{"id":1132,"title":{"rendered":"The Heeding Presumption In South Carolina: A Balanced Approach"},"content":{"rendered":"

\r\nWilliam Ryan Nichols\u200a1<\/a>\u200a<\/span><\/sup> According to Aaron Twerski and Neil Cohen, [n]ot only would such a result clash with fundamental principles of fairness and corrective justice, but it has no parallel in design and manufacturing defect cases where the law does not hold manufacturers responsible for harm they do not cause.<\/q>\u200a59<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a59\u200a<\/span>David G. Owen, Products Liability Law<\/span> 800 (2nd ed. 2008).<\/span><\/sup> \r\n<\/p>\r\n

\r\n<\/a>In Riley v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.<\/i>, the Montana Supreme Court rebutted several familiar policy arguments favoring the heeding presumption. The court recognized that we do not live in an ideal world where the heeding presumption would make perfect sense in warning defect cases; rather, we live in a world where warnings are often unread or flat out ignored. In its analysis, the Riley court, recognized the causal difficulties present in warnings cases but rationalized that the evidence required to establish a prima facie warnings case is not qualitatively different than testimony required in other contexts and further asserted that concerns about a plaintiff dying before testimony is taken is not exclusive to warning defect cases. The court concluded that the plaintiff had a full opportunity but failed to establish a prima facie case; therefore, the court reasoned that it would be unfair to allow the cause of action to continue by applying the heeding presumption. Finally, the court addressed the argument that the heeding presumption is consistent with the policy underlying strict products liability \u2014 to ease the burden on injured plaintiffs.\u200a60<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a60\u200a<\/span>Riley v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc<\/i>., 856 P.2d 196, 200<\/a> (Mont. 1993).<\/span><\/sup> The court acknowledged the fact that applying the heeding presumption would lighten the plaintiff\u2019s burden, but effectively revealed that argument\u2019s flaw in reasoning by contending that a defendant certainly is in no better position to rebut a presumption which totally excuses a plaintiff from meeting the causation element than a plaintiff is in establishing the causation element as part of the prima facie case.<\/q> \r\n<\/p>\r\n

\r\n<\/a>In 2009, the Nevada Supreme Court held that public policy was best served by not adopting the heeding presumption. Citing Riley, the court reasoned that it was illogical to presume that a plaintiff would have read and heeded an adequate warning if one had been provided because warnings often go unread or ignored in the modern world. The court\u2019s primary policy argument was premised on the indisputable principle that a manufacturer\u2019s most important duty is to make products that are safe for consumers. The duty to manufacture safe products is paramount and does not rely on information given in a warning; consistent with this reasoning, the court concluded that public policy is best served by discouraging reliance on warnings and ensuring that manufacturers strive to produce safer products.\u200a61<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a61\u200a<\/span>Rivera v. Philip Morris Inc.<\/i>, 209 P.3d 271, 277<\/a> (Nev. 2009).<\/span><\/sup><\/p>\r\n\r\n

<\/a>Other arguments opposing the heeding presumption from a policy standpoint are worth mentioning. For one, applying the heeding presumption opens the door for character evidence that is otherwise inadmissible and generally disfavored in court. A defendant must focus on character flaws in order to rebut the presumption because other evidence is generally limited. Further, no studies show that the heeding presumption results in better warnings and no studies show that safer warnings lead to fewer injuries. In light of this statistical evidence, it appears that the heeding presumption does not further the central policy behind products liability law \u2014 to protect consumers from unsafe products.\u200a62<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a62\u200a<\/span>Carrie A. Daniel, Guide to Defeating the Heeding Presumption in Failure-to-Warn Cases Defense Counsel Must Oppose the Distortion of Comment J\u2019s Language into A Presumption That Users Would Read and Heed Instructions<\/cite>, 70 Def. Couns. J. 250, 259<\/a> <\/span>(2003) (citing Crowston v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co<\/i>., 521 N.W.2d 401, 411<\/a> (N.D. 1994)).<\/span><\/sup> \r\n<\/p>\r\n

