workers
The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, last updated
in 2000, states that “ensuring national security includes countering
the negative influence of foreign religious organizations and
missionaries.” As in previous years, the Russian authorities in 2008
denied a visa request from the Dalai Lama to visit Buddhist-majority
regions, such as Kalmykia. Over 50 foreign religious workers, including
Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, Buddhists and Jews, have been barred
from Russia since 1998 and only a small number have since been allowed
to return. New visa rules introduced in October 2007 for business or
humanitarian visas, including religious work, permit visa holders to
spend only 90 out of every 180 days in Russia; procedures to extend
visas are lengthy and complex. These visa regulations have had a harsh
impact on many religious organizations, particularly those which for
historical reasons depend upon foreigners, such as the Catholic Church
and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. Three rabbis, one
from the Primorye region and two from Rostov-on-Don, were expelled from
Russia in 2008 on charges of violating their visas by serving as
religious leaders. In 2009, three Jehovah’s Witnesses defense lawyers
were deported from southern Russia. Hate Crimes against Persons and
Property Russian officials, especially on the local level, continue to
respond inadequately to numerous violent hate crimes directed against
members of various religious communities. Moreover, chauvinist groups
have stepped up their campaign against individuals, and some government
officials, and groups who defend the rights of religious and ethnic
minorities as well as migrants, including issuing death threats.
Russian neo- Nazi and other hate groups maintain websites which post
death threats against lawyers, judges, Russian human rights activists
and journalists whom they view as enemies. While Russian police have
offered some assistance to these defenders, their efforts usually are
ineffective and inconsistent. In all too many cases involving members
of Russia’s ethnic and religious minorities -- not to mention the
killings of human rights activists -- Russian authorities, particularly
on the local level, have not treated hate crimes in a serious and
consistent manner. Although police officials in Moscow stepped up
arrests and prosecution of violent chauvinists in 2009, other regions,
particularly Nizhny Novgorod, have lagged behind. Human rights groups
have expressed concern that hate crimes, often the result of attacks by
“skinhead” racist groups, are growing dramatically in Russia,
particularly against people from Central Asia, who are predominantly
Muslim. It should be noted that the number of victims of racist and
neo-Nazi motivated violence in Russia dropped slightly in 2009 from the
very high levels of the six previous years. Some credit belongs to the
Moscow region law enforcement agencies which in the latter half of 2008
and in 2009 undertook more decisive steps against the largest and most
aggressive ultra-nationalist groups. Racists faced concerted and
consistent official pressure, as seen in numerous detentions, arrests
and trials, resulting in at least 45 successful prosecutions of violent
crimes in which hate was as an aggravating factor (compared to 35 in
2008), for a total of 135 convictions. In 2009, according to a leading
Russian human rights group, at least 71 people were killed and at least
33 injured in racist/Neo Nazi violence. These numbers declined from a
high of 109 and 486, respectively, in 2008. Individuals from Central
Asia and the Caucasus, who are predominantly Muslim, were the most
frequent victims in xenophobic attacks. There were 42 documented
violent attacks motivated by religious hatred on individuals from
January 2009 until April 2010: 20 on Jehovah’s Witnesses, 17 on
Muslims, two on Protestants, and two on Russian Orthodox priests.
In addition, from January 2009 until April 2010 there were 65
documented acts of vandalism against the property of religious
communities: Russian Orthodox (27); Jehovah’s Witnesses (23); Jewish
(7); Muslim (3); and one each for Evangelical Protestants, Catholics,
Armenian Orthodox, Mormons, and pagan.
While such cases are usually prosecuted with appropriate charges, very
few cases result in conviction. As a result, members of religious
communities often feel that they lack protection even during religious
services, and express concerns about the security of their
organizations’ property. It is also important to note that neo-Nazi
groups seem to be changing tactics from street attacks on minorities
and migrants to targeted attacks on human rights activists and state
facilities. These groups now more frequently direct their attacks
against government buildings, police stations, military draft offices,
and the homes of law enforcement personnel in efforts to pressure state
authorities to adopt antiimmigrant measures or to take revenge for
official prosecutions. These groups appear to have decided that the
murders of minorities and migrants produce less publicity than the
murders of judges, civil society activists, lawyers and journalists.
Most officials and NGOs agree that many of these attacks are motivated
largely by ethnic intolerance, although religious and ethnic identities
often overlap. Nevertheless, members of Muslim, Jewish, Russian
Orthodox, Protestant, Catholic, and other religious communities have
been subjected to attacks apparently motivated by religious factors.
MPROC priest Daniil Sysoev was shot by a gunman at his Moscow church in
November 2009; Sysoev was known for his missionary activity, including
among Russia’s Muslim community, neo-pagans, and Protestants. In
December 2009, a Moscow court sentenced a Muscovite to a 14-year term
of imprisonment for the October 2008 murder of one of two Roman
Catholic priests. Religious minority leaders have concerns that Russian
government officials provide tacit or active support for a view held by
many ethnic Russians that their country should be reserved for them.
Civil society leaders link this to a perception that Russian identity
is threatened by a declining birthrate and high mortality among ethnic
Russians.
