The Executive Branch is resurgent. Recently, the Supreme Court held in Lucia v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n that Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”) in the SEC are inferior officers under the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. In doing so, the Court has called into question the removal protections of thousands of inferior officers in the Executive Branch. Veterans Law Judges (“VLJs”), administrative decision-makers within the Department of Veterans Affairs, are likely inferior officers and share the same statutory removal protection as ALJs. History illustrates the perils of greater executive oversight over administrative decision-makers, perils manifesting again today. Amidst calls to “burn down the administrative state,” Lucia and related case law threaten the decisional independence of VLJs and the integrity of a beleaguered veterans benefits appeals system. Accordingly, Congress should vest the powers to appoint and remove VLJs in the “Courts of Law.” Doing so would cure the constitutional defect in their current protection from removal while insulating them from extrajudicial influences. Specifically, Congress should place VLJs under the supervision of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC) and, in turn, place CAVC under the supervision of an Article III court. CAVC is in the best position to supervise VLJs, and placing CAVC under Article III supervision would remove VLJs from the executive chain of command. Not without its own challenges, this hybrid model of supervision is the ideal solution to the dilemma posed by Lucia.