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From 19 to 22 August the tenth annual meeting of the Orthodox Transfiguration Brotherhood--Transfiguration Assembly took place in Moscow. Around a thousand persons from eighteen dioceses of the Russian Orthodox church, located in Russia and seven countries of the near and far abroad, took part in plenary sessions, the work of round tables, and various fraternal meetings. Among the themes discussed were "The Council of the Russian Orthodox Church of 1917-1918 and Contemporary Church Life," "The Principle of Seniority in the Church," "Children and Youth," and "Small Brotherhoods: Problems and Prospects." Also widely discussed were problems associated with the common reading of scriptures outside of divine worship services and with personal and joint participation of members of the brotherhood in divine service.
At the assembly appeals were adopted (see below) expressing alarm over the fate of Russia on the brink of the third millennium and the hope for the regeneration of spiritual life within in. Participants in the assembly consider themselves not only an Orthodox brotherhood but also a church-public movement. At the same time they rejected the principle of the politicization of the church and the transformation of Orthodoxy into some variation of national state ideology. The jubilee and, to a certain extent, culminating tenth Transfiguration Assembly was held after traditional summer pilgrimages of member of the brotherhood, who this year covered seventeen dioceses of RPTs. The pilgrimages confirmed that our church needs the experience of the brotherhood especially in the area of Orthodox mission, catechization, and parish life. It was noted that fundamentalist forces that are trying to bring to naught the conciliar life of the church continue to operate actively around the church fence. "The restoration of the fullness of church life in our time is impossible without the restoration of continuity with regard to the decisions of the local council of RPTs of 1917-1918," those who assembled declared.
Transfiguration Brotherhood.
The unofficial brotherhood created in August 1990 has opened five previously closed churches in Moscow and the suburbs. With its support, an advanced theological school, the evangelistic and catechetical St. Filaret of Moscow Institute, and the largest open school in the Russian church were founded and now operate, and over the course of ten years the spiritual, educational magazine "Orthodox Community" and the fraternal newspaper "Presentation Sheet" have been published.
The members of the brotherhood consider the most important priorities of their activity to be the regeneration of the fullness of the tradition of the Orthodox church, parish life, the religious education of the laity, and a conscientious and consistent incorporation into the church of contemporaries who are coming to faith. The founder and spiritual guardian of the brotherhood, Father Georgy Kochetkov, created a contemporary system of Orthodox evangelism and catechization on the foundation of the tradition of the holy fathers. This year his dissertation, devoted to preparation for baptism and anointing, and two catechisms that he wrote were published. These are the only catechisms for catechumens and converts to be written and published in Russia in the twentieth century. In the course of the last five years the brotherhood has been subjected to continual pressure from fundamentalist forces, exerted through the newspapers "Radonezh," "Russkii vestnik," "Chernaia sotnia" [The Black Hundred], and the magazine and television program "Russkii dom," and so forth. As a result of a provocation arranged by these forces in June 1997, Fr Georgy Kochetkov still remains under a ban on his ministry on the basis of a false accusation and twelve of his associates have been excommunicated although the innocence of all of them has been documented more than a year and a half ago.
The evangelistic and catechetical St. Filaret's Advanced Orthodox Christian School of Moscow.
Created in 1988, its activity received official recognition this year: it was approved by the Department for Religious Education and Catechization of the Moscow patriarchate and it received a state license for advanced theological education. In 1999, 137 students studied in the school and heard lectures from 33 teachers, the majority of whom have academic degrees of doctor or kandidat of sciences. An open school exists within the Saint Filaret's school, where adults who are coming to the Orthodox faith can, in the course of a year, be deeply and seriously prepared for baptism or for their first confession. Every year the school helps several hundreds of Muscovites and residents of other cities of Russia and the near abroad enter the church. In 1999 the school had more than 500 enrolled. The school also includes theological courses and courses in church crafts.
"Orthodox Community" magazine.
The first issue of the magazine came out in 1990 before the first Transfiguration Assembly. In the course of ten years the magazine has tried to express the life and spiritual experience of the Orthodox church, avoiding scholasticism and stylization. It devotes special attention to little-known spiritual experience of the Russian church of our century and, in particular, the heritage of the new martyrs and confessors of Russia. The magazine regularly publishes living testimonies of our contemporaries about their path to God and the church, sermons of famous pastors, works of leaders of the Russian religious and philosophical renaissance, and articles on critical problems of theology and contemporary church life. Translations of articles of the best foreign Orthodox theologians are regularly prepared and published. The magazine comes out bi-monthly. Over the years the magazine has developed a faithful audience among those who, like the members of the Transfiguration Brotherhood, are greatly sensitive to the problems of the lack of spirituality in society and the shortcomings of religious education and parish life in the contemporary church.
from the "Appeal of the Participants of the Transfiguration Assembly to all members of the Brotherhood"
[. . .] A survey of the church's past requires honesty and courage. Here we must avoid both refined idealization and faithless horror. But however difficult and contradictory the historic past of the church has been, it is our history and we bear the burden of not only our own but also the church's historical repentance. Taking upon our shoulders the weight of historical mistakes, we recognize that this is the yoke of Christ, which is good. It is precisely the recognition of the church's responsibility that helps us even in the present circumstances to pray for those who persecute us, bless those who curse us, and continue to carry out our ministry. [. . .]