\r\n<\/a>Public Policy: It\u2019s a Draw\r\n<\/h3>\r\n

\r\n<\/a>Reasonable minds often differ. That is the beauty of the adversarial system; arguments grounded in reason, locked tight with seemingly no gaps, can be exposed. Often times, the superior argument from a policy standpoint is not clear. Creative and talented lawyers can frame most any argument to support their reasoning in a policy dispute. Therefore, a court\u2019s determination of which outcome promotes better policy<\/q> often depends on which lawyer most effectively frames his argument. This is evident in case law addressing the heeding presumption\u2019s policy rationales.\u200a63<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a63\u200a<\/span>Compare Coffman v. Keene Corp.<\/i>, 628 A.2d 710 <\/a>(N.J. 1993) (adopting the heeding presumption based on policy reasons), with; Riley v. Am. Honda Motors Co, Inc.<\/i>, 856 P.2d 196, 200<\/a> (1993) (declining to adopt the heeding presumption based on policy reasons).<\/span><\/sup> The truth of the matter is that the facts of each individual case often dictate whether or not applying the heeding presumption implements sound policy.\r\n<\/p>\r\n

\r\n<\/a>An analysis of several of the most significant conflicting arguments is instructive. First, there is the position that the heeding presumption is good policy because it incentivizes manufacturers to fulfill their basic duty to warn. Opponents of the heeding presumption rebut this argument by asserting that the superior policy is to encourage manufacturers to focus their resources on striving to create safe products, rather than relying on crafting warnings. This view is consistent with the Third Restatement\u2019s focus on design adequacy rather than warnings.\u200a64<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a64\u200a<\/span>Carrie A. Daniel, Guide to Defeating the Heeding Presumption in Failure-to-Warn Cases Defense Counsel Must Oppose the Distortion of Comment J\u2019s Language into A Presumption That Users Would Read and Heed Instructions<\/cite>, 70 Def. Couns. J. 250, 258<\/a><\/span> (2003).<\/span><\/sup> After all, warnings are an imperfect means to remedy a product defect.<\/q>\u200a65<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a65\u200a<\/span>Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez<\/i>, 977 S.W.2d 328, 336<\/a> (Tex. 1998).<\/span><\/sup> \r\n<\/p>\r\n

\r\n<\/a>It is also clear that easing the burden on the plaintiff is not a sound argument in favor of the heeding presumption. While such policy may be consistent with some of the underlying goals of strict products liability, this position is flawed. As the Riley court noted, the entire elimination of the plaintiff\u2019s burden would further this policy greatly; yet that does not make it sound policy. Shifting the causation burden to the defendant is generally not fair because [a] defendant certainly is in no better position to rebut a presumption which totally excuses a plaintiff from meeting the causation element than a plaintiff is in establishing the causation element as part of the prima facie case.<\/q>\u200a66<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a66\u200a<\/span>Riley v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc.<\/i>, 856 P.2d 196, 200<\/a> (Mont. 1993).<\/span><\/sup> Indeed, there is merit in the notion that deeply rooted products liability law burdens of proof should not be altered.\u200a67<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a67\u200a<\/span>Carrie A. Daniel, Guide to Defeating the Heeding Presumption in Failure-to-Warn Cases Defense Counsel Must Oppose the Distortion of Comment J\u2019s Language into A Presumption That Users Would Read and Heed Instructions<\/cite>, 70 Def. Couns. J. 250, 257<\/a> (2003) (citing Kevin J. O\u2019Connor, New Jersey\u2019s Heeding Presumption in Failure to Warn Product Liability Actions<\/cite>, Coffman v. Keene Corp.<\/i>, and Theer v. Philip Carey Co.<\/i>, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. <\/span>343, 356 (1994).<\/span><\/sup> Nevertheless, as explained in the following paragraph, this easing the plaintiff\u2019s burden<\/q> policy may be worth its salt depending on the circumstances. \r\n<\/p>\r\n

