In Stone v. Ritter, the Delaware Supreme Court attempted to end the debate revolving around good faith’s role in director fiduciary liability. The Stone court finally cleared up some doctrinal issues when it explicitly stated that good faith is not a freestanding duty on the level of care and loyalty. However, the court created a host of new questions and concerns - particularly in director oversight cases - when it included good faith solely as a subsidiary element of the duty of loyalty. The Stone court incorrectly held that the fiduciary duty of loyalty is not limited to cases involving a conflict of interest; loyalty also now encompasses director oversight cases. The court should have recognized that good faith is a necessary subsidiary element of both the duty of loyalty and the duty of care, and left director oversight in the realm of care.

The extent of director oversight liability under Stone remains to be seen. Whether the Chancery can appropriately apply the reformulated Caremark/Disney standard is anybody’s guess. If the recent contradictory decisions in Bear Stearns, Ryan, and Bridgeport are any indication, clarity and consistency in Delaware fiduciary law is a chimera.Fortunately, the Delaware Supreme Court’s cogent analysis in Lyondell, however, should provide some much needed post-Stone guidance.

In the wake of the current economic crisis, the Delaware courts need to recognize that the Stone formulation of good faith is inaccurate. The Delaware courts must also recognize that good faith is the overarching fiduciary goal, and thus, a necessary element of both the duty of loyalty and the duty of care.

This article examines Stone, including the factual basis and rationale of both the Chancery Court and the Delaware Supreme Court. This article then provides a concise history of Delaware’s constant repositioning of directors’ fiduciary duties. The article then analyzes the Delaware Supreme Court’s doctrinal shift regarding good faith and the duty of loyalty. This analysis includes both the conceptual and practical implications of good faith as a component of loyalty. This article also analyzes the Stone court’s improper repositioning of Caremark cases solely into the realm of loyalty. Additionally, this article analyzes the potential changes in section 102(b)(7) after the Delaware Supreme Court’s improper shift of good faith from care to loyalty, as well as the most recent - and inconsistent - post-Stone cases. This article concludes with a glance at the future of director liability and a proposed solution to the new quagmire presented by Stone. In brief, the Delaware courts need to recognize that good faith is the overarching fiduciary goal, and thus a necessary element of both the duty of loyalty and the duty of care. Further, the Delaware courts need to reverse Stone’s reframing of director oversight claims as primarily loyalty claims and reincorporate the appropriate Caremark duty of care framework.

This article explores the ways in which bodily expression can constitute symbolic speech that courts should protect pursuant to the First Amendment of the Constitution. In a previous article, I referred to this type of bodily speech as “body protest.” Body protest can refer to actions that individuals undertake to assert their autonomy, identity, and freedom from societal restrictions. For women, body protest may be used “to challenge gender restrictions and to activate women-centric legal reforms.” For example, women may express body protest through dance, dress, or performance arts. These individuals are often sexually profiled because of how they use their bodies. This article analyzes the sexual profiling issues inherent in grooming cases within the context of First Amendment jurisprudence in the public employment sphere and argues that the First Amendment's protection of freedom of expression offers a basis to expand upon personal rights in grooming cases.

The goal of this article is to argue that by placing body protest and other expression that occurs in public employment appropriately within the scope of the First Amendment, society can eradicate widespread gender bias in the workplace. Part I of this article discusses why the First Amendment should be strengthened as a cause of action in gender-based grooming cases. Part II presents evidence of sexual profiling in rape cases, which reflect society's attitudes towards women's grooming choices. Parts III and IV analyze sexual profiling in the workplace, the treatment of gender-based grooming policies and sex stereotyping under Title VII, and the utilization of conduct as gender-based expression under the First Amendment. Part V *378 seeks to reconcile sexual profiling claims brought under the First Amendment with Supreme Court jurisprudence from Pickering v. Board of Education, Connick v. Myers, and Garcetti v. Ceballos. And last, Part VI considers the possibility of learning by analogy from the sexual orientation cases.

This article, entitled “Girls Gone Wild” and Rape Law: Revising Contractual Concept of Consent and Ensuring an Unbiased Application of "Reasonable Doubt” When the Victim Is Non-Traditional (American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy and the Law, Volume 17, Number 1, 2009), argues that the traditional contractual standard for consent applied in rape cases is erroneous and particularly harmful to non-traditional rape victims. It, therefore, proposes a change to what is coined by the author as a “continuum-based” standard of consent. Courts’ treatment of non-traditional rape victims when applying the traditional contractual consent standard perpetuates gender biases that nullify the very purpose of the rape shield laws. These decisions are full of sexist assumptions and inferences about the victim’s sexual behavior, which courts use to justify their decisions to allow evidence of the victim’s past sexual conduct. This type of evidence unfailingly permeates the jury’s decision as to whether or not the alleged victim’s behavior and past acts are worthy of protection.