Page 6 of 12

Sports gambling is inherently a states’ rights issue, as recognized by the United States Supreme Court in recent pivotal cases, such as the 2018 seminal case, Murphy v. NCAA. In Murphy, the Court found that a provision in Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), a federal law regulating state sports gambling, that restricted a state’s ability to repeal its own sports betting legislation unconstitutionally commandeered state legislatures. Following this 2018 ruling, and the addition of President Trump appointed justices, the Court has consistently reaffirmed state’s rights, from employment contracts to sports gambling. As states, voters, and sports organizations, like the NCAA and the NFL, push to legalize sports betting, especially with the rise of Daily Fantasy Sports, more legal challenges to PASPA will inevitably arise. So, with President Trump’s states’ rights bias and its reflection in his appointments to the Supreme Court, the end of PASPA is near and states’ rights will ultimately win.

For statists, the government is not only conceptualized independently of and/or before experience, but also apart from experience, or a priori. When problems are not solved through the state, then more government intervention is logically required, because it is understood by statists as the solution. Since the state is not blamed for the failures (because it is said to be the solution for the failures), statism results in a logical fallacy. We intend to present and refute such fallacy in the present work.

Futerman and Block perform an important service by putting a name—a priori statism—to the unreasoning attachment so many people feel for socialism, the only system of political economy that has been conclusively refuted in practice. They set out their own doctrine in brisk, manifesto-like fashion, which means that they inevitably assert more than they argue. Hence, if Futerman and Block wish to convince even someone who, like the author of this response, is among the freest of free marketeers, they will have to do much more than they do here. In particular, they will have engage seriously with the fact that the market and the government, as fundamentally different social institutions, face very different schedules of transactions costs. Thus, with respect to some value-producing transactions, it is very likely that the government’s costs are lower, which implies that, in a limited range of cases, governmental intervention in the market is efficient. If they wish to make their moral arguments persuasive, Futerman and Block need to clarify how they understand some key moral terms. It may be that, once they do so, whatever plausibility their more radical claims possess will evaporate.

The ability to engender trust is a critical skill for mediators, especially when conducting online dispute resolution. The purpose of this empirical research is to examine the extent to which parties can trust a mediator when communicating in a video- collaborated environment known as telepresence. Will parties who have never met a mediator prior to the mediation and who communicate solely using telepresence, find the mediator to be trustworthy and trust the mediator to the same extent as those parties who communicate face-to-face with the mediator? Will factors such as age, gender, and educational level significantly affect an individual’s ability to trust a mediator? Does an individual’s familiarity with, and use of, a video-collaborated environment such as Skype, FaceTime or a similar platform affect an individual’s ability to trust a mediator? What is the impact of an individual’s predisposition to trust? We analyzed data from a small-scale experimental study (N=59), and in this research project conclude that there is no statistically significant difference in the extent to which participants trust a mediator in all contexts and factors. The same result applies to trustworthiness except for one exception regarding the effect of a pre-disposition to trust.

This Article provides an in-depth look at the act of state doctrine and its application in Republic of Ecuador v. Dassum. Specifically, the Author explains the doctrine and its underlying purposes, which includes avoiding friction between the executive branch of the United States and foreign nations, encouraging settlement of disputes outside of the judiciary, promoting predictability in transnational transactions, and avoiding potential interference with the executive branch’s interests in foreign relations. Further, the Author argues that the preservation of amicable diplomatic relations between the United States and foreign sovereign states requires that particular caution be taken with lawsuits filed within the jurisdiction of the United States against or by these sovereign states as the doctrine’s principle consideration is international comity. The Author explains that, despite these underlying principles, the Third District Court of Appeal in Miami, Florida, held that the doctrine precluded inquiry into the merits of the case, which determinatively found the defendants personally liable for the failure of what was previously one of Ecuador’s largest banks. The Author argues that, by erroneously applying the doctrine here, the Third District effectively denied the Isaias brothers due process and set a dangerous precedent.

This Article takes the critical position that taxpayer pluralism, a distributive justice principle that underlies the current charitable tax incentive, is violated when an elite class of taxpayers are empowered to determine which charities merit subsidization. Recent enactments brought in by the TCJA will most likely place a damper on giving from low- and middle-income taxpayers. Charitable giving from high-income taxpayers, however, will remain unaffected because they’re more likely to itemize their deductions and will continue to receive tax benefits for their philanthropy. This Article proposes a non-refundable charitable tax credit to replace the current below-the-line deduction to induce giving from a wide-array of donors in an effort to restore taxpayer pluralism—supported by both a detailed economic and philosophical analysis. Finally, this Article outlines the foundations of a charitable tax credit system that prioritizes giving to different charitable subsectors based on the following factors: the positive externalities generated by each charitable subsector, the price elasticity of giving, and the government’s ability to subsidize each charitable subsector in the absence of a tax incentive.

