This Article addresses how the neutrality principle has evolved over the course of a century and how this gradual evolution ultimately yielded a more relaxed definition of neutrality. More specifically, it explores the complex institutional interplay between government and religion to contend and find that the Supreme Court has come to abandon its traditionally restrictive approach to church-state cooperation in favor of a more permissive norm. Toward this end, it traces the development of the neutrality principle by reviewing the relevant case law and discussing the insights and reservations expressed by Supreme Court Justices on the use of public funds for sectarian purposes. Two basic conclusions appear to emerge from this framework of analysis. One is that the Court has traditionally interpreted the Establishment Clause in a highly strict and forceful manner to forbid the government from providing even nonpreferential aid to religion. The second is that the Court has all but rejected as unduly restrictive the 1971 Lemon Test to allow for a wider scope of government aid to sectarian bodies under the Establishment Clause.