\r\n<\/a>A popular argument among proponents of the heeding presumption is that it eliminates the need for self-serving testimony.\u200a68<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a68\u200a<\/span>See e.g., Coffman v. Keene Corp.<\/i>, 628 A.2d 710, 719<\/a> (N.J. 1993).<\/span><\/sup> In fact, one court has gone as far as calling such testimony useless.<\/q>\u200a69<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a69\u200a<\/span>Reyes v. Wyeth Labs.<\/i>, 498 F.2d 1264, 1281<\/a> (5th Cir. 1974).<\/span><\/sup> Though it may be true that self-serving testimony is not the ideal method for establishing reliable evidence, it is a far cry from being useless.<\/q> Concerns that testimony may be self-serving are not unique to warning defect actions. Certainly, there is some value in allowing a plaintiff to present his testimony to a jury of his peers.\u200a70<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a70\u200a<\/span>See Riley v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc.<\/i>, 856 P.2d 196, 200<\/a>(Mont. 1993).<\/span><\/sup> A jury is quite capable of determining credibility. Indeed, when a criminal defendant chooses to testify, his very liberty often rests on a jury\u2019s determination of his credibility. Such testimony is inevitably self-serving, yet it would never be considered useless in this context.\u200a71<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a71\u200a<\/span>See Johnson v. State<\/i>, 461 S.E.2d 209, 210<\/a> (Ga. 1995).<\/span><\/sup> Furthermore, self-serving testimony is generally appropriate in actions based on misrepresentation.\u200a72<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a72\u200a<\/span>See e.g., Richard v. Tri-J Indus. Const., Inc.<\/i>, 478 So. 2d 215, 217<\/a> (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).<\/span><\/sup> Misrepresentation claims and warning defect claims are conceptually similar to the extent that both claims invoke the notion of injury caused by the conveyance, or lack thereof, of inaccurate or inadequate information. In sum, self- serving testimony is clearly not an ideal means for establishing convincing and reliable evidence; yet, under appropriate circumstances, it is still useful and necessary to establish causation in warning defect cases.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

<\/a>While it is clear, both from case law and common knowledge, that the heeding presumption is not a logical presumption,\u200a73<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a73\u200a<\/span>See Rivera v. Philip Morris Inc.<\/i>, 209 P.3d 271, 277<\/a> (Nev. 2009) (citing Riley v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc.<\/i>, 856 P.2d 196, 200<\/a> (Mont. 1993)).<\/span><\/sup> it is equally clear that the law\u2019s interest in fairness demands it in certain circumstances. From a policy standpoint there must be a balance, as there is virtue in both arguments. There is a substantial interest in allowing injured plaintiffs to recover and unfortunately, without the heeding presumption, that can be practically impossible in some situations. However, there is nearly an equal interest in separating non-deserving plaintiffs from those who truly deserve redress. This can create quite a conundrum for courts. On one hand, a court may choose not to apply the heeding presumption, which would practically assure that the representative of a deceased plaintiff would not be able to carry the burden of proving causation. On the other hand, if the court applies the heeding presumption, an undeserving plaintiff will have no problem establishing a prima facie cause of action because the causation element is essentially thrown out the window. This places the manufacturer in an unfair position because, while it is difficult for a plaintiff to convince a jury that he would have heeded an adequate warning, there is likely greater difficulty in presenting evidence that the plaintiff would not have heeded an adequate warning.\u200a74<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a74\u200a<\/span>See Carrie A. Daniel, Guide to Defeating the Heeding Presumption in Failure-to-Warn Cases Defense Counsel Must Oppose the Distortion of Comment J\u2019s Language into A Presumption That Users Would Read and Heed Instructions<\/cite>, 70 Def. Couns. J. 250, 259<\/a> <\/span>(2003).<\/span><\/sup> Thus, fundamental fairness requires a balancing of these interests, dictated by the distinct circumstances of each particular case. By no means is the heeding presumption perfect. It does not merit universal application; but currently, it is the only solution in the context of warning defect cases capable of sustaining fairness in certain circumstances. However, as illustrated above, applying the presumption universally will promote unfairness in some circumstances; consequently, a well-defined rule controlling proper application of the heeding presumption is necessary.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

