{"id":72364,"title":{"rendered":"There is Nothing \u201cQualified\u201d About the Doctrine of Qualified Immunity"},"content":{"rendered":"

\r\nLucia Leoni\u200a1<\/a>\u200a<\/span><\/sup> The Indemnification Study importantly found that \u201claw enforcement officers employed by [all] eighty-one jurisdictions . . . almost never contributed to settlements and judgments in police misconduct lawsuits\u201d \u2014 a conclusion that necessarily conflicts with one of qualified immunity\u2019s primary purposes.\u200a66<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a66\u200a<\/span>Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification<\/i>, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 885, 905, 912<\/a> <\/span>(2014).<\/span><\/sup><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n

Beginning with the forty-four largest jurisdictions in The Indemnification Study, there were 9,225 civil rights cases that resulted in payments to plaintiffs, which was estimated to reach $735,270,772 in settlements and judgments. Police officers involved in these cases contributed to satisfying such settlements and judgements in .41 percent of those cases and were financially responsible for approximately .02 percent of the total dollars paid. In the thirty-seven smaller jurisdictions, not one of the 8,141 officers employed by departments therein contributed to a settlement or judgment in any type<\/i> of civil claim.\u200a67<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a67\u200a<\/span>Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification<\/i>, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 885, 913, 915<\/a> <\/span>(2014).<\/span><\/sup> Further, in all eighty-one jurisdictions, \u201cno officer paid a nickel to satisfy punitive damages awards in section 1983 cases.\u201d\u200a68<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a68\u200a<\/span>Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification<\/i>, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 885, 918<\/a><\/span> (2014).<\/span><\/sup> And not even could the financial burden of retaining defense counsel save this policy goal because The Indemnification Study found that police officers are nearly always provided an attorney free of charge.\u200a69<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a69\u200a<\/span>Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification<\/i>, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 885, 915\u201316 <\/a><\/span>(2014).<\/span><\/sup><\/p>\r\n\r\n

\r\nV. \u201cThe Doctrine is Called \u2018Qualified Immunity.\u2019 In Real Life it Operates Like Absolute Immunity.\u201d\r\n<\/h2>\r\n\r\n

These are words uttered by a federal district court judge amidst public outrage across the Nation following the police killing of George Floyd;\u200a70<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a70\u200a<\/span>See<\/i> Jamison v. McClendon<\/i>, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386, 391<\/a> (S.D. Miss. 2020).<\/span><\/sup> his sentiment is in good company.\u200a71<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a71\u200a<\/span>See e.g.,<\/i> Estate of Taylor v. Salt Lake City<\/i>, 16 F.4th 744, 789\u201390<\/a> (10th Cir. 2021); Salway v. Norris<\/i>, 2:20-CV-115-MLC, 2021 WL 2953668, at *2\u20134 <\/a>(D. Wyo. July 14, 2021); Monterroso v. Purdy<\/i>, No. 20-CV-255-CAB-BGS, 2020 WL 5576719 n.1<\/a> (S.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2020); United States v. Weaver<\/i>, 975 F.3d 94, 109<\/a> (2d Cir. 2020); Briscoe v. City of Seattle<\/i>, 483 F. Supp. 3d 999<\/a> (W.D. Wash. Sept. 1, 2020).<\/span><\/sup> In August 2020, Judge Carlton Reeves of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi reluctantly granted a police officer\u2019s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds and took the opinion as an opportunity to lay out the unjust nature of the judge-made doctrine.\u200a72<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a72\u200a<\/span>See generally<\/i> Jamison<\/i> v. McClendon<\/i>, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386<\/a> (S.D. Miss. 2020).<\/span><\/sup> Judge Reeves began his opinion with a powerful message, aiming to magnify how the Doctrine\u2019s arbitrary procedure has unfair effects on civil rights plaintiffs:<\/p>\r\n\r\n

\r\nClarence Jamison wasn\u2019t jaywalking.\r\nHe wasn\u2019t outside playing with a toy gun. \r\nHe didn\u2019t look like a \u201csuspicious person.\u201d \r\nHe wasn\u2019t suspected of \u201cselling loose, untaxed cigarettes.\u201d \r\nHe wasn\u2019t suspected of passing a counterfeit $20 bill. \r\nHe didn\u2019t look like anyone suspected of a crime. \r\nHe wasn\u2019t mentally ill and in need of help. \r\nHe wasn\u2019t assisting an autistic patient who had wandered away from a group home. \r\nHe wasn\u2019t walking home from an after-school job. \r\nHe wasn\u2019t walking back from a restaurant. \r\nHe wasn\u2019t hanging out on a college campus. \r\nHe wasn\u2019t standing outside of his apartment. \r\nHe wasn\u2019t inside his apartment eating ice cream. \r\nHe wasn\u2019t sleeping in his bed. \r\nHe wasn\u2019t sleeping in his car. \r\nHe didn\u2019t make an \u201cimproper lane change.\u201d \r\nHe didn\u2019t have a broken tail light. \r\nHe wasn\u2019t driving over the speed limit. \r\nHe wasn\u2019t driving under the speed limit. \r\n<\/blockquote>\r\n
\r\nNo, Clarence Jamison was a Black man driving a Mercedes convertible.\u200a73<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a73\u200a<\/span>Jamison<\/i> v. McClendon<\/i>, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386, 390<\/a> (S.D. Miss. 2020).<\/span><\/sup>\r\n<\/blockquote>\r\n\r\n

