{"id":47016,"title":{"rendered":"The Uncharted Waters of Veterans Class Actions"},"content":{"rendered":"

\r\nMax W. Yarus\u200a1<\/a>\u200a<\/span><\/sup> Relief for one veteran through mandamus becomes relief at the expense of another veteran whose claim must be cured through mandamus, which becomes relief at the expense of another veteran, revealing the Federal Circuit\u2019s reasoning for promoting class actions in the context of VA delay.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n

<\/a>The Monk<\/i> plurality also overlooks the practical concerns of veterans and low-information nature of the VA when requiring that veterans affirmatively show the reason for their delay. The veterans\u2019 benefits system has become demonstrably more formal and complex, but despite its growing intricacy and backlog, there have been few developments in the VA\u2019s transparency.\u200a35<\/a>\u200a<\/span><\/sup> However, the blend of the merits and commonality determinations is weighed too heavily by the dissent, considering that the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Wal-Mart<\/i> required courts to conduct a rigorous analysis<\/q> that necessarily overlaps the two. The CAVC has treated the commonality requirement, in the context of delay and non-delay claims, differently. Although not a delay claim, in Wolfe v. Wilkie<\/i>, the CAVC rejected the VA\u2019s argument that when analyzing the commonality of a class, the answer alone<\/q> must dispose of the class members claims. The Court reasoned that such standard is too stringent where the putative class does not make an as-applied challenge to the regulation at issue, but instead raises a facial challenge to the regulation\u2019s validity. Thus, the CAVC held that a difference in facts of the Wolfe class does not stymie certification of this class as they did in the Monk<\/i> plurality.<\/q>\u200a56<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a56\u200a<\/span>See Wolfe v. Wilkie<\/i>, 32 Vet. App. 1, 28\u201329<\/a> (2019).<\/span><\/sup><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n

<\/a>Even though the Supreme Court in Geraghty<\/i> required a putative class to propose and construct subclasses for prisoners, veterans more closely resemble the Medicaid claimants in Prado-Steiman<\/i> where the Eleventh Circuit\u2019s rigorous analysis led it sua sponte modify and create subclasses for sensitive claimants. And while Medicaid applicants in Prado-Steiman<\/i> traverse an adversarial district court, veterans are embroiled in a uniquely claimant-friendly adjudicatory system. Veterans are thus distinguishable from both prisoners in Geraghty<\/i> and even from Medicaid claimants in Prado-Steiman<\/i> and should command a lesser standard for finding commonality among a class than prescribed by Monk<\/i>. The Godsey<\/i> Court\u2019s insistence that the CAVC is not bound by a class\u2019 proposed definition, coupled with its willingness to extend the principle of class modification to meet commonality requirements, effectively lowers that standard.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

\r\n<\/a>IV. Class Modification in Practice\r\n<\/h2>\r\n\r\n

<\/a>Although not a delay claim, in Skaar v. Wilkie<\/i>, the CAVC has already illustrated its willingness to extend the principle of class modification. In Skaar<\/i>, veterans who participated in the nuclear cleanup of Palomares, Spain collectively challenged the VA\u2019s reliance on the Air Force\u2019s dose methodology when calculating exposure to radiation in compliance with 38 C.F.R. \u00a7 3.311.\u200a57<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a57\u200a<\/span>Skaar v. Wilkie<\/i>, 32 Vet. App. 156, 168 (2019). <\/span><\/sup> Specifically, each class member claimed that they were harmed by VA\u2019s failure to rely on sound scientific and medical evidence.<\/q><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n

<\/a>The question of whether VA\u2019s use of a certain methodology is prejudicial on its face strikes at a dispositive legal issue central to each member\u2019s claim. However, in briefing, the Secretary argued that a dissimilarities analysis highlighted impediments to the proposed class definition which would ultimately erode commonality. Indeed, the petitioner\u2019s initial proposal was expansive and not atypical of an attempt to incorporate as many class members in the action as possible, including:<\/p>\r\n\r\n