\r\n<\/a>V. A Solution\r\n<\/h2>\r\n

\r\n<\/a>A simple, all encompassing, rule for dealing with the difficult causation issues is not possible without completely reworking the traditional standards for warning defect cases.\u200a75<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a75\u200a<\/span>See Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Resolving the Dilemma of Nonjusticiable Causation in Failure-to-Warn Litigation<\/cite>, 84 S. Cal. L. Rev. 125, 139<\/a> <\/span>(2010).<\/span><\/sup> Nevertheless, a clear workable rule for applying the heeding presumption is quite capable of reasonably balancing the competing fairness interests. The basic premise of the rule is simple; South Carolina courts should apply the heeding presumption only when fairness demands it. Thus, courts should apply the presumption in two different situations. The most obvious situation where fairness demands its application is when the plaintiff is dead or testimony is otherwise impossible or at least impracticable. In this scenario, the rebuttable heeding presumption will satisfy the causation element. If the defendant presents sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, consistent with the general rule, the plaintiff must establish that the warning defect was the proximate cause of the accident.\u200a76<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a76\u200a<\/span>See Sharpe v. Bestop, Inc.<\/i>, 713 A.2d 1079, 1085<\/a> (N.J. 1998).<\/span><\/sup><\/p>\r\n\r\n

<\/a>Fairness also demands application of the heeding presumption when the injury occurs in the workplace context where there is evidence to support a doubt concerning whether the plaintiff had a meaningful choice to heed warnings. Likewise, the heeding presumption will satisfy the causation element in this scenario. Consistent with the New Jersey Supreme Court\u2019s approach to this situation, in order to overcome the presumption in the workplace context, a manufacturer must show two things. First, that had an adequate warning been provided, the employer itself would not have heeded the warning by taking reasonable precautions for the safety of its employees and [second, the employer] would not have allowed its employees to take measures to avoid or minimize the harm from their use or exposure to the dangerous product.<\/q>\u200a77<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a77\u200a<\/span>Coffman v. Keene Corp.<\/i>, 628 A.2d 710, 724<\/a> (N.J. 1993).<\/span><\/sup> Conversely, fairness demands that courts refrain from applying the heeding presumption in injury cases where the plaintiff is normally capable of testifying. Applying the presumption in this scenario would create a windfall for undeserving plaintiffs with weak cases while filling the dockets with claims that should have been dismissed at summary judgment. Although self-serving testimony is not ideal, it is warranted in this scenario because the interest in providing redress for injured plaintiffs is usually outweighed by the interest in separating weak claims from good claims out of fairness to manufacturers who face a considerable disadvantage when the causation burden is shifted. This balanced approach to the warning causal conundrum is not overwhelmingly profound. In fact, the Montana Supreme Court, who coincidentally, authored an emphatic rejection of the heeding presumption in Riley, recently embraced a similar flexible<\/q> approach for applying the heeding presumption in Patch v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co.<\/i>, where the court concluded that the presumption\u2019s application should be dictated by the facts.\u200a78<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a78\u200a<\/span>Patch v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co.<\/i>, 257 P.3d 383, 389<\/a> (Mont. 2011).<\/span><\/sup> While this method for applying the heeding presumption appears to be the logical approach any capable court would take when faced with this issue, we must be mindful that bad facts create bad law. There is a tangible possibility that a court would sweepingly adopt the heeding presumption when faced with a perfect storm<\/q> of bad facts. This would open the door for plaintiffs with weak cases to benefit from the heeding presumption at the expense of manufacturers and, more importantly, at the expense of fairness.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

\r\n<\/a>VI. Conclusion\r\n<\/h2>\r\n

<\/a>In sum, the solution is simple: the heeding presumption should substitute for causation when the plaintiff is dead or testimony would otherwise be impossible. Likewise, it should substitute for causation in the workplace context when it is determined that the plaintiff lacked a meaningful choice of whether to heed warnings or not. However, it should not apply when the plaintiff is cable of testifying. Granted, this solution has noticeable weaknesses. It allows most death cases, even weak ones, to proceed, and it does nothing to alleviate the difficult causal issues faced by deserving plaintiffs. Yet, it balances the competing interests involved in warning defect cases in the most appropriate manner currently available. In the end, despite its substantial weaknesses, the heeding presumption, subject to rebuttable defeasance, appears worth the candle.<\/q>\u200a79<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a79\u200a<\/span>David G. Owen, Products Liability Law<\/span> 800 (2nd ed. 2008).<\/span><\/sup><\/p>\r\n\r\n

