Copyrighted material. For private use only.
In an unusually frank account of Russian church life, Patriarch Alexy II scolded priests this week for "assuming the lifestyle of New Russians" by driving expensive cars and sporting mobile telephones in front of impoverished parishioners. [Translation of the patriarch's speech.]
The head of the Russian Orthodox Church, who spoke Wednesday at the annual meeting of the Moscow Diocese, stressed the need for more social outreach, something that has remained at the bottom of most parishes' list of priorities.
The full text of the patriarch's annual report, which usually names transgressors and includes a great deal of criticism, has traditionally been a guarded internal document. But even the excerpts of the text released by the Moscow Patriarchate were unusually strong. In most documents made public in the past the Church has painted a far rosier picture.
In another departure from past practices, Alexy II called for greater openness and transparency in Church affairs in the face of what he called an anti-Church press.
The patriarch attributed the problems in the Church in part to the "spirit of the time" and the domination of "ethically negative values" in society such as greed, lies and personal ambitions.
Part of the clergy, he said, has attempted to imitate the lifestyle of New Russians, which generates resentment on the part of people struggling to make ends meet.
"One has to realize that a mass transformation of consciousness is taking place among simple impoverished people," his report said. "They see that they are not needed by anybody: Neither the state nor the society is taking care of them, and now the Church too shows that the rich and not the poor are closer to her."
The annual meeting, at which deans of churches and heads of parish councils are present, is a major event in the life of each diocese, but Moscow's meeting is particularly important because of the patriarch's report. In his report, the patriarch, who also is the capital's bishop, outlines the main policies of the Russian Orthodox Church hierarchy.
The call for greater openness marked a noticeable change in policy.
"We should speak sincerely and truthfully about all problems that exist today in our church life without waiting for these issues to be raised and interpreted by others, including our ill-wishers," the patriarch said.
The Church was involved in several high-profile conflicts this year that drew extensive critical coverage in the media. The Patriarchate also has faced rumors that Alexy II's health was in decline and that he was increasingly isolated by his entourage.
In one of the well-publicized conflicts, a reformist Moscow community was virtually disbanded and kicked out of its church, while its popular leader, Priest Georgy Kochetkov, was suspended by the patriarch.
In Yekaterinburg, a conservative bishop was accused of burning books by several prominent Orthodox theologians, though he denied the allegations.
Also in Moscow, Hegumen Martiri Bagin, who led a parish sponsored by Inkombank, was removed for disobedience and unsanctioned appropriation of real estate. But due to the secretive manner on the part of the Patriarchate, the removal was portrayed by Bagin's supporters as a clamp down on dissent.
In Wednesday's report, the patriarch said the need for money has caused some parishes to have "business contacts with representatives of private companies, banks and the shadow economy, who are interested in legalizing their business through the Church. Should one say how much this does not correspond with Christian ethics?"
He also said some clergymen have attempted to use their relations with big business and "quasi-political circles" to exert pressure on him, but were unsuccessful.
However, the patriarch's report continued the Church's attack on the liberal religious radio station Sofia, which has been accused of undermining the Church by ungrounded criticism of the hierarchy and propagation of Western views.
Alexy II scolded priests for not doing more to help Russians in need.
"Every year I call on deans and heads of parish councils with the request to activate charity activities at the parish level, but unfortunately my words are not heard by everybody," the patriarch's report said.
He addressed criticism that the Church has found money for rebuilding and restoring churches but not for helping the poor.
"Modern life demands new approaches," the patriarch's report said. "Although with difficulty we have found resources to restore churches and gild iconostases, now we need to find them [resources] for other no less important types of church activities."
Alexy II urged parishes to cooperate in funding social projects. "What one parish cannot do, two or three will be able to."
He stressed the importance of increasing the clergy's educational and personal spiritual level. He pointed to the danger of priests abusing their power of confessor by demanding total obedience from their flock, turning people into "robots" and church communities into "sects."
The report also included statistical data on the Russian Orthodox Church, which claims jurisdiction over all of the former Soviet Union except for Georgia and owns property in Europe, Northern America and Israel.
The Church has 151 active bishops in 127 dioceses. About 19,700 clergymen serve in more than 19,000 parishes. Of 478 monasteries and convents, 299 are on the territory of the Russian Federation.
In Moscow, the Church has title to 428 churches and 39 chapels, with 539 priests and 206 deacons, which is 72 more clergymen than in 1997.
courtesy of Ray Prigodich
(posted 30 December 1998)
Statement by the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation
Every time when the policy of the ruling regime is a failure it resorts to the old and tested method of escalating anti-Communist hysteria. A distinguishing feature of the present-day campaign of lies and slander, which was launched by electronic mass media, became its defiantly Russophobic character. The thesis about "Russian fascism" and a "red-brown" threat, and about "anti-Semitism" as an allegedly official stand taken by the Communist party has been in the picture again.
The aim of this campaign is obvious: to divert the attention of society from the catastrophic situation in which the country is and from those who are truly to blame for it, to provoke anti-Jewish sentiments among the masses and to channel the growing social protest of the working people into a dead-end way - along the line of interethnic conflicts.
I am convinced that these plans are doomed to failure in the end. But eyes should not be closed to the fact that provocateurs succeed now and then in achieving the results they desire. In response to the Russophobic hysteria half-baked statements addressed to Jews were voiced by some Communists, statements which run counter to the provisions of the Programme of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the decisions of the Plenary Session of the Central Committee on the problems related to interethnic relations.
These statements are based on an unjustified and harmful combination of the problem concerning Zionism as a political phenomenon and the Jewish problem. It is, above all, Zionism itself, which declares that it is a "purely national" concept of gathering Jews in the land of their origin, that is interested in such a combination. If the aims of Zionism were really exhausted by this, there would be no additional problems. I want to remind you that it is the Soviet Union, when recognizing the right of the Jewish people to national and state self-determination, that was active in its efforts in the past to help the establishment of the State of Israel but, certainly, not to the detriment of the vital interests of the Arab people of Palestine.
However, Zionism manifested itself really as a variety of the theory and practice of the most aggressive imperialist circles, which strive for world supremacy. In this respect it is related to fascism. The only difference between them is that Hitlerite Nazism acted under the mask of German nationalism and strove for world supremacy openly, while Zionism, when it appears under the mask of Jewish nationalism, acts in a concealed manner, using, among other things, someone elseôs hands.
Fascism and Zionism are the most sworn enemies, above all, of those peoples, whose national sentiments and prejudices they exploit. Fascism and Zionism are nonnational and profoundly anti-popular in their essence. When World War II was coming to a close, Hitler sought to drag after himself the entire German people into the grave, denying them the right to existence.
