This Article builds upon various scholarly critics of moralistic laws to argue that legal prohibition of drugs and prostitution is inefficient. In so doing, it relies on economists’ scholarship, which has demonstrated that the high costs of regulation are not justified, considering the minimal success of these regulations as well as the harm caused by those regulations. Philosophers, for millennia, have grappled with formulating principles of morality and have attempted to determine which of those principles ought to be codified and imposed as societal rules of law on individuals. Attempts to coerce individuals into adopting certain behavioral patterns or forgo destructive ones have been referred to as “moral dirigisme”. Moral dirigisme manifests itself in “the attempt or tendency to control certain kinds of moral behavior by formal legal means." (See, e.g., Mario J. Rizzo, The Problem of Moral Dirigisme: A New Argument Against Moralistic Legislation, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 789, 791 (2005). Moral dirigisme (John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 13 (Stefan Collini ed., 1989) (1859) is an economic term, which describes an economic structure for which the government provides strong direction. (See generally Élie Cohen, Le Colbertisme “High Tech”: Économie Des Telecom et du Grand Projet (1992); David Baker, The Political Economy of Fascism: Myth or Reality, or Myth and Reality?, 11 NEW POL. ECON., 157, 227-50 (2006). The term dirigisme derives from the French word diriger, which means to guide. (see WordReference.com, French to English Dictionary, (last visited Sept. 3, 2009). Moral dirigisme, by analogy, refers to the underlying philosophy which believes that moral behaviors can be changed through formal regulation. It is referred to, by Mario J. Rizzo, as “the attempt or tendency to control certain kinds of moral behavior by formal legal means.” (See Rizzo, supra note 2, at 791). Rizzo views acts by the state to prohibit or authorize certain conduct of individuals in an attempt to force them to act morally as flawed. Id. The laws prohibiting drugs and prostitution serve as perfect examples of implementation of a moral dirigiste philosophy. I contend in this Article that the dirigiste approach to drugs and prostitution is erroneous and inefficient.

From Plato’s Socrates to Kant’s Categorical Imperatives to Hume’s observations, philosophers have confronted the nebulous intersection of absolutely necessary laws and purely beneficence-inducing laws, which cannot be implanted as a product of coercion. While the principles of justice have generally been perceived as capable of inspiring precise laws, other principles such as those guiding beneficence have been viewed by philosophers as more contingent on the individual’s state of mind or circumstances and less likely to be regulated by formal rules. This Article explores the proper role the law should play in regulating behaviors (such as drug use and/or in prostitution) that society deems harmful, but that are resistant to prohibition. Additionally, it considers items deemed harmful to the public, but not subject to any form of prohibition. Furthermore, it re-examines the consequences of U.S. drug and prostitution policy, focusing on the inevitable “black market” effects of the punitive style of enforcement, and initiates serious consideration of policy alternatives to discourage drug use and limit the number of vulnerable women engaging in prostitution.

Consequently, the Article is divided as follows. Part II considers the inefficiency of the prohibition of drugs and prostitution. Part III discusses the underlying legal and philosophical theories that support prohibitory legislation and analyzes why prohibition of drugs and prostitution, although a popular default mechanism, is ineffective at eradicating these behaviors. Part III also identifies the Smithian-Humean view of justice as a basis to evaluate prohibition-based laws. Part IV explores the issues inherent in the prohibition of drugs and considers alternative approaches. Part V explores issues that result from the prohibition of prostitution and Part VI proposes an alternative framework to the prohibition of prostitution. Part VII explores ways of preventing pro-prostitution regulations from strengthening the sex trafficking market. Finally, Part VIII borrows from philosophical frameworks to formulate a standard that helps differentiate between effective and ineffective prohibition. Through an analysis of the unintended effects of prohibition, this Article provides a strong economic and legal argument for the legalization of prostitution and, at the very least, marginal changes in U.S. drug policy.

Systemic employment discrimination cases, including private class actions and EEOC "pattern or practice" actions, have been used since the 1960s to redress overt forms of discrimination in the workplace. Today, however, there is an emerging area of systemic employment litigation that holds the potential to play an important role in combating the sources of structural or "second generation" discrimination: systemic harassment litigation. Unfortunately, litigants and courts are generally confused about how systemic harassment claims should be pursued and litigated. Harassment cases do not fit the mold for "pattern or practice" cases outlined by the Supreme Court in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, leaving the federal courts divided over key substantive and procedural issues in systemic harassment cases.

In this Article, I propose a litigation framework and enforcement strategy for systemic harassment cases that is founded upon the statutory language of Title VII. By carefully observing the distinction between those provisions of Title VII aimed at protecting the interests of individual "aggrieved persons" and the separate provisions aimed at protecting the public interest, a sensible litigation framework can be formulated for systemic harassment cases. Failing to observe this statutory distinction has led the EEOC to pursue an ineffective enforcement strategy. The EEOC's focus in systemic harassment cases has been to obtain monetary damages for individual victims under an increasingly outdated rules-enforcement paradigm, rather than to obtain meaningful prospective relief. As a result, the EEOC has missed an important opportunity to begin addressing structural forms of discrimination. I propose an alternative public enforcement strategy for systemic harassment cases that focuses on obtaining effective consent orders that will usher in structural reform and will result in a more efficient allocation of enforcement resources.

