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Erin Okuno, You Say “Potato,” and I Say “Burger”: Labeling Laws for Plant-Based Meat Alternatives, Lewis & Clark L. Rev. (2027)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Robyn Powell, Holding Out for Love: Why Disabled People Can’t Say ‘I Do’, 61 Wake Forest L. Rev. (2026)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
Ten years after Obergefell v. Hodges, marriage remains out of reach for millions of disabled people. While explicit bans on interracial and same-sex marriage have fallen, disabled people navigate a sophisticated web of discrimination that operates across legal, economic, institutional, and cultural domains. Guardianship laws strip away decision-making authority, benefit programs impose devastating marriage penalties that force impossible choices between love and survival, institutional policies prevent relationship formation, and cultural narratives render disabled people invisible as potential partners. These interlocking barriers make marriage effectively unattainable for many.
This Article charts a path forward through constitutional litigation, benefit reform, guardianship transformation, and cultural change—recognizing that piecemeal fixes cannot dismantle a system built to exclude. True marriage equality demands more than legal recognition on paper—it requires dismantling the obstacles that keep constitutional rights theoretical for millions of Americans. The systematic denial of marriage choice reflects deeper societal failures to recognize disabled people’s full humanity, autonomy, and citizenship. Constitutional promises of liberty and equality must extend beyond formal recognition to encompass the material conditions necessary for their meaningful exercise, and the systematic exclusion of disabled people from marriage represents a profound failure of these constitutional commitments that demands immediate and comprehensive redress.
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Ellen S. Podgor, May Venue under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1519 Be Premised Solely on Contemplated Effects? (25-5146), 53 Preview of United States Supreme Court Cases 20 (2026)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Ellen S. Podgor, Book Review, Quiet Counsel: Looking Back on a Life of Service to the Law (Rev. of Larry D. Thompson book), Champion 55 (2026)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Alicia Jackson, Racial Literacy, Book Bans, and The Miseducation of Critical Race Theory, Md. L. Rev. (2026)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Anthony Palermo, Data Breaches, Causation, and Constitutional Standing, (2026)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
This Article examines the causation requirement of Article III standing in modern data breach litigation. It argues that federal courts have systematically diluted constitutional limits on judicial power by presuming traceability where none exists. While data breaches are ubiquitous and alarming, the Article contends that the mere occurrence of a breach--and even an injury--should not itself establish a justiciable case or controversy. Drawing on foundational separation-of-powers principles, the Article situates the standing doctrine as an essential mechanism of judicial self-restraint--one that prevents courts from reflexively adjudicating societal fears untethered from any fair attribution to the defendant before the court.
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Royal C. Gardner, Wetlands Regulation in the United States, 10 Sarovar 15 (2026)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Rebecca C. Morgan, Failing Aging: Congress, the Social Contract, and “Saving” Social Security and Medicare, Journal of Aging, Law, and Policy (2026)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Anne E. Mullins, Asymmetric Legitimacy, Fla. L. Rev. (2026)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Anthony Palermo, Data Breaches and Article III, 78 Fla. L. Rev. (2026)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
Cyberattacks, hacks, and data leaks dominate news headlines and federal court dockets. Due to the proliferation of data breaches in the modern digital economy, an entire industry dedicated to protecting our electronic identities has emerged.
The law has not caught up with these realities. Constitutional standing requires a plaintiff to demonstrate an injury, actual or imminent, caused by the defendant. Despite their growing recognition of the significance of electronic personal information, courts struggle to evaluate standing in data breach cases. Federal appellate courts have shifted positions and adopted conflicting approaches. Afraid of costly litigation and uncertainty stemming from the unsettled state of the law--coupled with the potential exposure to catastrophic damages awards--companies ranging from small businesses to Fortune 500 corporations look to settle lawsuits filed by individuals whose information may have been accessed during a data breach, even when these individuals cannot identify any resulting injury.
This Article considers the circuit split dividing federal courts regarding their power to hear and resolve claims resulting from data breaches. It suggests that the mere existence of a breach fails to present the constitutionally required injury-in-fact to establish that a claim or controversy exists, and that courts should refuse to hear cases that cannot demonstrate a concrete and particular harm. By raising the threshold for judicial inquiry, courts can be spared thousands of frivolous lawsuits--thereby conserving their time and resources and enabling them to provide speedier justice to parties who can actually demonstrate harm.