{"id":47007,"title":{"rendered":"Lights, Lights, Lights! Illuminating the Need for Military Exceptions and Equitable Access to the Supreme Court Post-Ortiz<\/i>"},"content":{"rendered":"

\r\nStefano J. Cavallaro\u200a1<\/a>\u200a<\/span><\/sup> One of the earliest and most notable courts-martials was that of Benedict Arnold \u2014 his frustration over what he considered an unfair and politically driven trial likely contributed to his motive for his later acts that led his name to become the infamous American metonym for treason.\u200a14<\/a>\u200a<\/span><\/sup><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n

A driving motive for the military to adopt a civilian-like courts-martial and appellate system was to remove the capricious nature of the older courts-martial system. By expanding access to the Court, Congress is utilizing its Article I authority, as defined in Coe<\/i> and continued in Ortiz<\/i>, to have the CAAF, an Article I military appellate court, reviewed by the Court. In this manner, the military exception continues, and Congress is carrying on military law\u2019s tradition of appropriately utilizing features of civilian law to improve the courts-martial system.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n

The current situation for our service members runs against our general notions of fairness. Roughly 90% of special and general court-martials are ineligible for Supreme Court review due to the present limitations.\u200a90<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a90\u200a<\/span>Eugene Fidell, How Robust<\/q> is Appellate Review of Courts-Martial<\/cite>, Balkinization Blog<\/a>,<\/span> May 8, 2013. See also Bernie Becker, Military Appeal Process Is Challenged<\/cite>, N.Y. Times<\/a><\/span>, Nov. 27, 2008.<\/span><\/sup> Further, the CAAF acts far too often as an error-correcting court, and not a true appellate court that answers legal questions. In the 2014\u20132015 term, the CAAF acted nearly half of the time as an error-correcting court, and historically has not answered many of the substantive legal and policy questions that would be expected from a court of last resort.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n

A study found that the CAAF issued 152 decisions in the 1951\u20131952 term, 195 in the 1968\u20131969 term, 110 in the 1994\u20131995 term, and 37 in the 2014\u20132015 term. Error-correcting decisions when eliminating all decisions beyond the CAAF\u2019s discretionary docket in a were 112 in 1951\u20131952, 175 in 1968\u20131969, 94 in 1994\u20131995, and 29 in 2014\u20132015. The percentage of error-correcting decisions per term was 75% in 1951\u20131952, 89% in 1968\u20131969, 73% in 1994\u20131995, and 43% in 2014\u20132015. In contrast, the Supreme Court issued no error-correcting decisions in the 2014\u20132015 term and rarely does.\u200a91<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a91\u200a<\/span>Rodrigo M. Caru\u00e7o, In Order to Form a More Perfect Court<\/cite>, 41 Vt. L. Rev. 108<\/a><\/span> (2016).<\/span><\/sup><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n

If the CAAF will not fill this need, the Supreme Court is well-equipped and experienced in this role. The military system needs an appellate court than can answer the specialized questions that will arise as well as ones that just will not gain the Court\u2019s attention. Not only is this a proper use of civilian institutions, but by opening access to the Court, Congress also can incentivize the CAAF to act more accordingly as the military\u2019s court of last resort.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n