    \r\n
  1. \r\nveterans whose claims for . . . benefits related to exposure to ionizing radiation at Palomares the VA has denied at any level . . . except for those who have appealed to [the CAVC] and received a decision for which the mandate has issued;<\/q>\r\n<\/li>\r\n
  2. \r\nveterans whose claims the [VARO] or [Board] has denied and for which the deadline for appeal has expired, as well as veterans whose claims are currently pending before a [decision review officer] or the [Board] after an initial [VARO] denial;<\/q> and\r\n<\/li>\r\n
  3. \r\nPalomares veterans with an appeal currently pending before [the CAVC].<\/q>\u200a58<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a58\u200a<\/span>Skaar v. Wilkie<\/i>, 32 Vet. App. 156, 171\u201372 (2019).<\/span><\/sup>\r\n<\/li>\r\n\r\n<\/ol>\r\n\r\n

    <\/a>The proposed class also includes \u201cveterans with claims that have not yet been filed at the RO,\u201d including<\/p>\r\n\r\n

    \r\nthose who have not filed a claim for an existing condition, including because they are aware of the VA\u2019s history of denial of Palomares veterans\u2019 claims or the methodology used to calculate dose exposure\u201d and \u201cthose who have only recently developed a radiogenic condition, and those whose claims have been delayed at the RO.\u200a59<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a59\u200a<\/span>Skaar v. Wilkie<\/i>, 32 Vet. App. 156, 171\u201372 (2019). <\/span><\/sup>\r\n<\/blockquote>\r\n\r\n

    <\/a>Eventually, these proposed classes were modified to include [a]ll U.S. veterans who were present [the Palomares Cleanup], and whose application for service-connected disability compensation based on exposure to ionizing radiation the VA has denied or will deny by relying, at least in part, on the findings of dose estimates requested under 38 C.F.R. \u00a7 3.311.<\/q>\u200a60<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a60\u200a<\/span>Skaar v. Wilkie<\/i>, 32 Vet. App. 156, 189 (2019).<\/span><\/sup><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n

    <\/a>Notably, the CAVC excluded those past or expired claimants whose claims were denied before reaching the Board but did not perfect an appeal of that denial. The CAVC also excluded those who did have final Board decisions but failed to file a Notice of Appeal to the CAVC.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n

    <\/a>The majority in Skaar<\/i> recognized that it could not exercise jurisdiction over those abandoned claims. In removing those claims from its purview, the CAVC was very careful to note that these modified classes are not formal subclasses, but are \u201csubgroups merely for purposes of analyzing our jurisdiction as to each [putative member] . . .\u201d As in Godsey,<\/i> where veterans at the pre-certification stage for a second time endangered the possibility of a common resolution, the Skaar<\/i> Court sua sponte modified the class to exclude abandoned claims so as to provide a path to resolution for the rest of the claimants. In doing so, the CAVC clearly engaged in a form of first instance fact finding, much like what occurs at the agency levels.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n

    <\/a>Where there are few tools at the disposal of veterans and their counsel to fact find in a timely manner, Skaar<\/i> and Godsey<\/i> show that the CAVC is willing to conduct necessary discovery on behalf of veterans. These holdings are rather novel because, typically, the CAVC is barred from considering facts that were not before the Board prior to an appeal to the Court.\u200a61<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a61\u200a<\/span>38 U.S.C. \u00a7 7252(a)<\/a>.<\/span><\/sup> It is from this principle that the Monk<\/i> plurality required veterans to affirmatively plead the reasons for delay before the CAVC could hear them. However, Skaar<\/i> shows that the practical effect of certifying class actions at an appellate court is the need for the court to employ self-imposed fact-finding. While Godsey<\/i> introduced the idea that classes should be modified where dissimilarities are the only factors impeding commonality, the Skaar<\/i> Court further extended the Court\u2019s fact-finding powers, essentially wielding them as a tool to self-police its own jurisdiction during the certification process.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

