{"id":34049,"title":{"rendered":"Guardian Ad Litem Representation of Children in Florida Dependency Courts"},"content":{"rendered":"

Dennis W. Moore\u200a1<\/a>\u200a<\/span><\/sup><\/blockquote>\r\n\r\n

<\/a>The rule continues by addressing the specific requirements related to minors and incompetent persons by providing the following:<\/p>\r\n\r\n

Minors or Incompetent Persons. When a minor or incompetent person has a representative, such as a guardian or other like fiduciary, the representative may sue or defend on behalf of the minor or incompetent person. A minor or incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed representative may sue by next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for a minor or incompetent person not otherwise represented in an action or shall make such other order as it deems proper for the protection of the minor or incompetent person<\/em>. (Emphasis added).\u200a29<\/a>\u200a<\/span><\/sup><\/blockquote>\r\n\r\n

<\/a>Due to the disability of non-age, children cannot represent themselves in legal proceedings. Within dependency proceedings, the legislature has determined the child\u2019s interests and protection requires the appointment of a GAL. As such, the GAL is the party to the proceedings that in turn is the representative of the real party in interest: the child.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

<\/a>This construct is recognized in other states as well. When addressing ethical considerations related to the appointment of GALs, the North Carolina Ethics Committee of the North Carolina State Bar considered whether an attorney representing a GAL could claim attorney-client privilege. The Committee determined the role and responsibilities of the GAL is established by statute and the Court concluded by finding that a GAL must be treated as a represented party by opposing counsel. The Committee then iterated the fact that the attorney representing the GAL in such proceedings was required to follow the rules of professional conduct when representing the GAL.\u200a30<\/a>\u200a<\/span><\/sup><\/p>\r\n\r\n

<\/a>The Supreme Court of Kentucky addressed these issues in an attempt to reconcile the role of both GAL and attorney for the child within Kentucky\u2019s hybrid model of representation. In Morgan v. Getter<\/i>,\u200a70<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a70\u200a<\/span>441 S.W.3d 94, 116<\/a> (Ky. 2014).<\/span><\/sup> the Court summarized the issues as follows:<\/p>\r\n\r\n

Certainly, a lawyer undertaking to serve in the hybrid role of attorney-for-the-child\/advisor-to-the-court is immediately confronted with a likely conflict between his or her duty to report to the court and the duties to maintain the child-client\u2019s confidences, and not to act as both advocate and witness. Even absent the likely conflicting responsibility as agent of the court, moreover, critics maintain that a best interest<\/q> lawyer who substitutes his or her best-interest judgment for that of the child runs afoul of the duties to advocate ... zealously ... the client\u2019s position,<\/q> Preamble, and to abide by a client\u2019s decisions concerning the objectives of representation.<\/q>\u200a71<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a71\u200a<\/span>Florida Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys mirror the Kentucky regulations reviewed in Morgan. See Fla. Rules Prof\u2019l Conduct, Confidentiality of Information<\/cite>, R. 4-1.6<\/a>; Fla. Rules Prof\u2019l Conduct, Lawyer as Witness<\/cite>, R. 4-3.7<\/a>; Ch. 4; Fla. Rules of Prof\u2019l Conduct, Preamble: A Lawyer\u2019s Responsibilities<\/cite>; Fla. Rules Prof\u2019l Conduct, Objectives and Scope of Representation<\/cite>, R. 4-1.2<\/a>.<\/span><\/sup> (Internal citations omitted).<\/blockquote>\r\n\r\n

