ANNIVERSARY
OF THE
TOMOS. FULL INDEPENDENCE OF ORTHODOX CHURCH OF UKRAINE IS YEAR
OLD
by
Alexander Soldatov
SEVERAL
NECESSARY
ABBREVIATIONS:
PTsU—Orthodox
Church
of Ukraine—recognized by Constantinople, Alexandrian
patriarchate, and Greek
archdiocese, an autocephalous church with its center in Kiev and
led by
Metropolitan Epifany.
UPTsKP—Ukrainian
Orthodox
Church of the Kiev Patriarchate—a church, not recognized by
world
Orthodoxy, that arose in the early 1990s after the departure of
Metropolitan
Filaret from the RPTs [Russian Orthodox Church]. In December
2019 it joined the
PTsU, but in June 2019 Filaret declared its restoration outside
the PTsU.
UAPTs—Ukrainian
Autocephalous
Orthodox Church—a church, not recognized by world Orthodoxy and
not recognizing the creation of the UPTsKP in the 1990s. In
December 2018 it
joined the PTsU as a whole.
UPTsMP—Ukrainian
Orthodox
Church of the Moscow Patriarchate—part of the RPTs, having
limited
autonomy on the territory of Ukraine. Primate—Metropolitan of
Kiev Onufrey.
International
recognition
No one
has even disguised
the fact that the draft of the "canonical Ukrainian autocephaly"
was
directed against Moscow. To weaken its influence among local
Orthodox churches
of various countries, the "first in honor" within the Orthodox
world,
the Constantinople (Ecumenical) patriarchate, which is oriented
toward the
U.S.A., is striving to put an end to the "bipolarity" of this
world
that emerged back in the 1940s after the restoration of the
Moscow
patriarchate. In accordance with the design of Stalin, who
initiated this
restoration, the Moscow patriarchate, like the U.S.S.R.,
surrounded by a belt
of satellite countries, also became the leader of churches of
the countries of
"people's democracy" (Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania,
etc),
with the prospect of subordinating to its (soviet) influence the
Christian
East, also—Greece, Syria, Palestine. By order of the dictator,
hundreds of
thousands of dollars were spent from the state budget for gifts
to eastern
patriarchs who consented in 1945 to go to Moscow and recognize
the newly formed
Moscow patriarchate.
Of
course, after the
fall of the soviet block, the international influence of the
Moscow
patriarchate began to weaken rapidly. But the immediate occasion
for the chain
reaction that finally led to granting the tomos to Ukraine was
the sudden
refusal of Patriarch Kirill to participate in the Pan-Orthodox
Council on Crete
in 2016. It is noteworthy that the RPTs was one of the
organizers of this
council and it approved the drafts of all of its documents, and
it even formed
its own official delegation. But when it became clear that in
the event that
Moscow refused to participate in the council it would be
supported also by
several local churches, literally ten days before the start of
the sessions,
the RPTs suddenly decided not to go to Crete. Delegations of the
Antioch,
Bulgarian, and Georgian patriarchates also did not go there. As
a result the
authority of the council fell sharply, and its decisions were
not accepted by
the churches that did not participate in it.
Such an
unexpected
action by Moscow evoked the anger of the ecumenical
patriarchate, which from
that moment began preparing the ecclesiastical separation of
Ukraine from
Moscow.
Of
course, one insult
of Patriarch of Constantinople Bartholomew would not be
sufficient for deciding
the question of Ukrainian autocephaly. This was exceptionally
facilitated by
the political situation, both within Ukraine and also in the
world as a whole:
Russian aggression, which rallied Ukrainian civil society around
the national
patriotic agenda; anti-Russian sanctions; and the unprecedented
cooling of
relations between Moscow and the U.S.A. and the West in general.
Indeed, to a
great extent, autocephaly was a "personal project" of Petro
Poroshenko, who devoted the last year of his presidency to the
struggle for the
tomos. It is generally accepted that he was trying by this means
to raise his
approval rating and be elected to a second term. Actually,
Poroshenko was able
to use the prospects of his losing the election to speed up the
process: he
constantly reminded his church and secular partners in
Constantinople and in
Washington that in April 2019, the "window of opportunity" may
close
and they should not stall any longer.