Russian officials also respond inconsistently—and often inadequately—to
violent attacks associated with anti-Semitism. In December 2009, two
Jews were subjected to a violent attack outside a Moscow yeshiva and a
young Jewish man was assaulted by a neo-Nazi who shouted “Heil” in the
Moscow subway. In the latter incident, the alleged attacker was
detained by police but only charged with “minor hooliganism.” In the
city of Khabarovsk, two Molotov cocktails were thrown at a synagogue in
September 2009. Four young “skinheads” were arrested and charged with
arson; on the same night, the home of a police officer in Khabarovsk
who investigates racist crimes was also firebombed. Protestant groups
in Russia are frequent victims of hostile media attacks. Russian human
rights groups report that journalists often seek guidance from the
Russian Orthodox Church when researching articles about Protestants and
the media tend to portray Protestants as dangerous “sectarians.”
Russian rights advocates say that senior Russian government officials
should do more to support publicly the multi-ethnic and
multi-confessional nature of the Russian state and society. In fact,
some western and other observers have suggested that Russian
authorities have manipulated xenophobia for political purposes. The
Kremlin is believed, for example, to have supported the formation of
the ultra-nationalist Rodina political party. It also backed the
five-year-old nationalist youth movement Nashi, which has staged
numerous anti-sectarian public protests. Others have observed that the
Kremlin, by issuing nationalistic statements as well as demonstrating a
tendency to blame non-Russians for crime, has encouraged intolerant
attitudes toward non-Russians and those who do not identify with the
Russian Orthodox Church. In USCIRF’s view, more can and should be done
to ensure that Russian law enforcement agencies do not dismiss hate
crimes as “hooliganism,” but recognize them for what they are—human
rights abuses—and take steps to prevent and punish such crimes,
including those involving ethnicity and religion.
Defamation of Religions
Free speech concerns also arise in connection with several recent law
suits brought under Russia’s law against “insulting religious
feelings.” For example, two cases, allegedly instigated by elements
within the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church, were
brought against Andrei Erofeev, former curator of contemporary art at
the Tretyakov Museum, andYuri Samodurov, former director of the
Sakharov Center, for art shows they organized in 2004 in the Sakharov
Center. As of March 2010, their trial is ongoing. In addition, Russia’s
official Muslim community pressured the Russian version of “Newsweek”
magazine to issue a public apology for reprinting one of the Danish
cartoons of Mohammed in a special issue on Islam in Europe.
U.S. Policy
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton traveled to Moscow in April
2009 and presented a “reset” button to her Russian counterpart Foreign
Minister Sergey Lavrov, signaling that the Obama administration
believes that the future possibilities in U.S.-Russian relations
outweigh the past problems. Under Secretary of State William J. Burns,
who was U.S. ambassador to Russia from 2005 until 2008, has traveled to
Moscow several times in his new role, mainly to broker a fourth UN
Security Council resolution to sanction Iran over its nuclear program.
In the past year, the United States and Russia reached an agreement to
reduce their stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The United States imported
$18 billion in goods from Russia in 2009 and exported just over $5
billion last year. The Obama administration supports Russia’s accession
to the WTO.
According to the State Department’s 2009 Advancing Freedom and
Democracy Report, the overall objective of U.S. human rights policy in
Russia is to “support the country in becoming a more democratic,
vibrant, and stable geopolitical partner that increasingly moves toward
a free-market democratic system built on checks and balances, and acts
as a strong and effective partner in areas of common interest within
the international community.” The State Department seeks “to strengthen
and encourage the Russian government and society's own support for the
development of civil society and respect for the rule of law,” but
admits there are serious impediments, including due to the Russian
government’s restrictions on and harassment of civil society groups and
independent media. According to the 2009 Annual Report on International
Religious Freedom, the U.S. government discusses freedom of religion or
belief with the Russian government, religious groups, NGOs, and others,
as part of its overall policy to promote human rights. The U.S. Embassy
also supports the development of programs to sensitize officials to
recognize discrimination, prejudice, and crimes motivated by ethnic or
religious intolerance.
USCIRF believes that that the issue of freedom of religion or belief
should be given a high priority in the “reset” of bilateral relations,
since it is both a human rights and security concern in Russia.
Although Russia faces domestic security concerns, as evidenced most
recently in the March Moscow Metro bombings, the government’s sweeping
anti-extremism efforts against even peaceful religious believers risk
increasing radicalism and instability.
Recommendations
I. Strengthening U.S. Promotion of Human Rights, including Freedom of
Religion or Belief
The U.S. government should:
• urge, in public and at high political levels, the Russian
government to undertake programs and adopt legal reforms to ensure
respect for international norms on freedom of religion or belief;
• implement the provisions of the “Smith Amendment” of the 2010
Consolidated Appropriations Act (Section 7074 of P.L. 111-117) to
prohibit U.S. financial assistance to the Russian Federation government
due to, inter alia, its discrimination against religious groups through
laws and government actions, excessive application of the extremism
law, and reported restrictions by regional and local officials on
minority religious groups;
• maintain a mechanism to monitor publicly the status of human rights
in Russia, including freedom of religion or belief, particularly in the
case of repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment with respect to Russia,
as well as establish a program to monitor implementation of Russia’s
law on non-commercial organizations (NGO Law), including its impact on
religious organizations;
• organize regular roundtables in Washington with members of the
National Security Council, and representatives of religious communities
and civil society as well as academic specialists, on the status of
freedom of religion or belief in Russia;
• ensure that U.S. government-funded grants to NGOs and other sectors
in Russian society include projects to promote legal protections and
respect for freedom of religion or belief and methods to combat
xenophobia, such as by funding training programs on freedom of religion
or belief, promoting inter-religious cooperation, encouraging
pluralism, and combating hate crimes;
• support programs to train lawyers to contest violations of Russian
and international law regarding freedom of religion or belief in
Russian courts and before the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR);
• translate into Russian and make available, including by posting on
the U.S. Embassy Web site, U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation and
Department of Justice materials on combating hate crimes and
information relating to international standards on freedom of religion
or belief, xenophobia, and hate crimes, including relevant U.S.
