The systemic disparate treatment theory of employment discrimination is in disarray. Originally formulated in United States v. International B’hood of Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324, 360-61 (1977), the systemic disparate treatment theory provides plaintiffs with a method for creating an inference of unlawful discriminatory intent if plaintiffs can first present sufficient statistical evidence establishing that the employer was engaged in a “pattern or practice” of discrimination. While the Court and scholars have recently given substantial attention to the disparate impact theory, they have not adequately analyzed the contours of the systemic disparate treatment theory. For example, there are currently disputes about whether the systemic disparate treatment theory can be utilized by plaintiffs in (1) ADEA cases, (2) ADA cases, (3) hostile work environment cases, and (4) private individual (non-class) discrimination cases brought under any of the antidiscrimination statutes. The development of a coherent approach to systemic disparate treatment law is becoming increasingly important. Since 2006, the EEOC has made pursuit of its “Systemic Initiative” a top priority in its enforcement strategy. Thus, difficult questions about the application of the systemic disparate treatment theory will continue to surface.

In this paper, I take a first step toward bringing order to the systemic disparate treatment theory. I return to the foundations of the systemic disparate treatment theory in order to formulate a set of guiding principles for resolving the issues listed above. Drawing upon economic models of optimal allocation of burdens of proof in civil litigation and an application of Bayesian probability analysis, I argue that the proper extent of the systemic disparate treatment theory depends on three critical considerations: (1) the background prevalence (or prior probability) of the type of discrimination alleged; (2) the relative strength of the evidentiary signal provided by the proffered statistical evidence; and (3) the parties’ relative access to evidence on the element of discriminatory intent. Applying the principles I develop in this article, I conclude that the Teamsters systemic disparate treatment theory should be available to plaintiffs in ADEA, ADA, and individual (non-class) cases, but not in hostile work environment cases.

Taxation of international athletes is a failure. The lack of a single, consistent regime results in substantial enforcement difficulties for tax administrators as well as a massive compliance burden and potential double taxation for athletes. International athletes’ unique characteristics necessitate a separate tax regime. Athletes are extremely mobile and transient taxpayers and are often among the most highly compensated individuals in the world. They can earn substantial sums of money during very short periods in a particular country. And athletes often have vast freedom to decide where to reside and where to perform. The implications of this broken tax system run very deep due to the increasing commercialization and popularity of professional sports around the globe.

The purpose of this Article is threefold. First, to compare how six significant countries - the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Brazil, and China - currently deal with the inherent problems of taxing extremely mobile, transient, high-income taxpayers with diverse income. Second, to illustrate that each country takes a very different - and often very convoluted - approach that has resulted in confusing, complex, and inconsistent regimes. And finally, to propose a solution that will benefit tax administrators and athletes alike. This Article presents a rough blueprint for a feasible regime that is simple, effective, efficient, and extremely beneficial for both tax administrators and athletes. Now the sports world will have to wait and see if any countries are willing to play ball.