Keeping Current – Property Article
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Darryl Wilson, Keeping Current – Property, 39 Probate and Property 18 (2025)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Darryl Wilson, Keeping Current – Property, 39 Probate and Property 18 (2025)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Elizabeth Ippolito Boals, Cheating with the Fifth Amendment: Weaponizing the Fifth Amendment Privilege to Undermine Equitable Dissolution of Marriages, 58 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 363 (2025)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
Despite widespread adoption of no-fault divorce, many U.S. states still consider adultery in the allocation of alimony and property. In sixteen of those states, adultery remains a criminal offense-enabling spouses accused of infidelity to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination during divorce proceedings. This Article explores how such invocations obstruct discovery, delay litigation, and create strategic advantages for wealthier or culpable spouses, especially in fault-based or hybrid divorce regimes. After surveying the historical development of divorce law and the expansion of Fifth Amendment protections into civil contexts, the Article critiques current remedies-adverse inferences, implied waivers, and immunity-as ineffective or impractical. It argues for a proactive procedural solution: mandatory early-stage judicial inquiry into privilege claims and the application of precise adverse inferences tied to the scope of questioning. This approach, the Article contends, would mitigate inequity and restore fairness to divorce proceedings impacted by outdated adultery statutes.
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Rebecca C. Morgan, Older Adults in the Courtroom, CTLA Forum (2025)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Rebecca C. Morgan, Research Handbook on Law, Society, and Ageing (Reviews), 16 Journal of Aging Law & Policy 86 (2025)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Robyn Powell et al., Experiences with and Perceptions of the Child Welfare System During the Perinatal Period of Mothers with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, 19 Journal of Public Child Welfare 751 (2025)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
This qualitative study explored the perceptions and experiences of 16 mothers with intellectual and developmental disabilities (IDD) regarding their interactions with the child welfare system during the perinatal period. Adverse themes included fear of child removal, wariness of the healthcare system, insufficient assistance, and trauma and stress. Positive themes included support from others and believing in one’s self. Findings underscore the need for disability cultural competence, non-discrimination, family preservation, enhanced support, self-advocacy, and family-centered care across perinatal and child welfare systems to improve equity for mothers with IDD and their children. Further research is warranted.
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Robyn Powell, Disabled and Disenfranchised: The Fight for Reproductive Freedom and Democracy Post-Dobbs, 46 Cardozo L. Rev. 1385 (2025)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
The Supreme Court has thrust abortion onto ballots nationwide, transforming fundamental rights into political battlegrounds. In the aftermath of Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, people with disabilities face a perfect storm of eroded reproductive freedoms and persistent barriers to democratic participation. This Article exposes the hollow promise of the Court’s purported deference to “the people’s elected representatives,” revealing instead a landscape where those most affected by abortion restrictions struggle to have their voices heard. The Court’s invocation of democracy is arguably disingenuous, serving more as a rhetorical device than a genuine commitment to democratic principles. Nevertheless, engaging with this framing is crucial, as it now shapes the terrain on which reproductive freedom must be defended and advanced. The Dobbs decision not only dismantles reproductive rights but also lays bare the deep inequities in our democratic processes. For disabled people, this opinion amplifies existing challenges, subjecting them to heightened health risks, diminished healthcare access, increased economic insecurity, and further assaults on their bodily autonomy—all while their ability to influence relevant policies remains constrained
This Article contributes to the post-Dobbs discourse by proposing a radical reimagining of reproductive justice and disability rights advocacy within the imposed democratic framework. It introduces a dual strategy that combines tactical engagement with existing democratic systems and bold efforts to transform entrenched injustices. The Article outlines concrete pathways for empowering people with disabilities in the reproductive justice movement, including methods to shape public opinion, leverage lobbying, mobilize voting power, and increase disabled representation in political office. This innovative framework aims to achieve true reproductive freedom—grounded in bodily autonomy, self-determination, and dignity for all. Ultimately, it argues that confronting the democratic deficits facing the disability community is not just crucial for safeguarding reproductive freedom but essential for exposing and dismantling the Court’s flawed reasoning in Dobbs. With abortion rights now subject to the vicissitudes of electoral politics, this Article charts a course toward a more inclusive democracy—one that amplifies marginalized voices and reimagines reproductive justice in the complex post-Dobbs era.