Department of State and USCIRF reports;
• ensure that Russia’s citizens have access to U.S.
government-funded radio and TV broadcasts, as well as Internet
communications, including information on freedom of religion or belief
and on combating xenophobia and hate crimes, in particular by:
--restoring the previous levels of Russian-language radio broadcasts of
Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL),
restoring staffing levels, and considering new broadcast vehicles; and
--increasing funding for programs in minority languages, including the
RFE/RL Tatar and North Caucasus services;
• include in U.S.-funded exchange programs a wider ethnic and
religious mix of students, including from the North Caucasus,
Tatarstan, and other regions of Russia with sizeable Muslim and other
religious and ethnic minority populations;
• implement a U.S. visa ban and asset freeze against Chechen President
Ramzan Kadyrov due to: his leadership of the Chechen armed forces,
which the ECtHR has found responsible for severe human rights abuses;
his alleged killings of political opponents and local human rights
activists; and his institution of strict sharia law in Chechnya in
violation of international religious freedom standards;
• ensure that U.S.-funded conflict resolution and post-conflict
reconstruction programs for the North Caucasus also fund credible local
partners; and
• initiate International Visitor’s Programs on the prevention and
prosecution of hate crimes for Russian officials and other relevant
figures and include training sessions by the Department of Justice and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation as well as relevant NGOs and
academic experts.
II. Prioritizing Freedom of Religion or Belief in U.S. Bilateral and
Multilateral Diplomacy
The U.S. government should:
• organize as part of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential
Commission a working group comprised of legal experts on international
norms on freedom of religion or belief;
• ensure that U.S. Embassy officials and programs engage with local
officials throughout the Russian Federation and disseminate information
on international norms on freedom of religion or belief, including
regarding unregistered religious communities;
• urge the Russian government to invite and schedule dates for one or
more of the three Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) Personal Representatives on combating intolerance and the UN
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief to visit the
country during 2010;
• ensure that human rights issues, including freedom of religion
or belief, are raised in the context of negotiations on Russian
accession to the World Trade Organization, and work with members of the
G-8 to ensure that human rights issues, including concerning migration
and counter-terrorism, are raised at bilateral and multilateral
meetings;
• ensure that the humanitarian crisis in Chechnya and human rights
abuses perpetrated by the Russian federal military and local security
and police forces there, as well as in other North Caucasus republics,
are issues raised in U.S.-Russian bilateral relations;
• urge that the governments of Germany, Austria, Belgium, Poland,
France and Denmark do not accept the official Chechen culture centers
that the republic would like to institute in those countries;
• urge the Russian government to respect all resolutions of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the human rights and
humanitarian situation in the North Caucasus and reinstate regular
on-site visits by the Council of Europe’s Special Rapporteur for
Chechnya;
• urge the Russian government to address the issues raised by the UN
Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review and relevant treaty
bodies concerning Chechnya, accept visits to Chechnya by the UN Special
Rapporteurs on Extrajudicial Executions and Torture, and fully
cooperate with those Special Rapporteurs; and
• work with other OSCE States to ensure that human rights abuses in the
North Caucasus receive greater attention in OSCE deliberations and
encourage the OSCE to raise humanitarian and other assistance to the
civilian populations affected by the decade-long conflict in
Chechnya.
III. Addressing Russian Human Rights Issues
The U.S. government should urge the Russian government to:
• implement the February 2010 Constitutional Court decision that
the Civil Procedural Code be amended to require Russian courts to
implement decisions by the ECtHR rather than the payment of fines as is
current practice;
• reform the Ministry of Internal Affairs system of quotas for arrests
and detentions of alleged suspects which may result in denials of
justice;
• amend the Russian extremism law to address acts that involve violence
or incitement to imminent violence, and drop bans on non-violent
organizations, literature and religious communities;
• halt current investigations, and reconsider previous legal cases,
against individuals and organizations accused of extremism solely for
their exercise of internationally protected rights, including freedom
of religion or belief;
• withdraw or substantially amend the NGO law or, failing that, develop
regulations consistent with international standards limiting the
state’s discretion to interfere with the activities of NGOs, including
religious organizations; and
• cease and prosecute all alleged acts of involuntary detention,
disappearances, torture, rape, and other human rights abuses by the
Russian security services in Chechnya, including by pro-Kremlin Chechen
forces, and in other republics of the North Caucasus.
