David McNab and David Pasquantino were sentenced to prison for very different crimes, but in both cases the laws of another country served as a basis for the United States prosecutions. This Article examines and analyzes the McNab and Pasquantino cases, and in this process considers the issues faced when a prosecution is premised on another country's laws. For example, a key issue in the McNab case was whether the United States correctly interpreted Honduran law. In Pasquantino, the Court struggled with the use of a generic federal statute, wire fraud, to prosecute conduct that violates the revenue laws of another country.

A question explored in this Article is whether a United States prosecution should be allowed when the supposed harm caused by the criminal conduct is predominantly a harm to another country. This Article recommends that extraterritorial prosecutions, including those in the United States that use foreign law, need to give more recognition to the location of the social harm.

This article provides an organized list of considerations in teaching a live synchronous electronic education class. It offers a detailed course planning checklist.

Should blogs count as legal scholarship for purposes of tenure? This essay looks at the line between legal scholarship and service. It considers the value of blogging and the role it should play in a person's tenure review.

Obstruction of justice, with its many different statutes, is a crime that prosecutors can use with relative ease. It covers a wide breadth of activity and has few limitations. This paper examines the prosecutorial use of obstruction charges in the cases of Martha Stewart and Arthur Andersen, LLP. Although the statutes differed in these two prosecutions, with Arthur Andersen, LLP., prosecuted for the crime of obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. Section 1512, and Martha Stewart, prosecuted for several criminal charges including obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. Section 1505, both demonstrate how prosecutors can leave unfinished the original activity that was the subject of investigation to proceed with the easier obstruction charge.

This article provides a way to restrict prosecutors in their use of the crime of obstruction of justice when it is used solely for expediency purposes. In essence, it reads in an element of materiality as required for this crime in a manner similar to how the Supreme Court included materiality for fraud prosecutions. By adding an element of materiality as a requirement for an obstruction conviction, prosecutors are forced to complete investigations that can be completed on the substantive charges. In contrast, investigations that cannot continue because the obstructive conduct precludes continuation because of either destruction of evidence or intimidation of witnesses, still have available the ability to appropriately punish the activity via a charge of obstruction of justice.