For a
long time,
Patriarch Kirill did not believe the reality of the
"Constantinople
venture" and he supposed that he was simply being frightened to
get him to
compromise. He started to take real action only when it was too
late: on 31
August 2018 Kirill made a quick visit to Bartholomew, with whom
nothing was
agreed. And by October, Constatinople had officially cancelled
the act of 1686
that transferred the Kiev metropolia to the temporary
administration of Moscow
and he had removed the ecclesiastical punishment from the
leaders of the
"Ukrainian schism"—the former RPTs Metropolitan Filaret, who had
become in 1995 the unrecognized patriarch of Kiev, and the head
of the UAPTs,
Makary. In late November the decision was made in principle for
granting
autocephaly and the charter of the PTsU was approved and on 15
December 2018,
in Kievan Sophia, the Unification Council was held with the
participation of
all bishops of the unrecognized UPTsKP and UAPTs and just two
bishops of the
UPTsMP. An exarch of the ecumenical patriarch, Metropolitan
Emmanuel, presided
at the council. Finally, on 5 January 2019 the tomos concerning
autocephaly was
signed and on 6 January, Christmas Eve, it was ceremonially
given to the new
Ukrainian church.
Initially,
the RPTs
tried to take the path of isolation of the Constantinople
patriarchate, which
had "gone into schism," and it called the PTsU "a purely
political project that will terminate along with the Poroshenko
regime."
But not a single local church in the world followed the RPTs in
breaking
canonical communion with Constantinople. On the contrary, the
Greek church
recognized the autocephaly of the PTsU in October and the
patriarchate of
Alexandria (the second in honor in the Orthodox world) did so in
November of
last year. A bishop of the Orthodox Church of the Czech Lands
and Slovakia
concellebrated in Kiev with the primate of the PTsU and the
Ukrainian
autocephaly was confirmed by one Bulgarian metropolitan and part
of the
episcopate of the Cypriot archdiocese. Wavering on this matter
was observed in
the Georgian and Romanian churches. In order not to go into a
split from the
greater half of the Orthodox world and fall into isolation, the
leadership of
the RPTs came up with a move unprecedented in Orthodox history: it decided that the
decisions of the
Greek and Alexandrian churches were "nonconciliar," and
therefore it
severed communion with just a part of their episcopates in the
hope that the
remaining part would in the future not recognize the PTsU.
Orthodox
canons do
not provide for such a possibility: even if there are in Greece
and Africa
bishops who do not agree with their primates, but who do not
severe communion
with them, then these bishops share with their primates full
responsibility for
their "mistakes."
Autocephaly
is older
than Poroshenko
Ukrainian
political
events of 2019 refuted the slogan of Moscow's propaganda to the
effect that
Ukrainian autocephaly will fall along with the Poroshenko
government. The idea
(and its various iterations) of Ukrainian autocephaly existed
not only long
before Porosheko, but also under the soviet regime (to be sure,
mainly in
emigration) and even before the revolution. After all, the
inclusion of the
Kiev metropolia in the Moscow patriarchate in the late 17th
century was not
completely voluntary and the Ukrainian church tradition and
popular piety are
strongly quite different from Moscow's. It is possible that the
specific
scenario of "acceleration" of the receipt of autocephaly, which
was
achieved under Poroshenko, might displease somebody (for
example, it is
criticized by Patriarch Filaret), but that does not mean that
there is not in
Ukrainian society a profound basis for church "independence."
Its idea
is
inseparable from Ukrainian statehood. It is not in vain that the
primate of the
PTsU, Metropolitan Epifany, likens the tomos to the declaration
of Ukraine's
independence.
Every
attempt to
build Ukrainian statehood—in 1918-19, 1941-42, or at the fall of
the
U.S.S.R.—was accompanied by the spontaneous proclamation of
autocephaly through
a part of the Ukrainian church "going into schism." And if the
RPTs
recognizes an independent Ukrainian state, it should be
concerned about the
question of Ukrainian autocephaly, without waiting for the
initiative to be
seized by Constantinople and Washington. Incidentally, the
signature of the
current primate of the UPTsMP, Metropolitan Onufry, stands under
the 1991
appeal of the episcopate of this church for granting autocephaly
by Moscow.
Vladimir
Zelensky's
victory in the election for president slowed the process of the
transfer of
parishes from the UPTsMP into the PTsU. Whereas in the first
four months of
2019, more than 500 parishes transferred, in the rest of the
year it was about
100. However the process has not reversed. Only two cases are
known where
parishes that had transferred into the PTsU returned back into
the UPTsMP.