Congress should not change the Article I status of military appeals courts, nor should it place the CAAF under an existing Article III court. Moreover, the Court should not expand access via judicial means as it would have no basis to do so with an Article I court. Only through legislation should access to the Court be expanded. Congress, and only Congress, must act. In Ortiz<\/i>, the Court definitively held that it can hear appeals from the CAAF, however access remains limited.\u200a92<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a92\u200a<\/span>Ortiz v. United States<\/i>, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2173<\/a> (2018). See also Sam Nunn, The Fundamental Principles of the Supreme Court\u2019s Jurisprudence in Military Cases<\/cite>, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. 557<\/span> (1994).<\/span><\/sup> Now Congress can open the door.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

\r\n<\/a>VII. Conclusion\r\n<\/h2>\r\n\r\n

The case of Chief Petty Officer Gallagher has once again brought military justice into the spotlight. Not only is national attention back on the system, but so is judicial attention with the Court hearing a direct appeal from a service member for the first time in twenty-four years in Ortiz<\/i>. By asserting its jurisdiction over the CAAF, the Court indirectly sheds light on the glaring inequity that exists for our service members in the military appellate process. The majority found that the constitutional pedigree<\/q> and judicial nature<\/q> of the CAAF joined with statutory authority allows the Court to review the CAAF. Responding, the dissent placed greater emphasis on the command functions as well as the traditional military exception. Ultimately, the seven-member majority held the Court\u2019s jurisdiction over the CAAF.\u200a93<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a93\u200a<\/span>Ortiz v. United States<\/i>, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2173<\/a> (2018).<\/span><\/sup><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n

However, the current access to the Court remains insufficient and unfair to service members. The Court is presently limited to only hearing cases that the CAAF has granted review or extraordinary relief.\u200a94<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a94\u200a<\/span>28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1259<\/a>.<\/span><\/sup> Since the CAAF too often hears error-correcting cases, leaving many worthy questions unanswered, access to the Court is necessary. Service members are presently severely limited from getting redress from the Court, which stands in stark contrast to the access afforded to civilians and even enemy combatants.\u200a95<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a95\u200a<\/span>Eugene R. Fidell & Stephen I. Vladeck, Second-Class Justice in the Military<\/cite>, N.Y. Times<\/a><\/span>, Mar. 20, 2019.<\/span><\/sup><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n

As the Court emphasized in Solorio<\/i>, the courts-martial system derives from Congress\u2019s police powers to make rules<\/q> from Article I.\u200a96<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a96\u200a<\/span>Solorio v. United States<\/i>, 483 U.S. 435, 441<\/a> (1987).<\/span><\/sup> Any expansion of access to the Court must be paired with the continuation of the military exception that the Court has applied historically. The courts-martial system must remain a special and exclusive system<\/q> and be based primarily on the commander\u2019s need to preserve good order and discipline.\u200a97<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a97\u200a<\/span>Parker v. Levy<\/i>, 417 U.S. 733, 743<\/a> (1974).<\/span><\/sup><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n

Congress has already spoken to the importance of some certiorari access to the Court for service members. However, the access that military justice offers our service members is inadequate and unjust. Expanding access to the Supreme Court is simply Congress utilizing the most established court of last resort to continue to maintain the balance between the need for good order and discipline while providing a fair and just legal system that our service members deserve.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

Footnotes<\/h2>