After each declaration, Judge Reeves added a footnote clarifying which victim of police misconduct he was referring to.\u200a74<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a74\u200a<\/span>Jamison<\/i> v. McClendon<\/i>, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386, nn. 1\u201319<\/a> (S.D. Miss. 2020).<\/span><\/sup> He did this to exhibit how the very heartbeat of qualified immunity \u2014 the clearly established law standard \u2014 places arbitrary lines on factual scenarios, which in turn precludes plaintiffs like Jamison from vindicating their constitutional rights.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n

Begrudgingly applying qualified immunity to Jamison\u2019s case, Judge Reeves nevertheless dedicated a significant portion of his analysis to explain how what began as a mechanism to balance two competing interests \u2014 the need to hold officers accountable against the need to protect officers in the discretionary functions of their job \u2014 has morphed into a shield from liability no matter how egregious an officer\u2019s conduct:\u200a75<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a75\u200a<\/span>Jamison<\/i> v. McClendon<\/i>, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386, 402<\/a> (S.D. Miss. 2020).<\/span><\/sup> \u201cA review of our qualified immunity precedent makes clear that the Court has dispensed with any pretense of balancing competing values.\u201d\u200a76<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a76\u200a<\/span>Jamison<\/i> v. McClendon<\/i>, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386, 403<\/a> (S.D. Miss. 2020).<\/span><\/sup> His analysis begged the central question that \u201c[i]f Section 1983 was created to make the courts \u2018guardians of the people\u2019s federal rights,\u2019 what kind of guardians have the courts become?\u201d\u200a77<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a77\u200a<\/span>Jamison<\/i> v. McClendon<\/i>, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386, 404<\/a> (S.D. Miss. 2020) (quoting Haywood v. Drown<\/i>, 556 U.S. 729, 735<\/a> (2009)).<\/span><\/sup> According to Judge Reeves, the clearly established standard itself is \u201ca fool\u2019s errand\u201d because it is asking \u201cpeople who love to debate whether something is debatable.\u201d\u200a78<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a78\u200a<\/span>Jamison<\/i> v. McClendon<\/i>, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386, 406 (S.D. Miss. 2020).<\/span><\/sup> Judge Reeves\u2019s opinion has been commended by his colleagues for its informative criticism on the evolution of qualified immunity.\u200a79<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a79\u200a<\/span>See<\/i> Richardson v. City of New York<\/i>, 2020 WL 5754989 n.12<\/a> (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2020); Peterson v. Martinez<\/i>, No. 3:19-CV-01447-WHO, 2020 WL 4673953 n.5<\/a> (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2020).<\/span><\/sup><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n

All of this \u2014 the Doctrine\u2019s procedural arbitrariness, lack of alleged common law origins, and failure to meet its purported policy goals \u2014 is to say that qualified immunity must be revisited, re-evaluated, and replaced. As Judge Guido Calabresi of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit made clear, \u201c[t]he noxious effects of our current approach are all too obvious, and are manifested . . . broadly, in the current protests.\u201d\u200a80<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a80\u200a<\/span>United States v. Weaver<\/i>, 975 F.3d 94, 110<\/a> (2d Cir. 2020) (Calabresi, JJ., concurring).<\/span><\/sup> And after all, \u201crevisiting precedent is particularly appropriate where . . . experience has pointed up the precedent\u2019s shortcomings.\u201d\u200a81<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a81\u200a<\/span>Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233<\/a> (2009)<\/i>.<\/i><\/span><\/sup><\/p>\r\n\r\n

\r\nVI. A New Standard for Balancing Public Accountability and the Protection of Government Officials\r\n<\/h2>\r\n\r\n

