Introduction Article
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Michael S. Finch, Introduction, 32 Stetson L. Rev. 241 (2003)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Michael S. Finch, Introduction, 32 Stetson L. Rev. 241 (2003)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Peter Lake and Nancy Tribbensee, The Emerging Crisis of College Student Suicide: Law and Policy Responses to Serious Forms of Self-Inflicted Injury, 32 Stetson L. Rev. 125 (2002)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
The number-one student risk factor in the minds of most college administrators now is alcohol use, and to a certain extent, the use of other drugs. Alcohol has been a risk factor in a number of prominent student deaths, including the untimely death of Scott Krueger at MIT. Alcohol is heavily associated with secondary risks, such as sexual assault and student riots over changes in alcohol policies. High-risk alcohol use is also a major factor in self-inflicted injury. The Authors anticipate that in the near term, however, attention paid to suicide and other serious forms of self-inflicted injury will continue to increase and that these concerns may begin to gain prominence.
The American legal system has been reluctant to hold institutions liable for suicide or self-inflicted injury. Traditionally, an individual who committed suicide was thought to be the sole proximate cause of injury; therefore, other entities were not responsible for the suicide. These traditional legal rules translated into substantial protection for colleges and institutions of higher education with respect to suicide and self-inflicted injury. Such legal protection has created the reality that many institutions have not placed high priority on these issues. The Authors describe various factors that could begin to erode legal protections of colleges regarding student suicide. Many of these factors are already evident in the case law and in noncollege cases. The Authors offer a law-and-policy vision of appropriate college responses to student suicide and self-inflicted injury based in large measure on the facilitator model first put forth by Professors Bickel and Lake in their book, The Rights and Responsibilities of the Modern University: Who Assumes the Risks of College Life? The Authors recognize that universities are not in a position to place the general student population in custodial control sufficient to prevent suicide. A need to do so would undermine the very nature of the academy. Colleges cannot be bystanders, however, to this major social issue, which promises to become a major form of risk to manage in college communities. The college of the future will strive to create a reasonably safe learning environment supportive of individuals with mental-health issues and will be prepared to take reasonable steps to protect the physical safety of those and other individuals.
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Tim Kaye, Loss of Education is Damage to Property, 8 Educ., Pub. L. & Individual 12 (2003)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Luz Estella Nagle and Henry W. McGee, Hacia un regimen de responsibilidad civil por daño ambiental transfronterizo, 71 Revista Juridica Universidad de Puerto Rico 111 (2002)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Rebecca C. Morgan and Robert Fleming, Advance Directives: Ten Topics to Discuss with Clients, 19 GPSolo 39 (2002)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Roy Balleste, The Future of Artificial Intelligence in your Virtual Libraries, 22 Computers in Libraries 10 (2002)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Susan D. Rozelle, The Utility of Witt: Understanding the Language of Death Qualification, 54 Baylor L. Rev. 677 (2002)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
Death qualification is the process by which prospective jurors are questioned at voir dire regarding their attitudes toward the death penalty. Those who indicate they are so opposed to capital punishment that they either (1) would not find the defendant guilty regardless of the evidence, or (2) would not consider death as a possible sentence regardless of the circumstances of the crime, are excused for cause. They are not “death qualified” and may not sit.
Others have pressed for an end to the “disturbing practice” of death qualification because it denies capital defendants their constitutional rights to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community and to an impartial jury. This article offers an understanding of the law of death qualification as it presently exists that ensures that capital defendants are provided the protections to which they are entitled, without requiring a change in the law.
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Kristen D.A. Carpenter, Promise Enforcement in Public Housing: Lessons from Rousseau and Hundertwasser, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1073 (2002)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Paul Boudreaux, Understanding “Take” in the Endangered Species Act, 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 733 (2002)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
The prohibition against “take” of endangered species would appear, at first blush, to be the most powerful protection of the federal Endangered Species Act. But the provision has not met its potential, the article argues, in part because its parameters remain fuzzy. This article examines the parameters of intent, directness, timing, proximate causation, and standard of proof. This examination reveals a prohibition that holds its greatest potential as a means of enjoining an impending harm to a species.
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James W. Fox, Re-Readings and Misreadings: Slaughter-House, Privileges or Immunities, and Section Five Enforcement Powers, 91 Ky. L.J. 67 (2002)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
This Article wears two hats: on the one hand it responds to recent revisionist re-readings of Justice Miller's opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases, and on the other hand it seeks a historical connection between two areas of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence invigorated by recent Supreme Court decisions. On the latter point I argue that the historical background of the framing and early application of the Fourteenth Amendment reveals an intimate and essential connection between the proper interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause (an issue hinted at by the Court in Saenz v. Roe) and congressional enforcement powers under Section Five (an issue actively addressed by the Court in City of Boerne and its progeny).
The Article's architecture is as follows: Part One critiques the Slaughter-House revisionists, arguing that they provide an overly charitable reading of Justice Miller's opinion on the question of the incorporation of the Bill of Rights. Part Two explores the historical evidence from congressional debates about the Amendment and simultaneous congressional legislation such as the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Freedman's Bureau Act and then critiques the revisionists' implicit adoption of Miller's anti-natural rights interpretation of federal citizenship privileges. Part Three develops the idea of the congressional power of interpretive enforcement of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, primarily through a close reading of some of the congressional actions throughout Reconstruction, including the Anti-Peonage Act, the Enforcement (Anti-Klan) Act of 1871 and the Civil Rights Act of 1875. This Part argues that Congress took a fairly broad view of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and its own powers prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Slaughter-House, and that Slaughter-House re-directed congressional discourse away from a more expansive, fundamental rights interpretation of the Clause and toward a more constrained equality-of-rights interpretation. Finally, Part Four discusses the final blow to congressional development of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Civil Rights Cases.
This Article suggests that if it is true that Congress should play an important role in developing the contours of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, then actions by Congress which are based on its understanding of the Clause should be accorded more deference than currently granted by Court. By re-uniting the historical understandings of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the Enforcement Clause modern interpreters might find a plausible but overlooked constitutional basis for congressional actions to protect the rights of groups such as women, the disabled, and religious minorities.