    \r\n<\/a>V. Conclusion\r\n<\/h2>\r\n\r\n

    <\/a>At this juncture, the waters of class action litigation as applied to veterans are a little less murky. The decision to adopt rules for class actions consistent with the FRCP reduces uncertainty in the initial stages of certification, and it gives claimants freedom to assume that the rule does not depart in meaning from the Federal Rules. However, the initial application of Rule 23(a)(2) was too strict. The affirmative duty that Geraghty<\/i>, Parsons<\/i>, the Monk<\/i> plurality, and the Godsey<\/i> dissent impute onto veterans to construct a class based on a specific policy is unduly burdensome. This paradigm may be supported by precedent but certainly not the practical needs of litigants seeking class certification at an appellate court. It neglects the low-information nature of the VA and assumes that veterans can uncover the reason for their delay. Moreover, many of these class scenarios involve sufficiently distinguishable populations from veterans.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n

    <\/a>Instead, the history of class modification provides a naturally existing framework to relaxing Rule 23(a)(2). Like the Ninth Circuit in Prado-Steiman<\/i>, the modification doctrine specifically counseled the CAVC in Godsey<\/i> to conduct the rigorous analysis required by Wal-Mart<\/i> in a way that illuminates a common class even where none is proposed. In Skaar<\/i>, the CAVC has shown that it plans to continue that practice. Not only are human health and welfare concerned, but a lack of transparency within the adjudications process highlights the inability to uncover the reasons for their individual case\u2019s delay. This information gap obligates the CAVC to adopt an agency-like power in the first instances of fact-finding for classes alleging delay and sua sponte modify classes where justice so requires.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