<\/a>The Morgan<\/i> Court acknowledged a variety of legitimate concerns associated with attempts to reconcile best interest representation with the attorney-client relationship. For example, the Court observed that many critics maintain legal training does not provide a qualification for attorneys to make best interests judgements for other people. The Court also recognized the practical and financial considerations associated with providing multiple forms of representation to children in dependency proceedings. The Kentucky Supreme Court held it would not abandon the best interests approach in these proceedings and found that having two advocates appointed for each child, one to represent the child\u2019s best interests and another to represent the child\u2019s wishes, however worthy of consideration in theory, [was] unwieldy and impractical in practice.<\/q> In the final analysis, the Morgan<\/i> Court held that children are entitled to representation that does not blindly disregard the limitations on their ability to look after themselves.<\/q>\u200a72<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a72\u200a<\/span>Morgan v. Getter<\/i>, 441 S.W.3d 94, 116, 117<\/a> (Ky. 2014).<\/span><\/sup><\/p>\r\n\r\n

<\/a>In Colorado, a GAL must be appointed to all children in dependency proceedings and the GAL must also be a licensed attorney.\u200a73<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a73\u200a<\/span>See Colo. Rev. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 19-1-111<\/a>, 19-3-203<\/a>.<\/span><\/sup> The dependency judge may appoint a CASA volunteer in the dependency proceedings, however, the court is under no obligation to do so and the CASA volunteer is not always a party to the case when appointed.\u200a74<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a74\u200a<\/span>Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 19-1-206<\/a><\/span><\/sup>. This compartmentalization of resources and desire to fit the GAL into an attorney-client relationship has again resulted in confusion and raised issues associated with legal ethics.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

<\/a>The Colorado Supreme Court\u2019s decision in People v. Gabriesheski<\/i> highlights the tension between the potential dual roles of a lawyer serving as guardian ad litem.<\/q>\u200a75<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a75\u200a<\/span>Lisa Bliss, Colorado Denies Privilege for Guardian Ad Litem<\/cite>, Litigation News, News, Analysis and Publications from the ABA Section of Litigation<\/span> (December 20, 2011).<\/span><\/sup> In Gabriesheski<\/i>, a 16 year old child was removed from her parents\u2019 custody and placed in the dependency system as a result of sexual abuse by her stepfather. As required by Colorado statute, the child\u2019s lawyer was also her GAL. The child\u2019s stepfather was charged with two counts of sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust. Prior to the commencement of the stepfather\u2019s trial, the child recanted her accusations and the prosecution sought to call the GAL as a witness. The prosecution sought to offer the GAL\u2019s testimony to establish the mother coerced the child to recant. The defense attorney objected to the GAL\u2019s testimony on the grounds that all communications between the GAL and the child were confidential and inadmissible absent appropriate waiver. Specifically, defense counsel argued the communications were subject to the attorney-client privilege provisions of the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct.\u200a76<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a76\u200a<\/span>People v. Gabriesheski<\/i>, 262 P.3d 653, 655\u201356 <\/a>(Colo. 2011). The opinion does not state whether the child was appointed a CASA.<\/span><\/sup> The trial court agreed with defense counsel, held the communications were inadmissible and that order was affirmed by the appeals court.\u200a77<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a77\u200a<\/span>People v. Gabriesheski<\/i>, 205 P.3d 441<\/a> (Colo. App. 2008).<\/span><\/sup><\/p>\r\n\r\n

<\/a>The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the decision of the lower court upon application for writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court held that general law determines whether the attorney-client privilege was applicable to a GAL and the law requiring appointment of a GAL made no mention of the privilege. The Court also determined that while the Chief Justice may establish rules and duties for the GAL as authorized by general law, the rules established by the Chief Justice also made no mention of the attorney-client privilege associated with the appointment of the GAL.\u200a78<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a78\u200a<\/span>People v. Gabriesheski<\/i>, 262 P.3d 653, 654<\/a> (Colo. 2011).<\/span><\/sup> The Court then succinctly explained the differences between the roles of GAL and attorney as follows:<\/p>\r\n\r\n

Nothing in the term guardian ad litem,<\/q> which on its face indicates merely a guardian for purposes of specific proceedings or litigation, suggests an advocate to serve as counsel for the child as distinguished from a guardian, charged with representing the child\u2019s best interests. See generally Black\u2019s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) (quoting from Homer H. Clark, Jr. & Ann Laquer Estin, Domestic Relations: Cases and Problems 1078 (6th ed. 2000)).\u200a79<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a79\u200a<\/span>People v. Gabriesheski<\/i>, 262 P.3d 653, 658\u201359<\/a> (Colo. 2011).<\/span><\/sup><\/blockquote>\r\n\r\n