from the "Appeal of the Tenth Transfiguration Assembly (Annual Meeting of the Unofficial Transfiguration Brotherhood) to Patriarch Alexis II of Moscow and all-Rus"
[. . .] In the majority, members of our brotherhood have responded to the divine call and have come to the Russian Orthodox church consciously, opening our hearts to God and to our neighbor. Guided by holy scripture and the sacred tradition of the church and by the historical experiences of our church (especially by the actions of the holy council of the Russian Orthodox church of 1917-1918, whose decisions have not been rescinded and were supposed to be the most important canonical guide for our church) we have undertaken activity in the field of religious education. And by God's mercy this activity has been fruitful
The difficulty of our present situation arose because of a stormy and aggressive attack of fundamentalist forces which are in essence antichurch and schismatic. . . . And now we place before ourselves and the church the question: does the church really not need the experience we have developed in Orthodox evangelism, catechization, and parish life, based on the fullness of the Christian tradition, free of the extremes of fundamentalism and modernism? Or does all this not matter to anyone? We hope that a vital, frank dialogue and honest theological debate could serve the good of the church and society. We have always been open to such dialogue. The fate of Russia depends to a great extent on whether you, your holiness, will permit that which is vital to exist within the canonical and juridical boundaries of the Russian Orthodox church.
from the "Appeal of the Tenth Assembly of the Transfiguration Brotherhood to the Russian Public"
[. . .] We, the participants of the assembly held in Moscow 18-22 August 1999, at which around 1000 persons from eight countries were present, have been forced to recognize with sorrow that the desire to discover life according to justice, conscience, and Christian live by turning the national attention to the Russian Orthodox church immediately after the fall of the godless system has been turned into despair. The hopes of the people associated with the church were not justified for two reasons: society itself was not ready for a fruitful dialogue with the church, and church institutions, which were not always identical with the church itself in its depth and fullness, were not about to respond to the demands of the time. Unfortunately, even those few vital forces which were already capable of such beneficial activity in the field of religious education of the nation were treated with suspicion within the church itself, and now they are under constant pressure and are subjected to a barrage of slander and obstructions. [ . . .]
Guided by the words of the blesses Augustine, "In essentials, unity,
in what is secondary, diversity, in everything, love," the members of the
movement appeal for an open dialogue by all who are not indifferent to
the fates of Russia and the Russian Orthodox church. The goal of
the dialogue is to find a way out of the crisis situation whose intensification
could bring unpredictable consequences. [. . .]
(tr. by PDS)
(posted 30 August 1999)
The Last Supper, new Russian style
On the eve of the convocation of the local council in August 1917 the Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdiaev wrote prophetically: "In the last years of its existence the Holy Synod suffered the same corruption that the bureaucracy did; it contained the same rot that the state authority did. The church administration was bound to the old state authority and shared its fate." What a shame that what he wrote many decades ago is a reality today.
On 18 July 1961 the Orthodox bishops traveled from all corners of the USSR to the Saint Sergius Holy Trinity lavra. For them this was not only a possibility of visiting the capital but also of meeting with their brethren, friends, and contemporaries. It was a difficult time, the height of the Khrushchev persecution of the Russian Orthodox church. After a liturgy, as usual, Patriarch Alexis I invited the bishops to a ceremonial dinner. As suddenly as snow upon the head, at the time of the meal they were told that it was a bishops' council. Nobody suspected what the agenda of this council would be or who had prepared it. From the patriarch's introductory speech the stunned bishops learned that the synod had undertaken a reform of parish life and that henceforth the priest was merely an employee of the church society, which could dismiss him whenever it wished to. They were simply expected to ratify this reform.
It is said that history repeats itself, first as tragedy and then as farce. Like thirty-nine years previously, on 18 July 1999 the bishops arrived at the lavra on the memorial day of Saint Sergius of Radonezh. After serving the liturgy, they gathered in the dining room and suddenly learned that "there is a proposal" not to convoke a local council in February 2000 but to substitute for it a jubilee bishops' council. Again, not a single one of the bishops raised his voice against the secret decision of the Holy Synod which grossly violated the charter of RPTs. Except there was this one difference that in 1961 one of the bishops who came to the lavra, Ermogen Golubev, could have spoken out against the anticanonical decision of the synod which was thrust upon it by the communist party central committee (TsK KPSS). But he was not permitted to attend the dinner nor the session.
Today there is no TsK KPSS. The administration of the president does not interfere in the internal life of the church , much less the government. Whom do the Orthodox bishops fear, now that they are freed from the yoke of the bolsheviks of Russia? Why did not one speak out against the crudest violation of the charter of RPTs which was adopted at the local council on 6-9 July 1988? It declares unequivocally: "1. In the Russian Orthodox church the supreme authority in doctrine, church administration, and church justice--legislative, executive, and judicial--belongs to the local council." This means one thing. Not only in a crisis situation, the church people resolve problems that have arisen together: bishops, clergy, and laity. Point 2 of the charter states: "The council is convened by the patriarch (acting patriarch) and the Holy Synod as needed, but no less often than one time in every five years. It comprises bishops, clergy, monastics, and laity."
The value of this formulation is that it is supremely clear and does not permit any other interpretations. Nevertheless it has been grossly violated by the Holy Synod twice. The first time the members of the synod postponed the 1995 local council, stating that the previous council in 1990 had been an extraordinary one. Actually it was called in order to elect a patriarch. But why should this prevent convoking a regular council in 1995?
