Should an ongoing violation of an environmental statute be enforced by a permanent injunction? The Supreme Court made an injunction a hit-or-miss proposition in eBay v. MercExchange. That decision set forth an incoherent four-part test for permanent injunctions. Most notably, the test includes a standalone "irreparable injury" factor, unmoored from the old equitable law principle favoring injunctions when monetary damages are inadequate to the injury. The eBay test conflates a preliminary injunction, which is a procedural mechanism, with a permanent injunction, which is a
substantive remedy. The result is that courts struggle to give meaning to the "irreparable injury" element. Some courts treat "irreparable injury" as meaning "significant" an unwise departure from old equity law. In environmental cases, where injunctions often matter more than damages, courts have denied relief for many reasons without a unifying principle.

The incoherent injunction test is especially troubling to American law, which values certainty and adherence to statutory texts, such as the Administrative Procedure Act, which states plainly that courts "shall ... set aside agency conduct ... not in accordance with law." Courts (or Congress) should reverse the mischief of the eBay test and revert to textualism or, in statute-driven environmental cases, adopt a presumption favoring injunctive relief absent compelling national reasons to refrain from an injunction.

The conduct of Congress on January 6, 2021, exposed the ill-considered legal mechanics of the presidential electoral vote. In both 2017 and 2021, members of Congress “objected” to the Electoral College vote, threatening democracy. Guided by principles of neutrality and humility, this essay identifies potentially partisan vulnerabilities in the current electoral system and proposes three straightforward constitutional amendments. First, the Constitution should remove the ability of state legislatures to choose electors. Second, the Constitution should require expeditious state resolution of popular voting disputes. Third, and finally, the Constitution should remove Congress entirely from presidential electoral mechanics.

In this time of high racial tensions, it is worth revisiting the debate over de facto housing segregation. For more than half a century, from the Fair Housing Act of 1968 through the recent Supreme Court decision in Inclusive Communities, law has ostensibly set a goal of housing integration. How can we assess this goal in an age when most Americans live in expanding suburbs? This Article analyzes the traditional assumptions about segregation and concludes that: (1) the longstanding perception that Black Americans are trapped inside central cities is no longer true, as most Black Americans now live in suburbs; and (2) today's re-emergence of racial segregation in the suburbs appears to be significantly the result of private ordering. The conclusions are based on demographic, sociological, and economic sources (with a special focus on the Washington, D.C., area), which are used to develop a simple model of how small preferences can lead to widespread suburban segregation. These conclusions may be discomforting for both progressive and conservative viewpoints of race relations. But the Article also concludes that the old legal goal of integration of minority races into a majority-White culture may, today, be seen as both naive and patronizing. De facto segregation may be inevitable and may hold some surprising benefits for minority persons in a rapidly diversifying twenty-first century America.