To return governmental immunity to a qualified<\/i> form of immunity, I propose the following standard: courts adjudicating claims of alleged government official misconduct should only ask whether the current state of the law and\/or<\/i> common standards of human decency would have likely given that official a fair warning that their conduct is to be unconstitutional. This means that courts would no longer engage in a specified two-part analysis like the current qualified immunity procedure, but rather could find that the facts of a case involve a constitutional violation in light of precedent and\/or common standards of human decency. Importantly, this standard will depart from two significant parts of the current qualified immunity analysis. First, a \u201cfair warning\u201d threshold will not require courts to find prior cases with nearly identical facts to the case before it, which is the problematic basis of the rigid and unworkable clearly established law standard. Second, the \u201cfair warning\u201d standard will allow courts to consider the subjective intent of a government official to speak to an official\u2019s bad faith in the discharge of their duties.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

\r\nDefining What Constitutes a \u201cFair Warning\u201d \r\n<\/h3>\r\n\r\n

The first significant departure from the current form of qualified immunity is how the \u201cfair warning\u201d standard will direct courts to focus on precedent: instead of judging an official\u2019s conduct based solely <\/i>upon the clearly established law at the time \u2014 and then defining that clearly established law at a nearly unattainable level \u2014 the \u201cfair warning\u201d standard will a) require courts to focus on the reasonableness of a belief that the state of the law and\/or the common standards of human decency would or would not have put an official on notice that their conduct is unconstitutional, and b) allow for more general conclusions to be drawn from settled law.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n

To recap, under the current qualified immunity regime, a right is \u201cclearly established\u201d \u2014 and a plaintiff can overcome the affirmative defense \u2014 when \u201c\u2018every reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates that right.\u2019\u201d\u200a82<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a82\u200a<\/span>Ashcroft v. al-Kidd<\/i>, 563 U.S. 731, 741<\/a> (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton<\/i>, 483 U.S. 635, 640<\/a> (1987)).<\/span><\/sup> Under this new standard, however, a \u201cfair warning\u201d that an official\u2019s conduct is unconstitutional means that a reasonable official likely would have been on notice that their conduct was likely violating an individual\u2019s right(s).<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n

The \u201cfair warning\u201d standard would give courts the discretion to analyze the facts of a case in light of settled law, common standards of human decency, or both. An inquiry into settled law would necessarily entail just that \u2014 a court surveying controlling precedent as they would in any other case. But how<\/i> a court will focus on controlling precedent is where current qualified immunity and the \u201cfair warning\u201d standard differ: the \u201cfair warning\u201d standard will not require courts to find prior cases with the same factually specific scenarios before it can subject a government official to potential liability. As it stands under current qualified immunity, courts must find existing precedent that 1) is \u201cparticularized\u201d to the specific facts of the case before it and 2) has placed that constitutional question \u201cbeyond debate.\u201d\u200a83<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a83\u200a<\/span>White v. Pauly<\/i>, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552<\/a> (2017).<\/span><\/sup> Under this new standard, however, courts will be permitted to engage in more generalized interpretations of the factual scenarios from prior cases to allow for the fate of individuals\u2019 constitutional rights to depend on ordinary adjudicatory principles, as opposed to the arbitrary procedure that is qualified immunity. Thus, in this determination, a court\u2019s survey of the law will not be a death sentence.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n

An inquiry in the common standards of human decency is one that would allow courts to simply do justice. Courts will be able to make objectively reasonable, common-sense inferences from the general standards of life that, presumably, every individual is aware of. This inquiry will account for a government official\u2019s conduct that is inherently, and obviously, \u201cantithetical to human dignity,\u201d\u200a84<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a84\u200a<\/span>See<\/i> Hope v. Pelzer<\/i>, 536 U.S. 730, 745 <\/a>(2002).<\/span><\/sup> which necessarily means that there need not be prior caselaw on point for a court to deny a defendant immunity. This standard is one of custom, not law, and there should be no fear that such a standard is unworkable or improper because the Supreme Court is no stranger to using the customs of our country and its people to guide legal rules for government officials. For example, in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court created the \u201cknock and talk\u201d exception to the warrant requirement, which allows officers to approach a home for the purpose of making contact with an occupant without a warrant.\u200a85<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a85\u200a<\/span>See generally<\/i> Florida v. Jardines<\/i>, 569 U.S. 1<\/a> (2013)<\/span><\/sup> Considering an officer must enter the more intimate parts of one\u2019s home to execute this attempt, the Court said that the officers, like any other citizen, hold an implied license \u201cto approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave.\u201d\u200a86<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a86\u200a<\/span>Florida v. Jardines<\/i>, 569 U.S. 1, 8<\/a> (2013).<\/span><\/sup> In establishing this rule, the Court reasoned that [a] license may be implied from the habits of the country,<\/q><\/q> and that complying with the terms of that traditional invitation does not require fine-grained legal knowledge<\/em> . . . .<\/q>\u200a87<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a87\u200a<\/span>Florida v. Jardines<\/i>, 569 U.S. 1, 8<\/a> (2013) (emphasis added) (quoting McKee v. Gratz<\/i>, 260 U.S. 127, 136<\/a> (1922)).<\/span><\/sup> Thus, the requirement that an official not violate common standards of human decency is one that will account for those violations that do not require fine-grained legal knowledge, but that nevertheless occurred. This part of the analysis will serve as a catch-all for those novel cases that exhibit blatant breaches of human decency \u2014 something that the doctrine of qualified immunity fails miserably at.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n