\u200a1<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Stefano J. Cavallaro serves as a First Lieutenant in the United States Marine Corps, Student Judge Advocate, and as a licensed attorney in Florida. He received his B.S. from the Florida State University and his J.D. from the University of Florida. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of any agency of the U.S. Government or the United States Marine Corps.<\/div>
\u200a2<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Dave Phillips, Who Is Edward Gallagher, the SEAL the Navy Wants to Expel?<\/span><\/cite>, N.Y. Times A11<\/a>, Nov. 24, 2019.<\/div>
\u200a3<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Ortiz v. United States<\/i>, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2173, 2189\u2013206<\/a> (2018).<\/div>
\u200a4<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Eugene R. Fidell & Stephen I. Vladeck, Second-Class Justice in the Military<\/cite>, N.Y. Times<\/a><\/span>, Mar. 20, 2019.<\/div>
\u200a5<\/a>\u200a<\/span>U.S. Const.<\/span> art. I, \u00a7 8, cl. 14<\/a>; U.S. Const.<\/span> amend. V<\/a>; See Gordon D. Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Constitution: The Original Understanding<\/cite>, 71 Harv. L. Rev.<\/span> 293, 298 (1957); Stephen I. Vladeck, Military Courts and Article III<\/cite>, 103 Geo. L. J. 933, 937<\/span> (2015). <\/div>
\u200a6<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Walter T. Cox III, The Army, the Courts, and the Constitution: The Evolution of Military Justice<\/cite>, 118 Mil. L. Rev.<\/span> 1, 14 (1987). <\/div>
\u200a7<\/a>\u200a<\/span>10 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 801\u2013950<\/a>.<\/div>
\u200a8<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Hiatt v. Brown<\/i>, 339 U.S. 103, 111<\/a> (1950); see also Eugene R. Fidell & Stephen I. Vladeck, Second-Class Justice in the Military<\/cite>, N.Y. Times<\/a><\/span>, Mar. 20, 2019; Stephen I. Vladeck, Military Courts and Article III<\/cite>, 103 Geo. L. J. 933, 940<\/a><\/span> (2015).<\/div>
\u200a9<\/a>\u200a<\/span>28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1259<\/a>; see also 10 U.S.C. \u00a7 867(a)<\/a>: The Supreme Court may not review by a writ of certiorari under this section any action of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces in refusing to grant a petition for review.<\/q><\/div>
\u200a10<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Eugene R. Fidell, Brenner M. Fissel & Dwight H. Sullivan, Review of Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces by the Supreme Court of the United States<\/cite>, 20 LexisNexis 149, 150<\/span> (2002).<\/div>
\u200a11<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Burns v. Wilson<\/i>, 346 U.S. 137, 140<\/a> (1953).<\/div>
\u200a12<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Criminal Law Dep\u2019t, Criminal Law Deskbook Practicing Military Justice<\/cite>, TJAGLCS, U.S. Army 1\u20132<\/a> <\/span>(2019); Stephen I. Vladeck, Military Courts and Article III<\/cite>, 103 Geo. L. J. 933, 937, 962\u201363 <\/a><\/span>(2015); Albert N. Cavagnaro, Solorio v. United States: A Return to the Unrestrained Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Military Courts<\/cite>, 66 N.C. L. Rev. 1023, 1030\u201331<\/a><\/span> (1988); see, e.g., Michael P. Connors, The Demise of the Service-Connection Test: Solorio v. United States<\/span><\/cite>, 37 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1145, 1168<\/a> (1988); Edward F. Sherman, Military Justice Without Military Control<\/span><\/cite>, 82 Yale L. J. 1398, 1402<\/a> (1973).<\/div>
\u200a13<\/a>\u200a<\/span>William Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents<\/cite>, Library of Congress<\/a><\/span> 47\u201348 (2d rev. ed. 1920); United States. Continental Congress et al., Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774\u201389<\/cite>, 2 Washington, U.S. Govt. 111<\/span> (1904\u201337).<\/div>
\u200a14<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Nathaniel Philbrick, Why Benedict Arnold Turned Traitor Against the American Revolution<\/cite>, Smithsonian Mag.<\/a><\/span> (2016).<\/div>
