Social and cultural capital enable students to more easily access and take advantage of higher education. By lacking access to the social capital of the dominant group, immigrants do not benefit from education on equal terms with those who belong to the norm. High school participation, college preparation, and involvement in college reflect and amplify access to social capital, particularly at elite universities. Colleges’ definition of “merit” in admissions decisions replicates inequalities in access to social capital. While scholars have noted how racial minorities and students of low socioeconomic status are disadvantaged in the educational system, they have overlooked how immigrant status per se limits access to social capital and its benefits. Affirmative-action discussions also tend to be racialized, even if they intersect with immigration-policy debates. In theory, admission preferences are based on the assumption that those not belonging to the dominant group are less effective in the competition for resources, such as education. At its core, this assumption should be defined to include any deficiency in access to social capital. By recontextualizing affirmative-action rhetoric in this way, all immigrants’ challenges can be more easily recognized. At the same time, all immigrants’ contribution to diversity -- the only justification for affirmative-action remaining after the recent decision in Fisher v. University of Texas -- could be more fully recognized, while increasing intra-group diversity. The intersection of whiteness and outsider jurisprudence, in the context of access to social capital, provides a better understanding of how intra-group diversity can be achieved in education, and how we can create a more integrated society, paving way for a more meaningful democracy.

Contemporary European immigrants face unique socio-cultural and legal concerns that go beyond issues of race, class, national origins, or accent discrimination. These concerns are not adequately addressed by laws protecting groups based on their national-origins or ancestries. Scholarship and public discussions are silent on this topic. As a result, European-born Americans fall through the cracks in critical legal theory, not fitting into any of the traditional analytical frameworks. No labels apply to them. Like their predecessors a century ago, they are expected to assimilate easily. At the same time, they are (incorrectly) assumed to always, and uniformly benefit from access to white privilege. In reality, European-born Americans oscillate between being visible as foreigners, and fading into the invisible “white” norm. A closer analysis of their culturally-constructed identity — as illustrated by looking at employment discrimination — exposes the artificiality of the concept of “whiteness.” A more accurate understanding of European immigrants’ experience also calls for a more holistic and consistent definition and application of “national origins” protections under Title VII, and of “race”-based safeguards under section 1981. Looking more critically at the European immigrant experience points to the benefits of separating the concept of foreignness from the study of “race,” which often gets conflated with notions of national-origin and ethnicity.

Did the Court’s procedural decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes undermine the substance of the systemic disparate treatment theory of employment discrimination? The answer to that question hinges on understanding the theoretical foundation for what one scholar calls the “most potent and least understood of the various Title VII causes of action.” The current scholarly efforts to understand systemic disparate treatment law can be sorted into two distinct strands – methodological and contextualist. Scholars in the methodological strand question whether statistical techniques currently used by courts are sufficient to support an inference of discrimination. In the contextualist strand, scholars urge a conceptual expansion of the systemic disparate treatment theory that would impose liability on employers for wrongdoing located at the organizational level, rather than simply aggregating individual-level claims. These two strands have advanced independently, with scholars in each strand often overlooking the implications of progression in the other. This Article is the first attempt to unify these two scholarly strands. It does so by exposing the inescapable role of hidden Bayesian priors – preconceptions about background rates of discrimination – in the interpretation of statistical evidence. Taking a Bayesian view, the shortcomings of traditional statistical evidence identified by methodologists are not fatal. Yet, the Bayesian view also provides the conceptual space needed for further development of the organizational approach advanced by contextualists. The Wal-Mart decision presents an opportunity to radically rethink this misunderstood area of antidiscrimination law, and this Article takes the first step in developing of a coherent theory of systemic disparate treatment that embraces Bayesian priors.