The Supreme Court’s inability to establish a clear analytical path concerning personal jurisdiction in the stream-of-commerce context has confused lower courts and potential plaintiffs alike, The Court needs to adopt a clear stream—of—commerce analysis that is both
consistent with its prior decisions and reflective of the realities of the modern commercial world.

In today’s global economy, a manufacturer’s specific intentional contact With an individual state is a rarity. However, it is easily foreseeable that a manufacturer’s product would travel from nation to nation and from state to state. A manufacturer, with assistance from national or international marketing campaigns or through the Internet, can therefore easily tum entire nations into a single targeted market without giving a thought of addressing individual states.

In view of these realities, the Court should create a clear process whereby proper personal jurisdiction involving potential defendants with a national market can be easily and predictably analyzed. Some commentators have proposed statutory solutions, while others have proposed the creation of a rebuttable presumption, with the burden on the out-of-forum defendant to show that it took affirmative steps to avoid the forum state when it placed its product into the stream of commerce.

This Article first traces the historical development of the Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence from the territorial limitations of Pennoyer to the articulation of minimum contacts as a substitute for actual physical presence in International Shoe through its development of the split stream—of—commerce analysis presented in both World-Wide Volkswagen and Asahi, and lastly examines J, McIntyre, the Court’s most recent effort to solve the stream-of—commerce conundrum created by its prior opinions.

Lastly, this Article proposes a more balanced, and perhaps more elegant, approach to the stream-of-commerce conundrum, asserting that the Court should adopt a burden-shifting approach. Analysis under this proposal would first require that a plaintiff seeking to hale
a manufacturing defendant into court in a particular jurisdiction show that the defendant had engaged in a national marketing strategy without regard to state territorial borders. If this burden were met, then the burden would shift to the defendant to show that it took specific steps to avoid marketing or selling its product in the jurisdiction at issue.

This Article analyzes the issues that arise from the various time limits imposed by differing statutes of limitations involved in civil claims. The Author asserts that the current state of the law revolving around the various statutes of limitations risks the rejection of otherwise legitimate claims by allowing arbitrary time limits to be imposed across many different civil claims. The Author posits a number of solutions that might provide relief for individuals affected by varying statutes of limitations.

The Author advocates abandoning the current system of law that allows for varying statutes of limitations and replacing it With a single limitations period for the majority of civil claims. Additionally, the Author advocates abrogating the current view that failure to bring a claim within the statutorily defined time period results in an absolute bar from recovery and replacing it with a presumption of untimeliness, which may be overcome upon a showing of good cause.

Clients may deny climate change, but facts are facts, oceans are rising, and lawyers have duties to their profession and third parties. Applying traditional concepts of professional responsibility, with frequent consideration of the government lawyer’s duties to the public,
this Article considers how the lawyer’s duty of competence, duty to advise clients, duty of fairness to others, duty to the courts, and duty to organization clients all apply to the controversial context of sea level rise. While clients can, as a policy matter, choose the “do
nothing” option, lawyers have a duty to confront the deniers and to ensure that material facts are disclosed and meaningfully considered. Participating in a client’s deceptions and omissions could expose lawyers to negligent misrepresentation or disciplinary cases, but perhaps even more importantly, lawyers have a duty to the next generation, too.

In the 19803 and 19903, behavior analysts vigorously debated ethical concerns about the use of certain behavioral interventions to address severe behavior of disabled children. In 1997, while that debate was still ongoing, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)
was amended to require educators to consider the use of “positive behavioral interventions and supports,” among other strategies, to address problem behavior that impedes a disabled child’s learning. Since 1997, the “positive behavioral interventions and supports” framework has shifted focus, but IDEA’s language essentially has stayed the same. In addition, some states have enacted poorly—worded statutes or regulations in order to define positive or non-positive interventions. The legal requirements for behavioral interventions became even more onvoluted after the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a state may ban the use of any non-positive interventions, even though non-positive interventions can be effective tools to address severe behavior, particularly self—injurious and aggressive behavior, in disabled children.

This Article contends that a complete ban on the use of non-positive behavioral interventions violates a core tenet of the IDEA, specifically that each child with a disability is entitled to an individualized education program designed to meet that child’s unique needs. After an in—depth review of both the science and the law pertaining to behavioral interventions, this Article proposes ways in which Congress can amend IDEA to clarify the statute’s use of behavioral intervention techniques.

This Article analyzes how an exemption to the Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA) and the rules governing age-restricted communities intersect to affect the fundamental right of families to cohabitate. The Author focuses on the FHAA senior-housing exemption and how it negatively impacts minors—namely grandchildren—seeking to stay with extended family—usually grandparents—due to unfortunate emergency circumstances. This Article uses the constitutional justification from Moore v. East Cleveland and its line of cases to support a right of family cohabitation, based on the right of free association. The Article further contends that the right of family cohabitation is justified based on this country’s history and tradition of extended family caring for minor relatives.

The Author proposes a federal exception to the FHAA senior-housing exemption that would allow minors in unfortunate circumstances to live with extended family in age-restricted communities, arguing that the proposed exception comports with the Supreme Court cases that establish the right of family to associate as a fundamental liberty. The Author proposes several emergency conditions that should trigger an automatic exemption from an age-restricted community’s age requirement and explains why his proposed exception would benefit age-restricted communities.

Recently, New York City’s forward-thinking and often controversial Department of Mental Health and Hygiene enacted a regulation that limited the volume of soda sold at food service establishments in the City. The Portion Cap Rule, called the “Soda Ban” by critics, restricted sugary beverage volume to less than sixteen ounces. The “Ban” sparked public uproar in the City, especially from restaurants, vendors, and local business coalitions. Historically, New York has always been at the forefront of public health interventions. And, as public health became increasingly concerned with chronic, as opposed to communicable, disease, Mayor Michael Bloomberg was an ally to public health innovation.

This Article addresses the recent case challenging the constitutionality of the Portion Cap Rule before New York’s intermediate appellate court. While the court found the regulation unconstitutional, this Author suggests that the controlling case is factually distinguishable from the situation surrounding the Soda Ban. The controlling case on the constitutionality of public health regulation addresses four factors: (1) whether the regulation considers economic interests; (2) whether the administrative body essentially creates legislation by acting upon a clean slate or actually gap-fills existing legislation as it should; (3) whether the subject of this regulation is something that the legislature has already considered; and (4) whether the board had the requisite expertise. The court’s analysis of these four factors resulted in the holding that regulation is unconstitutional. This Author submits that the court grossly misunderstood the very nature of public health interventions and analyzes each of these four factors in light of not just the legal precedent of the controlling case, but also the history of public health interventions and the emerging changes in the future of public health.