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Judith A.M. Scully, DNA and Innocence, in Encyclopedia of American Civil Liberties (Paul Finkelman ed., Routledge, 2006)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Rebecca C. Morgan, From the Elder-Friendly Law Office to the Elder-Friendly Courtroom–Providing the Same Access and Justice for All, 2 NAELA Journal 325 (2006)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Peter Lake and Darby Dickerson, Alcohol and Campus Risk Management, Campus Activities Programming (2006)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Darryl Wilson, Myths and Misperceptions Affecting the Minority Student’s Law School Experience, in The African American Law School Survival Guide: Information, Advice and Strategies to Prepare You for the Challenges of the Law School Experience (Evangeline M. Mitchell ed., Hope's Promise Publishing, 2006)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Peter Lake and Darby Dickerson, Hazing in the Internet Age, NASPA Leadership Exchange (2006)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Linda S. Anderson, Incorporating Adult Learning Theory into Law School Classrooms: Small Steps Leading to Large Results, 5 Appalachian J.L. 127 (2006)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
This article explores aspects of adult learning theory that can be easily applied to law school teaching. It briefly addresses the landscape of legal education today: the traits of law students, pressures to change legal education, and the need to make legal education more effective. After describing several specific principles of adult education, the article offers concrete suggestions for incorporating these ideas by making small changes in the law school classroom that specifically address some of the current concerns about legal education.
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Ann Piccard, Judicial Activism or Judicial Independence? From Marbury v. Madison to Bush v. Gore, a Cautionary Tale for Democracy, Journal of the International Bar Association (2006)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Ellen S. Podgor, Blogs and the Promotion and Tenure Letter, 84 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1109 (2006)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
Should blogs count as legal scholarship for purposes of tenure? This essay looks at the line between legal scholarship and service. It considers the value of blogging and the role it should play in a person's tenure review.
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Michèle Alexandre, At the Intersection of Post-911 Immigration Practices and Domestic Policies: Can Katrina Serve as a Catalyst for Change?, 26 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 155 (2006)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Susan D. Rozelle, The Principled Executioner: Capital Juries’ Bias and the Benefits of True Bifurcation, 38 Ariz. St. L.J. 769 (2006)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
Capital jurors are "death-qualified," or asked to verify at voir dire that their views on the death penalty would not prevent them from serving impartially. Ironically, death qualification itself creates juries unfairly biased toward guilt and death. Empirical investigation has demonstrated this skewing effect for over fifty years, and with the release of the recent Capital Jury Project data, any doubts on this score surely have been laid to rest.
Efforts to ameliorate death qualification's prosecutorial bias have been hamstrung, however, by statutory unitary jury requirements like the one found in the Federal Death Penalty Act. Statutes like these, which require that the same jury that determined guilt also determine punishment, place defendants in a double-bind. Death-qualifying a unitary jury before the conviction stage asks jurors to presume the defendant is guilty before the trial has even begun. Waiting to death-qualify the unitary jury until after conviction, however, means jurors will be asked about their willingness to impose death after having heard all the gristly details of the crime, and not a scrap of evidence in mitigation.
True bifurcation offers an escape from the double-bind, but the unitary jury requirement forbids it. This article considers the rationales for the unitary jury requirement, framed as objections to true bifurcation, and proves them to be illusory. As the only real barrier to the improved fairness true bifurcation offers is the statutory requirement itself, that requirement should be abandoned. Surely the principled executioner would agree.