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Catherine J. Cameron, Illuminating the Iceberg: Brain Science and Punitive Damages in Libel Cases, 60 Tulsa L. Rev. 351 (2025)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Royal C. Gardner, Sackett and the Five Stages of Grief, 38 Tulane Envtl. L. Journal 263 (2025)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Stephanie Vaughan, A Symbiotic Relationship: Strengthening Advocacy Skills while Utilizing Teaching Assistants to Modernize the Classroom, 12 Stetson J. Advoc. & L. 125 (2025)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
Legal Research and Writing (LRW) courses are essential aspects of legal education. Though LRW courses vary throughout law schools, all courses share a common component: they teach skills that are not taught in traditional, doctrinal courses but are critical to research, writing, and advocacy. By being a skills-based course, LRW is typically measured through multiple assignments that contribute to a student’s final grade. LRW assignments can include memorandums of law, motions, appellate briefs, and oral arguments, to name a few. LRW courses, therefore, come with additional student workload that generally does not exist in doctrinal courses. Accordingly, student success in the course requires “prompt and individualized feedback, mentoring, and one-on-one conferences.”
The additional student workload inevitably requires a heavier professor workload — a workload that can be reduced through the use of technology and teaching assistants (TAs). While law students today grew up with technology and are comfortable using it, many professors do not share the same experiences. The disconnect between professors and technology inevitably means the professor’s approach to teaching will be outdated. Additionally, modern law students who grew up in a digital world expect immediate feedback on their work product. They are searching for instant gratification, whether it be via email, texting, or the classroom’s tech platform page. Without a superior knowledge of technology, professors — especially LRW professors — will struggle to keep up with the demands of modern students. This is where TAs prove to be essential. TAs can bridge the technology divide and assist professors in modernizing the classroom to meet the demands of today’s technology-driven students. TAs also benefit from this symbiotic relationship by refining their skills and becoming well-rounded advocates. This article discusses the rise of technology in the classroom following the pandemic, the ways in which TAs can minimize the technology learning curve for the benefit of the classroom, general guidance on selecting ideal TAs to best ease the burden on professor’s workload, and how TAs benefit from the relationship.
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Grant Christensen, Tribal Courts Are Courts of General Jurisdiction, 77 Fla. L. Rev. 679 (2025)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
Twenty years ago the Supreme Court misread its precedents and took a short cut to do what was “simpler” instead of what was right. It determined that tribal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction without examining the origins of tribal judicial power. Writing for the majority in Nevada v. Hicks, Justice Scalia concluded that in order to find that tribal courts were able to interpret federal law the Court would have to “attribute to tribal courts jurisdiction that is not apparent.” But power often exists even if it is not apparent at first glance. Unwilling to do even a cursory examination to determine whether tribal courts might nonetheless possess general jurisdiction, the Court decided that it would be “surely [ ] simpler… to conclude that tribal courts cannot entertain” claims arising under federal law. This article objects to the legal principle that tribes cannot exercise their inherent sovereign powers because it would “simpler” for the Supreme Court.
In Hicks, the Court abdicated its responsibility by not engaging in an analysis of the origins of the judicial power exercised by tribal courts. Under the principles of inherent sovereignty it is the tribal sovereign and not the Supreme Court that controls the jurisdiction of tribal courts. If a tribal government vests in its judicial department the authority to interpret federal law, then the tribal court maintains that power until withdrawn by the tribal sovereign. This article further argues that the Court in Hicks exceeded its Article III exercise of the judicial power to attempt to limit – against the will of the tribal sovereign – the general jurisdiction of tribal courts. It concludes by encouraging tribal governments to decide for themselves whether they want their courts to interpret federal law. If the tribal sovereign assigns that power to its courts, then tribal courts should begin affirmatively exercising general jurisdiction despite the Hicks precedent.
