The "objective territorial principle" is a common jurisdiction base used in the United States for the prosecution of extraterritorial crimes. With increased globalization, it becomes easier for a prosecutor to demonstrate that conduct occurring outside the United States is having a substantial effect in this country. Although "objective territoriality" expands the limits of extraterritorial jurisdiction, it sometimes fails to offer jurisdiction for conduct directly targeting the United States government. This article suggests that "objective territoriality" needs to be reconfigured to provide more respect for the laws of other countries. Likewise, in keeping with the decision of United States v. Bowman, it is important to provide extraterritorial jurisdiction when necessary to protect government processes of the United States. This article offers the concept of "defensive territoriality" as an alternative to "objective territoriality." It distinguishes this new concept from the "protective principle" and presents contextual application of how this new principle might operate in determining issues of extraterritoriality.

This essay provides a critical analysis of Attorney General Ashcroft's Order permitting the government to monitor attorney-client conversations in prison. It provides a summary of the Order, the responses to the Order, and discusses ongoing litigation that contests the Order. The Essay also provides, as background, the contextual setting that allows for monitoring under existing provisions in Title III and FISA. After examining the constitutional issues emanating from Ashcroft's Order permitting attorney-client monitoring in prison, there is a discussion of the implications to the Attorney-Client and Work Product Privileges. Of particular focus is the ethical responsibilities of counsel when maintaining contact with a client when monitoring may be occurring. The Essay considers the importance of finding an appropriate balance between civil liberties and national security, but maintains that the Attorney General should not be permitted to disregard constitutional rights, the attorney-client privilege and the ethical responsibilities of attorneys, claiming that these measures are necessary to fight terrorism.