<\/a>Ultimately, the Court was unwilling to impute to the statutory guardian ad litem-child relationship the legislatively-imposed, evidentiary consequences of an attorney-client relationship.<\/q>\u200a80<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a80\u200a<\/span>People v. Gabriesheski<\/i>, 262 P.3d 653, 658\u201359<\/a> (Colo. 2011).<\/span><\/sup> The decision, once again, illustrates the fundamental differences between a guardian and an attorney and the confusion and difficulties inherent in the tortured attempt to force the two roles together into an attorney-client relationship.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

<\/a>A similar scenario has occurred in Florida.\u200a81<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a81\u200a<\/span>R.L.R. v. State<\/i>, 116 So. 3d 570, 574 <\/a> (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).<\/span><\/sup> In R.L.R.<\/i>, a child under the jurisdiction of dependency court had not returned to his court ordered placement and was missing. The court had previously appointed an attorney ad litem to represent the child in addition to the GAL. The trial court ordered the child\u2019s attorney to disclose the child\u2019s location for the proper administration of justice.<\/q> Though the attorneys knew where the child was, they refused to tell the court the child\u2019s location or cell phone number because the child expressly told them not to disclose. On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal acknowledged the concern for the child\u2019s safety, but found no applicable exception to the attorney-client privilege stating:<\/p>\r\n\r\n

To find that there is a dependency exception<\/q> or, as specifically put forth in this case, that there is an exception where the client may be a danger to himself, would require this court to carve out an altogether new exception to the attorney-client privilege. That, however, is the rulemaking function of the legislature or, possibly, the Florida Bar\u2014not of this Court.\u200a82<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a82\u200a<\/span>R.L.R. v. State<\/i>, 116 So. 3d 570, 574 <\/a>(Fla. 3d DCA 2013).<\/span><\/sup><\/blockquote>\r\n\r\n

<\/a>The attorney cannot provide information to the court or make independent recommendations regarding the child\u2019s best interests because that would impermissibly require the attorney to substitute his or her judgment for that of the client.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

<\/a>By refusing to read an attorney-client relationship into Colorado legislation or Court rules, in practical terms, the Colorado Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Gabriesheski<\/i> functions as a reaffirmation of the public policy disfavoring the encouragement of children keeping secrets from the court after removal from their parents for abuse and neglect. It also illustrates the confusion and inefficiency of this practice noted throughout this section. The Gabriesheski<\/i> court concluded by noting several other jurisdictions that refused to extend the attorney-client privilege to attorneys functioning as GALs including Rhode Island, Illinois, New Hampshire, Alaska, Arkansas, and Massachusetts.\u200a83<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a83\u200a<\/span>People v. Gabriesheski<\/i>, 262 P.3d 653, 660<\/a> (Colo. 2011) (citing R.I. Gen. Laws \u00a7 15\u20135\u201316.2(c)(1)(iv)\u2013(v)<\/a> (2010); In re Guardianship of Mabry<\/i>, 666 N.E.2d 16<\/a> (Ill. App. 4th Dist. 1996) ; Ross v. Gadwah<\/i>, 554 A.2d 1284<\/a> (N.H. 1988); Alaska Bar Ass\u2019n Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 85\u20134<\/a> (1985); Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order 15.1, Attorney Qualifications and Standards \u00a7 5(g); Mass. Prob. & Family Ct. Standing Order 1\u201305, Standards for Guardians Ad Litem\/Investigators \u00a7\u00a7 1.3(c), 1.5 & cmt. <\/a>.<\/span><\/sup> In Florida, the GAL Program does not encounter the same issues related to the rules of professional responsibility of attorneys because the GAL is not attempting to engage the child in an attorney-client relationship.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