Footnotes<\/h2>
\u200a1<\/a>\u200a<\/span>B.S., Clemson University, 2011; J.D., South Carolina School of Law, 2014. While at South Carolina, Mr. Nichols was the Student Works Editor for the South Carolina Law Review and graduated in the top 10% of his class. Currently, Mr. Nichols is an associate for the law firm of Gallivan White Boyd where he practices in the areas of workers\u2019 compensation defense, business and commercial litigation, products liability and complex litigation.<\/div>
\u200a2<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Rivera v. Philip Morris Inc.<\/i>, 209 P.3d 271, 274 <\/a>(Nev. 2009); See also Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Resolving the Dilemma of Nonjusticiable Causation in Failure-to-Warn Litigation<\/cite>, 84 S. Cal. L. Rev. 125, 139 <\/a>(2010).<\/div>
\u200a3<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Tech. Chem. Co. v. Jacobs<\/i>, 480 S.W.2d 602, 606<\/a> (Tex. 1972).<\/div>
\u200a4<\/a>\u200a<\/span>David G. Owen, Products Liability Law<\/span> 797 (2nd ed. 2008).<\/div>
\u200a5<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See, e.g., Rivera v. Philip Morris Inc.<\/i>, 209 P.3d 271, 274<\/a> (Nev. 2009); Riley v. American Honda Motor Co.<\/i>, 856 P.2d 196, 200<\/a> (Mont. 1993).<\/div>
\u200a6<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Odom v. G.D. Searle & Co.<\/i>, 979 F.2d 1001, 1003<\/a> (4th Cir. 1992) (citing Thomas v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc.<\/i>, 949 F.2d 806, 812\u201314<\/a> (5th Cir. 1992)).<\/div>
\u200a7<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Allen v. Long Mfg. NC, Inc.<\/i>, 505 S.E.2d 354, 359\u201360<\/a> (Ct. App. 1998).<\/div>
\u200a8<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Branham v. Ford Motor Co.<\/i>, 701 S.E.2d 5, 14<\/a> (2010).<\/div>
\u200a9<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See David G. Owen, Products Liability Law<\/span> 797\u2013799 (2nd ed. 2008).<\/div>
\u200a10<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See David G. Owen, Products Liability Law<\/span> 797 (2nd ed. 2008).<\/div>
\u200a11<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Coffman v. Keene Corp.<\/i>, 628 A.2d 710, 716<\/a> (N.J. 1993) (citing Michalkov. Cooke Color and Chem. Corp.<\/i>, 451 A.2d 179, 183<\/a> (N.J. 1982)).<\/div>
\u200a12<\/a>\u200a<\/span>David G. Owen, Products Liability Law<\/span> 796\u201397 (2nd ed. 2008).<\/div>
\u200a13<\/a>\u200a<\/span>David G. Owen, Products Liability Law<\/span> 797\u201398 (2nd ed. 2008).<\/div>
\u200a14<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Tech. Chem. Co. v. Jacobs<\/i>, 480 S.W.2d 602, 606<\/a> (Tex. 1972); see also David G. Owen, Products Liability Law<\/span> 798 (2nd ed. 2008).<\/div>
\u200a15<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Restatement (Second) of Torts<\/span> \u00a7 402A cmt. j (Am. Law. Inst<\/span>. 1965). <\/div>
\u200a16<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Tech. Chem. Co. v. Jacobs<\/i>, 480 S.W.2d 602, 603\u2013606<\/a> (Tex. 1972)<\/div>
\u200a17<\/a>\u200a<\/span>S.C. Code Ann. <\/span>\u00a7 15-73-30 (1976).<\/div>
\u200a18<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Coffman v. Keene Corp.<\/i>, 628 A.2d 710, 717<\/a> (N.J. 1993); see also David G. Owen, Products Liability Law<\/span> 799 (2nd ed. 2008).<\/div>
\u200a19<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Coffman v. Keene Corp.<\/i>, 628 A.2d 710, 714, 717\u201320, 799<\/a> (N.J. 1993); see also David G. Owen, Products Liability Law<\/span> 799, 718\u2013719 (2nd ed. 2008).<\/div>
\u200a20<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See e.g., David G. Owen, Products Liability Law<\/span> 799 (2nd ed. 2008); Mark Geitsfeld, Inadequate Product Warnings and Causation<\/cite>, 30 U. Mich. J.L. Reform. 309<\/a> (1997).<\/div>