The great experience of the struggle of our Motherland against fascism serves us as a lodestar in the struggle against various forms of imperialist aggression. On the part of the peoples of the Soviet Union the struggle against German fascism was the national liberation Patriotic war in the real sense of this term. But it was not in any way the struggle against the German people. Suffice it to recall the words that "Hitlers come and go, whereas the German people remain," which were voiced at the time of a mortal danger for the Soviet people on November 7, 1941, from the main rostrum of the country. It is not out of place to recall the fact that when the war was coming to a close, in the spring of 1945, Ilya Ehrenburg, a member of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, tried to appeal for a national revenge upon Germans, he was rebuffed severely and corrected on the pages of the Pravda newspaper: "Comrade Ehrenburg is getting all mixed up!"
The present-day struggle against Zionism is not and cannot be in principle a struggle against the Jewish people or the State of Israel. We have never identified notions "a Jew" and a "Zionist." When standing for the friendship and fraternity of the peoples of Russia, we believe that all problems, which arise in this sphere, must be settled peacefully during a respectful and constructive dialogue. It is such Russo-Jewish dialogue that we have suggested more than once. Communists are ready to take part in it and on both sides for that matter because our party is internationalist by its composition and ideology.
Any forms in which chauvinism and national intolerance manifest themselves, no matter from whom they might come and what grounds might be used to justify them, are incompatible with communist convictions. These forms include the manifestations of Judeophobia, which insult the national dignity not only of Jews but also of all peoples of Russia. Therefore, views and pronouncements, which equate Jews with Zionists, should be condemned as fogyish because they disseminate in great numbers bourgeois and philistine prejudices, mask the class essence of Zionism and thereby make the struggle against it more difficult.
The idea of establishing in a legislative way a "percent norm" of representation of various national and religious communities among governmental authorities should also be recognized as being erroneous. Though this principle was given written expression in the Constitutions of some countries, for example, Lebanon, practice shows that interethnic peace and reconciliation are ensured not in this way. In a democratic country, which we want to see Russia, an equal participation of all communities among the organs of government is a matter related to a free choice of the people, to the government's wisdom and to the tact of the top leaders.
At the same time, the Jewish community should also be more definite on several problems - first and foremost, on the problem concerning its attitude to Zionism. The spread of Zionist ideology among Jews is in any case not the fault but is the misfortune of the Jewish people. The only point is whether Jews intend to continue to be reconciled to such a situation when their national sentiments serve now and then as a screen for Zionist ideology.
We believe that Jews, like the representatives of any Diaspora, have
an inalienable right:
to leave Russia for Israel, their historical Motherland, or for any other country;No one has only the right, being a citizen of Russia, to regard it as an alien "country of residence" and to be in it an "internal emigre," acting to the detriment of its interests and in favour of another country or an international corporation. There is no right either to be an instrument in the hands of Zionism. Not a single country in the world can reconcile itself to such doings and is obliged to put an end to them by all lawful means.to recognize Russia as their only Motherland, to live and work for its benefit within the composition of the Jewish community as an equal member of the multinational people of Russia;
to assimilate in regard to nationality, culture and language into the Russian people or any other people of Russia.
Communists did not invent this problem, which really exists. Our people are not blind. They cannot but see that the Zionization of the governmental authorities of Russia was one of the causes of the present-day catastrophic situation in which the country is, of the mass impoverishment and extinction of its population. They cannot close their eyes to the aggressive and destructive role of Zionist capital in the disruption of the economy of Russia and in the misappropriation of its national property. They are right when they ask the question as to how it could happen that the key positions in several branches of economy were seized during privatization mainly by the representatives of one nationality. They see that control over most of the electronic mass media, which wage a destructive struggle against our Fatherland, morality, language, culture and beliefs, is concentrated in the hands of the same persons.
I am convinced that the citizens of all nationalities living in Russia will be wise enough to examine these problems in a quiet and balanced way without yielding to provocations and without letting themselves be carried away by nationalistic intoxication. Among the people there is a growing awareness that the criminal course pursued by the anti-popular and nonnational oligarchy, which seized power, underlies all their present-day misfortunes. It is only the restoration of the sovereignty of the people and a resolute change in the social and economic course that will ensure the revival and prosperity of Russia and all its multinational people.
Genady Ziuganov
courtesy of Nickolai Butkevich,
Union of Councils for Soviet
Jews, Washington, D.C.
translation from the Communist Party of Russia, Russian version
(posted 29 December 1998)
The decress of diocesan bishops of Pskov, Moscow, Ekaterinburg, and Tomsk have been stern. They have included unfrocking, banning from ministry, and excommunication of clergy and laity of the Russian Orthodox church. And when one learns of cases of burning books by famous Russian theologians, then there arises a great wish to find out what is happening behind the wall that separates church from state. And in accordance with which legal documents are these punishments being administered?
According to the charter on administration of RPTs, confirmed by the local counsil of 1988, several levels of church courts exist. But upon which legal bases is the court established? At the beginning of the century there existed collections of laws that were appointed for the Orthodox clergy and these were substantial volumes. Today the church court is governed by a thin pamphlet with the title "Charter concerning the administration of RPTs." In a note to the charter we read: "As an appendix to the present charter there should be established "Procedure for church court." However this good intention (or recommendation) still has not been fulfilled, that is, the "Procedure" has not seen the light of day nine years afterward.
Who conducts the legal proceedings? If one judges by the decrees that have established punishments for the "guilty" clergy and churchmen, they proceed from the bishops and they are signed unilaterally by them alone. However the existing charter for administration of RPTs does not grant either to the patriarch or much less to the diocesan bishop the right of church judgment but it ascribes it solely to the collective church bodies, the diocesan council and the Holy Synod.
One of the stages in judicial procedure should be the inquest. The charter for the ecclesiastical consistory states that "conduct of the inquest is the jurisdiction of the police." The only case of the conduct of an inquest had to do with the incident in the church of the Dormition in Pechatniki, when the patriarch turned to the police. However upon the request of the patriarchate the conclusion of the investigation was submitted, which was signed by the commander of the fifteenth precinct of the police, Sr. Lt. Rimsky, who took upon himself the responsibility for investigation the case but did not examin a single one of the witnesses of the event, of whom there were no fewer that twenty persons, including officers of his own police precinct who were present, and besides this not one record to which he could appeal was drawn up. Incidentally, the inquest is an integral part of the contemporary civil court procedures, which the commander of the police department should have known.