<\/a>VII. Conclusion<\/h2>\r\n\r\n

<\/a>In Florida, most minors in the dependency system are appointed a GAL from one of the guardian ad litem programs organized under the Statewide Guardian ad Litem Office. These programs are comprised of volunteers, social workers (Child Advocate Managers or CAMs), and attorneys. All volunteers and CAMS are required to undergo extensive background screening and complete 30 hours of initial training related to the judicial proceedings, social services systems, and child maltreatment. When the court makes an appointment, the program will hopefully have a volunteer to assign. Each volunteer and CAM is represented by an attorney at all legal proceedings. There is no attorney-client relationship between the GAL Attorney and the child; however, representing the best interest of the child is the sole purpose of their advocacy. Applying the same analysis used to determine the responsibilities of attorneys retained by non-legal professionals and fiduciaries, the GAL Attorneys owe a duty of care to the primary and intended beneficiary of the GAL appointment, the child. While there is no compensation from the child\u2019s estate as in guardianship proceedings, the Statewide Guardian ad Litem Office is funded by the State and there is an express directive in general law related to the GAL\u2019s sole purpose stated above, which is to represent the child by representing his or her best interests until discharged by the court. As the program has no other directives related to its mission, there can be no question the child is the primary and attended beneficiary of this appointment.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

<\/a>Because dependency proceedings themselves, as well as the GAL appointment, is intended to serve the best interest of the child, although the GAL Attorneys represent the programs through their authorized constituents, i.e., volunteers and CAMs, they owe a duty of care to the child. This duty of care is codified in general law, court rules, and the GAL Standards, which requires the GAL Attorneys to protect the interest of the child throughout the proceedings and until discharged by the court. The Florida GAL Program represents the child in a fiduciary relationship and the GAL is retained to represent the GAL in the proceedings. The GAL Program effectively provides high quality representation to children in Florida\u2019s dependency court.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

