This Article provides a new way of organizing and thinking about what is perhaps the most important, useful, and ubiquitous – yet misunderstood, neglected, and underdeveloped – area in all of law: remedies. Even though remedial issues are present in every case, too little theoretical attention has been paid to them, leaving a wide array of remedial doctrines – ranging from injunctions to declaratory decrees, punitive damages to contempt, and unjust enrichment to specific performance – in search of a unifying theory.

This Article is the first to offer such a theory. Specifically, I argue that the broad array of seemingly distinctive remedies, operating over diverse subject matter areas, can be organized and justified by way of four distinct but related remedial principles: the principles of restoration, retribution, coercion, and protection. Each principle focuses on either the victim or the wrongdoer from a distinct (ex ante or ex post) temporal perspective. These principles, in turn, allow one to organize and unify a large swath of seemingly unique and unrelated remedies under a broad conceptual umbrella.

More importantly, however, by showing that all remedies are little more than specific instantiations of general remedial principles, it is my hope that this Article – by identifying and exploring the relationship between and among these principles – can help judges, practitioners, and policy makers think more clearly about what they are doing, as a descriptive matter, and ought to be doing, as a normative matter, when awarding and justifying a remedy – a matter they must consider no less frequently than in every single case.

This Article presents a reworking of Jorge Luis Borges’ short story, Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote, as applied to the U.S. Constitution. In Borges’ original story, which deals with important issues governing interpretation, the creation of meaning, and the ascertainment of original intent, Borges’ fictional scholar, Pierre Menard, undertakes to translate Cervantes’ Don Quixote for a modern audience by creating a Quixote that could have been written by Cervantes today. To do so, Menard begins by immersing himself in the world of 17th century Spain, much as an originalist today might immerse him or herself in 18th century America, as a first step in providing an accurate, yet modern, “translation” of the text. As he undertakes the process of translation, however, Menard comes to recognize that the words and phrases used by Cervantes have come to mean something quite different today. Further, he realizes that any change to the words themselves would fail to produce a truly modern translation of this canonical text because it would cause the loss of textual richness and interpretative understanding accumulated over generations. Therefore, in a stroke of genius, Menard recognizes that the best way to translate the Quixote to preserve the text’s modern meaning is to produce word-for-word, line-for-line “translation” of the antiquated original! It is important to note that Pierre Menard adamantly maintains that his word-for-word rendition of the original words is not simply a “copy” of the original text. Rather, as Borges’ original story suggests, Menard has actually produced a much more nuanced text than Cervantes, one that, though verbally identical, “is almost infinitely richer” in that the words penned by Cervantes no longer mean what they once did, but have become imbued with the accumulated historical understanding of many generations.

The parallels to the current debate surrounding the interpretation (or translation, if you will) our own Constitution are unmistakable. The words no longer mean what they once did, and the best way to convey the current meaning of the Constitution is by using the antiquated words and phrases of the 18th century original. These words and phrases, though they have themselves remained the same, are now viewed through the lens of the historical events (e.g., the Civil War, Reconstruction, and New Deal) and judicial precedents (e.g., the Dred Scott decision, Plessy v. Ferguson, and Brown v. Board of Education) so powerful as to have changed the meaning (though not the spelling) of the words themselves!

Therefore, in the text that follows, I have attempted to present these parallels by adapting Borges’ story to the U.S. Constitution. I have tried to keep as much of Borges’ original text as possible – including even the structure of his seemingly obscure academic footnotes – while changing what was necessary of the characters, footnotes, and themes to discuss legal, rather than literary, topics.

More specifically, in my version of the story, I attempt to propose, through the text, and develop, through the footnotes, a theory of constitutional “interpretation as translation” based on the scholarship of Borges’ fictional character, Pierre Menard, as told by a law professor intimately familiar with Professor Menard’s work. In my version, Professor Menard takes it upon himself to update and revise the U.S. Constitution for the twenty-first century and, in so doing, is confronted with a difficult problem of preserving the document’s modern meaning. Professor Menard acknowledges that many of the original words, phrases, and clauses used by the Framers have taken on new meaning over time, or have lost their meaning altogether, which renders the process of interpretation particularly elusive and odious. In a deeply profound exploration of the meaning of meaning, Professor Menard comes to the stark realization that his project of updating the Constitution for the modern generation must necessarily consist not in interpreting the text, but in translating it.

Having made this methodological leap, Professor Menard is next faced with the daunting task of choosing carefully the words, phrases, and clauses that will convey to the modern generation how the Constitution’s text, which was drafted over two centuries ago, should be understood today. Here, Professor Menard makes his second leap: given that the words of the constitution have become imbued with new meaning over time, in part due to historical circumstances, in part due to subsequent legislation, and in part due to judicial “interpretation” and development, the best way of “translating” the Constitution to capture and preserve how it is commonly understood today consists, ironically, in rewriting the text so that it is identical to the original! In undertaking this task, Professor Menard shows how constitutional “interpretation,” even (especially) while remaining faithful to the original text, can be better thought of not as an act of constitutional discovery, but one of constitutional creationism, in which the reader (usually a judge, but arguably the governed) creates meaning by translating and transforming the source text into something simultaneously new and familiar. This places Professor Menard’s theory in the unique position of both accepting textualism while rejecting its usual bedfellow, originalism, at least as that latter concept is commonly understood today. According to Professor Menard, original intent is relevant only to the extent that We The People of the here and now have interpreted this intent, but by this point, it is our contemporary translation (or interpretation, if you prefer) of the Founders’ intent, rather than the Founders’ intent itself, that ultimately controls and governs what we call meaning.