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Darryl Wilson, Keeping Current – Property, 39 Probate and Property 18 (2025)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Kristen David Adams and Brooke J. Bowman, The Banks Case: A Model for Persuasive Advocacy When Arguing Open Questions of Law, 54 Stetson L. Rev. 237 (2025)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Will Bunting and Tomer S. Stein, Lobbying by Brief: Unveiling the Dominance of Amicus Lobbying in the Development of Business Law, 78 SMU L. Rev. 83 (2025)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
This Article uncovers the pervasive and significant impact of business law Amicus Lobbying, a strategic tactic whereby lobby groups have commandeered the amicus curiae filing process in state courts to shape business law according to their interests.
The Article makes three primary contributions to the literature. First, it presents the only comprehensive dataset of amicus curiae filings in business law cases. This hand-collected dataset encompasses nearly all business law amicus curiae filings from 2005 to 2022 in the key jurisdictions of New York, California, Delaware, Texas, and Nevada. Second, it reveals a striking empirical finding: lobby groups account for 67% of all amicus curiae filings in the dataset, with a high rate of success in persuading courts to adopt their positions. Finally, the Article provides a normative assessment of Amicus Lobbying in business law and proposes policy recommendations designed to ensure a more balanced representation of stakeholder interests.
By shedding light on this understudied phenomenon, this Article aims to stimulate critical discourse on the intersection of lobbying, judicial decision-making, and business law formation. It offers valuable insights for scholars, practitioners, and policymakers engaged in the ongoing debate over the appropriate role and influence of interest groups in shaping legal doctrine.
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Jaclyn Lopez, Ethical Lawyering While Our House is on Fire, 40 Md. J. Int'l L. 1 (2025)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
This Essay scratches the surface of whether important tenets of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) meet the needs of movement lawyers and their clients. It begins by describing what movement lawyering is and its role in advancing social movements. It explores the evolution of the MRPC's justice aspirations, including the more recent cultural competence and anti-bias instructions. While centering the major rules of the MRPC such as duty of loyalty, confidentiality, and communication, the Essay tackles issues such as how do the MRPC accommodate movement lawyers' duties of loyalties to both their clients and their movement, where do the MRPC limit how movement lawyers can push the law, whether the MRPC truly permit movement lawyers to aid their clients in civil disobedience and other law-breaking activity, the limitations on movement lawyers
as press contacts, and how the MRPC guide movement lawyers in advancing their causes in sympathetic jurisdictions.
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Margie Alsbrook and Ashley Krenelka Chase, Three Blind Drafts: An AI-Generated Classroom Exercise, 37 Second Draft 1 (2025)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
This article offers a potential tool for legal writing professors seeking to quickly orient students to the positive power—and potential peril—of using generative artificial intelligence tools wisely in the practice of law. This article describes a verified, helpful classroom exercise designed to engage students in the critical evaluation of memos or briefs generated by various AI systems. Through this exercise, students quickly grasp pitfalls of the tools, while they also start to understand that different AI products suit different purposes.
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Grant Christensen, Article IV and Indian Tribes, 110 Iowa L. Rev. 629 (2025)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
Unlike the first three articles of the Constitution which create the three branches of the federal government, Article IV establishes a set of rules to police the actions of states and knit them together into a single union. Notably absent from Article IV is any mention of the tribal sovereign. Concomitantly, there has been no comprehensive academic discussion thinking about how the tribal sovereign complicates the purposes of Article IV. This piece advances a completely new understanding of Article IV and its implications in federal Indian law. It suggests that where Article IV advances rights to individual citizens (i.e. a citizen’s right to enforce a court judgment or their claim to the protection of the Privileges and Immunities Clause) then states may not use their connection to any tribal sovereign as an excise to deny them the protections of those rights. In contrast, where Articles IV speaks to rules designed to ensure states treat each other respectfully (i.e. requests for extradition, claims under the Equal Footing Doctrine, or any attempt to enforce the Guarantee Clause) then Article IV’s rules do not permit states to abridge, abrogate, modify, or erode the inherent rights of tribal nations. As the Court has recently opined, tribal governments themselves were absent from the Constitutional Convention and so constitutional limitations on the inherent powers of sovereigns do not extend to tribal governments.