\u200a21<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Branham v. Ford Motor Co.<\/i>, 701 S.E.2d 5<\/a> (2010).<\/div>
\u200a22<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Branham v. Ford Motor Co.<\/i>, 701 S.E.2d 5, 8<\/a> (2010).<\/div>
\u200a23<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See S.C. Code Ann.<\/span> \u00a7 15-73-30 (1976).<\/div>
\u200a24<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Branham v. Ford Motor Co.<\/i>, 701 S.E.2d 5, 14, 27, 16-17<\/a> (2010).<\/div>
\u200a25<\/a>\u200a<\/span>J. Rhoades White, Jr. Comment, Products Liability Law for Design Defects in South Carolina: The Aftermath of Branham v. Ford Motor Co<\/cite>., 62 S.C. L. Rev. 781, 791 (2011).<\/div>
\u200a26<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Prod. Liab. \u00a7<\/span> 2 cmt. l (Am. Law. Inst<\/span>. 1998).<\/div>
\u200a27<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See J. Rhoades White, Jr., Comment, Products Liability Law for Design Defects in South Carolina: The Aftermath of Branham v. Ford Motor Co<\/cite>., 62 S.C. L. Rev. 781, 793 (2011).<\/div>
\u200a28<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See J. Rhoades White, Jr. Comment, Products Liability Law for Design Defects in South Carolina: The Aftermath of Branham v. Ford Motor Co<\/cite>., 62 S.C. L. Rev. 781, 793 (2011).<\/div>
\u200a29<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Resolving the Dilemma of Nonjusticiable Causation in Failure-to-Warn Litigation<\/cite>, 84 S. Cal. L. Rev. 125, 139<\/a> <\/span>(2010).<\/div>
\u200a30<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Restatement (Second) OF Torts<\/span> \u00a7 402A cmt. j (Am. Law. Inst<\/span>. 1965).<\/b><\/div>
\u200a31<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See David G. Owen, The Puzzle of Comment j<\/cite>, 55 Hastings L.J. 1377<\/a><\/span> (2004).<\/div>
\u200a32<\/a>\u200a<\/span>David G. Owen, The Puzzle of Comment J<\/cite>, 55 Hastings L.J. 1377, 1381, 1382\u201383<\/a><\/span> (2004).<\/div>
\u200a33<\/a>\u200a<\/span>David G. Owen, The Puzzle of Comment J<\/cite>, 55 Hastings L.J. 1377, 1382, 1383<\/a><\/span> (2004).<\/div>
\u200a34<\/a>\u200a<\/span>David G. Owen, The Puzzle of Comment J<\/cite>, 55 Hastings L.J. 1377, 1380<\/a><\/span> (2004).<\/div>
\u200a35<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Allen v. Long Mfg. NC, Inc<\/cite>., 505 S.E.2d 354, 354\u2013358<\/a> (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts<\/span> \u00a7 402A cmt j (Am. Law. Inst<\/span>. 1965). <\/div>
\u200a36<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Allen v. Long Mfg. NC, Inc<\/cite>., 505 S.E.2d 354, 359<\/a> (Ct. App. 1998).<\/div>
\u200a37<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Prod. Liab<\/span>. \u00a7 2 cmt. l (Am. Law. Inst.<\/span> 1998).<\/div>
\u200a38<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Curcio v. Caterpillar, Inc.<\/i>, 543 S.E.2d 264, 268\u2013270<\/a> (S.C. 2003).<\/div>
\u200a39<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Curcio v. Caterpillar, Inc.<\/i>, 543 S.E.2d 264, 270<\/a> (S.C. 2003).<\/div>
\u200a40<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Prod. Liab<\/span>. \u00a7 2 cmt. l (Am. Law. Inst<\/span>. 1998).<\/div>
\u200a41<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Curcio v. Caterpillar, Inc.<\/i>, 543 S.E.2d 264, 272<\/a> (S.C. 2003).<\/div>
\u200a42<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Anderson v. Green Bull, Inc.<\/i>, 471 S.E.2d 708, 710<\/a> (S.C. App. 1996).<\/div>
\u200a43<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Curcio v. Caterpillar, Inc.<\/i>, 543 S.E.2d 264, 273\u2013275<\/a> (S.C. 2003); Glittenberg v. Doughboy Recreational Indus.<\/i>, 491 N.W.2d 208, 216<\/a> (Mich. 1992).<\/div>
