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Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Could Connecticut Be the First to Get Serious about Shareholders Rights Post-Citizens United? (2012)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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W. Scott Wright et al., Courting Independence: The Rise of Effective State Tax Courts and Tribunals, Tax Analysts: State Tax Notes 475 (2012)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Could the SEC Please Give Democracy a Hand? (2012)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Double Barrel Blast from Big Sky Country: Montana Rejects Citizens United (2012)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Rebecca Morgan, Development of Elder Law in the US, in Las Medidas Fiscales Como Instrumento de las Personas con Necesidades Especiales: Una Apuesta por las Medidas Juridicas Trasversales (Tirant lo Blanch, 2012)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Rebecca C. Morgan, Planning For Disability (2012)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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D. Benjamin Barros, Homestead and Other Legal Protections, in International Encyclopedia of Housing and Home (Susan J. Smith ed., Elsevier Science, 2012)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
In many legal contexts, homes are given more legal protection than other types of property. This additional protection can be divided into three categories. First, possessory rights in a home might be given more protection than possessory rights in another kind of property. For example, a legal system might make it more difficult for a creditor to force the sale a home to satisfy a debt than it would be for the creditor to force the sale of another type of property (say, a commercial office building) to satisfy that same debt. Second, a legal system might economically favor ownership or possession of a home over ownership or possession of another type of property. For example, ownership of a home might be subsidized where ownership of other types of property is not. Third, a home might be given special treatment when issues of privacy, freedom, or security are at stake. For example, a legal system might require the government to have a stronger justification for searching a home than is required for searching a commercial property.
This short encyclopedia entry focuses on the first category – those legal protections that give special protection to possessory rights in a home. It first elaborates on the distinction between rules favoring possession and the other two types of special legal protections given to homes. It then discusses various types of legal rules that give additional protection to possession of a home, including homestead rules favoring homeowners over creditors and tenure rules favoring renters over their landlords. Finally, it discusses theoretical issues related to the protection of possessory rights in homes, and considers open questions about whether this special protection is justified.
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Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, Projecting the Impact of Lanning and Ransom: Calculating “Projected Disposable Income” in Chapter 13 Repayment Plans, 29 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 59 (2012)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
This article considers the impact of two recent Supreme Court decisions regarding how a bankruptcy debtor calculates projected disposable income that must be dedicated to repayment of creditors in a chapter 13 case. Though the Supreme Court decisions seem consistent in that both reject a “formulaic” approach to that calculation, there are subtle inconsistencies that have caused confusion in applying these decisions. The article considers how these decisions impact the projected disposable income calculation in two different factual scenarios: (1) the debtor’s income or expenses terminate during the term of the plan, or (2) the debtor’s expenses remain the same but never reach the level of deductions contemplated by the United States Bankruptcy Code. Ultimately, the article concludes that the calculation of projected disposable income should focus on the debtor’s actual income and expenses in all situations.
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Susan D. Rozelle, The Story of Berry: When Hot Blood Cools, in Criminal Law Stories (Donna Coker ed., 2012)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Louis J. Virelli, Congress, the Constitution, and Supreme Court Recusal, 69 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1535 (2012)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
Recusal is one of the most hotly contested issues currently facing the Supreme Court. Within the wide-ranging debate over the Justices’ recusal practices, however, a singular theme has emerged: Congress must do more to protect the integrity and legitimacy of the Court by regulating the Justices’ recusal practices. Herein lies the problem. Rather than solve the puzzle of Supreme Court recusal, direct congressional regulation has created an impasse between Congress and the Court over recusal that has consequences for the reputation, efficacy, and legitimacy of both branches. In a precursor to this Article, I recast the issue of Supreme Court recusal as a constitutional question and argued that direct congressional regulation of Supreme Court recusal violates the separation of powers. This Article builds on that prior work and argues that separation of powers principles are critical to understanding and alleviating the inter-branch impasse over recusal. It contends that Congress, rather than the Court, should take the lead in resolving that impasse and that the separation of powers requires Congress to use indirect constitutional mechanisms to do so. Specifically, Congress should repeal the current statutory provision directly regulating Supreme Court recusal and focus instead on more indirect constitutional tools — such as impeachment, procedural reform, judicial confirmation, appropriations, and investigation — to influence the Justices’ recusal practices. This effort to frame the recusal debate within its proper constitutional context permits a more robust and productive dialogue about both the Justices’ recusal practices as well as the broader question of the nature and dynamics of inter-branch relations in our tripartite government.