The Holy Synod remains to the present the most closed structure of the Russian church. Whereas before perestroika, all sessions of the synod were recorded verbatim in a special journal, now, upon the suggestion of Metropolitan Kirill of Kaliningrad and Smolensk, some of the ticklish problems discussed by members of the synod are not recorded in the journal, remaining concealed not only from contemporaries but also from historians. Why are the synod's session shrouded in such secrecy? Perhaps the Holy Synod a like the CIA or Russian Intelligence Service which conduct secret operations? Of course not; the synod discusses problems which are not only not secret but have enormous and by no means idle interest for both clergy and laity. For example, the synod's session of 19 July of this year devoted much time to the scandals involving the homosexual conduct of two bishops, Nikon Mironov of Ekaterinburg and Gury Shalimov of Corsun. The press devoted so much attention to poor Bishop Nikon that he is notorious throughout Russia. The behavior of Bishop Gury was just as scandalous. The Holy Synod sent both into retirement, that is, it dismissed them, confirming thereby the justice of the journalistic accusations. But it dismissed them in conditions of strictest secrecy!
There are seven permanent members of the synod. His Holiness Patriarch Alexis II of Moscow and all-Rus presides at the sessions of the synod. He turned seventy this year. The chancellor of the Moscow patriarch, Metropolitan Sergius of Solnechnogorsk is 50. The patriarchal exarch of all-Belorussia, Metropolitan Filaret, is 64. The primate of the Ukrainian Orthodox church, Metropolitan Vladimir of Kiev, is 64. Metropolitan Yuvenaly of Krutitsy and Kolomna is 64. Metropolitan Vladimir of St. Petersburg and Ladoga is 70. And finally, the chairman of the Department of External Church Relations (OVTsS), Metropolitan Kirill (Gundiaev) of Kaliningrad and Smolensk, is 53. Colossal power is concentrated in the hands of these bishops. Besides them the Holy Synod includes temporary members, but their mandate is merely to raise their hands at the time of voting.
Within the Holy Synod there are three groups.
First group: the "Metropolitbureau"
The most authoritative group was created by Metropolitan Kirill. It includes metropolitans Yuvenaly and Vladimir of St. Petersburg. Metropolitan Kirill is a prominent figure not only among members of the synod. Thanks to his indefatigable energy, splendid memory, and broad knowledge, he has access to governmental offices and the administration of the president. Until recently he was absolutely certain that after the death of Patriarch Alexis II he would undoubtedly become primate of the Russian church. True, events of this year have shaken Master Gundiaev's assurance. In the first place, the patriarch, despite his age, is in splendid shape. Second, the metropolitan's team is rather powerful and well equipped and it has begun to crumble under his fantastic meanness. First the Orthodox Television Information Agency (PITA) attacked him. PITA complains about Gundiaev on all its TV programs and it has prepared clips of complaints and distributed them to the dioceses. Recently General Valery Lebedev, the brains and finance heart of OVTsS, left Master Gundiaev. The recent armed seizure of the "Universitetskaia" hotel by the autonomous noncommercial "Pilgrims' Center" association, which was founded by OVTsS, testifies to Metropolitan Kirill's agony. Of course, sooner or later the association will be thrown out of the fifteen-story hotel; the custodian bishops behave too impudently. Metropolitan Kirill's tobacco and alcohol scandals have undermined his authority on the international level. Nevertheless he has held onto his positions in the synod. He knows very well the weaknesses of members of the synod and he skillfully manipulates them. This is the great talent of the metropolitan. His impudence and frankness befuddle weak minds. Synod members who know about his ties with high places are not about to withstand his unbearable pressure. His close friendship with Berezovsky also has brought its fruits; the metropolitan has compromising information not only about all of the episcopacy but even about the patriarch and he occasionally leaks it to the press. The metropolitan is deathly afraid of a local council. There is no chance that he would remain chairman of OVTsS after it. And if he loses this chair he will automatically be removed from the Holy Synod.
His old friend and accomplice is Metropolitan Yuvenaly Poiarkov of Krutitsy and Kolomna. This bishop has never served a day in a parish. He knows the problems and needs of clergy only by hearsay. Although he came up through all the ranks, he spent the most difficult years for the Russian church abroad. He served in Berlin, Jerusalem, Prague, and even in Japan. He headed OVTsS for almost ten years. He thought that he would be elected patriarch in 1990 after the death of Patriarch Pimen. But he did not make it even to the second round. This so upset him that he suffered a heart attack. But after recovering, he reconciled himself to the situation and began to support the rise of Master Gundiaev. Metropolitan Yuvenaly is notorious in church circles for his nontraditional sexual orientation. A number of monasteries in the area around Moscow have already been turned into annexes of Sodom. His personal achievement was the disruption and discrediting of the burial of the remains of the royal Romanov family in 1998. From its creation he was a member of the state commission that studied the circumstances of the shooting and burial of the tsarist family. Since he was more knowledgeable than other bishops about the circumstances of this tragedy, by complex intrigues he managed to get the Holy Synod not to recognize the remains found near Ekaterinburg as belonging to the tsar. For him, a local council would be fatal. He is afraid that his old sins could come back to haunt him and numerous schisms in the diocese as well.