Further, and on a procedural note, courts will decide if a government official should receive immunity by determining the plausibleness of an official\u2019s belief that they did not have a fair warning that their conduct was unconstitutional considering the law and\/or common standards of human decency known to us all. A government official\u2019s claim of immunity would not<\/em> be plausible, for example, where a court could reasonably infer from the law and\/or common standards of human decency that a reasonable official likely had a fair warning that their conduct was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has defined plausible<\/q> as it relates to whether a plaintiff\u2019s claim is sufficient to overcome a defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss as one where the factual content . . . allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.<\/q> Considering that immunities from liability are affirmative defenses, it is safe to assume a government official will assert such a defense at the motion to dismiss stage, and therefore, it seems appropriate to borrow the \u201cplausibility\u201d rule for this new standard. Where it would be plausible that an official likely had a fair warning of the unconstitutionality of their conduct given the settled law and common standards of human decency, it is proper for that official to anticipate the consequences of their misconduct.\u200a88<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a88\u200a<\/span>Ashcroft v. Iqbal<\/i>, 556 U.S. 662, 678<\/a> (2009).<\/span><\/sup><\/p>\r\n\r\n

\r\nSubjective Intent of the Officer\r\n<\/h3>\r\n\r\n

The next significant departure from the current form of qualified immunity is returning to courts considering the subjective intent of a government official to determine the constitutionality of their actions. The Supreme Court initially rid qualified immunity of subjective inquiries in Harlow<\/i> in 1982 and has been unwavering in its commitment against probes into the subjective intent of government officials ever since. However, the Harlow<\/i> Court held that subjective-intent evidence was inadmissible because inquiries into the subjective intent of a government official prevented qualified immunity from doing its principal job of disposing of \u201cinsubstantial claims\u201d before trial\u200a89<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a89\u200a<\/span>Harlow v. Fitzgerald<\/i>, 457 U.S. 800, 816 <\/a>(1982).<\/span><\/sup> \u2014 a policy goal that this paper has debunked. The Court explained that \u201c[j]udicial inquiry into subjective motivation . . . may entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of numerous persons, including an official\u2019s professional colleagues,\u201d which \u201ccan be peculiarly disruptive of effective government.\u201d\u200a90<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a90\u200a<\/span>Harlow v. Fitzgerald<\/i>, 457 U.S. 800, 817<\/a> (1982).<\/span><\/sup> But now \u2014 exactly forty years after Harlow<\/i> was decided \u2014 we are faced with evidence that qualified immunity does not achieve its policy goals and, further, that the defense weighs unjustly in favor of protecting government officials. Because \u201c[r]evisiting precedent is particularly appropriate where . . . a departure would not upset expectations, the precedent consists of a judge-made rule that was recently adopted to improve the operation of the courts, and experience has pointed up the precedent\u2019s shortcomings,\u201d\u200a91<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a91\u200a<\/span>Pearson v. Callahan<\/i>, 555 U.S. 223, 233<\/a> (2009).<\/span><\/sup> it appears especially appropriate to reconsider the Court\u2019s decision to ignore the subjective intent of a government official.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n

A claim of immunity from liability should fail through a showing of bad faith on the part of a government official. A person using their office to violate a citizen\u2019s Constitutional right(s) due to personal judgment or incompetence cannot be said to be reasonable \u2014 and it is, and should be, that simple.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

\r\nVII. Conclusion\r\n<\/h2>\r\n\r\n

There is nothing \u201cqualified\u201d about the doctrine of qualified immunity. It is rare that a judge-made doctrine becomes commonly spoken of among laypeople, yet qualified immunity has taken center stage in the fight against police brutality.\u200a92<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a92\u200a<\/span>See generally <\/i><\/i>April Rodriguez, Lower Courts<\/i> Agree \u2014 It\u2019s Time to End Qualified Immunity<\/i>, Am. C.L Union<\/a><\/span> (Sep. 10, 2020); Amir H. Ali & Emily Clark, Qualified Immunity<\/i>: Explained<\/i>, The Appeal <\/a><\/span>(June 20, 2019); Nathaniel Sobel, What Is Qualified Immunity, and What Does It Have to Do With Police Reform?<\/i>, Law Fare<\/a><\/span> (Jun. 6, 2020).<\/span><\/sup> The American people want public accountability; they have grown tired of and angry with the law\u2019s lack of give for common standards of human decency. Qualified immunity stands as a barrier to the lawfulness of public official conduct, public accountability, and, ultimately, overall trust in the United States government\u2019s ability to care for its citizens. The Doctrine\u2019s jurisprudence has only proven to the very court that formed it that qualified immunity no longer has a place in a fair and civilized society.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n