But should the commander of the fifteenth police precinct have conducted an inquest at all and presented its results to the patriarchate? Of course not. As a result of his "inquest" citizens of Russia have been deprived of their right to employment (removed from the priestly ministry and role of churchmen) and the right to participate in the mysteries of the church (12 parishioners), and more than 2,000 member of the parish have been deprived of their church and their rector.
And so, we see, that the legal ground on which the Russian Orthodox church administers justice and sets punishments is deserted. The only tree that grows on it is the "Book of Rules" inasmuch as the indictments in the bishops' decress and the punishment of clergy, churchmen, and laity have been formed merely on the canons. But is the "Book of Rules" church law?
According to church dogma, Christ will come "to judge the living and the dead." It states also: "Judge not lest you be judged." And so the church acknowledged that God's justice is supreme, absolute, and objective. It was not in vain that the prerevolutionary church assigned to the episcopal court only the functions of investigation, exhortation, etc. The role, let's state clearly, is very modest by current understanding. The contemporary church by its charter gave this court the right to judge unilaterally, without juridical standards and control, that is virtually making the diocesan bishop equal with God. What kinds of consequences can this have for the church? We can see it for ourselves already: the clergy and increasingly the laity are in a condition that is very powerless and in "suspense," in fear of being deprived of civil rights and even more of their rights as the people of God, the "holy priesthood." (tr. by PDS)
Russian text courtesy of Andrei Platonov
(posted 28 December 1998)
Majority of Russia's population for teaching fundamentals of faith to children
by Mikhail Petrovich Mchedlov
Nezavisimaia gazeta--religions, 16 December 1998
Between declared rights, even those confirmed by appropriate laws, and their actual implementation there is an enormous distance, including not only the clarification of diverse tasks but also the planning for their fulfillment. With such a situation our public education now is wrestling, which must resolve in practice many questions that are associated with religious education. The abstract legal problem for the school and religion is that current Russian legislation recognizes the secular character of public education in state educational institutions. This means that it may not be either atheistic nor religious; but at the same time the school is called, as in any civilized society, to give to all pupils an understanding of religion and to guarantee the process of study for those of them who want it.
And thus arise endless questions. Who could be qualified to teach children information about religion, that is, religious studies, and how, and in what way? How should questions of religion be dealt with in the process of teaching the natural sciences and humanities? Who could accomplish this study outside the bounds of the curriculum and by what means?
Such questions now are being actively discussed and they have many aspects: methodological, personnel, material, etc. Any actions for guaranteeing the constitutional rights within the educational sphere can be effective only in light of understanding the real state of affairs, including the opinion of those people who are themselves involved.
At the center of attention of three sociological studies conducted throughout Russia in April-May 1998 by the Russian Independent Institute of Social and National Problems and the Center of Sociological Investigation of the Ministry of Public and Professional Education was the study of the expectations of parents and pupils for receiving religious education outside of the school curriculum. It was important to determine the degree of religiosity of pupils of public schools as well as the religiousness and attitude toward religious education of the population, including parents of school children and teachers. The sociological study included all basic social, professional, and age groups of the population of twelve regions of the country, plus Moscow and St. Petersburg (the sample was 2200 people); at the same time an all-Russian survey was conducted of 1160 teachers from 280 high schools of all the aforementioned regions and a survey of 1050 pupils of the sixth, eighth, and tenth grades from 210 schools (ages 11 to 17 years) in eight regions of the country.
Let's begin with what seems to be the main question: do school children themselves manifest an interest in religion and, thus, is there reason to expect from them requests for a religious education, as is provided for by article 5 of the federal law "On freedom of conscience and religious associations"? Results of the survey showed that pupils of ages 11 to 17 manifested these attitudes toward religion: 21.1% do not consider themselves religious and have no interest in religion; 20.1% do not consider themselves religious but they do have an interest in religion; 32.7% consider themselves religious but they do not participate in religious life; 3.4% regularly participate in religious life; 22.7% found the question difficult to answer. It is possible to conclude that among children aged 11 to 17 about one third are believers. If one could venture a guess that within the category of those wavering between faith and unbelief (22.7%) there are two equal-sized groups, then the number of believers (to some degree) among school children could be considered to be about 47.5%.
It would seem that such survey indicators do not reveal many substantial issues and differences, such as the superficiality in many cases of youthful religiosity.
Nevertheless it is possible to draw the following conclusion: almost half of the school youth display an interest toward religion and thus the organizers of the educational process, without any doubt, are called to satisfy the request for providing religious education, but outside the boundaries of the usual curriculum.
According to the spirit and letter of the aforesaid law, this requires, alongside the consent of the children, the request of the parents or guardians. Studies have shown that almost half of the population (45.2%) support the idea of introduction of religious education. However at the same time 33.3% of the population do not approve of this idea and 21.4% have difficulty determining an unequivocal position. Such a diversity of opinion shows a clearly sensitive situation and the possibility of one or another form of conflict among parents--advocates and opponents of religious education--in the case of organizing on the school premises of such education. Thus the actual organization in all details and aspects (place, time, personality of pupils, etc.) will require maximum tact, tolerance, civility, and avoidance of any infringement on the sensibilities and convictions of the supporters of any philosophical views. The criticalness of this issue is underscored also by the total split in public opinion regarding religious education on school grounds which is evidenced among the humanist intelligentsia (45% for each opinion) and military (39.2% for each opinion) and the opposition to this idea among the technical intelligentsia (52.3% opposed, 35.2% for) and small business entrepreneurs (39.7% opposed, 36.2% for). The greatest support for the idea of religious education on school grounds is found among white collar workers (54.2% for, 33.3% against) and rural residents (52.6% for, 31.6% against). The diversity of the picture is emphasized also by the variety of opinions among representatives of various world views and confessional groups of the population.
Finally, let's turn attention to the opinion of pedagogues. This is the more interesting in that traditionally in Russia long before the revolution of 1917 there was a tendency toward the secularization of school education which many teachers shared. Today the introduction of religious education into schools (extracurricular) is supported by 41.5% of teachers of Russia, while 58.5% do not support it. Of these, 29.6% of male teachers expressed support, while 43.1% of female teachers did. The difference in support for religious education among age groups of teachers ranged between 36 and 46% (the negative position was held by a majority of teachers over 60 years of age).