This Article critically examines Holmes’ widely influential but controversial “bad man” theory of law from its inception during a speech Holmes gave for the dedication of a new hall of the Boston University School of Law in 1897, through its development over the next century, to its current influence over legal fields as diverse as contract law, tort law, and modern punitive damages jurisprudence. Despite its extraordinary influence, this Article will argue that Holmes’ theory has been widely misunderstood, and can be more profitably understood, by both supporters and critics alike, not as supporting the bad man but the good, by providing an effective counterpart to the traditional positivist theory of law for which Holmes’ bad man theory of law has so often been associated. Indeed, Holmes’ theory, which has been portrayed by some as supporting the argument for the strict separation of law and morality, has been attacked by its critics both descriptively (as providing an incomplete picture of the law) and normatively (as providing an immoral or, at best, amoral theory of law), and has been accused of artificially driving a wedge between law, on the one hand, and justice or morality, on the other. Far from overlooking this relationship, however, a careful reading of Holmes suggests that he was himself well aware of the intimate relationship between law and morality, and seems to have recognized, somewhat surprisingly, that only by engaging in an analytical separation of these two concepts can they then be normatively reunited in an intellectually consistent and satisfying manner. In short, Holmes’ theory supports the idea that only by recognizing the differences between the concepts of law and justice, rather than by stressing their similarities, can the two be brought together and integrated into the social fabric upon which law must necessarily rest.

This Article examines more than three hundred promissory estoppel cases decided between January 1, 1981, when the Restatement (Second) of Contracts was published, and January 1, 2008, when research for this project began, to explore the manner in which courts conceptualize, decide, and enforce promissory estoppel claims under § 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Specifically, because the drafters of the Restatement (Second) made several important changes to § 90 of the Restatement (First) with the intent of making promissory estoppel more available, the role of reliance more prominent, and the remedies awarded to successful litigants more flexible, this Article investigates whether these changes have had their desired effect on promissory estoppel doctrine as reflected in the case law.

The research presented here can be interpreted to support three major claims. First, these data suggest that promissory estoppel is a much more significant theory of promissory recovery than has been previously thought and seems positioned to continue to grow in importance in the coming decades. Second, the data reveal that promissory estoppel cannot be understood exclusively in terms of “promise” or “reliance,” as some scholars and judges have suggested. Instead, the data reveal that most judges require the existence of both promise and reliance before allowing a promissory estoppel claim to proceed, although surprisingly few judges require a plaintiff to show that the equitable principle of “justice” has been satisfied. Last, and most significantly, these data reveal that, with respect to remedies, courts tend to treat promissory estoppel actions as traditional breach of contract actions, in that courts generally tend to award the (usually) more generous expectation measure of damages, which is typical in ordinary breach of contract actions, over the (usually) less generous reliance measure of damages, which is often awarded where non-contractual obligations have been breached (such as in tort law). However, by replacing these conceptual labels (such as “expectation” and “reliance” damages) with a more functional classificatory scheme capturing whether a promissory estoppel plaintiff has obtained the highest recovery available under any other theory of promissory recovery, including a “traditional” breach of contract action, this Article argues that the extent to which courts have treated promissory estoppel claims as fully contractual has been underappreciated.

This Article critically examines the applicability of law and economics, or wealth maximization theory, to contract law by examining this theory from within the consequentialist framework of utilitarianism. Roughly speaking, wealth maximization theory is a consequentialist theory of justice holding that those actions that increase wealth are just and should be allowed, whereas those actions that decrease wealth are unjust and should be forbidden. This theory has been used not only to support such controversial doctrines as efficient breach, but also to inform the way that many scholars and judges think about remedies for the breach of contract. Although the growth and acceptance of wealth maximization theory has been rapid since it was first formalized several decades ago, it is by no means uncontroversial, having been subject to constant attack since its inception from many who, operating outside of consequentialism, have criticized the normative foundations upon which wealth maximization theory rests, expressing their dismay over a theory that encourages the breaking of a solemn oath in the name of efficiency. Until now, however, previous scholarship has not critically examined this theory from within the consequentialist framework to see whether it, in fact, actually maximizes wealth. This Article provides that approach.

Unlike other scholarship in this area, this Article does not challenge the normative foundations upon which wealth maximization theory rests, but rather argues that, on its own terms, this theory fails to maximize wealth within contract law. This is because wealth maximization theory is a fundamentally utilitarian theory that depends upon, and derives its legitimacy from, the utilitarian concept of value. Notably however, wealth maximization theory often prevents value from being maximized in the name of wealth. This insight has profound implications, suggesting not only that the continued application of this theory to contract law ought to be seriously questioned, but also that the way both consequentialists and nonconsequentialists think about remedies in contract law may need to be rethought. Indeed, this insight may even help reconcile these divergent theories within contract law because, as this Article suggests, the best way to achieve the consequentialist end of utility maximization is often through the nonconsequentialist means of contract enforcement, including the enforcement of liquidated damages clauses and specific performance.