Toward a New Clean Water Act ArticleForthcoming
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Paul Boudreaux, Toward a New Clean Water Act, Georgetown Envtl. L. Review (2026)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Paul Boudreaux, Toward a New Clean Water Act, Georgetown Envtl. L. Review (2026)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Kristen R. Moore, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Legal Research, 39 The Second Draft (2026)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Paul Boudreaux, Congress and the Collapse of Environmental Law, Rutgers Law Journal (2026)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Kristen R. Moore and Angelina M. Vigliotti, Tribal Codes: A Legal Research Guide (William S. Hein & Co., 2026)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Robyn Powell, Holding Out for Love: Why Disabled People Can’t Say ‘I Do’, 61 Wake Forest L. Rev. 177 (2026)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
Ten years after Obergefell v. Hodges, marriage remains out of reach for millions of disabled people. While explicit bans on interracial and same-sex marriage have fallen, disabled people navigate a sophisticated web of discrimination that operates across legal, economic, institutional, and cultural domains. Guardianship laws strip away decision-making authority, benefit programs impose devastating marriage penalties that force impossible choices between love and survival, institutional policies prevent relationship formation, and cultural narratives render disabled people invisible as potential partners. These interlocking barriers make marriage effectively unattainable for many.
This Article charts a path forward through constitutional litigation, benefit reform, guardianship transformation, and cultural change—recognizing that piecemeal fixes cannot dismantle a system built to exclude. True marriage equality demands more than legal recognition on paper—it requires dismantling the obstacles that keep constitutional rights theoretical for millions of Americans. The systematic denial of marriage choice reflects deeper societal failures to recognize disabled people’s full humanity, autonomy, and citizenship. Constitutional promises of liberty and equality must extend beyond formal recognition to encompass the material conditions necessary for their meaningful exercise, and the systematic exclusion of disabled people from marriage represents a profound failure of these constitutional commitments that demands immediate and comprehensive redress.
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Andrew E. Mitchell et al., It’s Not the Plane, It’s the Pilot: Promoting a Practice-Ready AI Curriculum through Legal Research Instruction, J. Legal Educ. (2026)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Jaclyn Lopez, Conservation by Resurrection: The Endangered Species Act in an Era of Ecological Loss, Envtl. L. Reporter (2026)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
Endling. The word describes the last surviving member of a species before it goes extinct. It is a word Congress hoped would become obsolete with the passage of the Endangered Species Act. Enacted during a time of accelerating biodiversity loss, the Endangered Species Act reflects a deliberate congressional judgment that the destruction of species in the wild is a harm to America of a different magnitude – irreplaceable, intolerable, … irreversible. But now, emerging technologies coupled with a dismantling of the statute threaten to shift the Endangered Species Act’s precautionary approach to one of techno-optimism. Whereas in the past society might invoke traditional conservation interventions like captive breeding, reintroduction, and genetic rescue as last-ditch efforts to save a species from extinction, de-extinction technologies offer the promise of resurrecting species that have been lost to extinction. The concern is that society might increasingly rely upon future conservation interventions, be they tested or novel, in tolerating present harm to biodiversity. Such decision-making may enable wildlife management agencies to permit levels of harm that would otherwise jeopardize the continued existence of species, and thus be prohibited, on the unproven assumption that technology can later resurrect them.
This Article identifies this dynamic as “conservation by resurrection,” a form of decision-making that relies on speculative biological recovery of individual members of a species while sanctioning the degradation of the ecological conditions necessary for species survival. It draws on Endangered Species Act doctrine, administrative law, and the scientific framework of representation, resiliency, and redundancy (the 3Rs), which the Department of the Interior has converted into a policy framework for all its conservation decisions. The Article proposes a fourth R: “reversibility” as a conservation criterion requiring that a future conservation intervention must be demonstrably feasible, ecologically sufficient, timely, and reliable before agencies rely on it.
Reversibility draws a necessary line as society weighs the tradeoffs of racing toward or away from species extinctions. It insists that the promise of future conservation interventions cannot excuse present biodiversity or habitat loss unless that intervention produces real and sufficient conservation benefits. It forces society to confront not whether we might someday bring species back, but whether we are willing to let them disappear in the first place.
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Stacey-Rae Simcox and Mark Matthews, Drug & Alcohol Discharges, in Military Discharge Upgrade Legal Practice Manual (Margaret Kuzma et al. eds., 2nd ed., 2026)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, The ABCs of the UCC Article 9: Secured Transactions (4th ed., American Bar Association, 2026)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
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Katherine E. Donoghue, Navigating a New Frontier with a Familiar Compass: Applying Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine to Generative Artificial Intelligence, 79 Rutgers U. L. Rev. (2026)Clicking on the button will copy the full recommended citation.
The vast availability of generative artificial intelligence has created a fundamental question at the intersection between emerging technology and privilege doctrine: does a litigant waive attorney-client privilege or work-product protection by using generative artificial intelligence to analyze legal issues or develop case strategy when such action is taken with the intent of communicating the results to an attorney or using the results during litigation? The question moved from hypothetical to actual in United States v. Heppner, the first reported decision to conclude that such computer-generated communications are unprotected under both doctrines.
This Article challenges the reasoning underlying Heppner, proposes alternative results based on existing privilege doctrines, and warns courts not to treat generative artificial intelligence as though it were a human recipient rather than what it actually is—a computer-based tool. To be clear, this Article does not argue for a blanket artificial intelligence privilege. Rather, drawing on the historical development of the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine, as well as a century of jurisprudence adapting confidentiality and privacy principles to technological advancements, this Article contends that a party's communications with a generative artificial intelligence tool should not automatically forfeit the confidentiality protections that underlie the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine.
Central to this analysis is the United States Supreme Court's June 2026 decision in Chatrie v. United States, which significantly expands modern privacy jurisprudence in the context of evolving technology and personal data held by third-parties. This Article is at the forefront of examining how Chatrie's privacy reasoning informs the application of attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine to generative artificial intelligence, demonstrating the same principles that support reasonable expectations of privacy in location-tracking technologies held by third-parties—namely, the "revealing nature" of such data and the fact that such data is not "truly shared" with another person as that term is traditionally understood—likewise support preserving confidentiality when litigants use generative artificial intelligence to do legal analysis in preparation of speaking with an attorney or in anticipation of litigation.