The third member of the group is Metropolitan Vladimir of St. Petersburg and Ladoga. He was born into the family of a priest who served secretly during the years of persecution, hiding his priesthood even from his son. To save itself from persecution the family often moved from place to place. Nevertheless, when he became a priest, Vladimir Kotliarov advanced up the career ladder successfully. In the early 1960s he served in Jerusalem and was one of the observers from the Russian church at the second Vatican council in Rome. He was a representative of the Moscow patriarchate at the World Council of Churches in Geneva. At the end of the 1960s he was patriarchal exarch of western Europe and served in Berlin. He is notorious for his aristocratic manners (if he wears cuff links then they must be jeweled). Emulating Catherine II's favorite Grigory Potemkin, he enjoys fresh oysters which are brought to him from Paris and London. But his guests are most affected by his wine cellars. Metropolitan Vladimir Sabodan, who replaced him in Rostov on Don, nearly lost consciousness when he caught sight of and tasted the wines from the metropolitan's cellars. In the 1970-1980s his career rise halted and he was shuttled from one episcopal see to another. Patriarch Pimen was not well disposed toward him. Only after his death did Vladimir come into favor again. From 1995 he has ruled the St. Petersburg diocese, thereby becoming a permanent member of the Holy Synod. In Petersburg he began restoring order with an "iron hand," primarily in financial matters overturning traditions that had arisen over decades (oysters are expensive nowadays). Metropolitan Vladimir's ministry has been constantly accompanied by scandals. Their causes are his inability and lack of desire to get along with clergy. His administrative style is authoritarian. A local council would undermine the metropolitan's unlimited authority.
Second group: the "Swamp"
Metropolitans Filaret and Vladimir Sabodan are not only contemporaries. Both began their careers abroad. Metropolitan Filaret headed OVTsS for eight years and Master Vladimir was chancellor of the Moscow patriarchate six years. Both were rectors of the Moscow ecclesiastical schools. Both share a nontraditional sexual orientation. Metropolitan Vladimir was the chief competitor of Metropolitan Alexis Ridiger in the 1990 patriarchal elections. The split was slight; Metropolitan Alexis beat him by only twenty votes. Master Vladimir was the first of the bishops to have recourse to the media's help in getting damaging information against the exarch of Ukraine, Metropolitan Filaret Denisenko. After a number of scandals were published about his personal life, bishop Vladimir succeeded in getting a review of the "personnel" question at the 1992 bishops' council. Metropolitan Filaret was forced to retire but, when he returned to Kiev, he went into schism. Thanks to this Ukraine now has its own patriarch and three Orthodox churches. As a result of the schism the clergy of Ukraine find themselves between the hammer and the anvil. The government of Ukraine supports the schismatic patriarch Filaret, whom the 1997 bishops' council unfrocked and anathematized. Disputes between Orthodox and Greek Catholics rock western Ukraine. Neither OVTsS nor Metropolitan Vladimir himself have dealt with this problem. The problem of the status of the Ukrainian church would become an unavoidable question at a local council. It already is an exarchate, but until now it is neither autonomous nor autocephalous. Both metropolitans share one thing in common: under their administrations the largest monasteries--the Kiev caves lavra and the Zhirovitsy monastery--have become examples of Sodom and Gomorra. "Gay families" coexist peacefully in them, concealed by monastic garments.
Metropolitan Filaret Vakhromeev is an experienced politician. Although he is Russian, he gets along well with the unpredictable president of Belorussia. In evaluating the church situation he knows that today he is the most likely candidate for the patriarchal throne. Since everything is going well, what could come up at a council? Both metropolitans understand quite well that a local council is not only undesirable for them but could undermine their positions.
Third group: the "Minority."
There are only two members, the most holy patriarch of Moscow and all-Rus, Alexis II, and Metropolitan Sergius Fomin of Solnechnogorsk. They do not fear a local council. Neither clergy nor laity are likely to present them with substantial challenges. But in the Holy Synod they are the distinct minority.
Nevertheless the church situation is not hopeless. The notorious 1961 bishops' council expanded the number of permanent members of the Holy Synod. It added the chairman of OVTsS and the chancellor of the patriarchate. It is necessary today also to review the issue of expanding the membership of the Holy Synod. The Russian church now includes the countries of CIS and the Baltics. Obviously it would be necessary to add to the synod the primates of at least the larger republics, for example, Kazakhstan, northern Caucasus, and Baltics.
But this is only a half-measure. It is important to return to the decisions of the local council of 1917-1918, which nobody has abolished. Even now they are the guide to action. The council created a Supreme Church Council which included bishops, clergy, and laity. A demarcation of authorities was established. The Holy Synod dealt with matters of doctrine and liturgy and the Supreme Church Council dealt with economic problems of the dioceses and parishes. In 1967 the disgraced Archbishop Ermogen Golubev sent a document to Patriarch Alexis I, "On the fiftieth anniversary of the restoration of the patriarchate. A historical, canonical, and juridical guide." In it he sharply criticized the 1945 local council which began the canonical distortion of the conciliar life of the church. He wrote: "The state of the Russian Orthodox church at the beginning of the second fifty years since the restoration of the patriarchate to it cannot be considered satisfactory." His prophetic foresight came true. Today the Russian church is in the gravest of crises. It can be healed only by a return to the standards of the 1917-1918 local council and, in accordance with the charter, the urgent convocation of a local council in February 2000. (tr. by PDS)
(posted 21 August 1999)
18 August 1999 (Newsroom) -- As residents of a centuries-old flashpoint of frontier warfare between Islamic and Christian civilizations, the people of the North Caucasus region of southern Russia have often felt like pawns of foreign powers. Such is apparently the case now for Dagestan's delicate mix of ethnic groups, who seem to want no part in a radical insurgency that aims to separate from Russia and form an Islamic state with neighboring Chechnya. Yet equally troubling to most Dagestanis is the prospect of a massive influx of military and political might from Moscow that would linger long after the last separatist had been crushed.
Fueling each side of this multi-faceted struggle is an intricate interplay of economic, cultural and religious interests. Many want to draw immediate parallels to the Chechen war of 1994-96, but comparisons are not easily made, says Paul Steeves, an internationally recognized scholar of Russian history and religion at Stetson University in Florida. "We're not dealing with a broad-based united independence movement in Dagestan at all," Steeves explains. "It's a separatism that is being imposed on them by people who are coming from the point of view of Chechen nationalism."