Footnotes<\/h2>\r\n
\u200a1<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Mr. Moore is an attorney with the Statewide Guardian ad Litem Office in Tallahasee Florida. Mr. Moore graduated from Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad College of Law and has been licensed in Florida since May 2000.<\/div>
\u200a2<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Florida Guardian ad Litem Program Annual Report, 25 Years of Child Advocacy<\/a>, June 13, 2015.<\/div>
\u200a3<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Kossar v. State<\/i>, 13 Misc. 2d 941, 943<\/a> (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1958)<\/div>
\u200a4<\/a>\u200a<\/span>42 U.S.C. \u00a75106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii)<\/a>; Fla. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 39.820(1)<\/a>, 39.822(1)<\/a>.<\/div>
\u200a5<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Mary K. Wimsett, The Guardian ad Litem Program - Expanding the Model and Meeting New Challenges<\/cite>, 77 Fla. B.J. 26<\/a> (<\/span>Dec. 2003). <\/div>
\u200a6<\/a>\u200a<\/span>U.S. Dep\u2019t of Health and Human Services, Final Report on the Validation and Effectiveness Study of Legal Representation Through Guardian ad Litem <\/cite>(1994); Donald N. Duquette, Children\u2019s Justice: How to Improve Legal Representation of Children in the Child Welfare System<\/cite>, ABA (2016). <\/div>
\u200a7<\/a>\u200a<\/span>QIC Best Practice Model of Child Representation, QIC-Child Rep.<\/a><\/div>
\u200a8<\/a>\u200a<\/span>45 C.F.R. \u00a7 1340.14(g)<\/a> (2004); 55 Fed. Reg. 27,639 (July 5, 1990)<\/a>.<\/div>
\u200a9<\/a>\u200a<\/span>In re Josiah Z.<\/i>, 36 Cal. 4th 664, 679<\/a> (2005).<\/div>
\u200a10<\/a>\u200a<\/span>J. Eric Virgil and Stacy B. Rubel, Is My Judgement in Your Best Interest? How Decisions are Made in Guardianships and a Suggested Reform<\/cite>, 93 Fla. B.J. 50<\/a> <\/span>(Jan.\/Feb. 2019).<\/div>
\u200a11<\/a>\u200a<\/span>J. Eric Virgil and Stacy B. Rubel, Is My Judgement in Your Best Interest? How Decisions are Made in Guardianships and a Suggested Reform<\/cite>, 93 Fla. B.J. 50 <\/a><\/span> (Jan.\/Feb. 2019) (citing Linda S. Whitton & Lawrence A. Frolik, Surrogate Decision-Making Standards for Guardians: Theory and Reality<\/cite>, 2012 Utah L. Rev. 1491, 1492 <\/a><\/span>(2012)).<\/div>
\u200a12<\/a>\u200a<\/span>J. Eric Virgil and Stacy B. Rubel, Is My Judgement in Your Best Interest? How Decisions are Made in Guardianships and a Suggested Reform<\/cite>, 93 Fla. B.J. 50<\/a> <\/span>(Jan.\/Feb. 2019).<\/div>
\u200a13<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Santosky v. Kramer<\/i>, 445 U.S. 745, 787<\/a> (1982).<\/div>
\u200a14<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Lassiter v. Dep\u2019t of Soc. Servs. of Durham County, N.C.<\/i>, 452 U.S. 18, 32<\/a> (1981).<\/div>
\u200a15<\/a>\u200a<\/span>In Interest of D.B.<\/i>, 385 So. 2d 83, 87<\/a> (Fla. 1980).<\/div>
\u200a16<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Fla. Stat. \u00a7 39.013(1).<\/a><\/div>
\u200a17<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See The Florida Bar re Advisory Opinion HRS Nonawyer Counselor<\/cite>, 518 So. 2d 1270, 1270<\/a> (Fla. 1988); The Florida Bar<\/cite>, 547 So. 2d 909, 909<\/a> (Fla. 1989).<\/div>
\u200a18<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Fla. Const. Art. III, \u00a7 11(a)(17)<\/a>; Fla. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 743.01, 07<\/a>.<\/div>
\u200a19<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Garner v. I. E. Schilling Co.<\/i>, 174 So. 837, 839 <\/a>(Fla. 1937).<\/div>
\u200a20<\/a>\u200a<\/span>In re Gault<\/i>, 387 U.S. 1, 41<\/a> (1967).<\/div>
\u200a21<\/a>\u200a<\/span>In re Gault<\/i>, 387 U.S. 1, 36<\/a> (1967).<\/div>
\u200a22<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Garner v. I. E. Schilling Co.<\/i>, 174 So. 837, 839 <\/a>(Fla. 1937).<\/div>
