I SAW HER STANDING THERE
229
vasion of privacy have traditionally been conceived as intentional torts
.
30
In any event, whether or not the psychological injury is the most likely type
of harm has no bearing on whether the psychological injury is, in fact, real.
In
Gracey v. Eaker
, the Florida Supreme Court once again recognized
the reality of emotional distress and the need to protect the public from un-
necessary exposure to such harm
.
31
The Court, however, chose to recog-
nize such harm only in cases where fiduciary relationships are present
.
32
But this has proved difficult to apply. Bewildering results have included the
compensation of psychological injury when an HIV misdiagnosis was dis-
closed to a third party
,
33
but not when the individual himself was given a
similar misdiagnosis
.
34
The impact rule, although initially necessary and sound, has led to the
development of a body of caselaw that continues to distance itself from the
rule’s original goals, while the exceptions have created even more complex-
ity and uncertainty. In
Willis v. Gami Golden Glades, L.L.C.
, for example,
Justice Cantero pointed out in his dissent that “[d]uring the last decade, no
less than nine times district courts have certified questions to us regard-
ing the rule’s application or continued vitality”
.
35
Despite the 119 years of
caselaw following
International Ocean Telegraph Co. v. Saunders
, the orig-
inal problem of appropriate compensation for pure emotional injuries re-
mains. No wonder both scholars and members of the judiciary have called
for the abolition of the impact rule and its various exceptions.
30
S. Baptist Hosp. of Fla., Inc. v. Welker
,
.
31
.
32
Id
. at 353.
33
Fla. Dep’t. of Corrections v. Abril
,
.
34
R.J. v. Humana of Florida, Inc.
,
.
35
.
1...,219,220,221,222,223,224,225,226,227,228 230,231,232,233,234,235,236,237,238,239,...304