\u200a15<\/a>\u200a<\/span>U.S. Const.<\/span> art I, \u00a7 8, cl. 14<\/a>.<\/div>
\u200a16<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Gordon D. Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Constitution: The Original Understanding<\/cite>, 71 Harv. L. Rev.<\/span> 293, 299 n.9 (1957).<\/div>
\u200a17<\/a>\u200a<\/span>U.S. Const.<\/span> amend. V<\/a>.<\/div>
\u200a18<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Frederick Bernays Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice I<\/cite>, 72 Harv. L. Rev.<\/span> 1, 49 n. 30 (1958).<\/div>
\u200a19<\/a>\u200a<\/span>The Cox Commission, Report of the Commission on the 50th Anniversary of the Uniform Code of Military Justice<\/cite>, Nat'l Inst. of Mil. Just<\/a> <\/span>(May 2001).<\/div>
\u200a20<\/a>\u200a<\/span>10 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 801\u2013950 <\/a>.<\/div>
\u200a21<\/a>\u200a<\/span>10 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 802, 816, 818\u201320<\/a>. <\/div>
\u200a22<\/a>\u200a<\/span>United States v. Ali<\/i>, 71 M.J. 256, 268\u201369<\/a> (C.A.A.F. 2012); Manual for Courts-Martial United States<\/cite>, Joint Serv. Comm. on Military Justice<\/a> <\/span>(2019 ed.).<\/div>
\u200a23<\/a>\u200a<\/span>10 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 822\u201327; \u00a7 837<\/a>; see also Manual for Courts-Martial United States<\/cite>, Joint Serv. Comm. on Military Justice II-55<\/a><\/span> (2019 ed.).<\/div>
\u200a24<\/a><\/span> Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632<\/a>, 82 Stat. 1335.<\/div>
\u200a25<\/a>\u200a<\/span>10 U.S.C. \u00a7 7037<\/a>; 10 U.S.C. \u00a7 826<\/a>.<\/div>
\u200a26<\/a>\u200a<\/span>10 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 860(a), 866<\/a>.<\/div>
\u200a27<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Manual for Courts-Martial United States<\/cite>, Joint Serv. Comm. on Military Justice II\u2013190\u201391<\/a> <\/span>(2019 ed.).<\/div>
\u200a28<\/a>\u200a<\/span>10 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 866(d), 867(a); 941; 942(c)\u2013(d)<\/a>; 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1259<\/a>. See also Ryder v. United States<\/i>, 515 U.S. 177, 187<\/a> (1995).<\/div>
\u200a29<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Eugene R. Fidell, Review of Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces by the Supreme Court of the United States<\/cite>, Evolving Mil. Just.<\/span> 149, 151 n. 14 (Eugene R. Fidell & Dwight H. Sullivan eds., 2002). See also Eugene R. Fidell & Stephen I. Vladeck, Second-Class Justice in the Military<\/cite>, N.Y. Times<\/a><\/span>, Mar. 20, 2019; Eugene R. Fidell, Review of Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces by the Supreme Court of the United States<\/cite>, Evolving Mil. Just.<\/span> 149, 151 n. 14 (Eugene R. Fidell & Dwight H. Sullivan eds., 2002).<\/div>
\u200a30<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Ortiz v. United States<\/i>, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2170<\/a> (2018).<\/div>
\u200a31<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Edward F. Sherman, The Civilianization of Military Law<\/cite>, 22 Me. L. Rev. 3, 38\u201349<\/a><\/span> (1970); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, The Civilianization of Military Jurisdiction<\/cite>, in The Consitution and the Future of Criminal Justice in America 287, 288<\/a><\/span> (John T. Parry & L. Song Richardson eds., 2013). <\/div>
\u200a32<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Mil. R. Evid.<\/span> 1102(a)<\/a>; see also Manual for Courts-Martial United States<\/cite>, Joint Serv. Comm. on Military Justice III-51<\/a> <\/span>(2019 ed.); Fredric I. Lederer, The Military Rules of Evidence: Origins and Judicial Implementation<\/cite>, 130 Mil. L. Rev. 5, 13<\/a><\/span> (1990). <\/div>