For the Chechen warlords leading the insurgency, Dagestan, with its important trade links, is a route to prosperity. Devastated by the war, Chechnya has Russia's highest unemployment rate. Dagestan, which is twice the size of Chechnya, has 70 percent of Russia's shoreline on the oil-rich Caspian Sea and its only all-weather Caspian port. Even more compelling for some is a chance to expel the Russian "infidels" from a region largely inhabited by Muslims since the Ottoman Turkish empire Islamicized the region in the 18th century as a buffer zone between Christian and Islamic civilizations. That prospect has attracted radical mercenaries from throughout the Islamic world, many of whom earned their stripes fighting the Russians in Afghanistan.
"The insurgents need help in order to try to pull this off, because they are not that popular with majority," points out Richard King, a Russian history expert at Ursinus College in Collegeville, Pennsylvania.
The Afghan war in the 1980s became the inspiration and training ground for a new Islamic jihad movement that has battled against perceived enemies of Islam in Bosnia, Kosovo, Algeria, and other places, including Chechnya and now Dagestan, says Armin Terzi, a senior Middle East specialist at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, California.
Muslims from many nations who fought alongside the mujadeen in Afghanistan marveled at their success against the mighty Russian empire. "After that came a realization that We can defeat anybody," says Terzi, who served for three years at the Saudi mission to the U.N. in New York. "The whole notion of the new jihad movement began after that." Jihad means simply a "struggle" for purity. But for these zealots the highest form is a continued armed struggle against an infidel, Terzi says. When the Russians pulled out of Afghanistan and the war became a strictly civil conflict, most of the mercenaries left in search of another struggle.
"The Algerian war was a result of that," Terzi explains. "They didn't have anything else to do." Terzi says that while some may have purely religious motivations, for many, money is the draw. Some of the fighting is funded by private "charities," but much of it comes from the drug trade, he says.
Moscow does not want to repeat its mistake with Chechnya, where intense power only reinforced the resistance movement and further destabilized the region. Separatists outlasted the Russians in two years of fighting that ended in 1996 with Chechnya's declaration of independence, which is still unrecognized internationally.
"The Dagestanis fear domination more by the Chechens than by the Russians," says Mark Orsag, a professor of Russian history at Doane College in Nebraska who did doctoral work in Russia. "If it does drag out and the Russians are forced to use massive bombardment, that might turn the Dagestanis against them."
Dagestanis, who number about 2 million, have no unified identity like the Chechens, but comprise a patchwork of 34 rival ethnic groups. One of the most ethnically and linguistically complex regions in the world, Dagestan has five written languages and about two dozen others. Nearly every mountain valley -- like the Botlikh area where fighting is currently taking place -- has its own language or dialect, which is not understood by those in the next valley.
Few observers want to conjecture where the conflict might lead, but Orsag says there are two signs that seem to indicate that things are going well for the Russians. One is that local Dagestani troops have gone on the offensive, in one instance creating an avalanche that buried militants. "These people are saying to Yeltsin You don't have to send more troops because the guys you have here are doing job," Orsag maintains. "The other is that militants say that they have passed sentences of death against Yeltsin, Putin and other leaders and are training suicide bombers to go and blow them up, which seems to be a sign of desperation."
The Chechen warlords who are leading the struggle should not be confused with the Chechen government. Though Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov helped lead the Chechen rebellion in the mid-1990s, as a government bureaucrat he seems content with Chechnya's semi-autonomous situation and has distanced himself from his more radical former allies, Chechen guerrilla leader Shamil Basayev and his Saudi-born supporter, known as Khattab.
Khattab, who came to fight for the Chechens in 1995, is a follower of the austere Wahabi movement of Islam, which originated in Saudi Arabia. The influence of the Wahabi movement on the conflict is unclear because some Muslims use the term to describe a pure form of Islam rather than the specific movement begun by the reformer Abdul Wahab in the 18th century. While Khattab is vague about his origins, his declared aim to rid the North Caucasus of non-Muslims is consistent with the Wahabism practiced in Saudi Arabia. While Basayev takes a less radical stance -- expressing, for example, an openness to allowing NATO troops in the region -- he defends Khattab for his sacrifice to Chechnya.
Though Wahabism is foreign to the region, the radicalism it espouses can easily strike a chord among disenchanted Dagestanis and Chechens who have a long memory of Russian oppression. Some personally witnessed Stalin's retaliation to the resistance movement in World War II when some joined with the Nazis to resist the Russians. In retaliation, Stalin forcibly uprooted about half of the Chechens, many of whom died in the process.
For the Russians, the Chechen-led rebellion obviously poses a threat, but also an opportunity to strike back at Chechnya. "If the Russians do crush the Dagestani rebellion they will finish things once and for all and crush the Chechen rebellion," Terzi says.
Still, with more than 120 ethnic groups, Russia's troubles never seem to be over. Tatarstan, east of Moscow, has been less assertive than the southern republics, but has nevertheless declared its independence. With a large Muslim presence that is resentful of a dominant Russian Orthodox culture, the conflict has religious overtones, but is largely nationalistic, says Steeves of Stetson University.
Steeves points out that, significantly, no borders have been revised since the breakup of the Soviet Union. "If we get to the point where they start revising borders then there is the potential for a chain reaction with the final outcome being the big country of Russian falling apart," he says. "Just the instability in region would be so dangerous in terms of potential for nuclear accidents, or non-accidents. Even the potential for them to be used might cause neighbors to take precipitous action."