Zelensky's administration has behaved "equi-distantly" from all
church
jurisdictions and no discrimination against the PTsU or the
UPTsMP has been
experienced. The attempt of the 90-year-old honorary Patriarch
Filaret to
restore the UPTsKP "under Zelensky," declaring its independence
from
both Moscow and Constantinople, still seems curious. It does not
interest
Zelensky at all, and only a few parishes, statistically
invisible on the scale
of Ukraine, have followed Filaret.
The only
thing that
can be considered an achievement of the Moscow patriarchate in
the period of
Zelensky's presidency is the suspension of the process of
renaming the UPTsMP
by the Ukrainian Supreme Court. In December 2018, the Verkhovna
Rada adopted a
law according to which religious organizations whose center is
located in an
aggressor country must insert a mention of that center in their
official name.
In particular, the UPTsMP was supposed to be renamed "Russian
Orthodox
Church in Ukraine." Although the UPTsMP does not even want its
own
autocephaly, it is still shy about being called the RPTs: its
strategic task is
to keep the Ukrainian Orthodox people subordinate to the Moscow
patriarchate in
the future while not frightening it with the church's name that
is unacceptable
in the conditions of war.
As of
the start of
2020, the jurisdictional alignment in Ukraine has developed
thus: the largest
church remains the UPTsMP, with more than 13,000 parishes; in
second place is
the PTsU with about 8,000, and also the Greek Catholics with
almost 4,000
parishes. The UPTsKP restored by Filaret has barely 20 parishes
on Ukrainian
territory.
Optics
of Amman
In late
November last
year Moscow was visited by Patriarch of Jerusalem Theophilus
III. Judging by
the fact that during his brief visit he met with President
Vladimir Putin, the
initiative came from the Kremlin. The Jerusalem patriarch "has a
gimmick": the miracle of the descent of the Holy Flame on the
eve of
Easter has ideological significance for the Russian authorities.
It is then
distributed by airplanes about all the dioceses of the RPTs.
Many millions of
Russian television viewers observe the miracle live, while
commentators explain
that the flame descends from heaven only to the true church, and
when the
miracle ceases, the world will end. Ten years ago Patriarch
Theophilus III
tried to explain in modesty that the flame does not descend
directly from
heaven but it is a symbolic "representation" of how the light of
the
Resurrection spreads throughout the world from the Lord's grave.
But the
patriarch remains unheard in Russia.
Inasmuch
as now
Jerusalem is visited by no fewer pilgrims from Ukraine than from
Russia, and
the small Greek patriarchate survives in the Jewish state only
at the expense
of pilgrims, there is real danger in Jerusalem in the
recognition of the PTsU which
would erode the television thesis about the "descent of the
Flame only
upon the true church" (after all, the PTsU is "schismatic"). In
Moscow, a number of serious proposals were made to Theophilus
III, as a visible
sign of which was the bestowing on him in the church of Christ
the Savior of
the prize of the Foundation of the Unity of Orthodox Churches.
In response, the
Jerusalem primate invited all of his colleagues, led by
patriarchs Bartholomew
and Kirill, to a summit in the capital of Jordan, Amman, where
he wants to reconcile
them and find some way out of the "Ukrainian crisis." So far,
not a
single primate, besides Kirill, has officially confirmed his
participation in
the summit. Moreover, Patriarch Bartholomew wrote his refusal in
categorical
form and the archbishop of Cyprus demonstratively did not
respond to the
invitation. It is hard to understand what other efforts Moscow
can make so that
the summit in Amman happens.
A series
of foreign
policy defeats for the Moscow patriarchate reflects on the
influence of
Patriarch Kirill in Russian domestic politics. The personal
meeting of Putin
with the Jerusalem patriarch showed that the Kremlin has to take
upon itself in
its "manual control" even the purely church agenda. Of course,
there
are no bases so far for radical predictions. Nobody will
immediately send the
patriarch into retirement and replace him with the "president's
spiritual
director," Tikhon. But it will be uncomfortable for the
patriarch and
strange in that marginal political niche to which he has been
sent not only by
foreign policy considerations but also by the scandals around
his name and the
structures he heads that periodically arise in Russia news
media. However, his
position only reflects the trend, natural for a digital age, of
squeezing
religion out of the public political space into the innermost
depths of a
person's private life. "My kingdom is not from this world,"
Jesus
Christ warned. (tr. by PDS, posted 8 January 2020)
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