IV. Ensuring the Equal Legal Status and Treatment of Russia’s Religious
Communities
The Russian government should:
• affirm publicly at a high political level the multi-ethnic and
multi-confessional nature of Russian society and that all religious
communities in Russia are equal under the law and entitled to equal
treatment regardless of registration status, and direct government
officials at all levels not to grant preferences to or discriminate
against members of religious, ethnic and migrant groups;
• refrain from media attacks on any peaceful religious community
and adopt administrative measures against government officials who
engage in such attacks;
• cease interference in the internal affairs of religious communities,
unless stipulated by law and in conformity with international human
rights standards;
• ensure that law enforcement officials investigate and prosecute
crimes against members of all religious communities and establish a
fair and effective review mechanism outside the Procuracy to
investigate and sanction any officials who are found to have encouraged
or condoned such crimes;
• amend the legal provision of the extremism law whereby any court can
rule the Russian translation of a text to constitute extremism, which
automatically adds that text to the Federal List of Extremist
Literature and bans that text throughout Russia, and re-examine recent
court rulings deeming publications of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and of
the Turkish theologian Said Nursi extremist;
• undertake a thorough reform of the mandate and personnel of the
Ministry of Justice’s 2009 Expert Religious Studies Council so as to
diversify its membership and to revoke its authority to recommend
investigations of religious groups, including of their activities and
literature;
Recommendations
I. Strengthening U.S. Promotion of Human Rights, including Freedom of
Religion or Belief
The U.S. government should:
• urge, in public and at high political levels, the Russian
government to undertake programs and adopt legal reforms to ensure
respect for international norms on freedom of religion or belief;
• implement the provisions of the “Smith Amendment” of the 2010
Consolidated Appropriations Act (Section 7074 of P.L. 111-117) to
prohibit U.S. financial assistance to the Russian Federation government
due to, inter alia, its discrimination against religious groups through
laws and government actions, excessive application of the extremism
law, and reported restrictions by regional and local officials on
minority religious groups;
• maintain a mechanism to monitor publicly the status of human rights
in Russia, including freedom of religion or belief, particularly in the
case of repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment with respect to Russia,
as well as establish a program to monitor implementation of Russia’s
law on non-commercial organizations (NGO Law), including its impact on
religious organizations;
• organize regular roundtables in Washington with members of the
National Security Council, and representatives of religious communities
and civil society as well as academic specialists, on the status of
freedom of religion or belief in Russia;
• ensure that U.S. government-funded grants to NGOs and other sectors
in Russian society include projects to promote legal protections and
respect for freedom of religion or belief and methods to combat
xenophobia, such as by funding training programs on freedom of religion
or belief, promoting inter-religious cooperation, encouraging
pluralism, and combating hate crimes;
• support programs to train lawyers to contest violations of Russian
and international law regarding freedom of religion or belief in
Russian courts and before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR);
• translate into Russian and make available, including by posting on
the U.S. Embassy Web site, U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation and
Department of Justice materials on combating hate crimes and
information relating to international standards on freedom of religion
or belief, xenophobia, and hate crimes, including relevant U.S.
Department of State and USCIRF reports;
• ensure that Russia’s citizens have access to U.S.
government-funded radio and TV broadcasts, as well as Internet
communications, including information on freedom of religion or belief
and on combating xenophobia and hate crimes, in particular by:
--restoring the previous levels of Russian-language radio broadcasts of
Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL),
restoring staffing levels, and considering new broadcast vehicles; and
--increasing funding for programs in minority languages, including the
RFE/RL Tatar and North Caucasus services;
• include in U.S.-funded exchange programs a wider ethnic and
religious mix of students, including from the North Caucasus,
Tatarstan, and other regions of Russia with sizeable Muslim and other
religious and ethnic minority populations;
• implement a U.S. visa ban and asset freeze against Chechen President
Ramzan Kadyrov due to: his leadership of the Chechen armed forces,
which the ECtHR has found responsible for severe human rights abuses;
his alleged killings of political opponents and local human rights
activists; and his institution of strict sharia law in Chechnya in
violation of international religious freedom standards;
• ensure that U.S.-funded conflict resolution and post-conflict
reconstruction programs for the North Caucasus also fund credible local
partners; and
• initiate International Visitor’s Programs on the prevention and
prosecution of hate crimes for Russian officials and other relevant
figures and include training sessions by the Department of Justice and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation as well as relevant NGOs and
academic experts.