(posted 21 August 1999)
American officers are operating under the guise of preachers in Tver
In Tver province there are 235 registered religious associations. Despite the obvious competition among the "fishers for souls" there is considerable reason to conclude that several of them are affiliates of one and the same organization. For example, there is amazing coordination of the activities in our province of the "Church of the Resurrected Christ," the "Church of the Navigators" and the "Church of Latter Day Saints" (Mormons).
Web for students
Here is the first peculiarity: students of Tver State University and Tver State Technical University constitute the main membership of the first two organizations. The American church workers are especially happy about the kids from the departments of sociology, law, journalism, pedagogy, and psychology. The enrollment in such departments in Tver higher educational institutions is small and thus the followers of both "churches" are classmates or even the same people. Navigators and members of the "Church of the Resurrected Christ" frequently attend each other's meetings, especially when American "prophets" come to Tver on their invitation, and they swap cassettes with sermons received from abroad. But after all these are different religious movements.
Leaders of the Tver Mormons and Navigators traveled together to Vyborg to settle a question about the construction of a church there. Isn't it strange that the Navigators, Mormons and "Church of the Resurrected Christ" have a common mailbox in Moscow? Well, it is understandable since all these religious organizations are financed from abroad. The sponsors are American entrepreneurs. The official sponsor of the Navigators, John Sloan, as well as their director in Tver, Ed Tubbs and the superintendent of the Tver Mormons, Wesley Millard, are former officers in the army of USA who make no secret of their former military service.
So one can assume that the adherents of the "different branches of Christianity" (which is how the sectarians designate themselves) have a common goal. And their activities are coordinated. But what is their work directed toward? N. Krivelskaia, a lieutenant colonel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and deputy in the State Duma, suggested a reason for the invasion of the western sectarians: "It is quite possible that several workers of religious sects are being used by foreign states for intelligence purposes." And we should not forget that in pursuing what seems to be humane goals sects "swindle" people and cause them severe psychological trauma. In the State Duma the question of creating rehabilitation centers for victims of totalitarian sects and pseudoreligions has already been discussed. Nobody has yet undertaken to calculate how much harm sectarians have caused to the spiritual health of Russians. There are no such data for Tver province. How could one measure, let's say, the tragedy of the young girl who stabbed herself three times with a knife after attending a meetings in the "Russia" movie theatre, where the residence of the "Church of the Resurrected Christ" is located?
Air Force pilot became a "prophet"
Wesley Millard, a former Air Force pilot from USA, arrived in Tver "to bring the word of God." He was carrying it in his briefcase in the form of a book titled "Book of Mormon." But here's what is suspicious: Millard barely knew the history of the Mormon movement, just like his "missionary" colleagues. He had a hard time recalling when this religious association was organized and he did not know the names of the leaders of the movement. When controversial questions came up, he responded approximately: "I cannot explain that. It's what our prophets say. And their word is not open to question." Millard conducted his "mission" peculiarly, with trips into the woods for cookouts, intimate conversations on Sundays in the "Vulcan" theatre, and gatherings in homes of young Tver families.
I even went to one of Millard's "cookout services." I was among those invited because when we were introduced it came out that we had a common hobby, parachuting. On the fire meat was roasting, although the Mormons' rules have eating and drinking restrictions on parishioners. We played volleyball with the group of "missionaries" (in Tver Millard has five subordinates who are compatriots). The members of the Tver congregation of Mormons sunned themselves; they were homemakers, unemployed, an overage pupil from the auxiliary school. In a word, the standard "enrollment" of a sect: people who are spiritually and psychologically damaged. But. . .
Here's another strange event. Several months ago an American woman came to Tver, who was an adherent of Mormon teachings. She was improving her Russian language and at the same time she wanted to know whether there were brothers in the faith in Tver. She left convinced that no Mormon church was operating in the city. She did not consider Millard and his group fellow believers.
What kind of goal is being pursued by American officers, even former ones, in our country is not hard to guess. Even more so, as it turned out, the geography of the movement about Russia by Millard and his group confirms the guess: besides Tver they also have "preached" in Sergiev Posad, where enterprises of the military industrial complex are located, and in Korolev, one of the centers of "secret" research.
And how do you like the fact that, according to reports of workers of the passport and visa service of the provincial Department of Internal Affairs, "Mormons" are in Tver illegally? Three of them were registered to Moscow, where according to law they were supposed to conduct their activity. The offices of visa security do not know anything about the existence of these three, which has not interfered with the missionaries' preaching in Tver for several months. Recently a fourth joined them who also deceitfully avoided contact with the passport and visa service. Recently Millard hurriedly left the country. He did not even await the arrival of a new "missionary." Apparently he had fulfilled the orders of his command more quickly than had been planned. Or he was forced to retreat because of some unforeseen circumstances.