This Article explores the evolution of Florida law regarding public-private partnerships (“P3s”) and provides practical tips for local government practitioners to best position themselves and the governments they represent for success in partnering with private entities. Local governments and the private sector may collaborate on projects involving economic development, blight elimination or redevelopment, and acquisition of a needed asset or service. However, to avoid running afoul of the Florida Constitution, the government actor must be careful to ensure that the public benefit is sufficiently served and that the project does not disproportionately benefit the private partner. The standard—although not always consistently applied by the Florida Supreme Court—varies depending on the type of financing employed by the government, specifically on whether the governmental assets to be used are in hand at the time of the project’s inception, and if not, how they will be obtained (taxation versus enterprise net revenues). In any case, the constitutionality of a given project will hinge on whether it demonstrates a sufficient public purpose to be served.

In addition to describing strategies that local government attorneys can employ to best position their projects to meet the required standards, this Article also discusses the variety of mechanisms that a local government can use to implement such projects, including a city’s homerule power; the 2013 Florida P3 statute; a specific grant of community redevelopment power; and other economic incentive programs included in various statutes and regulations. The Author is the former City Attorney for the City of Panama City Beach and a past President of the Florida Municipal Attorneys Association.

In recent years, state and federal courts have used the fundamental right of free speech to curtail the government’s ability to regulate speech through sign and noise regulations. This Article traces that caselaw and seeks to provide best drafting practices for local governments regarding sign and noise regulations. First, the Author discusses developments regarding sign regulations, noting that the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert clarified that a court should determine the level of scrutiny to be applied based on whether the regulation is content-based in its operation, not on the government’s motive behind the regulation. As this holding requires many local governments to rewrite their sign regulations, the Author offers various suggestions, including: ensuring that regulations are content-neutral; revising regulations to confirm they are uniform to all users; regulating signage based upon zoning district; employing time and manner restrictions; and safeguarding from any subjective enforcement or favorable treatment.

Second, the Author discusses significant federal noise regulation cases, including the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Grayned v. City of Rockford, and the more recent Eleventh Circuit decision in Pine v. City of West Palm Beach, which established the current parameters to ensure government regulations are sufficiently clear and objective to avoid constitutional invalidity. The Author recommends that governments wading into the amorphous field of noise regulation should create a regulation that is well-defined, narrowly tailored, objective, and contains quantitative standards. After briefly discussing procedural safeguards, the Author concludes that, based on recent caselaw that has determined the boundaries for government sign and noise regulation, regulations in both arenas will continue to be highly scrutinized for constitutional overstep. Thus, it is best for local governments to review and redraft their existing regulations now.

In today’s modern society, all actions are measured against risk. Regardless of the category of risk that is being evaluated and the correlated potential negative outcome, it is almost impossible to simply avoid understanding risk and continue to thrive. With special focus on the application of risk in the context of local government in Florida— specifically municipalities—the Authors highlight why it is necessary to understand risk and reasonably mitigate risk through the process known as “risk management.” Particularly, the Authors explore and analyze the “self-insured” approach to risk management by a municipality.

In order to reach a conclusion, the Authors first survey an overview of the types of risk most often facing municipalities and the implication of sovereign immunity in Florida when evaluating those risks. The Authors then provide a more in-depth discussion of the differences between fully insured and self-insured risk management programs, which proceeds to an examination of the several factors most often utilized in deciding whether a municipality chooses a self-insured risk management program. In addition, the Authors use a case study of the City of Palm Bay, Florida, which adopted the self-insured risk management program, to demonstrate how it can be implemented. The Authors conclude by providing guidance on what local governments should consider when deciding to implement the selfinsured risk management program.

This Article examines the formation and evolution of the City of Tallahassee’s Independent Ethics Board, primarily through the Author’s experience as Tallahassee’s Ethics Officer. The Author begins by describing how Tallahassee’s Ethics Advisory Panel (the Panel) arose from poor public perception and allegations of political corruption. The Panel undertook various tasks and activities to improve governmental transparency and ethical accountability in Tallahassee. For example, the Author documents how the Panel ultimately decided to create an Ethics Officer who could serve as an advisor for elected officials over ethical matters. The Author then elaborates on how Tallahassee’s City Commission voted and implemented various proposals submitted by the Panel, such as how the City’s new Ethics Officer would take office. In addition, the Author examines how the public was involved in Tallahassee’s ethics reform by describing how various reform groups helped pass an amendment that altered the City’s charter on ethics and campaign finance matters. The Author then discusses how the new amendment created Tallahassee’s Independent Ethics Board and, among other things, implemented the roles and responsibilities the Board is now required to fulfill. Finally, the Author concludes by providing insight on how other municipalities can create and improve their own local governmental programs based on Tallahassee’s own experiences.