II. Prioritizing Freedom of Religion or Belief in U.S. Bilateral and
Multilateral Diplomacy
The U.S. government should:
• organize as part of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential
Commission a working group comprised of legal experts on international
norms on freedom of religion or belief;
• ensure that U.S. Embassy officials and programs engage with local
officials throughout the Russian Federation and disseminate information
on international norms on freedom of religion or belief, including
regarding unregistered religious communities;
• urge the Russian government to invite and schedule dates for one or
more of the three Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) Personal Representatives on combating intolerance and the UN
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief to visit the
country during 2010;
• ensure that human rights issues, including freedom of religion
or belief, are raised in the context of negotiations on Russian
accession to the World Trade Organization, and work with members of the
G-8 to ensure that human rights issues, including concerning migration
and counter-terrorism, are raised at bilateral and multilateral
meetings;
• ensure that the humanitarian crisis in Chechnya and human rights
abuses perpetrated by the Russian federal military and local security
and police forces there, as well as in other North Caucasus republics,
are issues raised in U.S.-Russian bilateral relations;
• urge that the governments of Germany, Austria, Belgium, Poland,
France and Denmark do not accept the official Chechen culture centers
that the republic would like to institute in those countries;
• urge the Russian government to respect all resolutions of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the human rights and
humanitarian situation in the North Caucasus and reinstate regular
on-site visits by the Council of Europe’s Special Rapporteur for
Chechnya;
• urge the Russian government to address the issues raised by the UN
Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review and relevant treaty
bodies concerning Chechnya, accept visits to Chechnya by the UN Special
Rapporteurs on Extrajudicial Executions and Torture, and fully
cooperate with those Special Rapporteurs; and
• work with other OSCE States to ensure that human rights abuses in the
North Caucasus receive greater attention in OSCE deliberations and
encourage the OSCE to raise humanitarian and other assistance to the
civilian populations affected by the decade-long conflict in Chechnya.
III. Addressing Russian Human Rights Issues
The U.S. government should urge the Russian government to:
• implement the February 2010 Constitutional Court decision that
the Civil Procedural Code be amended to require Russian courts to
implement decisions by the ECtHR rather than the payment of fines as is
current practice;
• reform the Ministry of Internal Affairs system of quotas for arrests
and detentions of alleged suspects which may result in denials of
justice;
• amend the Russian extremism law to address acts that involve violence
or incitement to imminent violence, and drop bans on non-violent
organizations, literature and religious communities;
• halt current investigations, and reconsider previous legal cases,
against individuals and organizations accused of extremism solely for
their exercise of internationally protected rights, including freedom
of religion or belief;
• withdraw or substantially amend the NGO law or, failing that, develop
regulations consistent with international standards limiting the
state’s discretion to interfere with the activities of NGOs, including
religious organizations; and
• cease and prosecute all alleged acts of involuntary detention,
disappearances, torture, rape, and other human rights abuses by the
Russian security services in Chechnya, including by pro-Kremlin Chechen
forces, and in other republics of the North Caucasus.
IV. Ensuring the Equal Legal Status and Treatment of Russia’s Religious
Communities
The Russian government should:
• affirm publicly at a high political level the multi-ethnic and
multi-confessional nature of Russian society and that all religious
communities in Russia are equal under the law and entitled to equal
treatment regardless of registration status, and direct government
officials at all levels not to grant preferences to or discriminate
against members of religious, ethnic and migrant groups;
• refrain from media attacks on any peaceful religious community
and adopt administrative measures against government officials who
engage in such attacks;
• cease interference in the internal affairs of religious communities,
unless stipulated by law and in conformity with international human
rights standards;
• ensure that law enforcement officials investigate and prosecute
crimes against members of all religious communities and establish a
fair and effective review mechanism outside the Procuracy to
investigate and sanction any officials who are found to have encouraged
or condoned such crimes;
• amend the legal provision of the extremism law whereby any court can
rule the Russian translation of a text to constitute extremism, which
automatically adds that text to the Federal List of Extremist
Literature and bans that text throughout Russia, and re-examine recent
court rulings deeming publications of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and of
the Turkish theologian Said Nursi extremist;
• undertake a thorough reform of the mandate and personnel of the
Ministry of Justice’s 2009 Expert Religious Studies Council so as to
diversify its membership and to revoke its authority to recommend
investigations of religious groups, including of their activities and
literature;
Recommendations
I. Strengthening U.S. Promotion of Human Rights, including Freedom of
Religion or Belief
The U.S. government should:
• urge, in public and at high political levels, the Russian
government to undertake programs and adopt legal reforms to ensure
respect for international norms on freedom of religion or belief;
• implement the provisions of the “Smith Amendment” of the 2010
Consolidated Appropriations Act (Section 7074 of P.L. 111-117) to
prohibit U.S. financial assistance to the Russian Federation government
due to, inter alia, its discrimination against religious groups through
laws and government actions, excessive application of the extremism
law, and reported restrictions by regional and local officials on
minority religious groups;
• maintain a mechanism to monitor publicly the status of human rights
in Russia, including freedom of religion or belief, particularly in the
case of repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment with respect to Russia,
as well as establish a program to monitor implementation of Russia’s
law on non-commercial organizations (NGO Law), including its impact on
religious organizations;
• organize regular roundtables in Washington with members of the
National Security Council, and representatives of religious communities
and civil society as well as academic specialists, on the status of
freedom of religion or belief in Russia;
• ensure that U.S. government-funded grants to NGOs and other sectors
in Russian society include projects to promote legal protections and
respect for freedom of religion or belief and methods to combat
xenophobia, such as by funding training programs on freedom of religion
or belief, promoting inter-religious cooperation, encouraging
pluralism, and combating hate crimes;
• support programs to train lawyers to contest violations of Russian
and international law regarding freedom of religion or belief in
Russian courts and before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR);
• translate into Russian and make available, including by posting on
the U.S. Embassy Web site, U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation and
Department of Justice materials on combating hate crimes and
information relating to international standards on freedom of religion
or belief, xenophobia, and hate crimes, including relevant U.S.
