Mapp v. Ohio tells the remarkable story of Dollree Mapp and her encounter with the Cleveland, Ohio, police during a search of her home. Although they were there on suspicion of criminal activity unrelated to her, Dollree eventually became the center of the Warren Court’s inquiry into expanding the Exclusionary Rule to the states. A case that started out as a First Amendment issue, was eventually decided on Fourth Amendment grounds. While Mapp v. Ohio is regarded as the start of the Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution, the true delight of this case lies in the story of Dollree Mapp and her journey into Supreme Court spotlight as one of the most important cases of the 20th Century.
Category: Issue 3
Procedural fairness and equal protection were the core of Gideon’s reasoning for a right to counsel for indigent criminal defendants. Under the same constitutional values, there should be a right to legal assistance of counsel for indigent civil litigants, especially in adversarial proceedings. This Article outlines the constitutional basis for a civil right to counsel. Further, it stresses the need for legislation to address the massive shortfall in legal representation available to indigent persons in the United States. Recognition of civil Gideon as part of the Constitution’s promise of justice accommodates a moral revolution. It exemplifies a shift in consciousness, rippling beyond the scope of the law and encompassing interpersonal relations.
This Article examines the Supreme Court’s landmark In re Gault decision of 1967, in which the Supreme Court ushered in the “due process era” of juvenile justice in America by determining that juveniles were entitled to the right to counsel and other procedural safeguards during delinquency proceedings. But this Article continues with a critical focus on the impact of the decision today, examining a dichotomy between what was declared a “revolution in children’s rights,” and how youth in the criminal justice system still have not seen the extent of constitutional protections declared necessary by Gault. Arguing that Gault has never been fully implemented, the Article offers two explanations for its stunted application, stating neither of which was within the Gault Court’s control. Finally, it considers more recent juvenile sentencing decisions in light of the post-Gault era, outlining the conclusion that comprehensive, lasting juvenile justice reform must be sought in state legislatures.
More than sixty years ago in Griffin v. Illinois, Justice Hugo Black opined that equal justice cannot exist as long as “the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.” While Griffin dealt with the limited issue of the inability of a defendant to pay for an appellate transcript, the Supreme Court and legislatures would subsequently extend Black’s equal justice analysis to cases involving other forms of criminal justice debt assessed at trial, appeal, incarceration, and probation. Despite the promise of these judicial and legislative pronouncements, indigent defendants, relative to defendants with financial resources, are still more likely to face difficulty obtaining adequate representation, more likely to be jailed before trial, more likely to plead guilty to avoid continued incarceration, more likely to face difficulty with fees assessed during incarceration, more likely to face continued monetary charges while on probation or parole, and more likely to face incarceration based on inability to pay criminal justice debt. The current two-tiered justice system reflects the concerns expressed by Bryan Stevenson “that the opposite of poverty is not wealth; the opposite of poverty is justice.”
This Article describes how the promise of equal justice, as developed in Griffin and extended by the Supreme Court, has gone largely unfulfilled in modern society. It also presents an overview of some reforms and recommendations to help the system restore Justice Hugo Black’s concept of equal justice and address Bryan Stevenson’s concerns over the injustice of poverty.
The Warren Court is celebrated for revolutionizing protection of individual liberty. While Chapman v. California might seem to stand in stark contrast with this view, a closer look reveals it is consonant with the Warren Court’s progressive jurisprudence. Chapman held that violations of constitutional rights may be subject to harmless error analysis, however it created a strict test for this analysis and shifted the burden of proof to the government, demonstrating the Court’s continued commitment to constitutional rights. Had subsequent Courts been faithful to Chapman’s construct, it might well have reduced, at least in part, the continuing problems with ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct that currently mar the criminal justice system.