\u200a33<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Compare Act of May 5, 1950, Pub. L. Ch. 169, 64 Stat. 118, 120 (1950) with Miranda v. Arizona<\/i>, 384 U.S. 436 <\/a>(1966), and Gideon v. Wainwright<\/i>, 372 U.S. 335<\/a> (1963). See also United States v. Kemp<\/i>, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 89, 97<\/a> (1962): Fully conscious of the fact that a person in the military service might not know of his right to refuse to answer and thereby unwittingly waive such privilege, and of his unique position while under interrogation, Congress went much further than the Fifth Amendment.<\/q><\/div>
\u200a34<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Anthony J. Ghiotto, Back to the Future with the Uniform Code of Military Justice: The Need to Recalibrate the Relationship between the Military Justice System, Due Process, and Good Order and Discipline<\/cite>, 90 N.D. L. Rev. 485, 511\u201312, 507<\/a><\/span> (2014); see also Elizabeth Cameron Hernandez & Jason M. Ferguson, The Brady Bunch: An Examination of Disclosure Obligations in the Civilian Federal and Military Justice Systems,<\/cite> 67 A.F. L. Rev. 187, 198<\/a><\/span> (2011).<\/div>
\u200a35<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Parker v. Levy<\/i>, 417 U.S. 733, 743<\/a> (1974).<\/div>
\u200a36<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Chappell v. Wallace<\/i>, 462 U.S. 296, 300<\/a> (1983).<\/div>
\u200a37<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Stephen I. Vladeck, Military Courts and Article III<\/cite>, 103 Geo. L. J. 933, <\/span>937, 962\u201363 (2015); see e.g. Karen A. Ruzic, Military Justice and the Supreme Court\u2019s Outdated Standard of Deference: Weiss v. United States<\/cite>, 70 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 265, 293<\/a><\/span> (1994); Military Justice and Article III<\/cite>, 103 Harv. L. Rev.<\/span> 1909, 1917 (1990).<\/div>
\u200a38<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Solorio v. United States<\/i>, 83 U.S. 435, 447, 450<\/a> (1987) (overruling O\u2019Callahan v. Parker<\/i>, 395 U.S. 258<\/a> (1969).<\/div>
\u200a39<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Edmond v. United States<\/i>, 520 U.S. 651, 664<\/a> (1997); see also Weiss v. United States<\/i>, 510 U.S. 163, 164<\/a> (1994).<\/div>
\u200a40<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Clinton v. Goldsmith,<\/i> 526 U.S. 529, 533\u201334<\/a> (1999). See also Ortiz v. United States<\/i>, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2173<\/a> (2018); United States v. Denedo<\/i>, 556 U.S. 904<\/a> (2009); United States v. Scheffer<\/i>, 523 U.S. 303<\/a> (1998).<\/div>
\u200a41<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Ortiz v. United States<\/i>, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2186\u20132197<\/a> (2018); United States v. Coe<\/i>, 155 U.S. 76, 86<\/a> (1894).<\/div>
\u200a42<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Ortiz v. United States<\/i>, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2184\u20132189<\/a> (2018).<\/div>
\u200a43<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Ortiz v. United States<\/i>, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2190, 2197, 2205<\/a> (2018).<\/div>
\u200a44<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Lance Cpl. Carlin Warren, Charlotte, N.C., natives strengthen their brotherhood while training on Parris Island, S.C.<\/cite>, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, USMC <\/a>(2018); George M. Reynolds & Amanda Shendruk, Demographics of the U.S. Military<\/cite>, Council on Foreign Relations<\/span> (2018); Kristen Bialik, The changing face of America\u2019s veteran population<\/cite>, Pew Research Center<\/a><\/span> (2017); see generally Douglas L. Kriner & Francis X. Shen, Invisible Inequality: The Two Americas of Military Sacrifice<\/cite>, 46 U. Mem. L. Rev. 545<\/a><\/span> (2016).<\/div>
\u200a45<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Andrew Cohen, None of the Supreme Court Justices Has Battle Experience<\/cite>, The Atlantic<\/a><\/span>, Aug. 13, 2012.<\/div>
