Category: Issue 4

In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015), the Supreme Court held that the temporary non-commercial sign regulations of a local sign code violated the First Amendment because they were content based and did not survive strict scrutiny. On its face, the Court’s holding was not extraordinary and was unanimously supported, but the Court fractured over the rationale for the holding. 

The six-Justice majority’s analysis has led to some confusion. In contrast to the three concurring opinions, the majority indicated that content discrimination should always trigger strict scrutiny, even if the law was passed in good faith, furthered a content-neutral justification, and did not single out any idea or viewpoint. The majority also suggested that a law is “content-based” if an officer must read it to enforce it, however glancing that review. The majority’s analysis thus raised questions concerning the applicability of strict scrutiny review in related contexts, as well as the appropriate application of content neutrality analysis.

Moreover, it is not clear that, if the issue were to come back before the Court, the majority analysis would hold sway. Three of the six Justices in the majority supported a narrowing concurring opinion, and one of the remaining three Justices in the majority is no longer on the Court.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Knick v. Township of Scott changed the landscape for regulatory takings cases. In this decision, the Supreme Court reversed one of the few bright-line rules in regulatory takings cases: the state-litigation requirement. Now, property owners with inverse condemnation claims are no longer forced to exhaust state-court remedies before suing in federal court. Accordingly, both plaintiffs and defendants have a new option available to them with regulatory takings cases. This Article discusses the history of the state-litigation requirement until the Supreme Court’s decision in Knick. Further, this Article discusses the Knick case, including the Supreme Court’s rationale for reversing its own precedent. Finally, this Article explores the new options that litigants have available post-Knick and evaluates which options are most desirable depending on the litigant’s objectives.

The Florida Constitution was ratified in 1968 at the dawn of modern environmental law. This Article identifies the wide range of constitutional provisions and gives an historical context for each. Florida’s organic legal document contains broad aspirational statements, unique governmental structure, authorization for incentives and programs to protect environmental resources, and the largest environmental funding provision in our nation’s history. These provisions provide the state with the authority and funding to address environmental issues in one of the country’s fastest growing states.

The influence of money in national and state politics is hardly a new phenomenon, and it is starting to become more prevalent at the local level. In October 2017, the City of St. Petersburg, Florida passed a historic ordinance seeking to regulate political spending in its local elections. The Ordinance was popularly known as a rebuke to Citizens United due to the limits it placed on independent expenditures by political action committees. However, a lesser-known—but arguably more impactful—aspect of this local legislation was its attempted regulation of political spending by foreign corporations.

While the Supreme Court has confirmed that the existing ban on political contributions by foreign nationals extends to foreign corporations, the contours of a “foreign corporation” have never been defined. In the absence of any federal guidance, the St. Petersburg Ordinance provides the first attempt to define and regulate such an entity. This Comment, after explaining the Ordinance’s legal backdrop and operative parts, focuses on the constitutional issues that the Ordinance raises. It then explores anticipated arguments that are likely to be made by both sides if the Ordinance’s validity is challenged in litigation. Ultimately, while the resolution of these issues remains uncertain, an understanding of their nuances will be useful to local governments around the country that may be contemplating similar measures to protect the integrity of their elections.

The Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act (S.B. 7026) is a legislative enactment seeking to make Florida schools safer and keep firearms out of the hands of mentally ill and dangerous individuals. The rationale is simple, S.B. 7026 was a necessary step in preventing another mass shooting like the one that unfolded at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida, on February 14, 2018, when a gunman slaughtered seventeen people, including fourteen students. Despite S.B. 7026’s inherent soundness, this Article argues that Florida legislators did not engage in a necessary deliberative review of S.B. 7026 before its passage and the bill will likely lead to unintended consequences. Further, this Article analyzes S.B. 7026 and concludes that the uncertain consequences involved with most legislation, including S.B. 7026, is best mitigated by affording the time inherent in the legal process and engaging in deliberate, expansive review procedures before passing legislation.