Such differences of opinion, as well as other difficulties exposed in the course of the study, inevitably lead to the conclusion that despite all the preconditions for the development of religious education in the schools, the "technology" itself for its introduction is not at all clear for either parents or teachers. (tr. by PDS)
Mchedlov is a professor and doctor of philosophy, and director of the "Religion in Contemporary Society Center"
(posted 26 December 1998)
MOSCOW. At the end of 1998 the Russian Orthodox church comprised 127 dioceses ruled by 151 bishops. The number of parishes of the Russian Orthodox church was more than 19,000 in which around 17,500 priests and 2,300 deacons minister, for a total of about 19,700 clerics. Patriarch Alexis gave these numbers in his report at the annual diocesan meeting of Moscow. The number of monasteries has reached 478, not counting 87 monastery annexes. Of these, 299 monasteries (151 male and 148 female) are located on the territory of Russia. On the territory of Ukraine there are 111 monasteries (51 male and 60 female), as well as nine monastery annexes. On the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States there are 58 monasteries (25 male and 33 female), as well as two monastery annexes. In the Baltic republics there are five monasteries (2 male and 3 female) as well as three skete annexes. In the far abroad there are five monasteries (2 male and 3 female). In Moscow the number of monasteries remains at four male and four female. Immediately under the patriarch's authority are 24 stauropigial monasteries.
The number of religious schools of the Russian Orthodox church has grown, including five ecclesiastical academies, 26 ecclesiastical seminaries, 29 ecclesiastical schools, one theological institute, two Orthodox universities, 13 preparatory pastors' courses, two diocesan women's ecclesiastical schools, and 28 icon painting schools. (tr. by PDS)
ORTHODOX RENAISSANCE IN RUSSIA IS A LEGEND.
Metaphrasis, 17 December 1998
MOSCOW. In a Vechernaya Moskva article by Evgenii Strelchik "With a
cross but without faith," the statistics, according to the author disprove
"the legend about Orthodox renaissance in Russia." "Today from 65
to 80 percent of the population look upon religion
in a positive way. Of these however, 20 percent do not believe in the
resurrection of the dead, 41 percent respect astrology. Russia remains
a pagan nation. Only 7 percent attend church once a month and only 4 percent
pray regularly. On Easter night 120 thousand people attended Moscow churches,
out of the 10 million population in Moscow." "People with weak faith
express indifference and disappointment towards official Church establishments
but they are thirsting for a personal communion with God."
CHURCH REGISTERED.
Now it can engage in social service.
by Evgeny Strelchik
Nezavisimaia gazeta--religions, 16 December 1998
The amazing slugishness of our bureaucratic machine was demonstrated by the way the Russian Orthodox church, which was the chief inspiration of the adoption of the law "On freedom fo conscience and religious associations," carried out the required reregistration only after thirteen months had gone by since the president signed it. On 26 November Minister of Justice of Russia Pavel Krasheninnikov published in the Ministry of Justice the order regarding state reregistration of the Russian Orthodox church and entered it into the state register of religious organizations of the Russian federation as Number One, and he informed Patriarch Alexis II of Moscow and all-Rus that the Ministry of Justice had given special honor to RPTs by reserving for it the honored position of the first certificate, even though more than fifty religious organizations of the country had been reregistered before it.
As is known, the new Civil Charter of RPTs was adopted at the October session of the Holy Synod in connection with the need for bringing the charter into conformity with the law adopted a year previously. However this document, as well as the new parish charter, had been drawn up under circumstances of special secrecy, without having been brought for discussion of the wider church public. Commenting on the adoption of the new edition of the charter, the most holy patriarch said: "Now the church has made up for the lost experience of social service in the past decades."
Despite the passage of more than a year since adoption of the law on freedom of conscience, the anxieties about its implementation have not quieted down. Rights defenders, who have assembled instances of persecution of members of small churches and sects, have submitted an appeal to the Constitutional Court for determination that the law is not in conformity with the constitution, which provides freedom of conscience.
On the eve of the issuance of the certification of registration of RPTs, 24 November, a report "On violations of human rights in the sphere of freedom of conscience" was presented in the Andrei Sakharov Museum Center, in which instances of the use of the law for prohibition of religious organizations (for example, the Moscow society of Jehovah's Witnesses and the Lutheran Mission in Khakasiia) were adduced. There were reports about the adoption in Russian regions of laws that contradict the Russian constitution and Russian legislation (Buriatiia and the Tula, Sverdlovsk, Orel, and Sakhalin regions, and elsewhere). Cases of rejection of requests for registration of organizations were presented (Volgograd, Kirov, Orel, Moscow, and other regions). "The chief danger for maintenance of freedom of conscience in Russia consists in the violations of the principle of the secular state," declared the executive secretary of the Chamber on Human Rights of the Political Consultative Conference of the Presidency of Russia, Lev Levinson. "The entire basis for massive repressions with regard to religious minorities and all those of other faiths has been prepared. But today the situtation is still rather stable. More dangerous is state protectionism with regard to a single confession on all levels."
At the time of the meeting between the minister of justice and the patriarch it was noted that the implementation of the law, which "came about with difficulty but now is regulating the activity of religious organizations," has not led, as its critics had expected, to violations of the civil rights and freedoms of citizens or to discrimination against religious minorities. The minister noted the special contribution of the Russian Orthodox church in the gathering of the Russian lands, the establishment and development of the spirituality and culture of our country, the consolidation of peace and concord with society, and the harmonization of interreligious and interethnic relations. The new law and the status of legal entity, according to the patriarch, give the church the possibility not only of performing its religious worship but also of conducting charitable activity, education, training, and social service. The patriarch and minister also discussed, according to a press release from the Ministry of Justice, issues of cooperation of RPTs and agencies of justice "for the attainment of interethnic and interreligious peace and concord in the country, the revival of spiritual and moral values, and the prevention of illegal and extremist phenomena within the religious sphere."
It should be noted that journalists who write on religious topics were not informed about this very significant event in the life of the Russian Orthodox church. By a strange combination of circumstances, the press service of the Ministry of Justice dealt with the distribution of accreditation certificates, but nothing about this event was known in the department of communications of the Department of External Church Affairs. As a result, this event which was so important for the RPTs did not receive sufficient coverage in the mass media. (tr. by PDS)
(posted 26 December 1998)
Opponents of new law on religious associations desperately
trying to salvage their reputation
by Sergei Chapnin
Nezavisimaia gazeta--religions, 16 December 1998
If a meeting of Russian officials has been conducted at the expense of foreign sponsors, then the "breakup of the Russian state" is not just an expression but a diagnosis of a pathology. The seminar-conference on the law "On freedom of conscience and religious associations," which was held 23-25 November in Moscow, gathered all the leading experts on church-state relations in the Russian federation. The venue of the event was the Russian Academy of State Services (RAGS), but the actual organizers of the seminar were private organizations: the Institute of Religion and Law, headed by Anatoly Pchelintsev, and the Christian Legal Center, headed by Vladimir Riakovsky.