Illegal Navigator
Not so long ago another foreigner left Tver who also was a former American officer, Ed Tubbs, who had come to Russia "to study the Russian language." This was the purpose stated in his entry documents. Tubbs was supposed to study language at the "Intercontact" program. But when the passport and visa service of Tver province checked, representatives of "Intercontact" stated that Tubbs was not their student. Then what was he doing in Tver? Illegal religious activity. Secretly, without registration, without permission to engage in missionary work, he organized a group for Bible study which had about twenty members. In the main they were students of higher educational institutions who are rather ambitious and active, are working on theses with interesting topics, and have unorthodox notions. That is, they are people who in time could occupy high posts in the administrative structures, law enforcement agencies, mass media, and the educational system. Besides students of the humanities departments, the group of the "Navigators' Church" includes children of military personnel, directors of enterprises, and supervisory workers. Psycho-linguistic exercises are conducted with them by means of rather strange approaches. Here are the methods which Tubbs constantly used. In one of the favorite Navigator games the participants sit in a circle beating a rhythm with their hands. Each person has a number (not a name or a nickname but an impersonal figure). The leader announces: "Eight, I am one." Eight then continues: "Five, I am Eight." And it goes on like this until they tire of it, using the peculiar "code." What kinds of associations does this raise? Of course, military ones: "We are constituent elements of a single whole; we maintain a single rhythm; we have no names; we do not question orders. . . ." After such a game it is time for joint prayer, but before it each person describes personal problems and what the parents are concerned about and how things are going at work. A system of bribery is operating successfully. A trip to Petersburg, financed by the Navigators. What luck. On the trip the leader holds long conversations with the "disciples." He is interested in everything, the circle of friends, relatives, acquaintances, and personal problems. He conducts a regular collection of information putting together their psychological portraits.
And what do you think of this offer: "We have been sent 500 (600, 800) dollars from America. Whoever needs money, don't hold back, speak up." Once a student has taken money "from the common treasury," of course he finds himself obligated to the sect. Tubbs had plans for opening a Sunday school for children who parents occupy influential positions. These plans were not accomplished. After serious warnings from the provincial passport and visa service, the leader of the Navigators sect was forced to leave the country. (tr. by PDS)
(posted 20 August 1999)
Your Excellency,
Esteemed Vladimir Vladimirovich
I heartily congratulate you on your selection and appointment to the high and responsible post of chairman of the government of the Russian federation.
I think that an enormous responsibility has been laid upon you inasmuch as the present social and economic situation in the country does not permit one to hope for a quick resolution of the problems facing the government.
As primate of the Russian Orthodox church, I am extremely delighted to recongize that despite all difficulties, good relations have developed between the government of the Russian federation and the Moscow patriarchate, which are called to demonstrate joint concern for the moral health of society, the establishment of social, economic, and political stability, and the preservation and increase of the rich cultural and historical heritage. I hope that in the future as well this cooperation, based on the principles of mutual respect, will be very constructive and fruitful.
I wish you, esteemed Vladimir Vladimirovich, strengthening of your spiritual and physical energies, courage, patience, and much success in your future labors in the responsible post of chairman of the government of the Russian federation.
With sincere respect
Patriarch Alexis II of Moscow and all-Rus
(tr. by PDS)
(posted 17 August 1999)
The mountain villages of Dagestan, scene of Russia's latest military clash with Chechen and Dagestani rebels, are extraordinarily remote. The people of the Botlikh region, a high corner on the Chechen-Dagestani border, are unique to their valley and speak their own language. The stark, barren crags of the Great Caucasus mountain range where they live are even more impenetrable than the wooded mountains of Chechnya.
A skirmish in this southernmost point of Russia may seem like a small problem with bandits in the hills. Yet the growing number of casualties shows both sides regard the area and the issue to be important enough to fight for. The rebels have a vision and proven determination. The Russian authorities are again trying to smash incipient separatism with brute force, despite the lessons of Chechnya that such tactics may only reinforce popular resistance and could bring greater instability and even military humiliation.
For the people of Dagestan, stuck in the middle, the conflict spells trouble. Dagestan, which only just managed to survive the fallout of the 1994-1996 war in Chechnya, is double the size of its Chechen neighbor and far more fractured, with a population of 2 million made up of 34 different ethnic nationalities. The power sharing between them is intricate and complicated.
For Russia, Dagestan retains an important strategic value. Dagestan commands 70 percent of Russia's shoreline to the oil producing Caspian Sea and its only all-weather Caspian port at Makhachkala. It provides the crucial pipeline links from Azerbaijan, where Russia maintains important oil interests. Geographically placed between Chechnya and the Caspian and Azerbaijan, it has served as a containing buffer, controlling the Chechens' access to the outside world.
For Chechnya, which won its freedom from Russian rule but has suffered drastically from the consequent economic isolation, Dagestan offers the way out to prosperity. During the war, Dagestan, and in particular the Botlikh region, became a conduit for weapons and men into and out of Chechnya. Hundreds of wounded Chechen fighters were spirited over the mountain roads to Azerbaijan for treatment. Now the routes offer the promise of trade, jobs and economic survival.
There is much more than economics driving this confrontation, though. The men leading the incursion into Dagestan are determined revolutionaries, who want to see the whole Caucasus region free from Russian rule. They regard much of Dagestan as theirs by right, harking back to the Islamic state that resisted Russian conquest for so long in the last century.
There are few people in Dagestan who actively support independence from Russia, yet discontent with Moscow runs deep. Since the war in Chechnya, the republic has suffered drastic economic decline and instability. Unemployment is the highest in all of Russia, and like all people from the Caucasus, the Dagestanis suffer ethnic discrimination in Russia. Their predicament leaves them susceptible to ideas of radical Islam, or even separatism, according to Enver Kisriyev, a Dagestani sociologist.
Shamil Basayev, the Chechen guerrilla commander who led his troops in the fiercest fighting of the war, is the driving force behind the latest fighting.
He has had Dagestan in his sights for more than a year now. After six months as Chechen prime minister last year, he resigned to set up a formal movement called the Congress of the Peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan and head its "peacekeeping force."
