Stetson Law Review

Trademark law protects the interests of the holder of trademarks as well as the interests of consumers, and thus attempts to avert confusion by preventing misleading usage of a trademark. As the Internet has expanded into the primary marketplace for consumers researching and purchasing items, the need to protect one’s trademarks has also increased.

This Article explores the doctrine of initial interest confusion in trademark infringement specific to pre-purchase or Internet technologically based claims. The Author explores the circuit split in the tests that different circuit courts apply when analyzing trademark keyword advertising claims. The Article proposes that, despite calls to abolish the initial interest confusion doctrine, the doctrine should be applied within the framework of trademark protections provided by the Lanham Act. By combining the initial interest confusion doctrine with the likelihood of confusion factors commonly used by courts, the Author asserts that trademarks and their associated interests will be better protected on the Internet. Additionally, the Author asserts that such a merger would better prepare courts to address future Internet issues.

Having originally drawn national attention for playing a part in the targeted killings of terrorist suspects abroad, unmanned aerial vehicles– commonly referred to as “drones”-recently became the subject of an even greater debate: law enforcement’s use of the technology to monitor American citizens. Drone surveillance stretches the boundaries of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, forcing courts to consider whether the two traditional tests for finding a Fourth Amendment violation-physical intrusion and reasonable expectation of privacy adequately protect citizens’ constitutional rights.

This Article posits that under the Fourth Amendment’s current doctrinal framework drone surveillance fails to amount to a “search.” As such, traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence inadequately protects citizens from unreasonable government intrusion by failing to address two key issues-length of surveillance and sophistication of the technology used by law enforcement. Moreover, this Article explains the two dominant remedial theories in public discussion-the mosaic theory, which if implemented would effectively alter the way courts view law enforcement action for Fourth Amendment purposes, and drone legislation. Ultimately, the Author rejects the mosaic theory as an unworkable framework, arguing that its nebulous standard fails to provide law enforcement officers with a practical, bright-line rule. Instead, the Author argues that citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights would be best protected by legislation that addresses both the acceptable forms of technology to be mounted on drones and the acceptable durational limits that should accompany drone usage by law enforcement.

Public entities currently manage the vast majority of roads, water systems, sewers, utilities, transportation, and communication systems. Much of this infrastructure will be due for replacement in the coming years, and public entities are not well suited to singlehandedly perform the task. State and local governments should therefore consider expanding participation in public-private partnerships. Different from privatization, public-private partnerships take a variety of forms that benefit a range of public interests. This Article sets forth public-private partnerships’ legal authority and historical employment in U.S. infrastructural needs. It continues by cataloging the types of available public-private partnerships in great detail. The Author provides public entities with practical considerations in (1) selecting a private partner; (2) selecting a specific form of public-private partnership; and (3) drafting contract-provisions that maximize the partnership’s efficiency. The Article concludes by addressing common counterarguments to public-private partnerships and advocating these partnerships’ implementation to meet the massive infrastructure needs that dawn on the horizon of the Replacement Era.

Florida’s Sunshine Law, which was intended to open government to the people, has been in effect for more than four decades and has seen relatively few changes or exemptions made by the Florida Legislature. This Article surveys some of the early judicial decisions interpreting and shaping the Sunshine Law, focusing on decisions by Justice Adkins, who called for a broad interpretation of the Sunshine Law and repeatedly indicated that the Law provided no exceptions. The Author contrasts Justice Adkins’ opinions with two judge-made exceptions to the Sunshine Law: the staff or “fact finding” exception and the post hoc remedial meeting exception. While these exceptions recognize practical limits on the Sunshine Law, they tend to show a move away from the broad open-government policy of Judge Adkins’s opinions and potentially misinterpret the spirit of the law. The Author then argues that the Florida Legislature needs to respond to the creation of these judicial exceptions because of the clash between these two views of the Sunshine Law. Accordingly, the Author proposes that the Florida Legislature amend the Sunshine Law to limit the staff exception and eliminate the post hoc meeting exception. By clarifying and giving bounds to these exceptions, the Author concludes that the legislature can ensure the open-government policy on which the law was based and allow officials to conduct themselves within the proper bounds.

Florida school districts are facing increasing fiscal pressure as property and sales tax revenues continue to decline as a result of the national economic downturn. Further financial deterioration could render a school district unable to meet its financial obligations. This Article examines lease financing, Florida’s school districts’ preferred method of financing schools’ construction and improvements, and discusses some surprising aspects of this financing method that could be revealed in the event of a school district’s default. Tracing caselaw, this Article follows the evolution of lease financing, charting its increasing popularity since the landmark case of State v. School Board of Sarasota County. The Article asserts that lease financing’s popularity is tied to the perceived credibility of the remedy of cross collateralization of leased facilities. The Article further argues that the use of lease financing has become path dependent on cross collateralization of leased facilities. Next, this Article identifies the inherent risks in cross collateralization of school facilities and questions whether cross collateralization of school facilities is an enforceable remedy in Florida. If cross collateralization were deemed unenforceable, wide-ranging effects to investors and school districts alike could follow because of the widespread incorporation of cross collateralization as a lease financing remedy. Finally, this Article calls for school districts to reexamine their reliance on this method of financing and explore alternative means of funding the construction of schools in the future.