    Footnotes<\/h2>
    \u200a1<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Max W. Yarus is an Appellate Litigation Attorney with Bergmann & Moore, LLC. B.A., Georgia College and State University; J.D., Stetson University College of Law.<\/div>
    \u200a2<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Monk v. Shulkin<\/i>, No. 15-1280, 2018 WL 507445 at *2 (Vet. App. Jan. 23, 2018).<\/div>
    \u200a3<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Monk v. Shulkin<\/i>, 855 F.3d 1312<\/a> (Fed. Cir. 2017); see generally Caroline Bressman, The Future of Class Actions<\/cite>, 104 Minn. L. Rev. 14<\/a> <\/span>(2017); Michael Sant\u2019Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action<\/cite>, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1992<\/a> <\/span>(2012).<\/div>
    \u200a4<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Monk v. Shulkin<\/i>, 855 F.3d 1312<\/a> (Fed. Cir. 2017).<\/div>
    \u200a5<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Godsey v. Wilkie<\/i>, 31 Vet. App. 207<\/a> (2019); Skaar v. Wilkie<\/i>, 31 Vet. App. 16<\/a> (2019).<\/div>
    \u200a6<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Ebanks v. Shulkin<\/i>, 877 F.3d 1037, 1040<\/a> (Fed. Cir. 2017).<\/div>
    \u200a7<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Veterans Judicial Review Act of 1988, H.R. 5288, 100th Cong.<\/a> (1988).<\/div>
    \u200a8<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Monk v. Shulkin<\/i>, No. 15-1280, 2018 WL 507445 at *2 (Vet. App. Jan. 23, 2018).<\/div>
    \u200a9<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Monk v. Wilkie<\/i>, 30 Vet. App. 167, 170<\/a> (2018). <\/div>
    \u200a10<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Compare U.S. Vet. App. R.<\/span> 23<\/a>, with Fed. R. Civ. P<\/span>. 23<\/a>.<\/div>
    \u200a11<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Monk v. Wilkie<\/i>, 30 Vet. App. 167, 175<\/a> (2018); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes<\/i>, 564 U.S. 338<\/a> (2011).<\/div>
    \u200a12<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Fed. R. Civ. P. <\/span>23(a)(2)<\/a>.<\/div>
    \u200a13<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes<\/i>, 564 U.S. 338, 349<\/a> (2011) (citing Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof<\/cite>, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97, 131\u201332<\/a><\/span> (2009)).<\/div>
    \u200a14<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes<\/i>, 564 U.S. 338<\/a> (2011).<\/div>
    \u200a15<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes<\/i>, 564 U.S. 338, 345<\/a> (2011).<\/div>
    \u200a16<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes<\/i>, 564 U.S. 338, 349\u201350<\/a> (2011).<\/div>
    \u200a17<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes<\/i>, 564 U.S. 338, 352<\/a> (2011) (citing Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond<\/i>, 467 U.S. 867, 876<\/a> (1984)).<\/div>
    \u200a18<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes<\/i>, 564 U.S. 338, 350<\/a> (2011) (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof<\/cite>, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97, 132<\/a> <\/span>(2009)).<\/div>
    \u200a19<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes<\/i>, 564 U.S. 338, 359\u201360 <\/a>(2011) (citing Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.<\/i>, 603 F.3d 571, 652<\/a> (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting)).<\/div>
    \u200a20<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Fed. R. Civ. P<\/span>. 23(b)(3)<\/a>.<\/div>
    \u200a21<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes<\/i>, 564 U.S. 338, 376\u201378<\/a> (2011) (Ginsburg, J., with Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).<\/div>
    \u200a22<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes<\/i>, 564 U.S. 338, 350\u201351 (2011) (citing Gen. Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon<\/i>, 457 U.S. 147, 160\u201361<\/a> (1982).<\/div>
    \u200a23<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes<\/i>, 564 U.S. 338, 352<\/a> (2011) (quoting Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond<\/i>, 467 U.S. 867, 876<\/a> (1984).<\/div>
    \u200a24<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Veterans Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act of 2017, Pub. L. 115\u201355, 115th Cong.<\/a> (2017).<\/div>
    \u200a25<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Monk v. Wilkie<\/i>, 30 Vet. App. 167, 169<\/a> (2018).<\/div>
    \u200a26<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Monk v. Wilkie<\/i>, 30 Vet. App. 167, 175\u201377<\/a> (2018) (citation omitted).<\/div>
    \u200a27<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Monk v. Wilkie<\/i>, 30 Vet. App. 167, 186<\/a> (2018) (Allen, J., with Bartley and Toth, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge<\/i>, 424 U.S. 319<\/a> (1976)). <\/div>
    \u200a28<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Monk v. Wilkie<\/i>, 30 Vet. App. 167, 177<\/a> (2018).<\/div>
    \u200a29<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Monk v. Wilkie<\/i>, 30 Vet. App. 167, 178<\/a> (2018).<\/div>
    \u200a30<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Parsons v. Ryan<\/i>, 754 F.3d 657<\/a> (9th Cir. 2014).<\/div>
