My Legal Writing: Memos Book
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Kirsten K. Davis, My Legal Writing: Memos (2016)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Kirsten K. Davis, My Legal Writing: Memos (2016)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Shooting Your Brand in the Foot: What Citizens United Invites, 68 Rutgers U. L. Rev. 1295 (2016)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
Part of what makes corporate political spending so fraught is the how valuable brand identity is to the average firm, the heterogeneous political views of customers and shareholders, as well as the increasing political polarization of the many segments of the America public. This means that corporate political spending which associates a brand with one political party is likely to alienate customers or shareholders who feel strongly affiliated with the opposite political party. American consumers have a long tradition of boycotting goods or services for political reasons and American shareholders have a history of divesting to make a political point. Thus there is a nontrivial risk that customers and investors will vote with their dollars when they discover corporate political activity. Furthermore, the ability to boycott or divest has been given a technological boost with the advent of multiple smartphone applications that provide end-users with instantaneous data about the politics behind mass marketed brands. This technology empowers a consumer to buy goods that are more closely aligned with the consumer’s political views and for investors to do the same with stocks. Finally this piece explores how consumer groups and investors have both coordinated efforts to pressure firms to leave the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC). This type of orchestrated one-two punch could be the wave of the future for politically active firms.
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Kirsten K. Davis, Qualitative and Quantitative Research Methods and Rhetorical Theory in the “Third Generation”, in Scholarship: Who Are We Now? Legal Writing Scholarship in Today's Academy (July 1, 2016)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
This paper, written for an audience of law school faculty who teach and research legal communication topics, covers the basic differences between qualitative and quantitative research methods. It contextualizes rhetorical theory and rhetorical methods of inquiry, specifically rhetorical criticism, within the qualitative/quantitative structure. it suggests that the "third generation" of legal writing/legal communication scholarship is best developed by understanding the differences between theory and method, the differences between qualitative and quantitative research, and the place of rhetorical theory and method in the community's research practices.
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Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Slaves to the Bottom Line: The Corporate Role in Slavery from Nuremberg to Now, 46 Stetson L. Rev. 167 (2016)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
Evidence of the inadequacy of our current legal system in dealing with the corporate role in slavery can be found on the docket of the U.S. Supreme Court from 2015. Tucked in among the blockbuster cases about abortion, affirmative action, and political corruption in the 2015–2016 Supreme Court term was a little‐noticed certiorari petition from Nestlé U.S.A. asking, essentially, to be dismissed from a case that alleged the company had aided and abetted the slavery of children in Côte d’Ivoire. One of the troubling things about Nestlé U.S.A.’s asking to be let out of the suit was that its legal argument was not an outrageous request given recent Supreme Court cases that make it nearly impossible for human rights plaintiffs to bring successful suits against multinational corporations in U.S. courts.
This Article argues that, at a minimum, U.S. courts need to be reopened as proper fora for hearing civil human rights cases brought against multinational corporations that do significant business in the United States, regardless of where the harm occurred. The reason that American courts should be reopened is not just to give financial relief to victims, but also to change the calculus within corporations to make slave labor as financially unattractive as possible. But, further, this Article argues that we need to get back to the moral clarity of the Nuremberg trials of the industrialists and have the fortitude to actually prosecute corporate actors that knowingly perpetuate slavery.
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Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, A locked iPhone; Unlocked Corporate Constitutional Rights, 164 U. Pa. L. Rev. 287 (2016)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Will Bunting, Resolving Conflicts over Scarce Resources: Private versus Shared Ownership, 99 Marq. L. Rev. 893 (2016)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
This Article models private ownership as a conflict resolution mechanism and contends that for the Coase Theorem (as defined here) to be consistent, private ownership must yield the Pareto-optimal use of scarce resources among all feasible conflict resolution mechanisms. Conflict over a scarce resource may be better resolved, however, by eliminating the possibility of private ownership and “forcing” parties to share ownership of a contested scarce resource. A corollary to the Coase Theorem is introduced which states: In the absence of transaction costs, the distribution of private and shared ownership is efficient. Provided transaction costs are high and shared ownership is socially-optimal, a role for the courts is suggested wherein de facto shared ownership is established by rendering private property rights random or unclear — judicial behavior that stands in contrast to the normative implications of the Coase Theorem.
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Linda S. Anderson, Marriage, Monogamy, and Affairs: Reassessing Intimate Relationships in Light of Growing Acceptance of Consensual Non-Monogamy, 22 Wash. & Lee. J. C.R. & Soc. Just. 3 (2016)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Kirsten K. Davis, Rhetorical Criticism as Essential Legal Skill: Some Thoughts on Developing Lawyers as “Public Citizens”, 16 Communication Law Review 43 (2016)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct for lawyers, upon which nearly all fifty state supreme courts base their legal ethics codes, direct lawyers to pursue the public good in their role as "public citizen[s] with special responsibility for justice." Yet, the lawyer as a public citizen is undertheorized in the literature and is not the focus of legal education. And even if this role is deemed important, questions remain of what, exactly, is the lawyer's responsibility as a "public citizen" and what skills a lawyer should possess to fulfill this role.
This essay first describes how the Model Rules of Professional Conduct — the lawyer's ethical rules — rhetorically construct the public citizen role but offer little on how the lawyer should implement this role in her professional life. It then offers how others have attempted to put flesh on the bones of the "public citizen" role so as to have as complete a view as possible of what that role means for lawyers. It explains the generally well-accepted view that law schools have largely failed to teach skills and instill values related to lawyers' roles as public citizens. And, finally, it argues that teaching rhetorical criticism skills in law school can play a central part in giving lawyers the intellectual skills to perform their roles as fiduciaries of the rule of law and participatory democracy and to understand themselves as moral actors in the public sphere.
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Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Citizen?: An Argument for the Separation of Corporation and State (Carolina Academic Press, 2016)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Louis J. Virelli, Transparency and Policymaking at the Supreme Court, 32 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 903 (2016)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
Transparency is undoubtedly an important principle in a democratic government. It is not, however, necessarily a one-size-fits-all proposition. This holds true for issues of transparency at the Supreme Court. Whereas the Court’s traditional adjudicative responsibilities fit comfortably within norms of transparent decision making like publishing written opinions in merits cases, some of its other, more policy-oriented roles do not. This short paper considers two areas in which the Court’s activities more closely resemble policy judgments than traditional adjudication — certiorari and recusal — and uses them as examples of how the nature of the Court’s activity can impact the value of transparency in that activity. It does not seek to prove that transparency is per se less valuable in certiorari and recusal decisions, but rather to highlight the highly discretionary nature of those decisions and to propose that granting such a high degree of latitude to the Court also triggers some of the protections, like the deliberative process privilege, that are more commonly associated with policymaking by administrative agencies. The result is a call for a more context-based dialogue about transparency at the Court in hopes of promoting both our democratic values and the legitimacy of one of our most important institutions.