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Rebecca C. Morgan, The Future of Elder Law. NAELA Quarterly Winter, 1999 President’s Message, 12 NAELA Quarterly 2 (2010)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Luz Estella Nagle, Corruption among Politicians, Law Enforcement, and the Judiciary, in Narcos over the Boarder: Gangs, Cartels, and Mercenaries (Robert J. Bunker ed., Routledge, 2010)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Rebecca C. Morgan, Introduction, Teaching Elder Law, 40 Stetson L. Rev. 1 (2010)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Andrew D. Appleby, For the Love of the Game: The Justification for Tax Exemption in Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 John Marshall Law Review 179– (2010)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
Intercollegiate athletics are a fundamental part of the American college experience. Nothing else unites and impassions entire campuses while providing educational opportunities to thousands of students who might not otherwise be able to attend college. Congress and the IRS have long recognized the immense educational value of intercollegiate athletics and have properly exempted intercollegiate athletics from federal income taxation. However, a few vocal critics have overreacted to escalating broadcasting agreements and coaching salaries, often without stepping back to examine these transactions in a broader tax policy context. This Article does just that, and demonstrates that longstanding tax exemption is undeniably justified in intercollegiate athletics.
This Article begins in Part I with an overview of tax exemption fundamentals, including a discussion of the tax policy justifications for tax exemption. Part II provides a brief history of tax exemption for intercollegiate athletics, as well as an overview of the current legislative posture. Part III provides an analysis of tax exemption in intercollegiate athletics. This part illustrates that intercollegiate athletics satisfy all the requirements for tax exemption, and that even activities such as big-time D-I football and basketball very likely avoid the Unrelated Business Income Tax (UBIT). Additionally, this part demonstrates that tax exemption is justified for intercollegiate athletics under several tax policy justifications, and that intercollegiate athletics also fall outside the UBIT justifications. This part concludes with a proposal to clarify that intercollegiate athletics should remain fully exempt from federal income taxation.
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Paul Boudreaux, Time Machine: Emma’s Legal Education, 59 J. Legal Educ. 454 (2010)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Rebecca C. Morgan, The Future of Elder Law Practice, 37 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1 (2010)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Brooke J. Bowman and Coleen M. Barger, The ALWD Companion: A Citation Practice Book (Aspen Publishers, 2010)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Brooke J. Bowman and Coleen M. Barger, Teacher’s Manual, The ALWD Companion: A Citation Practice Book (Aspen Publishers, 2010)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Marco Jimenez, The Many Faces of Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical Analysis Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 669 (2010)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
This Article examines more than three hundred promissory estoppel cases decided between January 1, 1981, when the Restatement (Second) of Contracts was published, and January 1, 2008, when research for this project began, to explore the manner in which courts conceptualize, decide, and enforce promissory estoppel claims under § 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Specifically, because the drafters of the Restatement (Second) made several important changes to § 90 of the Restatement (First) with the intent of making promissory estoppel more available, the role of reliance more prominent, and the remedies awarded to successful litigants more flexible, this Article investigates whether these changes have had their desired effect on promissory estoppel doctrine as reflected in the case law.
The research presented here can be interpreted to support three major claims. First, these data suggest that promissory estoppel is a much more significant theory of promissory recovery than has been previously thought and seems positioned to continue to grow in importance in the coming decades. Second, the data reveal that promissory estoppel cannot be understood exclusively in terms of “promise” or “reliance,” as some scholars and judges have suggested. Instead, the data reveal that most judges require the existence of both promise and reliance before allowing a promissory estoppel claim to proceed, although surprisingly few judges require a plaintiff to show that the equitable principle of “justice” has been satisfied. Last, and most significantly, these data reveal that, with respect to remedies, courts tend to treat promissory estoppel actions as traditional breach of contract actions, in that courts generally tend to award the (usually) more generous expectation measure of damages, which is typical in ordinary breach of contract actions, over the (usually) less generous reliance measure of damages, which is often awarded where non-contractual obligations have been breached (such as in tort law). However, by replacing these conceptual labels (such as “expectation” and “reliance” damages) with a more functional classificatory scheme capturing whether a promissory estoppel plaintiff has obtained the highest recovery available under any other theory of promissory recovery, including a “traditional” breach of contract action, this Article argues that the extent to which courts have treated promissory estoppel claims as fully contractual has been underappreciated.
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Joseph F. Morrissey, Introduction, The Transformative Power of Law, 39 Stetson L. Rev. 625 (2010)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.