This Essay responds to the execution of Lezmond Mitchell, the only American Indian on federal death row. The execution was carried out on August 26, 2020 over the objection of both members of the victims’ family and the Navajo Nation. This Essay takes the clear position that because the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 requires tribal consent to seek the death penalty for murder, or felony murder predicted on robbery or kidnapping, that tribal consent should also have been required before the United States sought the death penalty in a carjacking case. The interpretation by the Ninth Circuit and the decision by the Executive to proceed with the execution undermine tribal sovereignty and are contrary to both congressional intent and statutory interpretation.

Conflicts over the jurisdiction between tribal, state, and federal courts arise regularly due to the nature of overlapping sovereignty. The Supreme Court accepts an average of almost three Indian law cases a year and has decided more than twenty Indian law cases with a jurisdictional focus since 1978. As tribes become wealthier, they are increasingly acquiring new lands outside of their existing reservations. This expansion of territory generates new border zones where state and tribal interests converge. The Sixth Circuit recently decided the first federal appellate case dealing with the inherent criminal powers of tribal court jurisdiction over the conduct of Indians on tribal land that is located outside of the tribe’s reservation. The unanimous decision of the Sixth Circuit panel upheld the tribe’s inherent right to extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, but read into the opinion some limiting caveats that originate from civil, and not criminal, jurisdictional principles. This paper reads the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Kelsey v. Pope as the first in what is surely to be a myriad of conflicts over the extraterritorial jurisdiction of tribal courts. It suggests that while the Sixth Circuit’s approach to tribal sovereignty is generally in keeping with Supreme Court precedent, the court erred by conflating criminal with civil authority and thus over limited its discussion of the inherent powers of tribal courts. Instead the paper suggests that a more consistent reading of the inherent extraterritorial criminal powers of Indian tribes should support jurisdiction over both tribal members and tribal territory unless Congress has expressly circumscribed tribal authority. This broader understanding of extraterritorial jurisdiction is not only simpler to apply, but finds better support in Supreme Court precedent than the convoluted reasoning adopted by the Sixth Circuit.

This paper summarizes the topics and trends in Indian law confronted by courts in 2017. Designed as an update that will be useful to practitioners as well as scholars, the paper breaks the discussion down into more than forty topics and subtopics. For this paper, I tracked and read all 646 judicial opinions issued by state and federal courts that squarely decided questions of federal Indian law. From those cases I have distilled this update. Ideally the first in an annual collection.

The paper includes an empirical discussion of Indian law looking at which circuits and districts are presented with the most Indian law questions. It also examines what topics receive the most coverage providing a summary of more than 200 ICWA opinions as well as capturing obscure topics like the 4 cases decided on the Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act. It captures important moments in Indian law like Justice Thomas dissenting from denial of cert. in a land into trust case but also highlights the return of Leonard Peltier to federal court.

I hope the user finds this comprehensive update a useful survey of Indian law in 2017.

Indian defendants appearing before tribal courts are not protected by the Bill of Rights. Instead, Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act in 1968 to extend some, but not all, constitutional protections unto Indian reservations. Fifty years later and there continues to be extensive litigation surrounding ICRA.

This paper looks at all of the ICRA cases decided in 2017 to attempt to evaluate the merits of ICRA’s protections of tribal rights. The picture is decidedly mixed. From these cases the paper calls for three changes that directly respond to trends in civil rights litigation. 1) The paper suggests that courts expand the understanding of habeas jurisdiction to extend when an individual has been banished. It argues that banishment is a form of confinement and a restriction of liberty – albeit one where the jail cell is large, essentially the world minus the reservation. 2) Tribes must adopt codes that provide for a trial by jury and rules for determining who constitutes the jury and how it may be empaneled. While ICRA provides for a trial by jury, tribal courts have an affirmative duty to inform defendants of their right to request a jury trial. It is a violation of ICRA if the tribe does not make provisions for a jury when requested. 3) Finally tribal court judgments, when used in other forums, may be ambiguous because tribal law and tribal procedures are distinct from those followed by states or the federal system. Accordingly, any ambiguity that arises in response to a tribal court judgment should be resolved with a reference to the doctrine of lenity.

This article surveys thirty years of law review articles and compiles a formal ranking system to create a list of the 100 most influential Indian law scholarly pieces from the last thirty years. As Indian law has grown from a niche field offered by a couple schools to a robust legal discipline it is now impossible for the thousands of professors, students, practitioners, and judges to identify the most important pieces published each year. This piece, with its first of its kind approach to ranking Indian law scholarship, has the potential to not only highlight other important works but to become an article that is itself the focus of conversation.