\u200a44<\/a>\u200a<\/span>David G. Owen, The Puzzle of Comment J<\/cite>, 55 Hastings L.J. 1377, 1392<\/a><\/span> (2004).<\/div>
\u200a45<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Allen v. Long Mfg. NC, Inc<\/i>., 505 S.E.2d 354, 357<\/a> (Ct. App. 1998).<\/div>
\u200a46<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Prod. Liab<\/span>. \u00a7 2 cmt. l (Am. Law. Inst.<\/span> 1998).<\/div>
\u200a47<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Coward v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.<\/i>, 729 A.2d 614, 620<\/a> (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).<\/div>
\u200a48<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Coffman v. Keene Corp.<\/i>, 628 A.2d 710, 721, 718<\/a> (N.J. 1993).<\/div>
\u200a49<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Karin L. Bohmholdt, The Heeding Presumption and Its Application: Distinguishing No Warning from Inadequate Warning<\/cite>, 37 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 461, 470<\/a> <\/span>(2003).<\/div>
\u200a50<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Coffman v. Keene Corp.<\/i>, 628 A.2d 710, 718<\/a> (N.J. 1993)<\/div>
\u200a51<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the Death of Strict Products Liability: The Empire Strikes Back<\/cite>, <\/span>60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1183, 1184\u20131186<\/a> (1992).<\/div>
\u200a52<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See David G. Owen, Products Liability Law<\/span> 796 (2nd ed. 2008).<\/div>
\u200a53<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Coffman v. Keene Corp.<\/i>, 628 A.2d 710, 718<\/a> (N.J. 1993).<\/div>
\u200a54<\/a><\/span> See also David G. Owen, Products Liability Law<\/span> 797 (2nd ed. 2008).<\/div>
\u200a55<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Coffman v. Keene Corp.<\/i>, 628 A.2d 710, 718<\/a> (N.J. 1993).<\/div>
\u200a56<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Coffman v. Keene Corp.<\/i>, 628 A.2d 710, 719<\/a> (N.J. 1993).<\/div>
\u200a57<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Rivera v. Philip Morris, Inc.<\/i>, 209 P.3d 271, 277 (Nev. 2009)<\/a>; See also Riley v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc.<\/i>, 856 P.2d 196, 200<\/a> (Mont. 1993).<\/div>
\u200a58<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Aaron D. Twerski & Neil. B. Cohen, Resolving the Dilemma of Nonjusticiable Causation in Failure-To-Warn Litigation<\/cite>, 84 S. Cal. L. Rev. 125, 129 (2010)<\/a>.<\/span><\/div>
\u200a59<\/a>\u200a<\/span>David G. Owen, Products Liability Law<\/span> 800 (2nd ed. 2008).<\/div>
\u200a60<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Riley v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc<\/i>., 856 P.2d 196, 200<\/a> (Mont. 1993).<\/div>
\u200a61<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Rivera v. Philip Morris Inc.<\/i>, 209 P.3d 271, 277<\/a> (Nev. 2009).<\/div>
\u200a62<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Carrie A. Daniel, Guide to Defeating the Heeding Presumption in Failure-to-Warn Cases Defense Counsel Must Oppose the Distortion of Comment J\u2019s Language into A Presumption That Users Would Read and Heed Instructions<\/cite>, 70 Def. Couns. J. 250, 259<\/a> <\/span>(2003) (citing Crowston v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co<\/i>., 521 N.W.2d 401, 411<\/a> (N.D. 1994)).<\/div>
\u200a63<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Compare Coffman v. Keene Corp.<\/i>, 628 A.2d 710 <\/a>(N.J. 1993) (adopting the heeding presumption based on policy reasons), with; Riley v. Am. Honda Motors Co, Inc.<\/i>, 856 P.2d 196, 200<\/a> (1993) (declining to adopt the heeding presumption based on policy reasons).<\/div>