It is imperative that the doctrine of qualified immunity face judgment and be left in the past as no more than a steppingstone to a more equitable standard for adjudicating constitutional violations. Our constitutional rights are the fabric of this Nation; the freedom we relinquish is premised on an understanding that our government will do right by us. When an American citizen pursues redress of their grievances, a court of law should make every effort to do just that. \u201cDecency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen.\u201d\u200a93<\/a>\u200a<\/span>\u200a93\u200a<\/span>Olmstead v. United States<\/i>, 277 U.S. 438, 485 <\/a>(1928) (Brandies, J., dissenting).<\/span><\/sup> Public officials are citizens too, and while there are some concerns weighing in favor of certain immunities, none of those concerns outweigh the demands of our Constitution in protecting citizens from our powerful government.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

Footnotes<\/h2>
\u200a1<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Lucia Leoni is a third-year student at Stetson University College of Law in Gulfport, Florida.<\/div>
\u200a2<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Lil Baby, The Bigger Picture<\/a><\/i> (Quality Control Music 2020).<\/div>
\u200a3<\/a>\u200a<\/span>42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983<\/a>.<\/div>
\u200a4<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See generally Pierson v. Ray,<\/i> 386 U.S. 547<\/a> (1967) (holding that \u201cthe defense of good faith\u201d is available to public officials sued under \u00a7 1983).<\/div>
\u200a5<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See generally Harlow v. Fitzgerald<\/i>, 457 U.S. 800, 815\u201316<\/a> (1982).<\/div>
\u200a6<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Harlow v. Fitzgerald<\/i>, 457 U.S. 800, 818<\/a> (1982).<\/div>
\u200a7<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Common Law 1<\/a><\/span> (1909).<\/div>
\u200a8<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Mullenix v. Luna<\/i>, 136 S.Ct. 305, 316<\/a> (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).<\/div>
\u200a9<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Pearson v. Callahan<\/i>, 555 U.S. 223<\/a> (2009).<\/div>
\u200a10<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See<\/i><\/i> <\/i>Mullinex v. Luna<\/i>, 136 S.Ct. 305, 316<\/a> (2015).<\/div>
\u200a11<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Ashcroft v. al-Kidd<\/i>, 563 U.S. 731, 741<\/a> (2009) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton<\/i>, 483 U.S. 635, 640<\/a> (1987)).<\/div>
\u200a12<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See<\/i><\/i> generally Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court\u2019s Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity<\/i>, 100 Minn. L. Rev. Headnotes 62, 69\u201372<\/a><\/span> (2016).<\/div>
\u200a13<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Wilson v. Layne,<\/i> 526 U.S. 603, 617 <\/a>(1999) (emphasis added).<\/div>
\u200a14<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna<\/i>, 142 S. Ct. 4, 7<\/a> (2021).<\/div>
\u200a15<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See Wilson v. Layne,<\/i> 526 U.S. 603, 617 <\/a>(1999).<\/div>
\u200a16<\/a>\u200a<\/span>White v. Pauly<\/i>, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 <\/a>(2017).<\/div>
\u200a17<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Anderson v. Creighton<\/i>, 483 U.S. 635, 639<\/a> (1987).<\/div>
\u200a18<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Anderson v. Creighton<\/i>, 483 U.S. 635, 639<\/a> (1987).<\/div>
\u200a19<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See<\/i> Plumhoff v. Rickard<\/i>, 572 U.S. 765, 779\u201380<\/a> (2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd<\/i>, 563 U.S. 731, 742<\/a> (2009)).<\/div>
\u200a20<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Gotovac v. Trejo<\/i>, 495 F. Supp. 3d 1186, 1225 n.15<\/a> (D.N.M. 2020), aff\u2019d<\/i>, 20-2143, 2021 WL 4891621 (10th Cir. Oct. 20, 2021) (citations omitted).<\/div>
\u200a21<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Ashcroft v. al-Kidd<\/i>, 563 U.S. 731, 742<\/a> (2009) (quoting Wilson v. Layne<\/i>, 526 U.S. 603, 617<\/a> (1999)); Plumhoff v. Rickard<\/i>, 572 U.S. 765, 779\u201380<\/a>(2014).<\/div>
\u200a22<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Pearson v. Callahan<\/i>, 555 U.S. 223<\/a> (2009).<\/div>
\u200a23<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Saucier v. Katz<\/i>, 533 U.S. 194<\/a> (2001).<\/div>