\u200a23<\/a>\u200a<\/span>D.H. v. Adept Cmty. Servs.<\/i>, 271 So. 3d 870, 879<\/a> (Fla. 2018).<\/div>
\u200a24<\/a>\u200a<\/span>In re Josiah Z.<\/i>, 36 Cal. 4th 664, 679<\/a> (2005).<\/div>
\u200a25<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Fla. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 39.807<\/a>, 39.820.<\/a><\/div>
\u200a26<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Mark Hardin, Guardians Ad Litem for Child Victims in Criminal Proceedings<\/cite>, 25 J. Fam. L. 687, 728<\/a><\/span> (1987) (citing Montgomery v. Erie R. Co.<\/i>, 97 F.2d 289, 291<\/a> (3d Cir. 1938); Blackwell v. Vance Trucking Co.<\/i>, 139 F. Supp. 103, 106\u201307 <\/a>(E.D.S.C. 1956); Johnson v. Johnson<\/i>, 544 P.2d 65, 74 <\/a>(Alaska 1975); Gray v. Clements<\/i>, 286 Mo. 100, 227<\/a> (Mo. 1920)).<\/div>
\u200a27<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Fla. Stat. \u00a7 39.820(1).<\/a><\/div>
\u200a28<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.210<\/a><\/span><\/div>
\u200a29<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.210<\/a><\/span><\/div>
\u200a30<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Direct Contact with Lawyer Appointed Guardian ad Litem for Minor Plaintiff<\/cite>, Formal Ethics Opinion 8,<\/a> N.C. State Bar (2002).<\/div>
\u200a31<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Op. Att\u2019y Gen. Fla. 96-94 <\/a>(1996).<\/div>
\u200a32<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Supervision of the BIAs is maintained under R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-5.1<\/a>.<\/div>
\u200a33<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.13(a)<\/a>.<\/div>
\u200a34<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Standard 1, Florida Guardian ad Litem Program Standards, pg. 8<\/a> (Revised 2015).<\/div>
\u200a35<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Rushing v. Bosse<\/i>, 652 So. 2d 869, 873<\/a> (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).<\/div>
\u200a36<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Fla. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 39.822(1),<\/a> 39.820(1).<\/a><\/div>
\u200a37<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Fla. Stat. \u00a7 744.108.<\/a><\/div>
\u200a38<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Kingsley v. Kingsley<\/i>, 623 So. 2d 780, 783<\/a> (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).<\/div>
\u200a39<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Garner v. I. E. Schilling Co.<\/i>, 174 So. 837, 839 <\/a>(Fla. 1937).<\/div>
\u200a40<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Op. Att\u2019y Gen. Fla. 96-94 <\/a>(1996).<\/div>
\u200a41<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Op. Att\u2019y Gen. Fla. 96-94 <\/a>(1996) (citing Brennan v. Ruffner<\/i>, 640 So. 2d 143<\/a> (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)).<\/div>
\u200a42<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Op. Att\u2019y Gen. Fla. 96-94 <\/a>(1996) (citing Angel, Cohen and Rogovin v. Oberon Invest., N.V.<\/i>, 512 So. 2d 192<\/a> (Fla. 1987) (emphasis added)).<\/div>
\u200a43<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Op. Att\u2019y Gen. Fla. 96-94 <\/a>(1996).<\/div>
\u200a44<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Rushing v. Bosse<\/i>, 652 So. 2d 869, 873<\/a> (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).<\/div>
\u200a45<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Op. Att\u2019y Gen. Fla. 96-94 <\/a>(1996); Espinosa v. Sparber<\/i>, 612 So. 2d 1378, 1380<\/a> (Fla. 1993).<\/div>
\u200a46<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Fla. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 39.820(1)<\/a>, 39.822(1)<\/a>; Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.215(c).<\/a><\/div>
\u200a47<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Fla. Stat. \u00a7 39.822<\/a><\/div>
\u200a48<\/a>\u200a<\/span>In Interest of Ivey<\/i>, 319 So. 2d 53, 58<\/a> (Fla. 1st DCA 1975).<\/div>
