Challenging the view inspired by neoclassical economic theory that corporate behavior is best governed by the self-regulating process of the free market, this Article maintains that corporations should continue to be subjected to criminal prosecution for violating the law. Stressing the underlying struggle between social and economic institutions to shape our society, the Author employs institutional economic theory to identify the shortcomings inherent in market-deployed mechanisms as they relate to curtailing corporate criminal behavior. First, the Article details the public mistrust of corporations in light of recent scandals and explores divergent views among academia and practicing attorneys regarding the application of criminal law to artificial entities. Next, the Author examines the relationship of corporations and the criminal law through the lens of institutional economic theory, asserting that financial penalties alone both fail to deter corporate criminal activity and also fail to express society’s view of the social meaning of corporate criminality. The Author questions the claim that individual actors, and not corporations, commit crimes-asserting that corporate cultures tacitly influence and empower the individual actor and thus the entity should bear responsibility for criminal behavior performed in its service. Finally, the Article suggests that assigning criminal liability to corporations appropriately reflects public sentiment and eliminating corporations from the ambit of criminal law runs counter to the legitimate expectations of society.