    \u200a31<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Parsons v. Ryan<\/i>, 754 F.3d 657, 673, 676<\/a> (9th Cir. 2014).<\/div>
    \u200a32<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Monk v. Wilkie<\/i>, 30 Vet. App. 167, 175<\/a> (2018).<\/div>
    \u200a33<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Ebanks v. Shulkin<\/i>, 877 F.3d 1037<\/a> (Fed. Cir. 2017).<\/div>
    \u200a34<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Ebanks v. Shulkin<\/i>, 877 F.3d 1037, 1039\u201340 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also In re Barr Labs., Inc.<\/i>, 930 F.2d 72, 75<\/a> (D.C. Cir. 1991).<\/span><\/div>
    \u200a35<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See James D. Ridgway, The Veterans\u2019 Judicial Review Act Twenty Years Later<\/cite>, 66 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 251, 253<\/a> <\/span>(2010).<\/div>
    \u200a36<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki<\/i>, 563 F.Supp. 2d 1049, 1064<\/a> (N.D. Cal. 2008), affirmed in part, reversed in part on other grounds, 678 F.3d 1013<\/a> (9th Cir. 2012).<\/div>
    \u200a37<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Nohr v. McDonald<\/i>, 27 Vet. App. 124<\/a> (2014).<\/div>
    \u200a38<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Nohr v. McDonald<\/i>, 27 Vet. App. 124, 127<\/a> (2014).<\/div>
    \u200a39<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Ellen Brandau, The Future of Interrogatories Under Nohr v. McDonald, 8 Vet. L. Rev. 48<\/a> <\/span>(2016).<\/div>
    \u200a40<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Office of Inspector Gen., Audit of VA Regional Offices\u2019 Appeals Management Processes, U.S. Dep\u2019t Vet. Affairs<\/span> i<\/a>, May 30, 2012.<\/div>
    \u200a41<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Office of Inspector Gen., Review of Timeliness of the Appeals Process, U.S. Dep\u2019t Vet. Affairs ii<\/a><\/span> (Mar. 28, 2018).<\/div>
    \u200a42<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake<\/i>, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1063<\/a> (N.D. Cal. 2008), aff\u2019d in part, rev\u2019d in part sub nom. Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki<\/i>, 678 F.3d 1013<\/a> (9th Cir. 2012).<\/div>
    \u200a43<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake<\/i>, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1065<\/a> (N.D. Cal. 2008).<\/div>
    \u200a44<\/a>\u200a<\/span>National Ass\u2019n of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage<\/i>, 111 F.R.D. 543<\/a> (N.D. Cal. 1987).<\/div>
    \u200a45<\/a>\u200a<\/span>National Ass\u2019n of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage<\/i>, 111 F.R.D. 543, 546\u201348<\/a> (N.D. Cal. 1987). <\/div>
    \u200a46<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Monk v. Wilkie<\/i>, 30 Vet. App. 167, 170\u201371<\/a> (2018); Elkins v. Gober<\/i>, 229 F.3d 1369, 1377<\/a> (Fed. Cir. 2000).<\/div>
    \u200a47<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Fed. R. Civ. P<\/span>. 23<\/a>; Godsey v. Wilkie<\/i>, 31 Vet. App. 207<\/a> (2019).<\/div>
    \u200a48<\/a>\u200a<\/span>United States Parole Comm\u2019n et al. v. Geraghty<\/i>, 445 U.S. 388, 408<\/a> (1980).<\/div>
    \u200a49<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Prado-Steiman v. Bush<\/i>, 221 F.3d 1266, 1270<\/a> (11th Cir. 2000); Richardson v. Perales<\/i>, 402 U.S. 389, 400\u201301<\/a> (1971).<\/div>
    \u200a50<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Prado-Steiman v. Bush<\/i>, 211 F.3d 1266, 1281<\/a> (11th Cir. 2000).<\/div>
    \u200a51<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See, e.g., Susan J. v. Riley<\/i>, 254 F.R.D. 439, 451<\/a> (M.D. Ala. 2008). <\/div>
    \u200a52<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Godsey v. Wilkie<\/i>, 31 Vet. App. 207, 221<\/a> (2019) (citations omitted).<\/div>
    \u200a53<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Godsey v. Wilkie<\/i>, 31 Vet. App. 207, 222 n. 3<\/a> (2019).<\/span> <\/div>
    \u200a54<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Godsey v. Wilkie<\/i>, 31 Vet. App. 207, 221<\/a> (2019).<\/div>
    \u200a55<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Godsey v. Wilkie<\/i>, 31 Vet. App. 207, 231\u201332<\/a> (2019) (Pietsch, J., dissenting).<\/span><\/div>
    \u200a56<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Wolfe v. Wilkie<\/i>, 32 Vet. App. 1, 28\u201329<\/a> (2019).<\/div>
    \u200a57<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Skaar v. Wilkie<\/i>, 32 Vet. App. 156, 168 (2019). <\/div>
    \u200a58<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Skaar v. Wilkie<\/i>, 32 Vet. App. 156, 171\u201372 (2019).<\/div>
    \u200a59<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Skaar v. Wilkie<\/i>, 32 Vet. App. 156, 171\u201372 (2019). <\/div>
    \u200a60<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Skaar v. Wilkie<\/i>, 32 Vet. App. 156, 189 (2019).<\/div>
    \u200a61<\/a>\u200a<\/span>38 U.S.C. \u00a7 7252(a)<\/a>.<\/div>\r\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    Max W. Yarus<\/p>\n","protected":false},"meta":{"_citation":"9 Stetson J. Advoc. & L. 115 (2022)","_first_para":115,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-47016","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-32"]}