Why have these private organizations suddenly become so concerned with the problem of church-state relations that they spared no expense for tickets and accommodations for more than 150 participants from various corners of Russia? Are there really means for such enormous demonstrations of hospitality in a time of crisis? The answer is known even by those who are not acquainted with the dynamics of the development of church-state relations in recent years. The organizers of the seminar are prominant lobbyists who specialize in advocacy of the American (separationist) model of church-state relations in Russia. Their consequent struggle against the law "On freedom of conscience and religious associations," adopted a year ago, is well known not only in Russia but also abroad. The paradox is that today the specialists of the struggle against the law are educating officials from the Russian regions in how they should use this law. However there are a number of facts which permit one to suggest that for Pchelintsev and Riakovsky themselves the conference in RAGS was primarily a carefully planned public relations move of great importance for building up their damaged reputation. The issue is that they were at the center of a scandal that broke out in October 1998 within the ranks of the civil rights movement.
The formal occasion was the article "The Bumblebee" published in the Moskovskii komsomolets newspaper on 7 October. It contained several figures from the financial report of Pchelintsev and Riakovsky for 1997. At the time these rights defenders were engaged in the struggle against the law "On freedom of conscience and religious associations," and their budget consisted of no more nor less than 56,000 dollars. Another 28,000 dollars were devoted to the same goal at the beginning of 1998. Anatoly Pchelintsev then confidently declared: "The law will gradually poison the entire international atmosphere. It will place in doubt Russia's participation in European affairs and will threaten its isolation, which we will get in place of equality of rights. We can talk all we want about a greater Europe, but no such Europe will be able to accommodate a Russia with such a law on freedom of conscience. There can be only one outcome: with the adoption of the new law 'On freedom of conscience and religious associations' Russia has rejected membership among civilized countries which it acquired only recently." However the gloomy prediction has not come true. The hysteria of the "rights defenders" regarding the law was exaggerated exclusively at the expense of investment in an "informational war." Pchelintsev and Riakovsky harshly criticized the new law in numerous press conferences and in the mass media. As it turned out, the criticism was not completely devoid of self-interest. After publication of the documents in MK a number of serious questions were raised for these attorneys. It seems that all the press conferences and publications were lavishly paid for by foreign sponsors whose names still are unknown. It turns out that the recipients included the State Duma, the National Press Institute, and the A.D. Sakharov Center Museum, organizations which never take money for conducting press conferences! Yet more amazing are the payments for articles in the press, since virtually all reporters who have criticized the new law and have prepared materials with Pchelintsev and Riakovsky have unanimously declared that they received no money from them. Then where did these thousands of dollars mentioned in the account go? There still has been no answer.
The documents were made public completely at a conference of representatives of rights- defending organizations on 13 October. The main subject was devoted to a discussion of issues arising in connection with the preparation and submission of an appeal to the Constitutional Court regarding the unconstitutionality of the federal law "On freedom of conscience and religious associations," although actually at the center of attention were the aforementioned financial documents. Pchelintsev and Riakovsky themselves declared that they were seeing the papers for the first time and that their signatures were forged.
Yury Samodurov, directory of the Sakharov Center Museum, was surprised by the carelessness of the "rights defenders" and noted: "What has happened affects the purity of the work not only of their organizations but of all rights defenders and of those who are fighting against the unconstitutional articles of the law. As the person who has provided them a venue for their declarations I am interested in a detailed review of the situation. The organizing committee has supported my suggestion to conduct a public audit and to verify the complete financial accounting for the current year." The situation for the rights defendfers turned out to be so serious that the Informational Center of the civil rights movement issued on 19 October an unprecedented declaration which virtually admitted that Anatoly Pchelintsev and Vladimir Riakovsky were suspected of financial maneuvering. There never has been such a scandal within the ranks of Russian rights defenders. But there is no need to be upset: the account, which was written for the foreign sponsors and therefore was obviously exaggerated was primarily an accounting of cash on hand, and the public audit never will be completed. Understanding this, the Moscow rights defenders got ready for an act of public censure--a boycot.
The November seminar at RAGS was held on time. Pchelintsev and Riakovsky mounted a desparate attempt to show both the West, which very much dislikes financial carelessness, and the Moscow rights defenders that it is premature to judge them; after all, the prominent event in RAGS would be impossible without direct support from the power structures and that is just what Pchelintsev and Riakovsky had, strange as it may seem, gotten. At the same time, personal reputation always is regarded highly within rights defense circles and even successful political action could hardly restore the earlier trust toward those who loved American dollars too much. Even rights defenders cannot serve God and Mammon at the same time. (tr. by PDS)
(posted 26 December 1998)
Russia's vestigial Communist Party, the largest faction in the Duma, or parliament, continues to allow certain members to portray the heirs of Marx and Lenin as the spawn of Hitler.
The latest eruption of fascist ideology from a Communist legislator was the anti-Semitic outburst of Viktor Ilyukhin, chairman of the Duma's defense committee. At a hearing that he knew was being taped, this prominent Communist deputy offered a scapegoating explanation for Russia's current troubles that rivals, for sheer viciousness, anything propagated by Josef Goebbels.
Ilyukhin termed Russia's troubles in the post-Soviet years a genocide, and he blamed that genocide on - Who else? - the Jews.
''The large-scale genocide wouldn't have been possible if Yeltsin's inner circle had consisted of the main ethnic groups and not exclusively of one group, the Jews,'' the Communist lawmaker said.
He used one big lie to explain another, revealing not only a profound hatred of Jews but also a totalitarian contempt for reality. There has been no genocide in Russia since Stalin's death, and most members of Boris Yeltsin's different inner circles have not been Jewish.
To its credit, Yeltsin's government has come down hard on the anti-Semitism of the Communists. The Kremlin refused the Communists' demand to ban from the Duma the TV networks that reported Ilyukhin's calumny. Yeltsin's chief of staff delivered a letter to Gennady Seleznyov, the Communist speaker of the Duma, warning of dire consequences if the Communists do not curb their extremists and complaining that the Duma's indifference to racist tirades from Communist deputies has harmed Russia's reputation in the world.