\u200a64<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Carrie A. Daniel, Guide to Defeating the Heeding Presumption in Failure-to-Warn Cases Defense Counsel Must Oppose the Distortion of Comment J\u2019s Language into A Presumption That Users Would Read and Heed Instructions<\/cite>, 70 Def. Couns. J. 250, 258<\/a><\/span> (2003).<\/div>
\u200a65<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez<\/i>, 977 S.W.2d 328, 336<\/a> (Tex. 1998).<\/div>
\u200a66<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Riley v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc.<\/i>, 856 P.2d 196, 200<\/a> (Mont. 1993).<\/div>
\u200a67<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Carrie A. Daniel, Guide to Defeating the Heeding Presumption in Failure-to-Warn Cases Defense Counsel Must Oppose the Distortion of Comment J\u2019s Language into A Presumption That Users Would Read and Heed Instructions<\/cite>, 70 Def. Couns. J. 250, 257<\/a> (2003) (citing Kevin J. O\u2019Connor, New Jersey\u2019s Heeding Presumption in Failure to Warn Product Liability Actions: Coffman v. Keene Corp., and Theer v. Philip Carey Co.<\/cite>, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. <\/span>343, 356 (1994).<\/div>
\u200a68<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See e.g., Coffman v. Keene Corp.<\/i>, 628 A.2d 710, 719<\/a> (N.J. 1993).<\/div>
\u200a69<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Reyes v. Wyeth Labs.<\/i>, 498 F.2d 1264, 1281<\/a> (5th Cir. 1974).<\/div>
\u200a70<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Riley v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc.<\/i>, 856 P.2d 196, 200<\/a>(Mont. 1993).<\/div>
\u200a71<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Johnson v. State<\/i>, 461 S.E.2d 209, 210<\/a> (Ga. 1995).<\/div>
\u200a72<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See e.g., Richard v. Tri-J Indus. Const., Inc.<\/i>, 478 So. 2d 215, 217<\/a> (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).<\/div>
\u200a73<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Rivera v. Philip Morris Inc.<\/i>, 209 P.3d 271, 277<\/a> (Nev. 2009) (citing Riley v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc.<\/i>, 856 P.2d 196, 200<\/a> (Mont. 1993)).<\/div>
\u200a74<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Carrie A. Daniel, Guide to Defeating the Heeding Presumption in Failure-to-Warn Cases Defense Counsel Must Oppose the Distortion of Comment J\u2019s Language into A Presumption That Users Would Read and Heed Instructions<\/cite>, 70 Def. Couns. J. 250, 259<\/a> <\/span>(2003).<\/div>
\u200a75<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Resolving the Dilemma of Nonjusticiable Causation in Failure-to-Warn Litigation<\/cite>, 84 S. Cal. L. Rev. 125, 139<\/a> <\/span>(2010).<\/div>
\u200a76<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Sharpe v. Bestop, Inc.<\/i>, 713 A.2d 1079, 1085<\/a> (N.J. 1998).<\/div>
\u200a77<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Coffman v. Keene Corp.<\/i>, 628 A.2d 710, 724<\/a> (N.J. 1993).<\/div>
\u200a78<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Patch v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co.<\/i>, 257 P.3d 383, 389<\/a> (Mont. 2011).<\/div>
\u200a79<\/a>\u200a<\/span>David G. Owen, Products Liability Law<\/span> 800 (2nd ed. 2008).<\/div>\r\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

William Ryan Nichols<\/p>\n","protected":false},"meta":{"_citation":"6 Stetson J. Advoc. & L. 295 (2019)","_first_para":295,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-1132","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-23"]}