\u200a46<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Sabrina Tavernise, As Fewer Americans Serve, Growing Gap Is Found Between Civilians and Military<\/cite>, The Gainesville Sun<\/a><\/span>, Nov. 24, 2011.<\/div>
\u200a47<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Chappell v. Wallace<\/i>, 462 U.S. 296, 300<\/a> (1983).<\/div>
\u200a48<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Stephen I. Vladeck, Military Courts and Article III<\/cite>, 103 Geo. L. J. 933, 948<\/span> (2015).<\/div>
\u200a49<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Dynes v. Hoover<\/i>, 61 U.S. 65, 82\u201383<\/a> (1858); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.<\/i>, 458 U.S. 50, 71<\/a> (1982).<\/div>
\u200a50<\/a>\u200a<\/span>10 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 933\u201334<\/a>; Parker v. Levy<\/i>, 417 U.S. 733<\/a> (1974); see generally Jeremy S. Weber, Whatever Happened to Military Good Order and Discipline<\/cite>, 66 Clev. St. L. Rev. 123<\/a><\/span> (2017).<\/div>
\u200a51<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Compare Parker v. Levy<\/i>, 417 U.S. 733, 749, 755<\/a> (1974).<\/div>
\u200a52<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Solorio v. United States<\/i>, 483 U.S. 435, 436, 441, 444\u201345<\/a> (1987).<\/div>
\u200a53<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Ortiz v. United States<\/i>, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2175<\/a> (2018); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, Military Courts and Article III<\/cite>, 103 Geo. L. J. 933, 963<\/a><\/span> (2015).<\/div>
\u200a54<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Prosecutorial Power and the Legitimacy of the Military Justice System<\/cite>, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 937, 958<\/a><\/span> (2010); Stephen I. Vladeck, Military Courts and Article III<\/cite>, 103 Geo. L. J. 933, 963<\/a><\/span> (2015).<\/div>
\u200a55<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See John S. Cooke, Military Justice and the Uniform Code of Military Justice<\/cite>, Army Law. 1, 2<\/a><\/span> (2000); 10 U.S.C. \u00a7 837<\/a>.<\/div>
\u200a56<\/a>\u200a<\/span>10 U.S.C. \u00a7 837<\/a>. See also Edward F. Sherman, The Civilianization of Military Law<\/cite>, 22 Me. L. Rev. 3, 38\u201349<\/a><\/span> (1970); Stephen I. Vladeck, The Civilianization of Military Jurisdiction<\/cite>, in <\/span>The Constitution and the Future of Criminal Law in America<\/a> (John T. Parry & L. Song Richardson eds., 2013).<\/div>
\u200a57<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Robinson O. Everett, Some Comments on the Civilization of Military Justice<\/cite>, Army Law. 1, 3 <\/span>(1980).<\/div>
\u200a58<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society<\/cite>, 143\u201344 (2009). See also Anthony J. Ghiotto, Back to the Future with the Uniform Code of Military Justice<\/cite>, 90 N.D. L. Rev. 485, 522<\/a> <\/span>(2014); Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 6-22 Leader Development<\/cite>, U.S. Army<\/a><\/span>, (Nov. 21, 2019).<\/div>
\u200a59<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See, e.g., General Robert B. Neller, Message to the Force 2018: Execute,<\/q><\/cite> U.S. Marine Corps<\/a> <\/span>(Jan. 26, 2018). <\/div>
\u200a60<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Solorio v. United States<\/i>, 483 U.S. 435, 449, 452<\/a> (1987); see also Parker v. Levy<\/i>, 417 U.S. 733, 755<\/a> (1974) and Colonel Jeffery S. Weber, USAF, The Disorderly, Undisciplined State of the Good Order and Discipline<\/q> Term<\/cite>, Air War College<\/a><\/span> (Nov. 21, 2019).<\/div>
\u200a61<\/a>\u200a<\/span>David A. Schlueter, American Military Justice: Responding to the Siren Songs for Reform<\/cite>, 73 A.F. L. Rev. 193, 215\u201316<\/a> <\/span>(2015).<\/div>
\u200a62<\/a>\u200a<\/span>United States v. Morgan<\/i>, 40 C.M.R. 583, 586<\/a> (1969; Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chiefs of the Military Services, Commanders of the Combatant Commands<\/cite>, Sec'y of Def.<\/a><\/span> (Aug. 13, 2018).<\/div>