\u200a24<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Ashcroft v. al-Kidd<\/i>, 563 U.S. 731, 743<\/a> (2009).<\/div>
\u200a25<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Saucier v. Katz<\/i>, 533 U.S. 194, 201<\/a> (2001) (emphasis added).<\/div>
\u200a26<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Saucier v. Katz<\/i>, 533 U.S. 194, 201<\/a> (2001).<\/div>
\u200a27<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See generally <\/i>Pearson v. Callahan<\/i>, 555 U.S. 223<\/a> (2009).<\/div>
\u200a28<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Pearson v. Callahan<\/i>, 555 U.S. 223, 241<\/a> (2009).<\/div>
\u200a29<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Pearson v. Callahan<\/i>, 555 U.S. 223, 236<\/a> (2009).<\/div>
\u200a30<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Camreta v. Greene<\/i>, 563 U.S. 692, 707<\/a> (2011); see also<\/i> Evans v. Skolnik<\/i>, 997 F.3d 1060, 1072\u201373<\/a> (9th Cir. 2021) (Berzon, JJ., concurring).<\/div>
\u200a31<\/a>\u200a<\/span>E.g., Berg v. Kelly<\/i>, 897 F.3d 99, 106 <\/a>(2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickar<\/i>d, 572 U.S. 765, 774<\/a> (2014).<\/div>
\u200a32<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See<\/i> Pearson v. Callahan<\/i>, 555 U.S. 223, 242<\/a> (2009).<\/i><\/div>
\u200a33<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Karen M. Blum, Section 1983 Litigation: Post-Pearson and Post-Iqbal<\/i>, 26 Touro L. Rev. 433<\/a><\/span> (2010); Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States<\/i>: A Minnow or A Shark?<\/i>, 7 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 463 n.57<\/a><\/span> (2009); see also<\/i> Zadeh v. Robinson<\/i>, 902 F.3d 483, 498<\/a> (5th Cir. 2018) (Willett, JJ., concurring).<\/div>
\u200a34<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Andrew Chung et al., For Cops Who Kill, Special Supreme Court Protection<\/i>, Reuters<\/a> (<\/span>May 8, 2020).<\/div>
\u200a35<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Zadeh<\/i> v. Robinson<\/i>, 902 F.3d 483, 498\u201399<\/a> (5th Cir. 2018) (Willett, JJ., concurring) (quoting Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity<\/i>, 89 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 12<\/a> <\/span>(2015)).<\/div>
\u200a36<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Zadeh<\/i> v. Robinson<\/i>, 902 F.3d 483, 499<\/a> (5th Cir. 2018) (Willett, JJ., concurring).<\/div>
\u200a37<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Gotovac v. Trejo<\/i>, 495 F. Supp. 3d 1186, 1222 n.14.<\/a> (D.N.M. 2020), aff\u2019d<\/i>, 20-2143, 2021 WL 4891621 (10th Cir. Oct. 20, 2021).<\/div>
\u200a38<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Pierson v. Ray<\/i>, 386 U.S. 547, 554<\/a> (1967).<\/div>
\u200a39<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Filarsky v. Delia<\/i>, 566 U.S. 377, 384<\/a> (2012); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons<\/i>, 509 U.S. 259, 268<\/a> (1993) (quoting Pierson<\/i> v. Ray<\/i>, 386 U.S. 547, 554\u201355<\/a> (1967)); Tower v. Glover<\/i>, 467 U.S. 914, 921<\/a> (1984).<\/div>
\u200a40<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Gilbert v. Ride<\/i>r, 1 Kirby 180<\/a> (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786).<\/div>
\u200a41<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Hager v. Danforth<\/i>, 20 Barb. 16, 17\u201318<\/a> (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1854) (emphasis added).<\/div>
\u200a42<\/a>\u200a<\/span>State v. Lafferty<\/i>, 5 Del. 491<\/a> (Gen. Sess. 1854).<\/div>
\u200a43<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Golden v. South Carolina<\/i>, 1 S.C. 292<\/a> (1870).<\/div>
\u200a44<\/a>\u200a<\/span>E.g., State v. Dennis<\/i>, 43 A. 261, 262<\/a> (Del. Gen. Sess. 1895); Beaverts v. State<\/i>, 4 Tex. App. 175, 177 (Tex. App. 1878); Mesmer v. Cmmw.<\/i>, 67 Va. 976, 984\u201385<\/a> (1875); Mudrock v. Killips<\/i>, 28 N.W. 66, 68<\/a> (Wis. 1886).<\/div>
\u200a45<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Pierson v. Ray<\/i>, 386 U.S. 547, 555<\/a> (1967).<\/div>
\u200a46<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See<\/i><\/i> James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic<\/i>, 85 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1862, 1922, 1925<\/a> <\/span>(2010).<\/div>
\u200a47<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See<\/i><\/i> James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic<\/i>, 85 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1862, 1880<\/a><\/span> (2010).<\/div>