"The aim is the union of Dagestan and Chechnya," he said in an extended interview last year. Asked if that meant removing Dagestan from Russian jurisdiction, he answered, "Inshallah," which means "God willing." He said he hoped Dagestan would win independence without recourse to war, but that there were many Dagestanis willing to fight and he was prepared to help them. "I am helping Dagestan and will help anyone who is against Russia," he said.
At 34, Basayev is a fierce fighter with a clear political aim. For many years he has argued that the world is witnessing the collapse of the Russian empire and its dominance of the North Caucasus region. He was always confident that Russia would withdraw from Chechnya and predicts the same for Dagestan.
"Dagestan will be independent, there is no doubt," he said. "Russia will not have a presence in the North Caucasus, it will simply leave. Probably without war or bloodshed, it will collapse. Our job will be to prevent great bloodshed."
Basayev is supported and possibly helped with funds by a commander known by his nom de guerre, Khattab, who arrived in Chechnya in early 1995 to join the fight against Russia. Khattab keeps his origins secret, but is thought to be from Jordan or Saudi Arabia and a follower of Wahhabism, the conservative sect of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia.
He fought with the rebels against the Soviet army in Afghanistan but has since made his home in Chechnya and married a Dagestani. Wounded three times in Chechnya, he is very close to Basayev and has been training young Chechen and Dagestani fighters. His agenda, he says, is to fight the Russians and bring Islamic rule once more to the North Caucasus.
Khattab is reticent about his connections with other Wahhabi organizations around the world and about his long-term aims. Yet he is part of a growing presence of Wahhabis in the Caucasus, in particular in Dagestan and Chechnya. Their version of Islam is strict and militant, and much of it alien to the Caucasus. Not all Wahhabis advocate armed intervention; some are living peacefully in other Dagestani villages. But militant Wahhabis are finding fertile ground among the young, particularly when tempted by weapons training.
While Basayev defends Khattab fiercely as a brother who spilt his blood for Chechnya, he has spoken against Wahhabism, or extreme Islam, for Chechnya. Basayev is a practicing Moslem. Unlike the Wahhabis, who are against the presence of infidels in a Moslem country, Basayev says he would welcome the presence of NATO in the Caucasus and Chechnya.
The combination of Basayev and Khattab makes the Russian leadership see red. While Moscow can tolerate the moderate Chechen president, Aslan Maskhadov, it regards Basayev as a terrorist and a radical with whom it cannot negotiate, and Khattab as a dangerous foreign mercenary.
The authorities are not even considering negotiating with them over
their occupation of several villages in Dagestan, Zagir Arukhov, the deputy
nationalities minister in Dagestan, said in a telephone interview. "We
will not go to negotiate. They are bandits and we see this action as an
aggression and occupation of Dagestan."
LOCAL DIFFICULTY. EXAGGERATING THE DAGESTAN THREAT WILL EXACERBATE
IT
The Times, 17 Auguest 1999*
Russia has become highly sensitive about Islamist assertiveness since its failure to defeat Chechen separatists in the 1994-96 war. Muslim guerrillas who have crossed into nighbouring Dagestan from lawless postwar Chechnya, triggered an alarm system that was already on high alert. The rebels want to turn these two regions into an Islamic state. Anatoly Kvashnin, the general who ran the Chechen war, again confronts insurgents led by Shamil Basayev, his old Chechen opponent. Moscow is inclined to see this as the Chechnya war revisited. But, before Moscow goes takes plans for a fullscale onslaught any further, it should pause to consider whether it is overreacting.
It makes perfect sense to stop the gunmen in Dagestan. But may be alarmist to depict this small-scale unrest as a Chechnya-type threat. Chechnya's rebellion was backed by a population hostile to the advancing Russians and ready to fight. Dagestan is different, a hotch-potch of ethnicities run by pro-Moscow politicians with a preference for a quiet life. The last thing they want is for any group to start clamouring for self-rule; they also want to avoid the fate of Chechnya, which suffered 80,000 casualties. Dagestani police, who have no time for the extremists, are even helping the Russians to fight.
The militants number only 1,000 men; Russian forces, rather implausibly, claimed yesterday to have killed 600. The insurgents hold a mere half dozen villages, which are being bombed by Russian planes, in a landscape of remote mountains rising out of upland pastures that lie across more mountains. Few people live in these picturesque villages; few travel there. Roads are so avalanche-prone that rebels would find it hard to advance even as far as the tiny region's coastal cities. The group is backed by Wahhabis, an extremist sect recently introduced to the region; it is a tiny minority of which most locals disapprove, preferring their traditional, folksy, mystical Sufi Islam. Almost the only way to make Dagestanis rise up against Russia, in fact, would be an inappropriately severe Russian crackdown - a path that Moscow is already beginning to take.
Russia's response has been a mix of massive firepower and highly public panic about the threat to national unity. The new Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, was approved yesterday by the hard-line Duma, mainly because of his tough views on Dagestan. MPs declared the troubles there a threat to Russia and insisted the invaders be "wiped out"; President Yeltsin promised a tough response and said Mr Putin, a Soviet KGB veteran, was just the man to handle it.
This officially-endorsed panic is being read by some liberal sceptics as political sharp practice whose rewards will be reaped in Moscow, not the south. The aim, they suspect, is to scare Russians into giving more power to the security police - inheritors of the KGB. The KGB, dismembered during the Soviet collapse in 1991, was partly revived during the Chechen war in response to the threat that Chechens posed to Russia. An undesirable by-product of today's panic would be if Russia's secret police, who now have their man running the government, again extended their powers, drawing justification from the perception that Russians again need saving from a dire external threat.
*from Johnson's Russia List
(posted 17 August 1999)
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