\u200a63<\/a>\u200a<\/span>David A. Schlueter, American Military Justice: Responding to the Siren Songs for Reform<\/cite>, 73 A.F. L. Rev. 193, 215\u201316<\/a> <\/span>(2015)<\/div>
\u200a64<\/a>\u200a<\/span>A Few Good Men <\/a><\/cite>(Columbia Pictures 1992).<\/div>
\u200a65<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Ortiz v. United States<\/i>, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2172\u201373, 2180<\/a> (2018).<\/div>
\u200a66<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Criminal Law Dep\u2019t, Criminal Law Deskbook Practicing Military Justice<\/cite>, TJAGLCS, U.S. Army 1-2<\/a> <\/span>(2019). See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1259<\/a>.<\/div>
\u200a67<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Eugene R. Fidell, Review of Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces by the Supreme Court of the United States<\/cite>, in Evolving Mil. Just., 149, 150<\/span> (Eugene R. Fidell & Dwight H. Sullivan eds., 2002). See also 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1259<\/a>.<\/div>
\u200a68<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Stephen I. Vladeck, Military Courts and Article III<\/cite>, 103 Geo. L. J. 933, 950\u201351<\/span> (2015).<\/div>
\u200a69<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Reid v. Covert<\/i>, 354 U.S. 1, 35<\/a> (1957); see also Anthony J. Ghiotto, Back to the Future with the Uniform Code of Military Justice<\/cite>, 90 N.D. L. Rev. 485, 504<\/a><\/span> (2014).<\/div>
\u200a70<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Ortiz v. United States<\/i>, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2175, 2180<\/a> (2018).<\/div>
\u200a71<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Rodrigo M. Caru\u00e7o, In Order to Form a More Perfect Court<\/cite>, 41 Vt. L. Rev. 71, 122<\/a><\/span> (2016). See also See Eugene R. Fidell & Stephen I. Vladeck, Second-Class Justice in the Military<\/cite>, N.Y. Times<\/a><\/span>, Mar. 20, 2019.<\/div>
\u200a72<\/a>\u200a<\/span>James A. Young, Court-Martial Procedure: A Proposal<\/cite>, 41 Reporter 20, 24<\/a><\/span> (2014); John S. Cooke, Military Justice and the Uniform Code of Military Justice<\/cite>, Army Law. 1, 4<\/a><\/span> (2000). See also United States v. Scheffer<\/i>, 523 U.S. 303, 305<\/a> (1998) (addressing the admissibility of polygraph evidence with wide-ranging civilian effects); Davis v. United States<\/i>, 512 U.S. 452, 454<\/a> (1994) (addressing the ambiguous requests for counsel requiring law enforcement to stop questioning a suspect).<\/div>
\u200a73<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Military Justice Review Grp., Part I: UCMJ Recommendations, Dep\u2019t. of Def.<\/a><\/span> (2015).<\/div>
\u200a74<\/a>\u200a<\/span>H.R. Rep. No. 111-547<\/a> <\/div>
\u200a75<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Anthony J. Ghiotto, Back to the Future with the Uniform Code of Military Justice<\/cite>, 90 N.D. L. Rev. 485, 522<\/a> <\/span>(2014); Solorio v. United States<\/i>, 483 U.S. 441<\/a> (1987).<\/div>
\u200a76<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy<\/cite>, Dep't of Def.<\/a> <\/span>(2018). <\/div>
\u200a77<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Eugene R. Fidell, Review of Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces by the Supreme Court of the United States<\/cite>, in <\/span>Evolving Mil. Just., 149, 150 (Eugene R. Fidell & Dwight H. Sullivan eds., 2002).<\/div>
\u200a78<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Ortiz v. United States<\/i>, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2205<\/a> (2018). See also Eugene R. Fidell & Stephen I. Vladeck, Second-Class Justice in the Military<\/cite>, N.Y. Times<\/a><\/span>, Mar. 20, 2019.<\/div>
\u200a79<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Chappell v. Wallace<\/i>, 462 U.S. 296, 300<\/a> (1983).<\/div>
\u200a80<\/a>\u200a<\/span>David A. Schlueter, The Military Justice Conundrum: Justice or Discipline<\/cite>, 215 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 4<\/a><\/span> (2013); Anthony J. Ghiotto, Back to the Future with the Uniform Code of Military Justice<\/cite>, 90 N.D. L. Rev. 485, 504\u201305<\/a> <\/span>(2014).<\/div>
