The foundation of the modern corporation is built upon the separation of labor and capital. These entities were anathema to most Indigenous peoples when the Virginia Company was chartered in 1606 for the purpose of settling American lands. Over centuries of colonization federal law worked to assimilate Native Americans. Tribes were encouraged, even forced, to create their own corporate entities. Indelibly, consistent with their inherent sovereignty, Indigenous groups fused autochthonous legal principles into these corporate structures. Today, in the shadow of the #BLM movement and societal demands that corporations become more responsive to their communities and to the environment, shareholder primacy has reached its nadir. As corporate governance seeks to replace it with something stakeholder centered autochthonous principles gleaned from Indigenous corporations offer a way forward. These proposed reforms are as varied as the chthonic law they are built upon and range from making nature itself a corporate shareholder to issuing shares that gain voting rights only after they have been held to maturity.

This Essay responds to the execution of Lezmond Mitchell, the only American Indian on federal death row. The execution was carried out on August 26, 2020 over the objection of both members of the victims’ family and the Navajo Nation. This Essay takes the clear position that because the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 requires tribal consent to seek the death penalty for murder, or felony murder predicted on robbery or kidnapping, that tribal consent should also have been required before the United States sought the death penalty in a carjacking case. The interpretation by the Ninth Circuit and the decision by the Executive to proceed with the execution undermine tribal sovereignty and are contrary to both congressional intent and statutory interpretation.

Conflicts over the jurisdiction between tribal, state, and federal courts arise regularly due to the nature of overlapping sovereignty. The Supreme Court accepts an average of almost three Indian law cases a year and has decided more than twenty Indian law cases with a jurisdictional focus since 1978. As tribes become wealthier, they are increasingly acquiring new lands outside of their existing reservations. This expansion of territory generates new border zones where state and tribal interests converge. The Sixth Circuit recently decided the first federal appellate case dealing with the inherent criminal powers of tribal court jurisdiction over the conduct of Indians on tribal land that is located outside of the tribe’s reservation. The unanimous decision of the Sixth Circuit panel upheld the tribe’s inherent right to extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, but read into the opinion some limiting caveats that originate from civil, and not criminal, jurisdictional principles. This paper reads the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Kelsey v. Pope as the first in what is surely to be a myriad of conflicts over the extraterritorial jurisdiction of tribal courts. It suggests that while the Sixth Circuit’s approach to tribal sovereignty is generally in keeping with Supreme Court precedent, the court erred by conflating criminal with civil authority and thus over limited its discussion of the inherent powers of tribal courts. Instead the paper suggests that a more consistent reading of the inherent extraterritorial criminal powers of Indian tribes should support jurisdiction over both tribal members and tribal territory unless Congress has expressly circumscribed tribal authority. This broader understanding of extraterritorial jurisdiction is not only simpler to apply, but finds better support in Supreme Court precedent than the convoluted reasoning adopted by the Sixth Circuit.