\u200a49<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Buckner v. Family Servs. of Central Fla.<\/i>, 876 So. 2d 1285, 1288<\/a> (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).<\/div>
\u200a50<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Fla. Const. Art. V, \u00a720(c)(3)<\/a>.<\/div>
\u200a51<\/a>\u200a<\/span>In re Interest of J.S.<\/i>, 444 So. 2d 1148, 1149\u201350<\/a> (Fla. 5th DCA 1984).<\/div>
\u200a52<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Brown v. Ripley<\/i>, 119 So. 2d 712, 717<\/a> (Fla. 1st DCA 1960).<\/div>
\u200a53<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Bridget Kearns, A Warm Heart but A Cool Head: Why A Dual Guardian Ad Litem System Best Protects Families Involved in Abused and Neglected Proceedings,<\/cite> 2002 Wis. L. Rev. 699, 708<\/span> (2002). <\/div>
\u200a54<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Buckner v. Fam. Services of Cent. Fla., Inc.<\/i>, 876 So. 2d 1285, 1288<\/a> (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).<\/div>
\u200a55<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Fla. Stat. \u00a7 39.822(1), (4)<\/a>; Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.215(c)(1), (3).<\/a><\/div>
\u200a56<\/a>\u200a<\/span>In re Interest of J.S.<\/i>, 444 So. 2d 1148, 1149\u201350<\/a> (Fla. 5th DCA 1984).<\/div>
\u200a57<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Fla. Stat. \u00a7 39.820.<\/a><\/div>
\u200a58<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Kossar v. State<\/i>, 13 Misc. 2d 941, 943<\/a> (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1958); Fla. Stat. \u00a7 39.820<\/a>.<\/div>
\u200a59<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Buckner v. Fam. Services of Cent. Fla., Inc.<\/i>, 876 So. 2d 1285, 1286<\/a> (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (citing Brown v. Ripley<\/i>, 119 So. 2d 712<\/a> (Fla. 1st DCA 1960)). See also Roberts v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co.<\/i>, 256 F.2d 35, 39<\/a> (5th Cir. 1958); Zaro v. Strauss<\/i>, 167 F.2d 218<\/a> (5th Cir. 1948).<\/div>
\u200a60<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Mark Hardin, Guardians Ad Litem for Child Victims in Criminal Proceedings<\/cite>, 25 J. Fam. L. 687, 728<\/a><\/span> (1987) (citing Montgomery v. Erie R. Co.<\/i>, 97 F.2d 289, 291<\/a> (3d Cir. 1938); Blackwell v. Vance Trucking Co.<\/i>, 139 F. Supp. 103, 106\u201307 <\/a>(E.D.S.C. 1956); Johnson v. Johnson<\/i>, 544 P.2d 65, 74 <\/a>(Alaska 1975); Gray v. Clements<\/i>, 286 Mo. 100, 227<\/a> (Mo. 1920)).<\/div>
\u200a61<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Fla.Stat. \u00a7 39.807(2)(b).<\/a><\/div>
\u200a62<\/a>\u200a<\/span>https:\/\/www.childwelfare.gov\/pubPDFs\/represent.pdf<\/a> .<\/div>
\u200a63<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Barbara Ann Atwood, The Uniform Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Custody Proceedings Act: Bridging the Divide Between Pragmatism and Idealism<\/cite>, 42 Fam. L.Q. 63, 91<\/a><\/span> (2008) (summarizing and addressing the various criticisms). See also Barbara Ann Atwood, Representing Children Who Can\u2019t or Won\u2019t Direct Counsel: Best Interest Lawyering or No Lawyer At All?<\/cite>, 53 Ariz. L. Rev. 381, 391<\/a><\/span> (2011) (collecting state statutes and cases retaining the best interest<\/q> approach).<\/div>
\u200a64<\/a>\u200a<\/span>42 U.S.C. \u00a75106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii)<\/a> (2018).<\/div>
\u200a65<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Steven K. Berenson, The Elkins Legislation: Will California Change Family Law Again?<\/cite>, 15 Chap. L. Rev. 443, 479\u201380<\/a><\/span> (2012). See also, Robert E. Shepherd, Jr. & Sharon S. England, I Know the Child is My Client, But Who Am I?<\/q><\/cite>, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1917, 1922<\/a> <\/span>(1996).<\/div>