\u200a48<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See<\/i><\/i> James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic<\/i>, 85 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1862, 1893\u20131904<\/a><\/span> (2010). <\/div>
\u200a49<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See<\/i> Harlow v. Fitzgerald<\/i>, 457 U.S. 800, 814<\/a> (1982).<\/div>
\u200a50<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See<\/i> Forrester v. White<\/i>, 484 U.S. 219, 233<\/a> (1988).<\/div>
\u200a51<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Malley v. Briggs<\/i>, 475 U.S. 335, 341<\/a> (1986).<\/div>
\u200a52<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Malley v. Briggs<\/i>, 475 U.S. 335, 341<\/a> (1986).<\/div>
\u200a53<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Pearson v. Callahan<\/i>, 555 U.S. 223, 233<\/a> (2009) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant<\/i>, 502 U.S. 224, 227<\/a> (1991) (per curiam)).<\/div>
\u200a54<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Pearson v. Callahan<\/i>, 555 U.S. 223, 231<\/a> (2009)<\/i><\/i> (quoting Anderson v. Creighton<\/i>, 483 U.S. 635 n.2<\/a> (1987)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal<\/i>, 556 U.S. 662, 685<\/a> (2009); Siegert v. Gilley<\/i>, 500 U.S. 226, 236 <\/a>(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Mitchell v. Forsyth<\/i>, 472 U.S. 511, 526<\/a> (1985).<\/div>
\u200a55<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails<\/i>, 127 Yale L.J. 2, 28\u201329<\/a> <\/span>(2017).<\/div>
\u200a56<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails<\/i>, 127 Yale L.J. 2 29, 31\u201332<\/a> <\/span>(2017).<\/div>
\u200a57<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails<\/i>, 127 Yale L.J. 2, 54\u201355<\/a><\/span> (2017).<\/div>
\u200a58<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Turner v. Weikal<\/i>, Case No. 03:12-cv-00915 *3<\/a> (M.D. Tenn. Jun. 27, 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).<\/div>
\u200a59<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See, e.g., <\/i>Wesley v. Campbell<\/i>, 779 F.3d 421, 433<\/a> (6th Cir. 2015); Owens v. Baltimore City State\u2019s Attorneys Off<\/i>., 767 F.3d 379, 396<\/a> (4th Cir. 2014); Newland v. Reehorst<\/i>, 328 Fed. Appx. 788 n.3<\/a> (3d Cir. 2009); Field Day, LLC v. County of Suffolk<\/i>, 463 F.3d 167, 192\u201392 <\/a>(2d Cir. 2006); St. George v. Pinellas County<\/i>, 285 F.3d 1334, 1337, 1338<\/a> (11th Cir. 2002); Alvarado v. Litscher<\/i>, 267 F.3d 648, 651<\/a> (7th Cir. 2001); Sims v. Adams<\/i>, 537 F.2d 829<\/a> (5th Cir. 1976).<\/div>
\u200a60<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails<\/i>, 127 Yale L.J. 2, 45<\/a><\/span> (2017).<\/div>
\u200a61<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails<\/i>, 127 Yale L.J. 2, 46<\/a><\/span> (2017).<\/div>
\u200a62<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See <\/i>Justiniano v. Walker<\/i>, 986 F.3d 11, 27<\/a> (1st Cir. 2021).<\/div>
\u200a63<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Malley v. Briggs<\/i>, 475 U.S. 335, 341<\/a> (1986).<\/div>
\u200a64<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification<\/i>, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 885<\/a> <\/span>(2014).<\/div>
\u200a65<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification<\/i>, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 885, 905<\/a> <\/span>(2014).<\/span><\/div>
\u200a66<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification<\/i>, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 885, 905, 912<\/a> <\/span>(2014).<\/div>
\u200a67<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification<\/i>, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 885, 913, 915<\/a> <\/span>(2014).<\/div>
\u200a68<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification<\/i>, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 885, 918<\/a><\/span> (2014).<\/div>
\u200a69<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification<\/i>, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 885, 915\u201316 <\/a><\/span>(2014).<\/div>
\u200a70<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See<\/i> Jamison v. McClendon<\/i>, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386, 391<\/a> (S.D. Miss. 2020).<\/div>