This Article explores a question at the heart of tax exemptions for families under the Florida Constitution: what is a “family unit?” The Florida Statutes give no answer. So, does being married automatically make a family under the Constitution? How can a couple determine whether their love life, or marriage plans, might interfere with increasingly valuable tax exemptions? How should property appraisers decide such an intimate issue? To answer these questions, this Article first introduces the term “family unit,” and argues that it must be clearly defined by the legislature to ensure equitable administration of exemptions. Next, the Article discusses the origins of the “family unit” requirement and the term’s potential interpretations. Third, the Article addresses how lacking a standard definition can cause inequities in the system. Fourth, the Article summarizes the Attorney General Opinions and recent circuit and appellate cases on the subject of separate family units. Finally, the Article offers three potential resolutions to the current ambiguity surrounding the term: abolishing all property tax exemptions; defining a “family unit” as a married couple; and proposing a model statute defining “family unit” with specific factors for property appraisers to use when determining whether a “family unit” exists.

Cyberbullying, the use of technology to engage in bullying, has become a growing problem among adolescents throughout the country. This Article looks at the rising issue of cyberbullying and how it is negatively impacting children and adolescents nationwide. Reacting to the cyberbullying issue, Florida passed Jeffs Law, which requires that all schools have a policy prohibiting bullying and harassment through the school’s computer systems. The Author argues that Jeffs Law by itself is inadequate because it only addresses bullying that occurs on school grounds or through the school’s computers or computer networks. To more efficiently address the growing cyberbullying problem in Florida, the Author provides a new approach that includes education-based initiatives, amendments to Jeffs Law as well as the Communications Decency Act, and a holistic approach that includes parents and educators to address the problem as a community.

The Florida Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Browning v. Florida Hometown Democracy, Inc. provides an ideal study of the efficacy of issuing non-precedential written opinions. Browning involved the Florida Legislature’s adoption of a petition-signature-revocation statute that was enacted against the backdrop of fraud allegations permeating Florida’s election process. Due to tight time constraints, the Florida Supreme Court summarily affirmed, without a written decision, the First District Court of Appeal’s holding. Eight months later, the court issued a thirty-four page, three-justice plurality decision, with one justice concurring in the result only and two justices dissenting.

In this Article, former Florida Solicitor General Scott D. Makar, who now serves on the First District Court of Appeal, explores the issues surrounding non-binding written judicial opinions in the context of Browning. The Article focus on how judges, particularly appellate judges, must form majority opinions, and whether non-binding published opinions represent a strategic use of limited judicial resources. The Author discusses the additional concerns raised by using concurring-in-result-only opinions, especially when such opinions create uncertainty in the law. The Article then surveys an alternative to issuing non-precedential written opinions through affirming lower court decisions without providing a written opinion, and the Article discusses the attendant consequences and scholarly criticisms of both approaches.

Since the 2000 Bush v. Gore decision, Florida’s voting regulations and uniformity problems have received national attention. In an effort to improve voting mechanisms at the local level, a political action committee called Sarasota Alliance for Fair Elections (SAFE) promoted an amendment to Sarasota County’s voting regulation, intending to improve the casting, counting, and canvassing of citizens’ votes. In 2006, Sarasota County voters approved the changes, but the amendment’s validity remained questionable. On appeal, the court found that the Florida Election Code regulates all of the areas that the SAFE amendment sought to regulate, and although no explicit language preempted the changes, the code implied the Legislative intent to reserve voting regulations to the state, not the individual counties. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the decision in part, refusing to recognize preemption absent explicit language in the Election Code. This Article points out the flaws and omissions that led the Court to uphold the SAFE amendment. In its analysis, the Court diminished the value of implied preemption and set aside precedent that may eventually lead to the eradication of implied preemption in Florida. If the Court continues to give less weight to the significance of implied preemption, then the Legislature must learn that adding explicit language to future statutes may be the only way to achieve uniformity in Florida law.

Florida’s Sunshine Law requires all state, county, municipal, or political board or commission meetings to be conducted in public, and further states that no formal action will be considered binding unless conducted at a public meeting. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently held in Board of Trustees of the City of Delray Beach and Firefighters Retirement System v. Citigroup Global Enforcement that a government agency was bound by an agreement with a private entity that had not been conducted in public, despite the fact that an affected private citizen would be free to challenge such agreement. In this Article, the Authors draw attention to the fact that this decision conflicts with decisions from the Florida Supreme Court and the Fourth District Court of Appeal. The Authors explore these other courts’ decisions revoking private contracts that were created without meeting the Sunshine Law’s established disclosure procedure. Even when the private entity relies on the agreement to its detriment and there is no other basis for challenging the contract, these courts decided that the taxpayers should not be held accountable for such agreements and, therefore, that the government should be able to enforce the Sunshine Law’s requirements. It remains to be seen whether future court decisions will follow the Eleventh Circuit’s approach or adhere to the pertinent Florida Supreme Court jurisprudence.