Department of State and USCIRF reports;
• ensure that Russia’s citizens have access to U.S.
government-funded radio and TV broadcasts, as well as Internet
communications, including information on freedom of religion or belief
and on combating xenophobia and hate crimes, in particular by:
--restoring the previous levels of Russian-language radio broadcasts of
Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL),
restoring staffing levels, and considering new broadcast vehicles; and
--increasing funding for programs in minority languages,
including the RFE/RL Tatar and North Caucasus services;
• include in U.S.-funded exchange programs a wider ethnic and
religious mix of students, including from the North Caucasus,
Tatarstan, and other regions of Russia with sizeable Muslim and other
religious and ethnic minority populations;
• implement a U.S. visa ban and asset freeze against Chechen President
Ramzan Kadyrov due to: his leadership of the Chechen armed forces,
which the ECtHR has found responsible for severe human rights abuses;
his alleged killings of political opponents and local human rights
activists; and his institution of strict sharia law in Chechnya in
violation of international religious freedom standards;
• ensure that U.S.-funded conflict resolution and post-conflict
reconstruction programs for the North Caucasus also fund credible local
partners; and
• initiate International Visitor’s Programs on the prevention and
prosecution of hate crimes for Russian officials and other relevant
figures and include training sessions by the Department of Justice and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation as well as relevant NGOs and
academic experts.
II. Prioritizing Freedom of Religion or Belief in U.S. Bilateral and
Multilateral Diplomacy
The U.S. government should:
• organize as part of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential
Commission a working group comprised of legal experts on international
norms on freedom of religion or belief;
• ensure that U.S. Embassy officials and programs engage with local
officials throughout the Russian Federation and disseminate information
on international norms on freedom of religion or belief, including
regarding unregistered religious communities;
• urge the Russian government to invite and schedule dates for one or
more of the three Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) Personal Representatives on combating intolerance and the UN
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief to visit the
country during 2010;
• ensure that human rights issues, including freedom of religion
or belief, are raised in the context of negotiations on Russian
accession to the World Trade Organization, and work with members of the
G-8 to ensure that human rights issues, including concerning migration
and counter-terrorism, are raised at bilateral and multilateral
meetings;
• ensure that the humanitarian crisis in Chechnya and human rights
abuses perpetrated by the Russian federal military and local security
and police forces there, as well as in other North Caucasus republics,
are issues raised in U.S.-Russian bilateral relations;
• urge that the governments of Germany, Austria, Belgium, Poland,
France and Denmark do not accept the official Chechen culture centers
that the republic would like to institute in those countries;
• urge the Russian government to respect all resolutions of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the human rights and
humanitarian situation in the North Caucasus and reinstate regular
on-site visits by the Council of Europe’s Special Rapporteur for
Chechnya;
• urge the Russian government to address the issues raised by the UN
Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review and relevant treaty
bodies concerning Chechnya, accept visits to Chechnya by the UN Special
Rapporteurs on Extrajudicial Executions and Torture, and fully
cooperate with those Special Rapporteurs; and
• work with other OSCE States to ensure that human rights abuses in the
North Caucasus receive greater attention in OSCE deliberations and
encourage the OSCE to raise humanitarian and other assistance to the
civilian populations affected by the decade-long conflict in Chechnya.
III. Addressing Russian Human Rights Issues
The U.S. government should urge the Russian government to:
• implement the February 2010 Constitutional Court decision that
the Civil Procedural Code be amended to require Russian courts to
implement decisions by the ECtHR rather than the payment of fines as is
current practice;
• reform the Ministry of Internal Affairs system of quotas for arrests
and detentions of alleged suspects which may result in denials of
justice;
• amend the Russian extremism law to address acts that involve violence
or incitement to imminent violence, and drop bans on non-violent
organizations, literature and religious communities;
• halt current investigations, and reconsider previous legal cases,
against individuals and organizations accused of extremism solely for
their exercise of internationally protected rights, including freedom
of religion or belief;
• withdraw or substantially amend the NGO law or, failing that, develop
regulations consistent with international standards limiting the
state’s discretion to interfere with the activities of NGOs, including
religious organizations; and
• cease and prosecute all alleged acts of involuntary detention,
disappearances, torture, rape, and other human rights abuses by the
Russian security services in Chechnya, including by pro-Kremlin Chechen
forces, and in other republics of the North Caucasus.