When the Communists held power in the Soviet Union, they exercised a state monopoly on all forms of ideology and racism. Under the guise of internationalism, Stalin starved to death perhaps 7 million Ukrainians and deported to the East nearly the entire Chechen nation. But certain big lies were not allowed to be spoken in public. Now the Communists can show their true colors.
from Johnson's Russia List
(posted 22 December 1998)
Russian Fascists have taken action again-- this time in Krasnodar. On Friday, flyers that called for the killing of all Jews in Krasnodar Krai were put into local mailboxes. The flyers also contained a call to promote the candidacy of the Krai's governor Nikolai Kondratenko, who long ago earned fame as a fierce "fighter against Zionism", for the presidency of Russia. The city prosecutor has begun an investigation of the incident.
[Tr. note: The following is the text of the flyer, a copy
of which was faxed to State Duma deputy Iosif Kobzon by the mayor of Krasnodar,
Valery Samoilenko.]
AppealTo all residents of this house
Respected kubantsy [Tr. note: Residents of Krasnodar Krai]. You must quickly help our dear, flourishing Kuban get rid of the damned Judeo-Kikes!
Destroy their apartments, burn down their homes!
They have no place here on Kuban soil. Let us help our beloved leader N. I. Kondratenko in this difficult struggle.
Let us begin to actively collect votes to promote his candidacy for president!
All those who hide the damn Kikes will be numbered among them and also destroyed.
The Kikes will be destroyed and victory will be ours!!!
This antisemitic act in Krasnodar does not appear to be coincidental. A month and a half ago in Krasnodar city, the regional administration funded the publication of a book by a local writer and philosopher named Seleznev. The book was entitled "The Secret History of 20th Century Russia." In the opinion of city officials, the book is, to put it mildly, antisemitic. Nevertheless, the regional administration recommended that it be included in the curricula of local schools. This recommendation created a scandal-the city media sharply criticized the nationalistic policies of the regional administration and its leader, Nikolai Kondratenko, who long ago openly declared that one of the regional government's tasks is the struggle against Zionism.
A reaction to this media criticism by local fascists was not long in coming. On Friday, dozens of homes had flyers placed in their mailboxes. The authors of these flyers called upon kubantsy to, "get rid of the damned Judeo-Kikes." In addition, the flyer stated that, "all those who hide the damned Kikes will be numbered among them and also destroyed" (the original spelling and punctuation of the document has not been changed). Informing the readers of their flyers that victory would be theirs, the local fascists called for the presidential candidacy of their "beloved leader" Nikolai Kondratenko to be promoted.
By the way, Kondratenko himself has already attracted the attention of the Prosecutor General when it come to "the national question." After his noisy speech at the April forum of Kuban youth, when the head of Krasnodar Krai's administration blamed Zionists for the collapse of the Russian economy and for trying to destroy the Russian nation, a scandal erupted. The regional prosecutor undertook an investigation and then issued a resolution declining to press criminal charges. But by a decree from Yuri Skuratov, this decision was changed and now specialists from the Russian State Committee of Publishing and a council of experts from the Presidential Commission for Action against Political Extremism are using their expertise to examine the governor's pronouncements. After that it will be decided whether or not to bring criminal charges against him.
Regarding the distribution of the flyers, on the same day they were given out, city and district officials started getting phone calls from residents informing them of the antisemitic act. Some residents of Krasnodar sent the flyers to the mayor. Mayor Valery Samoilenko sent one of them to State Duma deputy Iosif Kobzon and wrote on it, "Yosif, how good it is that you live in Moscow." He then went to Yuri Skuratov with the request that he stamp out "national extremism." But the Prosecutor General has not yet responded, he is busy celebrating the holidays.
translated by Nickolai Butkevich,
Union of Councils for Soviet
Jews, Washington, D.C.
from Johnson's Russia List
(posted 16 December 1998)
Analytical report prepared by the research group of the Russian Independent Institute for Social and National Problems (RNISNP), whose membership includes M. Gorshkov, director of the group, N. Tikhonova, assistant director of group, L. Byzov, N. Davydova, A. Zdravomyslov, M. Mchedlov, V. Petukhov, A. Riabov, and F. Sheregi.
In November-December 1997, the RNISNP conducted a Russia-wide representative sociological research study on the subject, "Youth of the New Russia: who they are? how they live? what they seek?" for the Moscow representation of the F. Ebert Fund. The target of the study, conducted with a special sociological instrument (standardized interview), comprised two groups: a subject group, specifically youth of ages 17 to 26 inclusive (n=1974 persons), and a control group, representing a older generation of ages 40 to 60 (n=774 persons).
Analysis of the religiousness of Russian youth leads first of all to the establishment of a new phenomenon by contrast with data from the preperestroika period. Specifically this shows the overcoming among youth of negative stereotypes (like "religion inhibits the development of science," "religion is the preserve of the elderly," etc.), which had been promoted by the school curricula and atheistic education as a whole.
Whereas 10-15 years ago, the lowest level of religiousness (1-2%) in all age groups was among the youth (among adults it was around 10%), now age differences do not exert an identifiable effect on the religiousness of the population. This is demonstrated by answers of respondants of all groups of worldviews. Thus, 32.1% of the youth who were questioned believe in God, while among adults the proportion is 34.9%; those who are wavering between faith and unbelief constituted 27% and 27.6%, respectively; those who are indifferent to religion, 13.9% and 14.7%; and nonbelievers, 14.6% and 13.5%. A significant difference was found only among those who believe in "supernatural forces" (12.4% and 9.3% respectively), which apparently is related to the increase of youth in various forms of nontraditional religions, including nonconfessional mysticism (belief in communication with spirits, magic, sorcery, fortunetelling, witchcraft, astrology). The growth of significant interest in the occult and esoteric movements also has been promoted by the dissemination in recent time of large quantities of occultic literature, the demand for which has grown especially among youth and women.
For an objective understanding of the role and place of religion in the consciousness of youth it is important to take into account that a significant number of young people--not only those who believe in God but also representatives of the other worldview groups, including the indifferent and unbelievers, consider themselves adherents of traditional religions. This reflects inter alia the close ties between religious and national consciousness. Even while denying their own religiousness in self-identification of their world view, youth at the same time see themselves as followers of traditional religious associations. Thus, say, Orthodoxy and Islam are viewed not only as distinctive religious systems but as the natural cultural milieu, the national way of life ("Russian--therefore Orthodox," "Tatar--therefore Muslim"). Thus, not only 56.2% of those wavering and 24.1% of those who believe in supernatural forces consider themselves Orthodox, but also 8.8% of the indifferent and even 2.1% of the nonbelieving young people do.