\u200a81<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1291\u201392<\/a>.<\/div>
\u200a82<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Amend. to Rules H. Comm., Print 116-57f<\/a>; see also Equal Justice for Our Military Act of 2017, H.R. 2783, 115th Congress<\/a> (2017); H.R. 2828, 114th Cong. <\/a>(2015); H.R. 1435, 113th Cong.<\/a> (2013); H.R. 3133, 112th Cong.<\/a> (2011); H.R. 569, 111th Cong.<\/a> (2010); H.R. 3174 110th Cong.<\/a> (2007); H.R. 1364, 109th Cong.<\/a> (2005).<\/div>
\u200a83<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See H.R. Rep. No. 111-547, 12<\/a> (2009); see also 114 Cong. Rec. H10, 162 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008); Bernie Becker, Military Appeal Process is Challenged<\/cite>, N.Y. Times<\/a>, <\/span>Nov. 27, 2008.<\/div>
\u200a84<\/a>\u200a<\/span>H.R. Rep. No. 111-547, 6\u20137<\/a> (2009).<\/div>
\u200a85<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Ortiz v. United States<\/i>, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2170, 2190, 2205<\/a> (2018).<\/div>
\u200a86<\/a>\u200a<\/span>United States v. Coe<\/i>, 155 U.S. 76, 86<\/a> (1894). See also Ortiz v. United States<\/i>, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2176\u201377<\/a> (2018).<\/div>
\u200a87<\/a>\u200a<\/span>10 U.S.C. \u00a7 867(e)<\/a>; see also Article III \u2014 Federal Courts \u2014 Ortiz v. United States<\/cite>, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 317, 322<\/a> <\/span>(2018).<\/div>
\u200a88<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Dave Phillips, Trump Reverses Navy Decision to Oust Edward Gallagher From SEALs<\/cite>, N.Y. Times<\/a><\/span>, Nov. 21, 2019.<\/div>
\u200a89<\/a>\u200a<\/span>David A. Schlueter, The Military Justice Conundrum: Justice or Discipline<\/cite>, 215 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 74<\/a><\/span> (2013); Article III \u2014 Federal Courts \u2014 Ortiz v. United States<\/cite>, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 317, 325<\/a> (2018).<\/span><\/div>
\u200a90<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Eugene Fidell, How Robust<\/q> is Appellate Review of Courts-Martial<\/cite>, Balkinization Blog<\/a>,<\/span> May 8, 2013. See also Bernie Becker, Military Appeal Process Is Challenged<\/cite>, N.Y. Times<\/a><\/span>, Nov. 27, 2008.<\/div>
\u200a91<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Rodrigo M. Caru\u00e7o, In Order to Form a More Perfect Court<\/cite>, 41 Vt. L. Rev. 108<\/a><\/span> (2016).<\/div>
\u200a92<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Ortiz v. United States<\/i>, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2173<\/a> (2018). See also Sam Nunn, The Fundamental Principles of the Supreme Court\u2019s Jurisprudence in Military Cases<\/cite>, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. 557<\/span> (1994).<\/div>
\u200a93<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Ortiz v. United States<\/i>, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2173<\/a> (2018).<\/div>
\u200a94<\/a>\u200a<\/span>28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1259<\/a>.<\/div>
\u200a95<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Eugene R. Fidell & Stephen I. Vladeck, Second-Class Justice in the Military<\/cite>, N.Y. Times<\/a><\/span>, Mar. 20, 2019.<\/div>
\u200a96<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Solorio v. United States<\/i>, 483 U.S. 435, 441<\/a> (1987).<\/div>
\u200a97<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Parker v. Levy<\/i>, 417 U.S. 733, 743<\/a> (1974).<\/div>\r\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Stefano J. Cavallaro<\/p>\n","protected":false},"meta":{"_citation":"9 Stetson J. Advoc. & L. 52 (2022)","_first_para":52,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-47007","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-32"]}