In a series of cases addressing sexual orientation and other issues, the Supreme Court has ruled that laws grounded in animus are categorically unconstitutional and should be invalidated on that basis—regardless of whether they might be subject to invalidation on other grounds as well. Responding especially to Professor William D. Araiza’s elaboration of the Court’s animus doctrine, this Essay contends that the doctrine is sound as a matter of constitutional principle but highly problematic as a matter of judicial prudence. As the Author explains, there are difficult questions surrounding the precise meaning of animus, the issue of mixed motives, and the relationship between animus and traditional religious beliefs. Moreover, judicial declarations of animus exacerbate the political‐cultural divisions that infect contemporary American politics, damaging the democratic system that the Constitution is designed to protect. Accordingly, the Author concludes that animus should be a doctrine of last resort, to be invoked only when there is no viable and preferable doctrinal alternative.