IV. Ensuring the Equal Legal Status and Treatment of Russia’s Religious
Communities
The Russian government should:
• affirm publicly at a high political level the multi-ethnic and
multi-confessional nature of Russian society and that all religious
communities in Russia are equal under the law and entitled to equal
treatment regardless of registration status, and direct government
officials at all levels not to grant preferences to or discriminate
against members of religious, ethnic and migrant groups;
• refrain from media attacks on any peaceful religious community
and adopt administrative measures against government officials who
engage in such attacks;
• cease interference in the internal affairs of religious communities,
unless stipulated by law and in conformity with international human
rights standards;
• ensure that law enforcement officials investigate and prosecute
crimes against members of all religious communities and establish a
fair and effective review mechanism outside the Procuracy to
investigate and sanction any officials who are found to have encouraged
or condoned such crimes;
• amend the legal provision of the extremism law whereby any court can
rule the Russian translation of a text to constitute extremism, which
automatically adds that text to the Federal List of Extremist
Literature and bans that text throughout Russia, and re-examine recent
court rulings deeming publications of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and of
the Turkish theologian Said Nursi extremist;
• undertake a thorough reform of the mandate and personnel of the
Ministry of Justice’s 2009 Expert Religious Studies Council so as to
diversify its membership and to revoke its authority to recommend
investigations of religious groups, including of their activities and
literature;
Recommendations
I. Strengthening U.S. Promotion of Human Rights, including Freedom of
Religion or Belief
The U.S. government should:
• urge, in public and at high political levels, the Russian
government to undertake programs and adopt legal reforms to ensure
respect for international norms on freedom of religion or belief;
• implement the provisions of the “Smith Amendment” of the 2010
Consolidated Appropriations Act (Section 7074 of P.L. 111-117) to
prohibit U.S. financial assistance to the Russian Federation government
due to, inter alia, its discrimination against religious groups through
laws and government actions, excessive application of the extremism
law, and reported restrictions by regional and local officials on
minority religious groups;
• maintain a mechanism to monitor publicly the status of human rights
in Russia, including freedom of religion or belief, particularly in the
case of repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment with respect to Russia,
as well as establish a program to monitor implementation of Russia’s
law on non-commercial organizations (NGO Law), including its impact on
religious organizations;
• organize regular roundtables in Washington with members of the
National Security Council, and representatives of religious communities
and civil society as well as academic specialists, on the status of
freedom of religion or belief in Russia;
• ensure that U.S. government-funded grants to NGOs and other sectors
in Russian society include projects to promote legal protections and
respect for freedom of religion or belief and methods to combat
xenophobia, such as by funding training programs on freedom of religion
or belief, promoting inter-religious cooperation, encouraging
pluralism, and combating hate crimes;
• support programs to train lawyers to contest violations of Russian
and international law regarding freedom of religion or belief in
Russian courts and before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR);
• translate into Russian and make available, including by posting on
the U.S. Embassy Web site, U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation and
Department of Justice materials on combating hate crimes and
information relating to international standards on freedom of religion
or belief, xenophobia, and hate crimes, including relevant U.S.
Department of State and USCIRF reports;
• ensure that Russia’s citizens have access to U.S.
government-funded radio and TV broadcasts, as well as Internet
communications, including information on freedom of religion or belief
and on combating xenophobia and hate crimes, in particular by:
--restoring the previous levels of Russian-language radio broadcasts of
Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL),
restoring staffing levels, and considering new broadcast vehicles; and
--increasing funding for programs in minority languages, including the
RFE/RL Tatar and North Caucasus services;
• include in U.S.-funded exchange programs a wider ethnic and
religious mix of students, including from the North Caucasus,
Tatarstan, and other regions of Russia with sizeable Muslim and other
religious and ethnic minority populations;
• implement a U.S. visa ban and asset freeze against Chechen President
Ramzan Kadyrov due to: his leadership of the Chechen armed forces,
which the ECtHR has found responsible for severe human rights abuses;
his alleged killings of political opponents and local human rights
activists; and his institution of strict sharia law in Chechnya in
violation of international religious freedom standards;
• ensure that U.S.-funded conflict resolution and post-conflict
reconstruction programs for the North Caucasus also fund credible local
partners; and
• initiate International Visitor’s Programs on the prevention and
prosecution of hate crimes for Russian officials and other relevant
figures and include training sessions by the Department of Justice and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation as well as relevant NGOs and
academic experts.
II. Prioritizing Freedom of Religion or Belief in U.S. Bilateral and
Multilateral Diplomacy
The U.S. government should:
• organize as part of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential
Commission a working group comprised of legal experts on international
norms on freedom of religion or belief;
• ensure that U.S. Embassy officials and programs engage with local
officials throughout the Russian Federation and disseminate information
on international norms on freedom of religion or belief, including
regarding unregistered religious communities;
• urge the Russian government to invite and schedule dates for one or
more of the three Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) Personal Representatives on combating intolerance and the UN
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief to visit the
country during 2010;
• ensure that human rights issues, including freedom of religion
or belief, are raised in the context of negotiations on Russian
accession to the World Trade Organization, and work with members of the
G-8 to ensure that human rights issues, including concerning migration
and counter-terrorism, are raised at bilateral and multilateral
meetings;
• ensure that the humanitarian crisis in Chechnya and human rights
abuses perpetrated by the Russian federal military and local security
and police forces there, as well as in other North Caucasus republics,
are issues raised in U.S.-Russian bilateral relations;
• urge that the governments of Germany, Austria, Belgium, Poland,
France and Denmark do not accept the official Chechen culture centers
that the republic would like to institute in those countries;
• urge the Russian government to respect all resolutions of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the human rights and
humanitarian situation in the North Caucasus and reinstate regular
on-site visits by the Council of Europe’s Special Rapporteur for
Chechnya;
• urge the Russian government to address the issues raised by the UN
Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review and relevant treaty
bodies concerning Chechnya, accept visits to Chechnya by the UN Special
Rapporteurs on Extrajudicial Executions and Torture, and fully
cooperate with those Special Rapporteurs; and
• work with other OSCE States to ensure that human rights abuses in the
North Caucasus receive greater attention in OSCE deliberations and
encourage the OSCE to raise humanitarian and other assistance to the
civilian populations affected by the decade-long conflict in Chechnya.