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Catherine J. Cameron, Illuminating the Iceberg: Brain Science and Punitive Damages in Libel Cases, 60 Tulsa L. Rev. 351 (2025)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Royal C. Gardner, Sackett and the Five Stages of Grief, 38 Tulane Envtl. L. Journal 263 (2025)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Stephanie Vaughan, A Symbiotic Relationship: Strengthening Advocacy Skills while Utilizing Teaching Assistants to Modernize the Classroom, 12 Stetson J. Advoc. & L. 125 (2025)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
Legal Research and Writing (LRW) courses are essential aspects of legal education. Though LRW courses vary throughout law schools, all courses share a common component: they teach skills that are not taught in traditional, doctrinal courses but are critical to research, writing, and advocacy. By being a skills-based course, LRW is typically measured through multiple assignments that contribute to a student’s final grade. LRW assignments can include memorandums of law, motions, appellate briefs, and oral arguments, to name a few. LRW courses, therefore, come with additional student workload that generally does not exist in doctrinal courses. Accordingly, student success in the course requires “prompt and individualized feedback, mentoring, and one-on-one conferences.”
The additional student workload inevitably requires a heavier professor workload — a workload that can be reduced through the use of technology and teaching assistants (TAs). While law students today grew up with technology and are comfortable using it, many professors do not share the same experiences. The disconnect between professors and technology inevitably means the professor’s approach to teaching will be outdated. Additionally, modern law students who grew up in a digital world expect immediate feedback on their work product. They are searching for instant gratification, whether it be via email, texting, or the classroom’s tech platform page. Without a superior knowledge of technology, professors — especially LRW professors — will struggle to keep up with the demands of modern students. This is where TAs prove to be essential. TAs can bridge the technology divide and assist professors in modernizing the classroom to meet the demands of today’s technology-driven students. TAs also benefit from this symbiotic relationship by refining their skills and becoming well-rounded advocates. This article discusses the rise of technology in the classroom following the pandemic, the ways in which TAs can minimize the technology learning curve for the benefit of the classroom, general guidance on selecting ideal TAs to best ease the burden on professor’s workload, and how TAs benefit from the relationship.
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Grant Christensen, Tribal Courts Are Courts of General Jurisdiction, 77 Fla. L. Rev. 679 (2025)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
Twenty years ago the Supreme Court misread its precedents and took a short cut to do what was “simpler” instead of what was right. It determined that tribal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction without examining the origins of tribal judicial power. Writing for the majority in Nevada v. Hicks, Justice Scalia concluded that in order to find that tribal courts were able to interpret federal law the Court would have to “attribute to tribal courts jurisdiction that is not apparent.” But power often exists even if it is not apparent at first glance. Unwilling to do even a cursory examination to determine whether tribal courts might nonetheless possess general jurisdiction, the Court decided that it would be “surely [ ] simpler… to conclude that tribal courts cannot entertain” claims arising under federal law. This article objects to the legal principle that tribes cannot exercise their inherent sovereign powers because it would “simpler” for the Supreme Court.
In Hicks, the Court abdicated its responsibility by not engaging in an analysis of the origins of the judicial power exercised by tribal courts. Under the principles of inherent sovereignty it is the tribal sovereign and not the Supreme Court that controls the jurisdiction of tribal courts. If a tribal government vests in its judicial department the authority to interpret federal law, then the tribal court maintains that power until withdrawn by the tribal sovereign. This article further argues that the Court in Hicks exceeded its Article III exercise of the judicial power to attempt to limit – against the will of the tribal sovereign – the general jurisdiction of tribal courts. It concludes by encouraging tribal governments to decide for themselves whether they want their courts to interpret federal law. If the tribal sovereign assigns that power to its courts, then tribal courts should begin affirmatively exercising general jurisdiction despite the Hicks precedent.