\u200a66<\/a>\u200a<\/span>New York State Supreme Court, Ethics for Attorneys for Children, Summary of Responsibilities of Attorney For The Child<\/cite>, Section 7.2<\/a> (Jan. 2017).<\/div>
\u200a67<\/a>\u200a<\/span>American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers Representing Children: Standards for Attorneys for Children in Custody or Visitation proceedings with Commentary<\/cite>, 22 J. Am. Acad. Matrim. Law. 227<\/a><\/span>.<\/div>
\u200a68<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Barbara Ann Atwood, The Uniform Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Custody Proceedings Act: Bridging the Divide Between Pragmatism and Idealism<\/cite>, 42 Fam. L.Q. 63, 92\u2013100<\/a> <\/span>(2008). <\/div>
\u200a69<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Martin Guggenheim, A Law Guardian by any Other Name: A Critique of the Report of the Matrimonial Commission<\/cite>, 27 Pace. L. Rev. 785<\/a> (2007).<\/span><\/div>
\u200a70<\/a>\u200a<\/span>441 S.W.3d 94, 116<\/a> (Ky. 2014).<\/div>
\u200a71<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Florida Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys mirror the Kentucky regulations reviewed in Morgan. See Fla. Rules Prof\u2019l Conduct, Confidentiality of Information<\/cite>, R. 4-1.6<\/a>; Fla. Rules Prof\u2019l Conduct, Lawyer as Witness<\/cite>, R. 4-3.7<\/a>; Ch. 4; Fla. Rules of Prof\u2019l Conduct, Preamble: A Lawyer\u2019s Responsibilities<\/cite>; Fla. Rules Prof\u2019l Conduct, Objectives and Scope of Representation<\/cite>, R. 4-1.2<\/a>.<\/div>
\u200a72<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Morgan v. Getter<\/i>, 441 S.W.3d 94, 116, 117<\/a> (Ky. 2014).<\/div>
\u200a73<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Colo. Rev. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 19-1-111<\/a>, 19-3-203<\/a>.<\/div>
\u200a74<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 19-1-206<\/a><\/div>
\u200a75<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Lisa Bliss, Colorado Denies Privilege for Guardian Ad Litem<\/cite>, Litigation News, News, Analysis and Publications from the ABA Section of Litigation<\/span> (December 20, 2011).<\/div>
\u200a76<\/a>\u200a<\/span>People v. Gabriesheski<\/i>, 262 P.3d 653, 655\u201356 <\/a>(Colo. 2011). The opinion does not state whether the child was appointed a CASA.<\/div>
\u200a77<\/a>\u200a<\/span>People v. Gabriesheski<\/i>, 205 P.3d 441<\/a> (Colo. App. 2008).<\/div>
\u200a78<\/a>\u200a<\/span>People v. Gabriesheski<\/i>, 262 P.3d 653, 654<\/a> (Colo. 2011).<\/div>
\u200a79<\/a>\u200a<\/span>People v. Gabriesheski<\/i>, 262 P.3d 653, 658\u201359<\/a> (Colo. 2011).<\/div>
\u200a80<\/a>\u200a<\/span>People v. Gabriesheski<\/i>, 262 P.3d 653, 658\u201359<\/a> (Colo. 2011).<\/div>
\u200a81<\/a>\u200a<\/span>R.L.R. v. State<\/i>, 116 So. 3d 570, 574 <\/a> (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).<\/div>
\u200a82<\/a>\u200a<\/span>R.L.R. v. State<\/i>, 116 So. 3d 570, 574 <\/a>(Fla. 3d DCA 2013).<\/div>
\u200a83<\/a>\u200a<\/span>People v. Gabriesheski<\/i>, 262 P.3d 653, 660<\/a> (Colo. 2011) (citing R.I. Gen. Laws \u00a7 15\u20135\u201316.2(c)(1)(iv)\u2013(v)<\/a> (2010); In re Guardianship of Mabry<\/i>, 666 N.E.2d 16<\/a> (Ill. App. 4th Dist. 1996) ; Ross v. Gadwah<\/i>, 554 A.2d 1284<\/a> (N.H. 1988); Alaska Bar Ass\u2019n Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 85\u20134<\/a> (1985); Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order 15.1, Attorney Qualifications and Standards \u00a7 5(g); Mass. Prob. & Family Ct. Standing Order 1\u201305, Standards for Guardians Ad Litem\/Investigators \u00a7\u00a7 1.3(c), 1.5 & cmt. <\/a>.<\/div>\r\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Dennis W. Moore<\/p>\n","protected":false},"meta":{"_citation":"8 Stetson J. Advoc. & L. 39 (2021)","_first_para":39,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-34049","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-31"]}