III. Addressing Russian Human Rights Issues
The U.S. government should urge the Russian government to:
• implement the February 2010 Constitutional Court decision that
the Civil Procedural Code be amended to require Russian courts to
implement decisions by the ECtHR rather than the payment of fines as is
current practice;
• reform the Ministry of Internal Affairs system of quotas for arrests
and detentions of alleged suspects which may result in denials of
justice;
• amend the Russian extremism law to address acts that involve violence
or incitement to imminent violence, and drop bans on non-violent
organizations, literature and religious communities;
• halt current investigations, and reconsider previous legal cases,
against individuals and organizations accused of extremism solely for
their exercise of internationally protected rights, including freedom
of religion or belief;
• withdraw or substantially amend the NGO law or, failing that, develop
regulations consistent with international standards limiting the
state’s discretion to interfere with the activities of NGOs, including
religious organizations; and
• cease and prosecute all alleged acts of involuntary detention,
disappearances, torture, rape, and other human rights abuses by the
Russian security services in Chechnya, including by pro-Kremlin Chechen
forces, and in other republics of the North Caucasus.
IV. Ensuring the Equal Legal Status and Treatment of Russia’s Religious
Communities
The Russian government should:
• affirm publicly at a high political level the multi-ethnic and
multi-confessional nature of Russian society and that all religious
communities in Russia are equal under the law and entitled to equal
treatment regardless of registration status, and direct government
officials at all levels not to grant preferences to or discriminate
against members of religious, ethnic and migrant groups;
• refrain from media attacks on any peaceful religious community
and adopt administrative measures against government officials who
engage in such attacks;
• cease interference in the internal affairs of religious communities,
unless stipulated by law and in conformity with international human
rights standards;
• ensure that law enforcement officials investigate and prosecute
crimes against members of all religious communities and establish a
fair and effective review mechanism outside the Procuracy to
investigate and sanction any officials who are found to have encouraged
or condoned such crimes;
• amend the legal provision of the extremism law whereby any court can
rule the Russian translation of a text to constitute extremism, which
automatically adds that text to the Federal List of Extremist
Literature and bans that text throughout Russia, and re-examine recent
court rulings deeming publications of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and of
the Turkish theologian Said Nursi extremist;
• undertake a thorough reform of the mandate and personnel of the
Ministry of Justice’s 2009 Expert Religious Studies Council so as to
diversify its membership and to revoke its authority to recommend
investigations of religious groups, including of their activities and
literature;
• distribute on a regular basis updated information on freedom of
religion or belief, including Russian constitutional provisions,
relevant legislation and court decisions, to the Russian judiciary,
religious affairs officials, the Justice Ministry, the Procuracy, and
law enforcement bodies;
• extend the current annual training program for regional and local
religious affairs officials to include the judiciary, Procuracy, law
enforcement agencies, and the Justice Ministry;
• direct the Russian Federation Human Rights Ombudsman to set up
a nationwide monitoring system on the status of freedom of religion or
belief in the 84 regions of Russia; and
• accept visits from the three OSCE Tolerance Representatives and
the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, and grant
unrestricted access for these officials to religious communities and
regions.
distribute on a regular basis updated information on freedom of
religion or belief, including Russian constitutional provisions,
relevant legislation and court decisions, to the Russian judiciary,
religious affairs officials, the Justice Ministry, the Procuracy, and
law enforcement bodies;
• extend the current annual training program for regional and local
religious affairs officials to include the judiciary, Procuracy, law
enforcement agencies, and the Justice Ministry;
• direct the Russian Federation Human Rights Ombudsman to set up
a nationwide monitoring system on the status of freedom of religion or
belief in the 84 regions of Russia; and
• accept visits from the three OSCE Tolerance Representatives and
the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, and grant
unrestricted access for these officials to religious communities and
regions.
• distribute on a regular basis updated information on freedom of
religion or belief, including Russian constitutional provisions,
relevant legislation and court decisions, to the Russian judiciary,
religious affairs officials, the Justice Ministry, the Procuracy, and
law enforcement bodies;
• extend the current annual training program for regional and local
religious affairs officials to include the judiciary, Procuracy, law
enforcement agencies, and the Justice Ministry;
• direct the Russian Federation Human Rights Ombudsman to set up
a nationwide monitoring system on the status of freedom of religion or
belief in the 84 regions of Russia; and
• accept visits from the three OSCE Tolerance Representatives and
the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, and grant
unrestricted access for these officials to religious communities and
regions.
• distribute on a regular basis updated information on freedom of
religion or belief, including Russian constitutional provisions,
relevant legislation and court decisions, to the Russian judiciary,
religious affairs officials, the Justice Ministry, the Procuracy, and
law enforcement bodies;
• extend the current annual training program for regional and local
religious affairs officials to include the judiciary, Procuracy, law
enforcement agencies, and the Justice Ministry;
• direct the Russian Federation Human Rights Ombudsman to set up
a nationwide monitoring system on the status of freedom of religion or
belief in the 84 regions of Russia; and
• accept visits from the three OSCE Tolerance Representatives and
the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, and grant
unrestricted access for these officials to religious communities and
regions.