This Article examines the causation requirement of Article III standing in modern data breach litigation. It argues that federal courts have systematically diluted constitutional limits on judicial power by presuming traceability where none exists. While data breaches are ubiquitous and alarming, the Article contends that the mere occurrence of a breach--and even an injury--should not itself establish a justiciable case or controversy. Drawing on foundational separation-of-powers principles, the Article situates the standing doctrine as an essential mechanism of judicial self-restraint--one that prevents courts from reflexively adjudicating societal fears untethered from any fair attribution to the defendant before the court.
Building on Supreme Court standing jurisprudence--from Simon and Warth to Lujan and Clapper--the Article demonstrates that causation is the most underenforced and yet most constitutionally significant element of standing in data breach cases. It argues that lower courts have improperly collapsed traceability into injury or risk--often attributing harm to hacked companies despite the presence of independent criminal actors, intervening mitigation measures, prior breaches, and widespread data exposure. Through an analysis of circuit-level decisions, the Article also identifies an emerging split in how courts assess causation and criticizes the prevailing majority approach for relying on inference-stacking and temporal proximity-rather than the "fairly traceable" standard required by Article III.
Ultimately, the Article contends that causation is not a mere technical pleading hurdle. Instead, traceability presents a substantive constitutional safeguard that prevents the judiciary from doubly victimizing the countless entities already harmed by criminal cyberattacks. By reinvigorating causation analysis at the threshold stage, courts can preserve the separation of powers, reduce unwarranted class-action litigation, and ensure that federal jurisdiction remains confined to disputes involving injuries directly attributable to defendants before the court. In an era of pervasive technological risk, the Article warns that abandoning causation in the name of deterrence or fear threatens not only fairness to litigants but also the constitutional limits that give judicial authority its legitimacy.