It is particularly clear, also, that worldview itself, including religious worldview, is far from "monolithic" for many young people but is characterized by a rather complex structure and variation. For example, among those who are wavering between faith and unbelief 32.7% identify themselves as Orthodox, 30.0% as Muslim, and 14.3% as protestants; of those who believe in supernatural forces, 6.5% are Orthodox; 6.7%, Muslim; 6.3%, Catholic; 10.0%, Jews; and 37.7% who do not belong to any specific confession.
Respect for one's national-confessional traditions, however, does not by any means translate into readiness to follow blindly and openly the social, political, and religious precepts of the religious leaders. We shall study these issues in more detail. It is interesting to examine how contemporary youth views the place of religious organizations in the new conditions of social and political life of Russia. Thus, to the question "What role, in your opinion, should be played by religious organizations in the religious and social life of our country?" the answers were distributed in the following manner. Only 5.4% of the young respondants favored an active role of confessions in the social and political life of society. Substantially more (24.0%) considered that the activity of confessions should be directed only to the satisfaction of the religious needs of believers, and almost half (49.2%) of young people suggest that the activity of confessions should be strictly restricted to serving the strengthening of spirituality and morality within society. Analogous answers were also gotten among the adult population (7.0%, 24.0% and 59.7%, respectively).
The popularity of this notion in the public opinion of youth is confirmed also by expression of support for the spiritual and moral activity of religious organizations from representatives of all worldview groups (believers, 56.1%, waverers, 52.4%, believers in supernatural forces, 58.4%, indifferent, 35%, and nonbelievers, 34.2%) and of all confessional groups (Orthodox, 56.0%, Muslims, 60.0%, Catholics, 75.0%, protestants, 64.3%, and Buddhists, 50.0%).
Thus, the majority of youth who are positively inclined toward the growth of the influence of religious organizations actually express the wish that religious organizations narrowly define their place in public life and not interfere in areas lying outside their competence. These attitudes and opinions, incidentally, are translated also into civic activity and the political conduct of the population, which can be illustrated, for example, in the attitude of believers toward political associations with confessional bases. We can mention that in the parliamentary elections in December 1995, the "Christian Democratic Union of Christians of Russia" polled only 0.3% of the votes, the all-Russian Muslim Movement (Nur), 0.6%, and the social-political movement "Union of Muslims of Russia" was not even able to collect sufficient signatures for participation in the elections.
Of course, one should not evade another, still insufficiently studied, tendency: the presence of a small number of respondants in the worldview and confessional groups who take an active role in the confessions in their own secular sphere, social and political life (among believers, 10.9%, believers in supernatural forces, 3.7%, Orthodox, 8.0%, Muslims, 10.0%). Such essentially clerical attitudes and orientations could under certain conditions (offence against national sensitivities, violation of constitutional principles, especially equality of religious organizations before the law, exploitation of religious sensitivities by extremist leaders, etc.) expand. Contemporary life (alas!) provides bases for such gloomy predictions.
Believing youth display a rather sensitive and engaged attitude toward various aspects of the political experience of confessions, including state-church relations. It is interesting in this regard to study how much believing youth as well as the population as a whole accepts the idea of religious pluralism in a country where the constitution proclaims the secular character of the state and the equality of confessions before the law. It appears that here the interests of various religious organizations conflict and thus the understanding and interpretation of this problem cannot be identical. Nevertheless, the study shows that the main issue for the population, including youth, (in contrast with some religious leaders) is rejection of the idea of an exceptional position for one religion. The idea that Orthodoxy should be the state religion is shared by 11.5% of young respondants and 16.3% of adults. The equality of religions before the law, independent of their doctrine and history, is supported by 40.0% of youth and 40.8% of adults. Those who are willing to give preference to traditional religions and restrict the activity of new confessions are 23.2% and 28.2% respectively.
As we see, although in our society discussions about the missionary activity of foreign religious organizations as well as indigenous new confessions has somewhat subsided, there exists on this matter a persistent immunity in public opinion, shared by almost a quarter of those questioned. Attitudes on this matter are noteworthy by worldview and confessional groups. The idea of giving Orthodoxy state status is most supported by believers (17.4%), and least common among those who believe in supernatural forces (5.7%). A majority of all worldview groups support the equality of religions with amazingly equal indicators, an average of 40.8% of the young sample. It is significant that the analogous indicator among the adult population is 40.8%. Among those who want to deny preference to traditional religions there is a certain difference of opinion between believers (22.0%) and nonbelievers (18.5%).
Within the confessional groups, 18.4% of Orthodox and 5.6% of Buddhists are willing to give state status to Orthodoxy, while this is completely rejected by Muslim, Catholic, protestant, and Jewish respondants. The idea of the equality of religions found a more significant and generally cordial support, although with varying numbers: among Orthodox, 37.0%, Buddhists, 44.0%, protestants, 57.1%, Jews, 70.0%, and Muslims, 80%. Naturally support for preferential treatment of traditional religions was expressed by representives of these same confessions: Orthodox 24.2%, Muslims, 20.0%, Buddhists, 22.2%, and only 14.3% of protestants.
For an understanding of the role of religion in the worldview of youth, it is important how it interprets moral restraint and the nature of possible actions in various life situations, including the extraordinary. The young people were shown a list of actions that are not approved by public morality, much less religious morality. A comparision of the orientation and actions of believing youth with the general data in the sample shows clearly that in regard to dubious secular "entertainments," and even with regard to deviant forms of behavior, there is no difference regarding principles in the answers of believing youth and those of the average of the sample. Evidence that, for contemporary youth, attitude toward religion and the adoption of its standards and rules have no formative effect upon their system of values comes also from answers with regard to other matters.
Thus, to the question "What do you do in your free time?" only 3.2% of respondants answered "attend church or religious association." At the same time, among confessional groups there was a greater tendency to visit a religious building among young Muslims (13.3%) and protestants (57.1%). Among youth, the only thing less popular for leisure activity than attending church was attending political organizations (0.4%). We note that while 46.3% of the youth questioned consider themselves Orthodox, only 4.0% of them attend church. To the question "What is your usual circle of informal friendship?" only 4.4% answered that it was "fellow believers who share my religious and political views."
The issue of the evident "secularization" of values and preferences of youth can be seen also by means of analysis of answers to the question about its role models. Thus, if only 22.0% of those questioned said they have a life model whom they wish to emulate, of these only 11.4% said that a spiritual mentor served as such an ideal.
To the question "With whom could you share your most secret thoughts?", only 3.4% of those questioned named a spiritual mentor. It is not without interest that among those who believe in supernatural forces, this indicator constituted 6.9%, that is, double the average. Apparently this says that in their lives a great role is being played by newly arising idols, gurus, and contemporary "magicians."