\u200a71<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See e.g.,<\/i> Estate of Taylor v. Salt Lake City<\/i>, 16 F.4th 744, 789\u201390<\/a> (10th Cir. 2021); Salway v. Norris<\/i>, 2:20-CV-115-MLC, 2021 WL 2953668, at *2\u20134 <\/a>(D. Wyo. July 14, 2021); Monterroso v. Purdy<\/i>, No. 20-CV-255-CAB-BGS, 2020 WL 5576719 n.1<\/a> (S.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2020); United States v. Weaver<\/i>, 975 F.3d 94, 109<\/a> (2d Cir. 2020); Briscoe v. City of Seattle<\/i>, 483 F. Supp. 3d 999<\/a> (W.D. Wash. Sept. 1, 2020).<\/div>
\u200a72<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See generally<\/i> Jamison<\/i> v. McClendon<\/i>, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386<\/a> (S.D. Miss. 2020).<\/div>
\u200a73<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Jamison<\/i> v. McClendon<\/i>, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386, 390<\/a> (S.D. Miss. 2020).<\/div>
\u200a74<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Jamison<\/i> v. McClendon<\/i>, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386, nn. 1\u201319<\/a> (S.D. Miss. 2020).<\/div>
\u200a75<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Jamison<\/i> v. McClendon<\/i>, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386, 402<\/a> (S.D. Miss. 2020).<\/div>
\u200a76<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Jamison<\/i> v. McClendon<\/i>, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386, 403<\/a> (S.D. Miss. 2020).<\/div>
\u200a77<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Jamison<\/i> v. McClendon<\/i>, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386, 404<\/a> (S.D. Miss. 2020) (quoting Haywood v. Drown<\/i>, 556 U.S. 729, 735<\/a> (2009)).<\/div>
\u200a78<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Jamison<\/i> v. McClendon<\/i>, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386, 406 (S.D. Miss. 2020).<\/div>
\u200a79<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See<\/i> Richardson v. City of New York<\/i>, 2020 WL 5754989 n.12<\/a> (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2020); Peterson v. Martinez<\/i>, No. 3:19-CV-01447-WHO, 2020 WL 4673953 n.5<\/a> (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2020).<\/div>
\u200a80<\/a>\u200a<\/span>United States v. Weaver<\/i>, 975 F.3d 94, 110<\/a> (2d Cir. 2020) (Calabresi, JJ., concurring).<\/div>
\u200a81<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Pearson v. Callahan<\/i>, 555 U.S. 223, 233<\/a> (2009)<\/i>.<\/i><\/div>
\u200a82<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Ashcroft v. al-Kidd<\/i>, 563 U.S. 731, 741<\/a> (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton<\/i>, 483 U.S. 635, 640<\/a> (1987)).<\/div>
\u200a83<\/a>\u200a<\/span>White v. Pauly,<\/i> 137 S. Ct. 548, 552<\/a> (2017).<\/div>
\u200a84<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See<\/i> Hope v. Pelzer<\/i>, 536 U.S. 730, 745 <\/a>(2002).<\/div>
\u200a85<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See generally<\/i> Florida v. Jardines<\/i>, 569 U.S. 1<\/a> (2013)<\/div>
\u200a86<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Florida v. Jardines<\/i>, 569 U.S. 1, 8<\/a> (2013).<\/div>
\u200a87<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Florida v. Jardines<\/i>, 569 U.S. 1, 8<\/a> (2013) (emphasis added) (quoting McKee v. Gratz<\/i>, 260 U.S. 127, 136<\/a> (1922)).<\/div>
\u200a88<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Ashcroft v. Iqbal<\/i>, 556 U.S. 662, 678<\/a> (2009).<\/div>
\u200a89<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Harlow v. Fitzgerald<\/i>, 457 U.S. 800, 816 <\/a>(1982).<\/div>
\u200a90<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Harlow v. Fitzgerald<\/i>, 457 U.S. 800, 817<\/a> (1982).<\/div>
\u200a91<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Pearson v. Callahan<\/i>, 555 U.S. 223, 233<\/a> (2009).<\/i><\/i><\/div>
\u200a92<\/a>\u200a<\/span>See generally <\/i><\/i>April Rodriguez, Lower Courts Agree \u2014 It\u2019s Time to End Qualified Immunity<\/i>, Am. C.L Union<\/a><\/span> (Sep. 10, 2020); Amir H. Ali & Emily Clark, Qualified Immunity<\/i>: Explained<\/i>, The Appeal <\/a><\/span>(June 20, 2019); Nathaniel Sobel, What Is Qualified Immunity, and What Does It Have to Do With Police Reform?<\/i>, Law Fare<\/a><\/span> (Jun. 6, 2020).<\/div>
\u200a93<\/a>\u200a<\/span>Olmstead v. United States<\/i>, 277 U.S. 438, 485 <\/a>(1928) (Brandies, J., dissenting).<\/div>\r\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Lucia Leoni<\/p>\n","protected":false},"meta":{"_citation":"10 Stetson J. Advoc. & L 108 (2023)","_first_para":108,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-72364","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-34"]}