Schemes to Defraud Article
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Ellen S. Podgor, Schemes to Defraud, 27 Champion 12 (2003)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Ellen S. Podgor, Schemes to Defraud, 27 Champion 12 (2003)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Royal C. Gardner, Perspectives on Wetlands and Biodiversity: International Law, Iraqi Marshlands and Incentives for Restoration, 15 Colorado Journal of International Envtl. L. and POlicy 1 (2003)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Royal C. Gardner, Rehabilitating Nature: A Comparative Review of Legal Mechanisms That Encourage Wetland Restoration Efforts, 52 Cath. U. L. Rev. 573 (2003)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
This article reviews the current legal mechanisms throughout the world that are designed to encourage wetland restoration activities. Part I examines international law that calls for wetland restoration. Part II explores non-regulatory programs that offer financial incentives for wetland restoration. In particular, direct payments to landowners and indirect payments through tax deductions and credits are noted. Part III explores domestic, non-cash incentives that are outside of traditional, permit-based regulatory programs. Such incentives include the generation of good will or favorable publicity for corporations (or their desire to avoid unfavorable publicity), governmental permission to conduct harvesting activities that would otherwise be limited or prohibited, and governmental assurances not to impose stricter land-use controls if the restoration project results in environmental improvements. Part IV reviews several domestic regulatory programs and indentifes incentives for wetland restoration, including mitigation banking.
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Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Housing in the Heartland: An Examination of the Hollman v. Cisneros Consent Decree, the Politics of Racial Concentration and the Possibilities Offered by Democratic Experimentalism, 17 Nat'l Black L.J. 98 (2003)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, Determining Congressional Intent Regarding Dischargeability of Imputed Fraud Debts in Bankruptcy, 54 Mercer L. Rev. 987 (2003)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Roy Balleste and Gordon Russell, Implementing Virtual Reference: Hollywood Technology in Real Life, 23 Computers in Libraries 14 (2003)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, Domino Effect: The Continued Existence of Liability for Fraud in Bankruptcy Despite Good-Faith Settlements by the Honestly Unfortunate Settlor, 53 Cath. U. L. Rev. 81 (2003)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, Trustees in Trouble: Holding Bankruptcy Trustees Personally Liable for Professional Negligence, 35 Conn. L. Rev. 525 (2003)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
Professional negligence is a fact of life. Insurance companies know this. Professionals know this. The general public knows this. However, not all professionals are responsible for their own negligence. For some professionals, negligence liability may be curbed for policy reasons. However, this article argues that no such policy reasons exist for limiting the personal liability of a negligent bankruptcy trustee.
Courts treat negligent trustees in one of three ways. The first, and most lenient standard for trustees, is that negligence, whether it be "mere negligence" or "gross negligence" will not subject a trustee to liability. In circuits following this standard, a trustee must take an intentional action in order to be personally liable for that action. This standard evolved from decisions in non-bankruptcy cases regarding immunity for judges and other court-appointed employees.
The second possible standard, which has gained popularity as a "middle-ground" alternative, allows trustees to be liable for gross negligence but not for mere negligence. In so doing, these courts have tried to hold a trustee liable for something less than his or her intentional actions without going so far as to hold a trustee liable for simple, garden-variety negligence.
Finally, some courts hold trustees personally liable for any type of negligence, as well as intentional actions. The rationale for this liability stems from the trustee's role as an attorney, subject to standards of reasonableness in light of the circumstances. This article argues that such a standard should be utilized by all courts in order to promote a fair distribution of bankruptcy assets among the creditors and to comply with public expectations of a trustee's performance. Although ideas of immunity evolve from legal ideas, these ideas are outdated and inapplicable in the context of modern bankruptcy cases. And, while gross negligence offers a middle ground, this article argues that defining professional negligence in terms of a similarly situated bankruptcy trustee obviates the need for such a middle ground.
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Paul Boudreaux, Federalism and the Contrivances of Public Law, 77 St. John's L. Rev. 523 (2003)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Rebecca C. Morgan, Book Review, I Only Say This Because I Love You, NAELA News (2003)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.