This Article examines the causation requirement of Article III standing in modern data breach litigation.  It argues that federal courts have systematically diluted constitutional limits on judicial power by presuming traceability where none exists.  While data breaches are ubiquitous and alarming, the Article contends that the mere occurrence of a breach--and even an injury--should not itself establish a justiciable case or controversy.  Drawing on foundational separation-of-powers principles, the Article situates the standing doctrine as an essential mechanism of judicial self-restraint--one that prevents courts from reflexively adjudicating societal fears untethered from any fair attribution to the defendant before the court.

Cyberattacks, hacks, and data leaks dominate news headlines and federal court dockets. Due to the proliferation of data breaches in the modern digital economy, an entire industry dedicated to protecting our electronic identities has emerged.

The law has not caught up with these realities. Constitutional standing requires a plaintiff to demonstrate an injury, actual or imminent, caused by the defendant. Despite their growing recognition of the significance of electronic personal information, courts struggle to evaluate standing in data breach cases. Federal appellate courts have shifted positions and adopted conflicting approaches. Afraid of costly litigation and uncertainty stemming from the unsettled state of the law--coupled with the potential exposure to catastrophic damages awards--companies ranging from small businesses to Fortune 500 corporations look to settle lawsuits filed by individuals whose information may have been accessed during a data breach, even when these individuals cannot identify any resulting injury.

This Article considers the circuit split dividing federal courts regarding their power to hear and resolve claims resulting from data breaches. It suggests that the mere existence of a breach fails to present the constitutionally required injury-in-fact to establish that a claim or controversy exists, and that courts should refuse to hear cases that cannot demonstrate a concrete and particular harm. By raising the threshold for judicial inquiry, courts can be spared thousands of frivolous lawsuits--thereby conserving their time and resources and enabling them to provide speedier justice to parties who can actually demonstrate harm.

This article analyzes a Florida Supreme Court case, as well as the precedent leading up to it and subsequent decisions, which raised important questions about the independent tort doctrine and economic loss rule in contract disputes. Although similar, these two principles are not identical, and they are often confused by litigants and courts alike. That confusion led in part to debate surrounding the contours and even survival of the independent tort doctrine following the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Tiara Condominium Association, Inc. v. Marsh and McLennan Companies, Inc., which limited the application of the economic loss rule. This article asserts, however, that the decision actually confirms the independent tort doctrine's continued application in Florida and further argues that that the doctrine rests on sound principles of efficiency and equity and should be endorsed and applied by Florida courts. The article also provides an overview of the distinction between the independent tort doctrine and economic loss rule, analyzes the court's decision and relevant precedent, and explains why the independent tort doctrine should remain a vital component of Florida contract law.