This article explores the ways in which bodily expression can constitute symbolic speech that courts should protect pursuant to the First Amendment of the Constitution. In a previous article, I referred to this type of bodily speech as “body protest.” Body protest can refer to actions that individuals undertake to assert their autonomy, identity, and freedom from societal restrictions. For women, body protest may be used “to challenge gender restrictions and to activate women-centric legal reforms.” For example, women may express body protest through dance, dress, or performance arts. These individuals are often sexually profiled because of how they use their bodies. This article analyzes the sexual profiling issues inherent in grooming cases within the context of First Amendment jurisprudence in the public employment sphere and argues that the First Amendment's protection of freedom of expression offers a basis to expand upon personal rights in grooming cases.

The goal of this article is to argue that by placing body protest and other expression that occurs in public employment appropriately within the scope of the First Amendment, society can eradicate widespread gender bias in the workplace. Part I of this article discusses why the First Amendment should be strengthened as a cause of action in gender-based grooming cases. Part II presents evidence of sexual profiling in rape cases, which reflect society's attitudes towards women's grooming choices. Parts III and IV analyze sexual profiling in the workplace, the treatment of gender-based grooming policies and sex stereotyping under Title VII, and the utilization of conduct as gender-based expression under the First Amendment. Part V *378 seeks to reconcile sexual profiling claims brought under the First Amendment with Supreme Court jurisprudence from Pickering v. Board of Education, Connick v. Myers, and Garcetti v. Ceballos. And last, Part VI considers the possibility of learning by analogy from the sexual orientation cases.

The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act clarified the application of the EEOC charge filing period for purposes of determining whether a claim of compensation discrimination is timely. But a number of timeliness questions remain unanswered for claimants alleging discrimination on grounds other than compensation discrimination. This Essay examines one question left open after the enactment of the Ledbetter Act, specifically: When, if ever, does the EEOC charge filing period begin to run in cases where the plaintiff alleges that defendant engaged in a "pattern or practice" of unlawful "discrete acts" of discrimination? In this Essay, I consider the difficulties that arise when attempting to apply the seemingly straightforward timely-filed charge requirement to pattern or practice cases. I evaluate the policy arguments supporting the competing interpretations of the timely-filed charge requirement as applied to pattern or practice cases, and I suggest a number of possible legislative solutions that could provide certainty to employers and potential claimants.

The United States of America currently faces unprecedented challenges. If our nation fails to effectively answer these challenges - such as fragile national security, the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, and potentially catastrophic climate change - we will lose our position as a world power. One problem underlies all of the United States’ challenges: Dependence on foreign oil. If the United States can dramatically reduce its oil dependence, the direct effect would be less exposure to Middle Eastern turmoil, dampened competitive pressures in Asia, significantly reduced funds flowing to terrorist activities, and a revived economy.

This article proposes a detailed plan that would efficiently and effectively eliminate the United States’ foreign oil dependence. The foundation of this novel proposal is a significantly increased gasoline tax that would eliminate gasoline consumption and consequently solve our nation’s most pressing challenges.

This article begins by analyzing the root problem of the United States’ most pressing challenges: Staggering foreign oil consumption. This article examines the wide-ranging effects of our immense oil consumption on virtually all aspects of life - including national security, climate change, the world economy, the environment, and public health. This article then proposes a simple solution: A federal gasoline tax large enough to reduce consumer demand to practically zero. A significantly increased gasoline tax is the ideal solution; nothing else so simple can have such an immense impact on all our nation’s most pressing challenges. The discussion begins with the general economic principles underlying a gasoline tax, and then moves to a detailed plan to effectively implement such a gasoline tax. Although virtually all economists support an increased gasoline tax, this article is the first to thoroughly propose such a substantial tax combined with the elimination of fuel economy standards. This article also analyzes the Obama administration’s most recent efforts to stimulate the economy and fight climate change. This article then discusses the results of the proposed gasoline tax and its accompanying precipitous drop in fossil-fuel demand. The article concludes with a detailed look at the alternative-energy solutions that would quickly proliferate in a society devoid of gasoline demand.

This article presents a novel and timely proposal that would efficiently and effectively eliminate the United States’ foreign oil dependence, and at the same time immediately stimulate the economy and build a foundation for long-term economic growth. Hopefully this article will begin the discussion that prompts the United States to lead an international shift toward sustainable growth and prosperity.

This article, entitled “Girls Gone Wild” and Rape Law: Revising Contractual Concept of Consent and Ensuring an Unbiased Application of "Reasonable Doubt” When the Victim Is Non-Traditional (American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy and the Law, Volume 17, Number 1, 2009), argues that the traditional contractual standard for consent applied in rape cases is erroneous and particularly harmful to non-traditional rape victims. It, therefore, proposes a change to what is coined by the author as a “continuum-based” standard of consent. Courts’ treatment of non-traditional rape victims when applying the traditional contractual consent standard perpetuates gender biases that nullify the very purpose of the rape shield laws. These decisions are full of sexist assumptions and inferences about the victim’s sexual behavior, which courts use to justify their decisions to allow evidence of the victim’s past sexual conduct. This type of evidence unfailingly permeates the jury’s decision as to whether or not the alleged victim’s behavior and past acts are worthy of protection.