We turn further to the cycle of questions that reveal the interrelationship of confessional and worldview factors with social, economic, and political goals and orientations of youth. In particular, answers in all worldview groups, whether believing, wavering, indifferent, or unbelieving youth, displayed the same common tendency: those who consider that they have lost from the reforms that have taken place in Russia are significantly greater than those who consider that they have won from them. However, among those who believe in God this opposition is much less sharp: winners, 13.6% and losers, 20.4%, while among unbelievers it is 12.5% and 33.8% respectively. Still more striking are answers received to the question whether the current reforms in Russia are being conducted in the interests of youth and the future of the country. In the various worldview groups the answers were characterized by a significant conviction that the reforms do not serve the interests of youth and the future of the country. Thus 46.6% of believers in God think this way (while only 12.3% are persuaded that they do serve their interests), waverers, 43.6% (with 12.2% thinking positively), believers in supernatural forces, 49.0% (11.8% positive) and nonbelievers, 53.7% (11.0% positive).
It is remarkable that against the background of an absence of optimism among a significant portion of youth relative to the fate of their country, believers nevertheless have a somewhat less pessimistic view on the development of Russia in the next 5-10 years.
A more moderate view of young believers also appears in other matters. For example, in answers to the question whether they like today's life in Russia on the whole, an unreserved "yes" was expressed by 9.2% of believers and 6.8% of nonbelievers. A rather strong inclination and quest on the part of believing youth toward a moderate form of life and toward eternal life values was evidenced by their inclusion, like all youth, among the things they desire in various areas the attainment of a good education, formation of a happy family, and hobbies.
A definite difference between believing and nonbelieving youth was expressed in the degree of demonstration of interest in politics (among the group of nonbelievers 1.5 times more than in the group of believers pay careful attention to political information in the country) and in the degree of participation in the work of political parties, demonstrations, pickets, strikes, etc (in the course of the past year the group of nonbeleivers participated twice as often in such actions). The study also showed that believers are less inclinted to open forms of protest. The possible reaction of the worldview groups to a substantial worsening of the lives of youth and their families was significant. Under such a turn of events,8.2% of believers, 4.9% of waverers, 4.1% of believers in supernatural forces, 9.5% of those indifferent to religion, and 15.7% of nonbelievers are willing to participate in various forms of protest.
The group of believers displayed a more patriarchal and native Russian understanding of "legality" (justice) and the standards of social life, which was demonstrated in answers to the question about how one should relate to the law. Among those inclined to obey it under all circumstances even if it does not fully comport with contemporary reality, believers in God and in supernatural forces are fewer than among those who are indifferent or unbelievers (7.9% and 8.2% over against 13.9% and 11.0%). Significantly closer for believers is the idea that "it is not so important whether something conforms to the law or not; the main thing is that it be just" (36.5% and 42.4% respectively over against 28.1% and 28.8%).
Thus, religiousness, like the entire worldview of contemporary youth, has a rather complicated structure. With the general increase in the number of believers, relative to the past decades, among young people there has appeared a significant portion (more than 50%) of those who are undecided, wavering between faith and unbelief, and also those who are indifferent and who believe in immanent supernatural forces. The nonreligious type of worldview continues to occupy a substantial part of the consciousness of the youth. The most religious youth in great measure support the maintenance of family and national values and, with all the concern for the urgent social and political realities, they are not willing at the present time for them to be decisively transformed. (tr. by PDS)
Russian text, courtesy of Konstantin Krylov; Russian text of complete report available in ZIP format at National Electronic Library
(posted 14 December 1998)
HAARARE, ZIMBABWE. Konrad Raiser, WCC General Secretary, in conversation with the Metaphrasis correspondent, confirmed that recently he received an official notification from Patriarch Maksim about the departure of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church from the World council of Churches. However, during the last several days the administration of the WCC maintained its silence "in order not to interfere with the productive work of the Assembly." Konrad Raiser pointed out that the letter stressed that "the hopes for the Bulgarian Church's participation in the WCC have not been realized," however the main reason stated was the need for preserving Church unity. The decision to end ecumenical contacts was made by the Synod of the Bulgarian Church on 9 April 1998 but to make the departure effective it was necessary to send the letter with the official notification. On the other hand the Bulgarian Patriarchate's unofficial representatives were active in the work of the Assembly as consultants
SPECIAL COMMISSION ESTABLISHED BY THE VII ASSEMBLY OF THE WCC
by Sergei Chapnin (Metaphrasis)
Sobornost, 12 December 1998
HARARE. The delegates of the VIII Assembly of the WCC approved the proposal to establish a special commission for the Orthodox participation in the WCC. "Following the Canberra Assembly (1991 S.Ch.) The relations of the Orthodox Churches with the Council reached a critical state," as pointed out in one of the working papers submitted by Gabriel Habib, delegate of the Antiochian Patriarchate. As a result, the Bulgarian and Georgian Churches left the WCC and a number of Orthodox Churches reduced their participation in the WCC.
In May 1998 the Orthodox Churches proposed the establishment of a mixed commission to discuss "mutually accepted ways of Orthodox participation in the ecumenical movement and a radical reorganization of the WCC." The Council supported this proposal.
Explaining the Orthodox position, Bishop Nifon of the Romanian Patriarchate presented the Salonika declaration to the Assembly and pointed out that at a consultation of heads of Orthodox and Oriental delegations held on 10 December, the declaration was fully supported. Thus today the Salonika declaration becomes the basis for the unanimous position of the Orthodox and Oriental Churches with respect to the Ecumenical Movement.
The Assembly agreed with the proposal to establish a special commission consisting of representatives of all Local Orthodox Churches as well as an equal number of representatives of other churches represented in the WCC.
The commission is charged with studying and analyzing all questions connected with Orthodox participation in the work of the WCC; to develop proposals for the essential changes in the structure and the method of the Council's operation. The WCC Central Committee will implement the necessary changes in the Council's activities. Changes in the WCC statutes will be implemented at the next Assembly.
It is expected that the work of the commission will last for at least two years. The fact that the establishment of the commission has not resolved the problem of Orthodox participation, was illustrated by the Russian Orthodox Church's delegation's decision to put their participation in the work of the Council's Central Committee on hold until the commission completes its work.
It is expected that the make-up of the commission will be confirmed by March, 1999 and its first session will be in June.
translated by A. Smirinsky
Russian text at Sobornost
(posted 14 December 1998)
Coprighted material. For private use only.
If material is quoted, please give credit to the publication from which it came. It is not necessary to credit this Web page.