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Peter Lake, The Foundations of Higher Education Law for Student Affairs (1st ed., NASPA, 2011)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, Sword or Shield: Use of Tithing to Establish Nondischargeability of Debt Following Enactment of Religious Liberties and Charitable Donation Protection Act, 19 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 471 (2011)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Darryl Wilson, The Caribbean Intellectual Property Office (CARIPO): New, Useful and Necessary, 19 Michigan State Journal of International Law 551– (2011)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Joseph F. Morrissey, Lochner, Lawrence, and Liberty, 27 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 609 (2011)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
This article, “Taking Lochner Out of the Closet,” is at the intersection of contract law, constitutional law, and sexual orientation law. The article offers a fresh and neutral analytical framework based on liberty of contract to advance gay rights. The framework might also be applied to other areas of concern where government regulation must be justified.
With respect to gay rights specifically, many of the states of the United States have statutes, constitutional provisions, and court decisions that deny individuals the right to have a family, specifically a spouse and children, based on sexual orientation. Advocates frequently argue that such acts violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection or invade a constitutional right to privacy. However such arguments are often defeated by counter arguments presented with religious, moral and even emotional fervor.
This article discusses and develops an alternative analytical framework that is perhaps more neutral and less emotional than pleas for equal protection or privacy, and that might be used to critically assess such restrictions. The argument is one based on the historic principles of liberty of contract. Those principles were prevalent during what has become known as the Lochner era, an era named for the infamous case of Lochner v. New York, which was decided in 1905. (Lochner held that a statute regulating working hours of bakers was unconstitutional). The Lochner case and the era named for it was dominated by a simple presumption that people should be allowed the liberty to order their own affairs through contract and that regulatory encroachments on that liberty interest would be evaluated critically. This article argues that it is with just such a presumption that restrictions denying individuals the liberty to pursue and have a family should be evaluated and, most likely, found to be unconstitutional.
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Louis J. Virelli, Introduction, Chief Justice Roberts’ Influence on the Supreme Court, 40 Stetson L. Rev. 661 (2011)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Darryl Wilson, Battle Galactica: Recent Advances and Retreats in the Struggle for Preservation of Trademark Rights on the Internet, 12 Journal of High Tech Law 1– (2011)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Michael S. Finch and Michael P. Allen, An Illustrated Guide to Civil Procedure (2nd ed., Aspen Publishers, 2011)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Louis J. Virelli, The (Un)Constitutionality of Supreme Court Recusal Standards, 2011 Wis. L. Rev. 1181 (2011)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
Supreme Court recusal is one of the most timely and hotly contested issues in American law. Recent debate over when justices should be precluded from deciding certain cases has included public calls for the exclusion of Justices Thomas and Kagan from any future cases addressing the constitutionality of the controversial Affordable Care Act, the congressional testimony of two sitting justices, a letter from over 130 law professors successfully prodding Congress to introduce a new Supreme Court recusal reform bill, and numerous editorials in national print and electronic media outlets. Among the wide variety of voices in the discussion, a singular theme has emerged - more rigorous congressional regulation of Supreme Court recusal practice is needed to protect the integrity and legitimacy of the Court.
This discussion, however, misses the point. Lost in the impassioned debate about when justices should recuse themselves is a far more important and fundamental constitutional question: who should make that decision? This issue is at the core of our constitutional separation of powers and federalism principles, and should take center stage in the debate over Supreme Court recusal. This Article is the first to comprehensively apply separation of powers principles to the question of Supreme Court recusal, and argues that the Constitution requires that the Supreme Court be the sole arbiter of its own recusal standards. This argument shifts the focus of the debate from an ineffectual and unrealistic congressional command model, based primarily on notions of judicial ethics, to a more fundamental constitutional inquiry into the proper exercise of legislative and judicial authority. While this Article represents a significant break from current orthodoxy, it is imperative to situate the Court’s recusal decisions within the proper normative framework. Understanding the unconstitutionality of Supreme Court recusal standards should yield a more useful and transparent dialogue about the Court’s recusal practices going forward.
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Andrew D. Appleby, Leveling the Playing Field: A Separate Tax Regime for International Athletes, 36 Brook. J. Int'l L. 605– (2011)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
Taxation of international athletes is a failure. The lack of a single, consistent regime results in substantial enforcement difficulties for tax administrators as well as a massive compliance burden and potential double taxation for athletes. International athletes’ unique characteristics necessitate a separate tax regime. Athletes are extremely mobile and transient taxpayers and are often among the most highly compensated individuals in the world. They can earn substantial sums of money during very short periods in a particular country. And athletes often have vast freedom to decide where to reside and where to perform. The implications of this broken tax system run very deep due to the increasing commercialization and popularity of professional sports around the globe.
The purpose of this Article is threefold. First, to compare how six significant countries - the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Brazil, and China - currently deal with the inherent problems of taxing extremely mobile, transient, high-income taxpayers with diverse income. Second, to illustrate that each country takes a very different - and often very convoluted - approach that has resulted in confusing, complex, and inconsistent regimes. And finally, to propose a solution that will benefit tax administrators and athletes alike. This Article presents a rough blueprint for a feasible regime that is simple, effective, efficient, and extremely beneficial for both tax administrators and athletes. Now the sports world will have to wait and see if any countries are willing to play ball.
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Ann Piccard et al., Another Crack in the Thin Skull Plaintiff Rule: Why Women with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder Who Suffer Physical Harm from Abusive Environments at Work or School Should Recover from Employers and Educators, 20 Tex. J. Women, Gender, & L. 165 (2011)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.